The Nature of Truth: An EssayClarendon Press, 1906 - 182 Seiten |
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Häufige Begriffe und Wortgruppen
¹ Cf A's error absolute abstract actual adequate affirmed angles appercipient character apprehension Aristotle assumption Attributes coherence-notion of truth complete conceive conception concrete thinking consciousness constitute corre correspondence correspondence-notion criticism Descartes discordance distinction endeavour essential nature eternal Ethics Euclidean Space expression F. H. Bradley fact factor false finite experience formulation G. E. Moore God's human knowledge idea ideal experience identity immediate independent individual infinite inner intuition involves isolated judge judgement of perception judgement of science logical logical assertion manifest mediate ment mental Metaphysics modal modes Monad monistic natura naturata negative element notion object partial philosophy Plato possessed precisely problem propositions psychical existents real counterpart reality recognized relation riences scientific mind self-fulfilment sensation sense sentient side significant whole single judgement Spinoza Spinoza's structure Subjective Idealism Substance system of judgements systematic coherence Theaetetus theory of truth things thought timeless tion true unity universal judgement
Beliebte Passagen
Seite 37 - It may be said — and this is, I believe, the correct view — that there is no problem at all in truth and falsehood ; that some propositions are true and some false, just as some roses are red and some white...
Seite 175 - And since all human discursive knowledge remains thought ' about ' an Other, any and every theory of the nature of truth must itself be ' about ' truth as its Other ; ie, the CoherenceNotion of truth on its own admission can never rise above the level of knowledge which at the best attains to the truth of correspondence.
Seite 47 - I conclude, then, that the relation affirmed between A and B in the proposition "A differs from B," is the general relation of difference, and is precisely and numerically the same as the relation affirmed between C and D, in "C differs from D.
Seite 52 - ... that truth and falsehood apply not to beliefs, but to their objects ; and that the object of a thought, even when this object does not exist, has a Being which is in no way dependent upon its being an object of thought : all these are theses which, though generally rejected, can nevertheless be supported by arguments which deserve at least a refutation.
Seite 79 - Now there can be one and only one such experience : or only one significant whole, the significance of which is self-contained in the sense required. For it is absolute self-fulfilment, absolutely self-contained significance, that is postulated ; and nothing short of absolute individuality — nothing short of the completely whole experience — can satisfy this postulate. And human knowledge — not merely my knowledge or yours, but the best and fullest knowledge in the world at any stage of its...
Seite 82 - In our view it is the Ideal which is solid and substantial and fully , actual. The finite experiences are rooted in the Ideal. They share its actuality, and draw from it whatever' being and conceivability they possess.
Seite 129 - The angles at the base of an isosceles triangle are equal to one another; and if the equal sides be produced, the angles -upon the other side of the base shall be equal.
Seite 37 - and ' Falsity ', in the only strict sense of the terms, are characteristics of ' Propositions '. Every Proposition, in itself and in entire independence of mind, is true or false ; and only Propositions can be true or false. The truth or falsity of a Proposition is, so to say, its flavour, which we must recognize, if we recognize it at all, immediately : much as we appreciate the flavour of pineapple or the taste of...
Seite 87 - RELATIVE' TRUTH. BY HAROLD H. JOACHIM. § 1. THE view, which I wish to attack, may be put roughly as follows : Every judgment is either true or false, and what is true is true always and absolutely and completely.
Seite 77 - ... are materials, which retain no inner privacy for themselves in independence of the form. They hold their distinctive being in and through, and not in sheer defiance of, their identical form ; and its » identity is the concrete sameness of different materials.
Verweise auf dieses Buch
Action as History: The Historical Thought of R.G. Collingwood Stein Helgeby Eingeschränkte Leseprobe - 2004 |