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engage it from the ambiguithis account that I have me late writers, in distinpowers which were formerstanding and to the Will, by ctual, and the latter active. The ce were long ago proposed for Hobbes; but they never appear to neral use, and are indeed liable to ob

been owing to the very comprehensive ved in philosophical treatises to the word that the use of it has so frequently been late by intellect. The two words, as they aly employed, seem to be very nearly, if not Synonymous: and the latter possesses the ad

being quite unequivocal, having never acquirLatitude of application of which the former adThe adjective intellectual, indeed, has had its ng extended as far as the substantive understandbut, as it can be easily dispensed with in our parar arguments, it may, without inconvenience, be opted as a distinctive epithet, where nothing is aimed but to mark, in simple and concise language, a very eneral and obvious classification. The word intellect can be of no essential use whatever, if the ambiguity in the signification of the good old English word understanding be avoided; and as to intellection, which a late very acute writer* has attempted to introduce, I can see no advantage attending it, which at all compensates for the addition of a new and uncouth term to a phraseology which, even in its most simple and unaffected form, is so apt to revolt the generality of readers.

The only other indefinite word which I shall take notice of in these introductory remarks, is judgment; and, in doing so, I shall contine myself to such of its ambiguities as are more peculiarly connected with our presCutubject. In some cases, its meaning seems to ap

that of understanding; as in the nearly synon

Coll. See his Philosophy of Rhetoric, Vol. I. p. 103, 1st, edit.

ymous phrases, a sound understanding, and a sound judgment. If there be any difference between these two modes of expression, it appears to me to consist chiefly in this, that the former implies a greater degree of positive ability than the latter; which indicates rather an exemption from those biases which lead the mind astray, than the possession of any uncommon reach of capacity. To understanding we apply the epithets strong, vigorous, comprehensive, profound: to judgment, those of correct, cool, unprejudiced, impartial, solid. It was in this sense that the word seems to have been understood by Pope in the following couplet:

""T is with our judgments as our watches; none
Go just alike, yet each believes his own."

For this meaning of the word, its primitive and literal application to the judicial decision of a tribunal accounts sufficiently.

Agreeably to the same fundamental idea, the name of judgment is given, with peculiar propriety, to those acquired powers of discernment which characterize a skilful critic in the fine arts; powers which depend, in a very great degree, on a temper of mind free from the undue influence of authority and of casual associations. The power of Taste itself is frequently denoted by the appellation of judgment; and a person who possesses a more than ordinary share of it is said to be a judge in those matters which fall under its cognizance.

The meaning annexed to the word by logical writers is considerably different from this; denoting one of the simplest acts or operations of which we are conscious, in the exercise of our rational powers. In this acceptation, it does not admit of definition any more than sensation, will, or belief. All that can be done, in such cases, is to describe the occasions on which the operation takes place, so as to direct the attention of others to their own thoughts. With this view, it may be observed, in the present instance, that when we give our assent to a mathematical axiom; or when, after perusing the demonstration of a theorem, we assent to the conclusion ; or, in general, when we pronounce concerning the truth

or falsity of any proposition, or the probability or improbability of any event, the power by which we are enabled to perceive what is true or false, probable or improbable, is called by logicians the faculty of judgment. The same word, too, is frequently used to express the particular acts of this power, as when the decision of the understanding on any question is called a judgment of the mind.

In treatises of logic, judgment is commonly defined to be an act of the mind, by which one thing is affirmed or denied of another; a definition which, though not unexceptionable, is perhaps less so than most that have been given on similar occasions. Its defect (as Dr. Reid has remarked) consists in this, that, although it be by affirmation or denial that we express our judgments to others, yet judgment is a solitary act of the mind, to which this affirmation or denial is not essential; and, therefore, if the definition be admitted, it must be understood of mental affirmation or denial only; in which case, we do no more than substitute, instead of the thing defined, another mode of speaking perfectly synonymous. The definition has, however, notwithstanding this imperfection, the merit of a conciseness and perspicuity, not often to be found in the attempts of logicians to explain our intellectual operations.

Mr. Locke seems disposed to restrict the word judgment to that faculty which pronounces concerning the verisimilitude of doubtful propositions; employing the word knowledge to express the faculty which perceives the truth of propositions, either intuitively or demonstratively certain. "The faculty which God has given man to supply the want of clear and certain knowledge in cases where that cannot be had, is judgment; whereby the mind takes its ideas to agree or disagree; or, which is the same thing, any proposition to be true or false, without perceiving a demonstrative evidence in the proofs.

"Thus, the mind has two faculties, conversant about truth and falsehood.

"First, knowledge, whereby it certainly perceives, d is undoubtedly satisfied of the agreement or disament of any ideas.

"Secondly, judgment, which is the putting ideas together, or separating them from one another in the mind, when their agreement or disagreement is not perceived, but presumed to be so; which is, as the word imports, taken to be so, before it certainly appears. And if it so unites, or separates them, as in reality things are, it is right judgment.'

For this limitation in the definition of judgment, some pretence is afforded by the literal signification of the word, when applied to the decision of a tribunal; and also, by its metaphorical application to the decisions of the mind, on those critical questions which fall under the province of Taste. But, considered as a technical or scientific term of Logic, the practice of our purest and most correct writers sufficiently sanctions. the more enlarged sense in which I have explained it; and, if I do not much deceive myself, this use of it will be found more favorable to philosophical distinctness than Mr. Locke's language, which leads to an unnecessary multiplcation of our intellectual powers. What good reason can be given for assigning one name to the faculty which perceives truths that are certain, and another name to the faculty which perceives truths that are probable? Would it not be equally proper to distinguish, by different names, the power by which we perceive one proposition to be true, and another to be false?

As to knowledge, I do not think that it can, with propriety, be contrasted with judgment; nor do I apprehend that it is at all agreeable, either to common use or to philosophical accuracy, to speak of knowledge as a faculty. To me it seems rather to denote the possession of those truths about which our faculties have been previously employed, than any separate power of the understanding by which truth is perceived.†

* Essay on the Human Understanding, Book iv. Chap. 14.

In attempting thus to fix the logical import of various words in our language, which are apt to be confounded, in popular speech, with reason, and also with reasoning, some of my readers may be surprised, that I have said nothing about the word wisdom. The truth is, that the notion expressed by this term, as it is employed by our best writers, seems to presuppose the influence of some principles, the consideration of which belongs to a different part of my work. In confirmation

Before concluding these preliminary remarks, I cannot help expressing my regret, that the subject on which I am about to enter will so frequently lay me under the necessity of criticising the language, and of disputing the opinions of my predecessors. In doing so, I am not conscious of being at all influenced by a wish to indulge myself in the captiousness of controversy; nor am I much afraid of this imputation from any of my readers who shall honor these speculations with an attentive perusal. My real aim is, in the first place, to explain the grounds of my own deviations from the track which has been commonly pursued, and, secondly, to facilitate the progress of such as may follow me in the same path, by directing their attention to those points of divergency in the way, which may suggest matter for doubt or hesitation. I know, at the same time, that, in the opinion of many, the best mode of unfolding the principles of a science is to state them systematically and concisely, without any historical retrospects whatever; and I believe the opinion is well founded, in those departments of knowledge, where the

of this, it may be remarked, that whereas the province of our reasoning powers (in their application to the business of life) is limited to the choice of means, wisdom denotes a power of a more comprehensive nature, and of a higher order; power which implies a judicious selection both of means and of ends. It is very precisely defined by Sir William Temple to be "that which makes men judge what are the best ends and what the best means to attain them."

Of these two modifications of wisdom, the one denotes a power of the mind which obviously falls under the view of the logician; the examination of the other, as obviously, belongs to ethics.

A distinction similar to this was plainly in the mind of Cudworth, when he wrote the following passage, which, although drawn from the purest sources of ancient philosophy, will, I doubt not, from the uncouthness of the phraseology, have the appearance of extravagance, to many in the present times. To myself it appears to point at a fact of the highest importance in the moral constitution of man.

"We have all of us by nature pávrsugár (as both Plato and Aristotle call it, a certain divination, presage, and parturient vaticination in our minds, of some higher good and perfection, than either power or knowledge. Knowledge is plainly to be preferred before power, as being that which guides and directs its blind force and impetus; but Aristotle himself declares, that there is λóyou rı xgsïtrov, which is λóyou dex; something better than reason and knowledge, which is the principle and original of it. For saith he λόγου ἀρχὴ οὐ λόγος, ἀλλά τι κρεῖττον. The principle of reason is not reason, but something better."-Intellectual System, p. 203.

Lord Shaftesbury has expressed the same truth more simply and perspicuously in that beautiful sentence which occurs more than once in his writings: "True wisdom comes more from the heart than from the head."-Numberless illustrations of this profound maxim must immediately crowd on the memory of all who are conversant with the most enlightened works on the theory of legislation; more particularly, with those which appeared, during the eighteenth century, on the science of political economy.