dismiss him, if, after hearing his arguments, they continue to entertain views essentially different from those which he is disposed to advocate.

VII.

Equal Electoral Districts.—In all the American States the representation is based on the population. There are no little towns called boroughs, sending as many members as cities ten times as large, but equal electoral districts are established throughout the whole Union ; that is to say, so many representatives are allotted for so many people. This principle, which is so glaringly violated in England, is too obviously correct for us to undertake its defence.

In England, a trumpery village town sends as many representatives as Manchester, Edinburgh, or Dublin; and the consequence is, that the landed aristocracy, who control the voters of the petty boroughs, do not care a straw about the voice of the great cities, which is drowned by the clamour of aristocratic nominees in the house of commons, called representatives Indeed the so-called representation of the people of England, is a mere pretence, the only class really represented being the great landowners.

VIII.

Property Qualification for Members.-With respect to the absence of a property qualification for representatives in the American republics, but little need be said. In England and Ireland, a large property qualification is required (£600 per annum for the member of a county, £300 per annum for a borough member), because the institutions are designed to secure class legislation—i. e. law-making and government for the aggrandisement of aristocrats. The eldest sons of peers and members for the English universities require no property qualification. We are aware that many of those who favour this system have reasoned themselves into the belief that it is all for the benefit of the people.

It was a favourite argument with Burke, and is a favourite argument with the champions of aristocracy, that it is necessary to sustain a pampered class by legislative enactments, and that the people ought to feel very grateful to that class. Suppose, say these reasoners, all the rich were deprived of their food, the poor man would not get half an ounce more meat than he now gets. But that is not the question: it is not how much the aristocracy eat, but what are the consequences, political, social, and moral, of their monopoly of the land, of legislation, government patronage, and all the power of the State?

The argument in question assumes that it is a matter of perfect indifference to the welfare of a community what system of land tenure may prevail, and that it is utterly unimportant whether the institutions of a country are despotic, aristocratic, or founded on the popular will. On

the contrary, it appears to us that these are all questions of paramount importance; and we find that all people who govern themselves are high-spirited, intelligent, moral, and prosperous, whilst those who are deprived of the first right of humanity, self-government, and governed by a set of men by fraud and force, are to a great extent grovelling, immoral, ignorant, wretched, and degenerate.

In a democracy, the representative is not required to be a man of property, because it is not designed that the legislation of the country shall be effected for the especial benefit of the property-owning class. It is only required that the representative shall be a citizen of mature age, in whom the electors have chosen to place their confidence.

When this principle was violated by the framers of some of the early American constitutions, democracy was not so thoroughly understood as it is now. But we have seen that the violation was only a nominal one, the qualification being very small in amount. It was a heedless imitation of the example set by the mother country.

There is no better reason for a law requiring a representative to be a man of property than there would be for requiring an admiral or a judge to own so many acres of land, or an attorney or physician to have fixed property producing a specified income.

IX.

Voting by Ballot.-This is the most convenient mode of voting, especially when a large number of officers are elected at the same time. It is almost universally adopted in the several Republics, but in Virginia and Kentucky, and perhaps in one or two other States, the ballotting system is not used.

In England it is contended that the voting ought to be open, because the non-electors have a right to know how the electors exercise the franchise. This is a fallacy: no such right is claimed or recognised. The true reason for objecting to secret voting in England is that it would seriously diminish the influence of the landed aristocracy, who now control most of the electors. These aristocrats want to retain a check upon the voters, by retaining the means of ascertaining for whom they vote. It is important to have the vote by ballot in the present condition of society in Great Britain and Ireland, to prevent the employers in the rural districts from assuming to control the votes of the labourers. The practice of voting by ballot tends to make the elections peaceful: there is no squabbling at the poll-booth, and the man who casts an unpopular vote is not hooted at by the crowd.

In many of the States there is a political party called the liberty party, the members of which refuse to cast their votes for either Whigs or Democrats, preferring to testify their support of candidates who are determined to make opposition to slavery the cardinal point. These

men know that their candidates cannot succeed, but also know that the moral influence of their protest will be great at some future time. Now many of these men would be too timid in some districts to encounter the jeers and scoffs of the populace, which they would have to submit to if the voting were not by ballot. Secret voting can in no case produce mischief, but may and does in thousands of cases protect the voter from undue influence. When the franchise is limited, and the system of society is aristocratic, then voting by ballot is necessary, to protect the voter from the coercion of his superiors; when the suffrage is universal, voting by ballot is useful, to prevent the voter from being too much influenced by the current of popular opinion in the district in which he happens to reside.

X.

Remuneration of Representatives.—In all the States the representatives of the people in congress and in the State legislatures are paid for their services. All governors and other officers are likewise paid. This is an important feature in the theory of democratic government.

In England the members of parliament are not paid for their services. In ancient times the members of the house of commons were paid by their constituents, but now the lords and commons legislate gratuitously; and a member of the house of commons usually has to expend large sums of money to defray the expences of his election. Each party employs lawyers to attend the registration courts, where hundreds of knotty questions of law and fact have to be disposed of every year in making out the list of voters. Here is another evil consequence of the present limited franchise. The battles fought in the registration courts require large supplies of the sinews of war, and each political party is usually compelled to select a candidate who can and will subscribe handsomely towards the expenses of the party in the registration courts, and at the election. All this has the tendency desired by the aristocratic party, namely, the exclusion of mere men of talent in favour of men of money. In England one must belong to the independently wealthy classes in order to be qualified to represent the people, for in addition to the direct qualification required by law (which does not apply to Scotland), the member must give up his time, must live in an expensive style in London, and, in addition to all that, must in most instances pay hundreds of pounds towards the expenses of the party to which he belongs, or his patron, friends, or relatives must pay for him.

Looking, then, at the English electoral system, at the law requiring the member to be a man of large property, and to render his services gratuitously, and regarding also the social position of the member of parliament and the enormous expenses attendant upon the registration of voters and the election, we need not be surprised at the absence of

men of talent from the house of commons, and the eternal presence there of arrogance and aristocratic insolence, with corresponding shallowness and stupidity.

In a democracy, the representatives of the people are paid for their services, because it is desired to get men of talent to serve the country, irrespective of the question, whether they are rich or poor. The democrat would as soon think of having unpaid generals and judges as unpaid representatives. The unpaid representative or officer is inefficient and comparatively negligent: no reliance can be placed upon him. Besides, he expects a quid pro quo in some shape or other-the disposal of patronage or the exercise of power, not as the servant, but as the master of the people.

The Americans regard all public functionaries as their servants, and they ought to be so regarded. Care is taken that the functionary shall not have too long a lease of power, nor too large a remuneration. He is thus prevented from becoming haughty and overbearing. The contrast between the behaviour of an English official and an American is very remarkable: the former is haughty towards his inferiors, and servile to his superiors, whilst the American is civil and courteous in his behaviour to all alike. The English unpaid justice of the peace lords it over the suitors, prosecutors, and witnesses; the American paid justice of the peace treats all around him with perfect familiarity, and is himself treated with proper respect.

The principal features of the American electoral system have recently been adopted by several of the most important nations on the continent of Europe in all their integrity. France has imported the American electoral system entire and unalloyed; and Germany and Italy have not fallen far short of the glorious example of the United States. Holland has just adopted a constitution with a broad electoral basis. The representatives are not required to possess any property qualification, but are paid for their services, and one-third of their number is chosen every year. After considerable discussion, universal suffrage was preferred to household suffrage by the German convention at Frankfort; and the same result will follow a calm and dispassionate discussion everywhere else. Under the American electoral system, the voters are not personally solicited by the candidates for their votes. The candidates are nominated at meetings of their respective parties, and tickets are printed with their names upon them, for the voters to deposit at the polls. The candidates address the people at public meetings, but do not go round, as English candidates do, and ask each elector for his vote and interest. More seemly too than the proceedings of the house of commons are those of the American legislatures. The house of commons can hardly be called a deliberative assembly. It is not the practice with many to listen to the speeches, which, moreover, being addressed to an impatient

auditory assembled at night to vote upon and decide questions, not to discuss them, are generally of the most contemptible description as specimens of logic, although some of them may pass muster as specimens of oratory. The members are seen lying stretched at full length on the benches fast asleep. The man of the people cannot obtain a hearing; when advocating the principles of democracy, he will be hooted down by the aristocracy and their minions. It is true that actual personal encounters do not take place on the floor of the house, as they have done two or three times in the far Western States, but challenges have not infrequently been delivered and accepted in the house of commons. The language of the speakers may be less offensively personal than is sometimes heard in the legislative assemblies of the Southern and far Western States, but this does not compensate for the general unstatesmanlike behaviour of the house of commons, and the practical exclusion of liberal sentiments, and of calm and deliberate discussion on most important occasions.

In the American legislatures the members assemble in the day-time for the transaction of business; each member is provided with a desk, pens, ink, and paper; the discussion is quiet and orderly, uninterrupted by those cries and noises which characterise the English house of commons, and entitle it to its nick-name, "the bear-garden."