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have forbore to enter into any detail on their account; but in order to avoid any details prejudicial to the great object which the King has in view, and to accelerate the work of a general peace, his Majefty will not refufe to explain himself in the first inftance on the points which concern thofe powers. If, then, the Catholic King fhould defire to be comprehended in this negotiation, or to be allowed to accede to the definitive treaty, this would meet with no obstacle on the part of his Majefty. Nothing having been conquered by either of the two Sovereigns from the other, no other point could, at the prefent moment, come into the question but that of the reestablishment of peace, fimply, and without any restitution or compensation whatever, except fuch as might poffibly refult from the application of the principle declared at the end of the fourth article of the memorial, already delivered to the Minuter for Foreign Affairs.

But if, during the negotiation, any alteration fhall take place in the fate of things in this refpect, it will then be proper to agree upon the reftitutions and compenfations to be made on each fide. With regard to the Republic of the United Provinces, his Britannic Majef ty, and his allies, find themselves too nearly interested in the political fituation of thofe provinces to be able to confent in their favour to the re-cftablishment of the ftatus ante bellum, as with refpect to territorial poffeffions; unless France could, on her part, reinftate them in all refpects in the fame political fituation in which they stood before the war. If at least it were poffible to re-establish in thofe provinces, agreeably to what is believed to be the with of a great majo rity of the inhabitants, their ancient conftitution and form of government, his Majefty might then be difpofed to relax, in their favour, from a very confiderable part of the conditions on which the prefent ftate of things obliges him to infift. But if, on the contrary, it is with the Republic of Holland, in its present state, that their Britannic and Imperial Majefties will have to treat, they will feel themfelves obliged to feek, in territorial acquifitions, thofe compenfations, and that fecurity, which fuch a state of things will have rendered indifpenfible to them. Reftitutions of any kind, in favour of Holland, could in that cafe be admitted in fo far only as they fhall be compenfated by arrangements calculated to conVOL. LIX.

tribute to the fecurity of the Austrian Netherlands. The means of accomplishing this object will be found in the ceffions which France has exacted in her treaty of peace with Holland, and the poffeffion of which, by that power, would in any cafe be abfolutely incompatible with the fecurity of the Auftrian Netherlands in the hands of his Imperial Majefty.

It is on thefe principles that his Britannic Majetty would be ready to treat for the re-enablishment of peace with the Republic of Holland in its prefent ftate. The details of fuch a difcuffion must neceffarily lead to the confideretion of what would be due to the intereft and the rights of the House of Orange.

MY LORD,

Paris, Dec. 20.

Mr Ellis returned here from London on Thursday laft, the 15th inftant, at five P. M. and delivered to me the dispatches with which he was charged by your Lordship.

Although nothing can be clearer, more ally drawn up, or more fatisfactory than the inftructions they contain, yet as it was of the laft importance that I should be completely mafter of the subject before I saw the French Minifter, I delayed afking for a conference till late on Friday evening, with a view that it should not take place till Saturday morning.

He appointed the hour of feven A. M. on that day, and it was near one before we parted. Although what is faid by M. Delacroix before he has communicated with the Directory cannot be con fidered as officially binding, and proba. bly may, in the event, be very different from what I may hear when he speaks to me in their name, yet as it is impoffible they should not nearly conjecture the nature of the overtures I should make, and of courfe be prepared in fome degree for them, it is material that your Lordship fhould be accurately acquainted with the first impreffions they appear to make on M. Delacroix,

I prefaced what I had to communicate with' faying, that I now came authorised to enter into deliberation upon one of the most important subjects that perhaps ever was brought into difcuffion; that its magnitude forbade all fineffe, excluded all prevarication, fufpended all prejudices; and that as I had it in command to speak and act with freedom and truth; I expected that he, on his part, would confider these as the only means which 6 F

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could or ought to be employed, if he wished to fee a negotiation, in which the happiness of millions were involved, terminate fuccefsfully: That, for greater precifion, and with a view to be clearly understood in what he was about to propofe, I would give him a confidential memorial, accompanied by an official note, both which, when he had perufed them, would speak for themselves. The memorial contained the conditions, on the accomplishment of which his Majef ty confidered the restoration of peace to depend. The note was expreflive of his Majefty's readiness to enter into any explanation required by the Directory on the fubject, orto receive any contre-projet, refting on the fame bafis, which the Directory might be difpofed to give it That, moreover, I did not hesitate declaring to him, în conformity to the negotiation, that I was prepared to anfwer any questions,explain and elucidate any points, on which it was poffible to forefee that doubts or mifconceptions could arife on the confideration of these papers. And having faid thus much, I had only to remark, that I believed, in no fimilar negotiation which had ever taken place, any Minifter was authorized, in the first inftance, to go fo fully into the difcuffion as I now was: That I was fure neither the truth of this remark, nor the manifeft conclufion to be drawn from it, would escape M. Dela'croix's obfervation.

I then put the two papers into his hands: He began by reading the note, on which of courfe he began to exprefs fatisfaction. After perufing the confidential memorial with all the attention it deserved, he, after a fhort paufe, faid, that it appeared to him to be liable to infurmountable objections; that it feemed to him to require much more than it conceded, and, in the event, not to leave France in a fituation of proportional greatnefs to the Powers of Europe. He faid, the Act of their Conftitution, according to the manner in which it was interpreted by the beft Publicifts (and this phrafe is worthy remark) made it impoffible for the Republic to do what we required. The Auftrian Netherlands were annexed to it; they could not be difpofed of without flinging the nation into all the confufion which muft follow a convocation of the Primary Affemblies; and he faid, he was rather furprif ed that Great Britain should bring this

forward as the governing condition of the treaty, fince he thought he had, in fome of our late converfations, fully explained the nature of their Constitution to me. I replied, that every thing I had heard from him on this point was perfectly in my recollection, as it probably was in his, that though I had liftened to him with that attention I always afforded to every thing he faid, yet I had never made him any fort of reply, and had neither admitted nor controverted his opinion: That although I believed I could easily difprove this opinion from the fpirit of the French conflitution itfelf; yet the difcuffion of that conftitution was perfectly foreign to the object of my miffion; fince, even allowing his two pofitions, viz. that the retroceffion of the Auftrian Netherlands was incompatible with their laws, and that we ought to have known that beforehand; yet that there existed`a droit public in Europe, paramount to any droit public they might think proper to eftablish within their own dominions; and that if their conftitution was publicly known, the treaties exifting between his Majefty and the Emperor were at leaft equally public, and in these it was clearly and diftinctly announced, that the two contracting parties reciprocally promife not to lay down their arms with out the reftitution of all the dominions, territories, &c. which may have belonged to either of them before the war. That the date of this ftipulation was previous to their annexing the Auftrian Netherlands to France; and the notoriety of this ought at the very moment when they had paffed that law, to have convinced them, that, if adhered to, it must prove an infurmountable obftacle to peace. I applied his maxim to the Weft India Islands, and to the settlements in the Eaft Indies; and asked him, Whether it was expected that we were to wave our right of poffeffion, and be required still to confider them as integral parts of the French Republic which must be restored, and on which no value was to be fet in the balance of compensation ?

I alfo ftated the poffible case of France having loft part of what the deemed her integral dominions, inftead of having added to them in the courfe of the war, and whether then, under the apprehenfion of still greater loffes, the Government, as it was now compofed, fhould confider

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itself as not vefted with powers fufficient to fave their country from the impend ing danger, by making peace on the conditions of facrificing a portion of their dominions to fave the remainder? M. Delacroix faid, this was stating a cafe of neceffity, and fuch a mode of reafoning did not attach to the prefent circumftances. I readily admitted the firft part of this propofition, but contended, that if the power existed in a cafe of neceffity, it equally exifted in all others, and particularly in the cafe before us; fince he himself had repeatedly told me, that peace was what this country and its Government wished for, and even wanted.

M. Delacroix, in reply, shifted his ground, and by a ftring of arguments, founded on premiffes calculated for this purpose, attempted to prove, that, from the relative fituation of the adjacent countries, the prefent Government of France would be reprehenfible in the extreme, and deferve impeachment, if they ever permitted the Netherlands to be feparated from their dominions; that by the partition of Poland, Ruffia, Auftria, and Pruffia had increased their power to a moft formidable degree; that England, by its conquefts, and by the activity and judgement with which it governed its colonies, had doubled its ftrength.

Your Indian empire alone, faid M Delacroix with vehemence, has enabled you to fubfidize all the Powers of Europe against us, and your monopoly of trade has put you in poffeffion of a fund of inexhauftible wealth. His words were, “Votre empire dans l'Inde vous a fourni les Moyens de falarir toutes les Puiffances contre nous, et vous avez accapare le commerce de maniere que toutes les richeffes du monde fe verfent dans vos coffres."

terous doctrine; I contented myfelf with reminding him of what he had faid to me in one of our laft conférences, when he made a comparison of the weakness of France under its Monarchs, and its ftrength and vigour under its Republican form of government. "Nous né fommes plus dane la decrepitude de la France Monarchique, mais dans toute la force d'une Republique adolescente†," was his expreffion; and I inferred from this, according to his own reasoning, that the force and power, France had acquired by its change of government, was much greater than it could derive from any acquifition of territory; and that it followed, if France when under a regal form of government was a very just and conftant object of attention, not to say of jealoufy, to the other powers of Europe, France (admitting her axiom) was a much more reasonable object of jealoufy and attention under its prefent conftitution, than it ever had yet been, and that no addition to its dominions could be seen by its neighbours but under impreffions of alarm for their own future fafety, and for the general tranquillity of Europe. M. Delacroix's anfwer to this was fo remarkable, that I muft beg leave to infert it in what I believe to be nearly his own words :"Dans le tems revolutionaire tout ce que vous dites, my Lord, etoit vrairien n'egaloit notre puiffance; mais ce tems n'existe plus. Nous ne pouvons plus lever la nation en maffe pour voler au fecours de la patrie en dangert Nous ne pouvons plus engager nos concitoyens d'ouvrir leurs bourfes pour les verser dans le trefor national, et de se priver meme du neceffaire pour le bien de la, chofe publiquet." And he ended by faying, that the French Republic, when at peace, neceffarily muft become the most quiet and pacific power in Europe. I only observed, that in this cafe the paffage of the Republic from youth to

We are no longer in the dotage of the French Monarchy, but in all the vigour of a young republic.

From the neceffity that France fhould keep the Netherlands and the left bank of the Rhine, for the purpose of preserving its relative fituation in Europe, he paffed to the advantages which he contended would result to the other powers by fuch an addition to the French do- During the Revolution, my Lord, all minions. Belgium (to ufe his word), that you fay was true; nothing could equal by belonging to France, would remove our power. But that time is now over. We what had been the fource of all wars for can no longer raise the nation in a body to two centuries paft; and the Rhine be- defend their country, though in danger; we ing the natural boundary of France, can no longer perfuade our fellow citizens would enfure the tranquillity of Europe to open their purfes to pour them into the for two centuries to come. I did not national treasury, or deprive themfelves of feel it neceffary to combate this prepof the neceffaries of life for the public good.

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decrepitude had been very fudden; but that till I never could admit that it could be matter of indifference to its neighbours, much less a neceffary security to itself, to acquire fuch a very extenfive addition to its frontiers as that he had hinted at.

This led M. Delacroix to talk of of fering an equivalent to the Emperor for the Auftrian Netherlands; and it was to be found, according to his plan, in the fecularization of the three Ecclefiaftical Electorates, and feveral Bithoprics in Germany and in Italy.

He talked upon this fubject as one very familiar to him, and on which his thoughts had been frequently employed. He fpoke of making new Electors, and named, probably with a view to render his scheme more palatable, the Stadtholder, and the Dukes of Brunswick and Wurtemberg as persons proper to replace the three Ecclefiaftical Electors which were to be reformed.

'ceffarily become fubject matter for ne gociation, and be balanced against each other in the final arrangement of a ge neral peace. “You then perfift," faid M. Delacroix, "in applying this principle to Belgium?" I answered, "Moft certainly; and I fhould not deal fairly with you if I hefitated to declare, in the outfet of our negotiation, that on this point you must entertain no expec tation that his Majefty will relax, or ever confent to fee the Netherlands remain a part of France."

M. Delacroix replied, he faw no prof. pect in this cafe of our ideas ever meet ing, and he defpaired of the fuccefs of our negociation. He returned again, however, to his idea of a poffible equi valent to be found for the Emperor; but as all he proposed was the alienation or difmemberment of countries not belonging to France, even by conqueft, I did not confider it as deserving attention, and it is certainly not worth repeating to your Lordship.

I need not obferve that all the equivalents propofed, however inadequate to the exchange, were offered as a return for our confent that the Netherlands fhould remain part of France; of course the admitting them in any shape would have been in direct contradiction to my instructions.

M. Delacroix touched very slightly on Italy, and the courfe of our converfation did not bring this part of the fubject more into difcuffion.

It would be making an ill ufe of your Lordship's time to endeavour to repeat to you all he faid on this fubject; it went in fubftance (as he himfelf confef fed) to the total fubverfion of the prefent conftitution of the Germanic Body; and as it militated directly against the principle which both his Majefty and the Emperor laid down fo diftinctly as the bafis of the peace to be made for the Empire, I contented myself with reminding him of this circumftance, particularly as it is impoffible to difcufe this point with any propriety till his Imperi- I muft add, that whenever I mentional Majefty becomes a party to the need the restoration of the Netherlands to gociation. I took this opportunity of the Emperor, I always took care it hinting, that if, on all the other points, should be understood that these were to France agreed to the propofals now be accompanied by fuch further ceffions made, it would not be impoffible that as fhould form a competent line of defome increase of territory might be ced- fence, and that France could not be pered to her on the Germanic fide of her mitted to keep poffeffion of all the infrontiers, and that this, in addition to termediate country to the Rhine; and I the Duchy of Savoy, Nice, and Avignon, particularly dwelt on this point, when would be a very great acquifition of I held out the poffibility of admitting an ftrength and power. M. Delacroix here extenfion of the limits of France on the again reverted to the conftitution, and fide of Germany. But as the French faid, that thefe countries were already Minifter no lefs ftrenuously opposed the conftitutionally annexed to France. I reftitution of the Netherlands to the replied, that it was impoffible, in the Emperor, than I tenaciously infifted upnegociation which we were beginning, on it, the further extenfion of my claim for the other powers to take it up from could not of course become a subject of any period but that which immediately argument. preceded the war, and that any acquifition or diminution of territory, which had taken place among the belligerent powers fince it first broke out, muft ne

I believe I have now, with a tolerable degree of accuracy, informed your Lordfhip of all that the French Minister said on my opening myself to him on that

part

part of my inftruction's which more im- however, appear quite impoffible that mediately relates to peace between this point might be fettled without much Great Britain, his Imperial Majefly, and difficulty; and that means might be deFrance. It remains with me to inform vifed that his Catholic Majelly thould your Lordship what paffed between us not break his faith, and both England on the fubject of our refpective allies. and France be equally fatisfied. I then held out to him, but in general terms, that either Spain might regain her part of St Domingo, by making fome confiderable cellion to Great Britain and France, as the price of peace, or that, in return for leaving the whole of St Domingo to France, we fhould retain either Martinico, or St Lucia and Tobago. M. Delacroix liftened with a degree of attention to these propofals, but he was fearful of committing himself by any expreffion of approbation, and he difmiffed the fubject of the Court of Madrid by obferving, that France never would forfake the interefts of its allies.

On the articles referving a right to the Court of St Petersburgh, and to that of Lisbon, to accede to the treaty of peace on the strict status ante bellum, the French Minifter made no other remark than mentioning the allies of the Republic, and by enquiring whether I was prepared to say any thing relative to their interefts, which certainly the Republic could never abandon. This afforded me the opportunity of giving in the confidential memorial B. relative to Spain and Holland, and I prefaced it by repeating to him the fubftance of the firft part of your Lordship's No 12.

Although I had touched upon the Spanish part of St Domingo, when I had been speaking to M. Delacroix on the peace with France, yet, as it did not become a matter of difcuffion between us till I came to mention the peace with Spain, I thought it better to place all that paffed on the fubject in this part of my dispatch; it was the only point on which he entered, but I by no means infer, from his not bringing forward fome claims for Spain, that we are not to hear of any in the course of the nego tiation; on the contrary I have little doubt that many, and most of them inadmiffible, will be made before it can be ended. He, however, was filent on them at this moment, and confined all, that he had to say to combating the idea that Spain was bound by the treaty of Utrecht, not to alienate her poffeffions in America. I had the article copied in my pocket, and I read it to him. He confeffed it was clear and explicit, but that circumftances had so materially altered fince the year 1714, that engagements made then ought not to be confidered as in force now. I faid that the fpirit of the article itself went to provide for diftant contingencies, not for what was expected to happen at or near the time when the treaty was made, and that it was because the alteration of circumftances he alluded to as poffible that the claufe was inferted; and that if Spain paid any regard to the faith of treaties, the muft confider herself as no lefs ftrictly bound by this claufe now, than at the moment it was drawn up.

I went on by faying, that it did not,

Our converfation on thofe of its other ally, Holland, was much longer, as the wording of the memorial inevitably led at once deep into the subject.

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M. Delacroix affected to treat any viation from the treaty of peace concluded between France and that country, or any restoration of territories acquired, under that treaty, to France, as quite impracticable. He treated as equally impracticable any attempt at reftoring the ancient form of government in the Seven United Provinces. He talked with an air of triumph of the eftablifhment of a National Convention at the Hague, and with an affectation of feeling, that by it the cause of freedom had extended itself over fuch a large number of people. He, however, was ready to confefs, that from the great loffes the Dutch Republic had fuftained in its colonies, and particularly from the weak manner in which they had defended them, it could not be expected that his Majesty would consent to a full and complete reftitution of them, and that it was reafonable that fome fhould be facrificed; and he asked me if I could inform him how far our views extended on this point?—I said I had reafon to believe that what his Majefty would require, would be poffeffions and fettlements which would not add either to the power or wealth of our Indian dominions, but only tend to fecure to us their fafe and unmolefted poffeffion. You mean by this, faid M. Delacroix, the Cape and Trincomale? I faid, they certainly came under that defcription; and I faw little profpect of their being

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