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when on board, in presence of BrigadierGeneral Clinton, and others of the Staff, told me of the action of the 17th, and said it was his intention to advance next morning. I was of opinion that it was not expedient to adopt that intention, especially as he had communicated to me the difficul. ties the army laboured under, from the want of cavalry and artillery horses, and the impracticability, of moving the army to any considerable distance from the victualling ships. The decision I came to, namely, that the army should halt, was a serious one, but in my mind amply justified by the considerations opposed to its advance. The enemy greatly out-numbered the British in cavalry, and the nearer they approached the defences surrounding Lisbon, the nearer were they to their resources. In such a state of things, had the British army receiv ed a check, the disasters might have been incalculable. I therefore thought it most proper to desist from an advance till a junction was formed with the remaining part of the British army.-(Here Sir Harry entered into a description of the relative strength of the several forts in the Tagus, and inferred that, while the British army were engaged in reducing these forts, the enemy might have fought them under great advantage; and further, had Sir C. Cotton been compelled to put to sea with his fleet, the impression upon the forts could have been very trifling, as the army had no heavy artillery or battering ammu pition. The surf too might have cut off provisions.) Under all these circumstances, as I have before stated, I thought it prudent that the army should halt, and I felt great satisfaction that my brother offi cers, whose talents and experience were unquestionable, concurred with me in the propriety of that opinion. On the morning of the 21st I landed, and presently heard a firing towards Vimiera. I was convinced the enemy had anticipated the necessity of the British army's advancing, by commencing an attack themselves. I understood Sir Arthur Wellesley was on the left of the army, and I shortly after joined him on the heights. I had a few words of explanation with him, and had such reason to be satisfied with the dispositions he had made, that I directed him to go on, and complete the business he had so successfully and so happily begun. By thus directing him to proceed, I imagined I was exercising one of the functions of a commander in Chief, and 1 held myself responsible for the issue.-Soon after the French gave way, and in less than two hours they were every where repulsed. At this moment I was informed that no advantage could be expected from the Portugueze cavalry; and on Sir Ar

thur's suggesting the propriety of the troops advancing, I answered, that I saw no reason for changing my first opinion, and that it was better the army should wait the arri val of reinforcements before they proposed to advance. During the engagement, I had observed the inability of the artillery horses, and a want of celerity in their movements. I also observed large bodies of the enemy's cavalry moving in different directions, and a body of infantry to the left which had not been engaged. These, and other circumstances, formed my determination, and Generals Murray and Clinton said I had well determined. It also appeared to me that the enemy's plan of attack was ill advised and ill supported. Had we been more advanced, we should have been more exposed. I therefore thought it better to halt and refresh the men, and to get the wounded on board the ships. Gen. Ackland's brigade had been up all night, and the rest of the army was under arms before daylight. Of these disadvantages the enemy might have profited had we advanced, as they knew the country, and were in possession of its resources; but the principal reasons were what he had already stated, and the necessity of getting the wounded off the field of battle. On the 22d, Sir A. Wellesley came to me from Peniche, and informed me that Sir H. Dalrymple had arrived. I went to the outposts, and found the French General Kellerman was advancing with a flag of truce.Of the transactions subsequent upon that, the Court, Sir Harry presumed, were already in possession."

A string of questions were put by the Court, and answered by Sir Harry Burrard, which our limits will not permit us to detail; and, at their conclusion,

Lord Moira put the following questions to Sir Harry Burrard:

Q. You have stated, as one of your reasons for not advancing, that the British troops had been long under arms, and were greatly fatigued. Is it not to be understood that the French troops had been an equal time' under arms, and as fatigued with the action-A. I thought the troops required refreshment. The French troops, I should suppose, must have been under arms much earlier than the English, as they marched to the attack.

Sir Harry Burrard then took his seat at a table near Sir Hew Dalrymple, and the statement of Sir Arthur at the opening of the Court, and the narrative delivered by Sir Harry, were read pro forma by the Deputy Judge Advocate, the Hon. Mr Ryder being absent.

A Gentleman, who officiated for the Judge Advocate, read a string of questions

which had been previously sent to Sir H. Burrard; and the latter read his answers, which chiefly tended to the same points which were dwelt upon in his narrative, and in which he gave the same reasons for deciding that the army should not advance, which he had before detailed, namely, the want of cavalry and the deficiency of artillery horses.

After Sir Harry Burrard concluded his narrative, he underwent an examination upon questions suggested by Sir Arthur Wellesley, as did Sir Arthur himself, together with Generals Spencer, Ferguson, and Lord Burghersh, chiefly on the positions of the French and British armies, and upon the propriety or inpropriety of the movements suggested by Sir A. Wellesley after the battle of the 21st, on the retreat of the French; in the course of which it was alleged, that had the attack of the enemy been followed up, not a French soldier of the left wing would ever have reached Lisbon, which measure had been urged very strongly by Sir Arthur, but countermanded in the orders by Sir Harry Burrard, who directed that the British troops should halt.

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Sir H. Dalrymple, Sir H. Burrard, and Sir A. Wellesley, concurred in replying to the first question, that in their opinion the French certainly had it in their power after the 22d to cross the Tagus. They also concurred in answering to the last, that it was impossible for them to conjecture the motives by which Gen. Junot had been influenced in preferring the evacuation of Portugal to a protracted compaign there. To them the evacuation appeared advantageous to the British interests.

Col. Torrens was re-examined by Sir A. Wellesley and Sir H. Burrard. His testi mony went to prove, that Sir Arthur had represented to Sir Harry, in the strongest terms, the expediency of pursuing the advantages gained by the British on the 21st,

but in vain.

Sir Harry Burrard briefly addressed the Court, stating the reasons by which he had

been induced to refuse Sir A. Wellesley permission to proceed. They were, in substance, that he understood the whole of the enemy's force had not been engaged in the battle of the 21st, and that the extensive lines which the British occupied were not favourable to any further advantages; that the centre of the British had been engaged an hour and a half; and that the enemy possessed a large body of cavalry. He was aware that his determination not to proceed was not likely to please a gallant army in the moment of triumph; but under all the circumstances of the case, he conceived, that had he not done so, he should have been guilty of a gross dereliction of duty. He lamented the absence of his Staff to corroborate his opinion; declared that he acted from the best of his judgment, and admitted that the responsibility of the business rested on him alone.

Sir A. Wellesley rose, and said, "Tho' I did, and still do differ from Sir H. Burrard, with respect to the expediency of pursuing the advantages gained over the enemy on the 21st, I hope I may be allowed to take this opportunity of declaring to the Court and the public, that I am convinced he was only influenced by such motives as an officer ought to feel in the discharge of his duty to his country."

Sir H. Burrard was then examined by Sir H. Dalrymple; in the course of which examination, he distinctly allowed that the convention had met with his approbation.

At five o'clock the President adjourned the Court, observing that the examination of evidence had closed, and that their fur ther proceedings would not be in public.

REPORT TO THE KING.

The Report and Opinion of the Board of Inquiry have been sent to his Majesty.The report contains a full abstract of the evidence, and is of great length, but the opinion is stated to be as follows:

"On a consideration of all the circumstances, as set forth in this report, we most humbly submit our opinion, that no further military proceeding is necessary on the subject, because, howsoever some of us may differ in our sentiments respecting the fitness of the convention, in the relative situation of the two armies, it is our unanimous declaration, that unquestionable zeal and firmness appear throughout to have been exhibited by Lieut.-Generals Sir Hew Dalrymple, Sir Harry Burrard, and Sir Arthur Wellesley, as well as that the order and gallantry of the rest of the officers and soldiers, on every occasion during this expedition, have done honour to the troops, and reflected lustre on your Majesty's arms. It seems that, upon this opinion being

delivered to the Commander in Chief, his Royal Highness found it was not so explicit, upon the armistice and convention, as the words of his Majesty's warrant appear ed to enjoin, and the Court was therefore ordered to re-assemble, and subjoin their opinion" Whether under the relative situa tion of the two armies on the 22d of Aug. an Armistice was adviseable; and if so, whether the terms were such as ought to be agreed upon?"--And, in like manner, their opinion" Whether, under the rela tive situation of the two armies, subsequent to the armistice, and after the whole of the British force had been landed, a Convention was adviseable; and if so, whether the terms were such as ought to be agreed upon?"

Upon these two questions being separately put to each member of the Court, it appears that

Gen. Sir D. Dundas,
Gen. Lord Heathfield,
Gen, Craig,

Lt.-Gen. Earl Pembroke,
Lt-Gen. Sir G. Nugent,

Lt. Gen. Nicholls,

Were for the armistice.

Earl Moira against the armistice. And, upon the second question, it appears that

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The following are the reasons given by the Officers who dissented from the majority.

My reason for considering the armistice as advisable on the 22d of August was, be cause the enemy had been able to retire after the battle of the 21st, and take up a strong defensive position.

OL. NICHOLLS, L. G.

I think, considering the great increase of our force from the first suspension of hostility to the definitive signing of the convention, added to the defeat the enemy had suffered, Sir Hew Dalrymple was fully entitled to have insisted upon more favourable OL. NICHOLLS, L. G.

terms.

I approve of the armistice after a due consideration of the relative situations of the two armies on the evening of the 22d August; but I cannot fully approve of the whole of the convention, after a due consideration of the relative situation of the two armies at the time: because it does not appear to me that, in the progress of the negociation, sufficient stress was laid upon the

great advantages which had resulted, or were likely to result, from the former suc-cessful operations of the British army in the field, from the considerable reinforcements which had joined it subsequent to the commencement of the negociation, from the cause in which the British army was engaged being the cause of Portugal, which gave good reason to reckon upon the good will, if not upon the active assistance, of the majority of the inhabitants; and, also, from the unusual readiness which, as it appears to me, was manifested by Gen, Junot to enter into negotiation, and by the French negotiator to accede to terms as they were proposed, and to such construction as Lieut. Gen. Sir Hew Dalrymple put upon them in some instances, where they might have borne a difference of interpretation. therefore think it probable, for the above reasons, that if less favourable terms to the French army had been insisted upon, they would have been acceded to.

I

PEMBROKE, Lieut. Gen. I feel less awkwardness in obeying the order to detail my sentiments on the nature of the convention, because I have already joined in the tribute of applause due in other respects to the officers concerned. My opinion, therefore, is only opposed to their's on a question of judgment, where their talents are likely to have so much more weight, as to render the profession of my difference, even on that point, somewhat painful. The duty is, however, imperious on me, not to disguise or qualify the deductions which I have made during this investigation.

An armistice simply might not have been objectionable, because Sir Hew Dalrymple, expecting hourly the arrival of Sir John Moore's division, might see more advantage for himself in a short suspension of hostilities, than what the French could draw from it. But as the armistice involved, and in fact established the whole principle of the convention, I cannot separate it from the latter.

Sir A. Wellesley has stated, that he considered his force, at the commencement of the march from the Mondego river, as sufficient to drive the French from their posisions on the Tagus. That force is subsequently joined by above 4000 British troops, under Generals Anstruther and Ackland. The French make an attack with their whole disposeable strength, and are repul sed with heavy loss, tho' but a part of the British army is brought into action. difficult to conceive that the prospects which Sir A. Wellesley entertained could be unfavourably altered by these events, even had not the certainty of speedy reinforcements to the British army existed.

It is

It is urged, that had the French been pushed to extremity, they would have crossed the Tagus, and have protracted the campaign in such a manner as to have frustrated the more important view of the British Generals-namely, sending succours into Spain.

This measure must have been equally feasible for the French if no victory had been obtained over them; but I confess that the chance of such an attempt seems to me assumed against probability. Sir HDalrymple notices what he calls "the critical and embarrassed state of Junot," before that General had been pressed by the British army; and, in explanation of that expression, observes, that the surrender of Dupont, the existence of the victorious Spanish army in Andalusia, which cut off the retreat of the French in that direction, and the universal hostility of the Portugueze, made the situation of Junot one of great distress. No temptation for the translation of the war into Alentejo presents itself from this picture; nor does any other representation give ground to suppose that Junot could have contemplated the measure as holding forth any prospect but ultimate ruin, after much preliminary distress and disgrace. The strongest of all proofs as to Junot's opinion, arises from his sending, the very morning after the battle of Vimiera, to propose the evacuation of Portugal; a step which sufficiently indicated that he was satisfied he could not only make no effectual defence, but could not even prolong the contest to take the chance of accidents. He seems, indeed, to have been without any real resource.

It appears in evidence, that of the troops left by him in Lisbon and the forts, a considerable proportion were of very doubtful quality. Those troops on whose fidelity he could confide, had been dismayed by a signal defeat, and they were sensible that they had no succour to look for from abroad.To the British generals it was known, when the armistice was granted, that 10,000 men under Sir J. Moore, as well as the 3d and and 42d regiments of foot, with the 18th dragoons, might be immediately reckoned upon; and although much advantage had not been drawn from the Portuguese troops, their support, and the general violence of the country against the French, cannot be laid out of this calculation.

The disparity of force and circumstances was, then, such as could leave no doubt that the issue must be favourable to us. I do not omit adverting to the difficulties urged as possible to occur in furnishing the British army with bread. But putting aside the obvious solution, that such a temporary privation is not ruinous to an army

where cattle can be procured in the country, this difficulty cannot be well pleaded, if admission is to be given to the speculation, that the heavy cannon necessary for battering forts St Julien and Cascaes were to be got ashore in the bays of the rock of Lisbon. The question then comes to this, whether the convention did (as has been asserted) secure all the objects which were proposed by the expedition? If it did not, it was not what his Majesty was entitled to expect from the relative situation of the two armies.

I humbly conceive it to have been erroneous to regard the emancipation of Portutugal from the French, as the sole or the principal object of the expedition. Upon whatever territory we contend with the French, it must be a prominent object in the struggle to destroy their resources, and narrow their means of injuring us, or those whose cause we are supporting. This seems to have been so little considered in the convention, that the terms appear to have extricated Junot's army from a situation of infinite distress, in which it was wholly out of play, and to have brought it, in a state of entire equipment, into immediate currency, in a quarter too where it must interfere with our most urgent and interesting concerns.

Had it been impracticable to reduce the French army to lay down its arms unconditionally, still an obligation not to serve for a specified time might have been insisted upon, or Belleisle might have been prescribed as the place at which they should be landed, in order to prevent the possibility of their reinforcing (at least for a long time) the armies employed for the subjugation of Spain. Perhaps a stronger consideration than the merit of those terms presents itself. Opinion relative to the British arms was of the highest importance, as it might influence the confidence of the Spaniards, or invite the nations groaning under the yoke of France, to appeal to this country, and co-operate with it for their deliverance. The advantages ought, therefore, to have been more than usually great, which should be deemed sufficient to balance the objection of granting to a very inferior army, hopeless in circumstances, and broken in spirit, such terms as might argue, that notwithstanding its disparity in numbers, it was still formidable to its victors. No advantages seem to have been gained that would not have equally followed from forcing the enemy to a more marked submission. The gain of time as to sending succours into Spain, cannot be admitted as a plea; because it appears that no arrangements for the reception of our troops in Spain had been undertaken previous to the

con

convention; and this is reasoning without subsequent facts.

The convention in Egypt, which has been advanced as a parallel case, appears to me inapplicable. No object beyond the dislodgement of the French from Egypt was there in question. In the present inthe operation of the convention stance, upon the affairs of Spain was a consideration of primary interest; and in that view the inevitable effect of some of the articles offers itself to my mind as liable to material objection.

I trust that these reasons will vindicate me from the charge of presumption, in maintaining an opinion contradictory to that professed by so many most respectable officers; for, even if the reasons be essentially erroneous, if they are conclusive to my mind (as I most consciously affirm them to be,) it is a necessary consequence that I must disapprove of the convention. Dec. 27. 1808. MOIRA, General.

TRIAL FOR MURDER. On Monday, Dec. 19. a Court Martial was held on board the Salvador del Mundo, in Plymouth harbour, on James Smith, the master's mate of his Majesty's sloop of war the Parthian, on a charge preferred by Lieut. Steventon of that ship, for the murder of Capt. Balderston, on Monday, 12th December. The Court was composed as follows:

Admiral Sutton, President.
Capt. Broke,
Quilliam,
Smith.

Capt. Scott, Rodd, Seymour,

Sir Wm. Bolton. The members of the Court being sworn, the prosecutor, Lieut. T. Steventon's narrative, was read, and the following witnesses examined:-The purser deposed, that on Monday the 12th, about one o'clock, he was walking on the starboard side of the quarter-deck, when he heard Capt. B. inquire for the prisoner, requesting to know why he was not on deck, and desired he might be immediately sent for. In the course of two or three minutes the prisoner came up, saying, "Did you send for me, Sir?" Capt. B. replied, "why was you not on deck at a time like this, when the ship was getting under weigh?" The prisoner replied, "I was never told ;" when Capt. B. replied, "that was no excuse, and for his general bad conduct since he had been in the ship, he would disrate him, as neglect of duty was a thing he never forgave inany officer;" at the same time saying to the witness who was on the other side of the quarter deck," Mr Snape, disrate him." The prisoner then said in a most contemptuous manner, (crossing his hands over his body)

"Very well, Sir, you may do so if you please." The witness went below, and ordered the clerk to disrate him at the Captain's request. In the course of between ten and fifteen minutes, he went on deck, and reported that he had desired the clerk to disrate him; did not see the prisoner at that time. About three quarters of an hour after, the witness was standing on the poop, Capt. B. was standing with his back towards him on the larboard gang ladder, looking at the sails, when the witness observed the priser turn round the capstan, and when at the distance of five or six feet from Capt. B. observed him present a pistol at the back of Capt. B. The witness rushed from the poop with an intent to seize him, but before he reached him, he had discharged the contents in the back of Capt. B. He then flew to the assistance of the Captain, who, turning round, with one hand took hold of the stanchion, exclaimed, "I am shot! who has shot me?" and fell into my arms. Many flew to his assistance. The witness rushed from him in the agitation of his mind, to have put an end to the prisoner; when Mr Steventon the first Lieut. requested he would not do any thing to the prisoner, as he was then secured.He then assisted in conveying Captain B. to his cabin, and continued with him for about fifteen minutes, when he thought, from his speaking so sensibly, there might yet be hopes, and the first Lieutenant immediately gave me a boat to go to Dr Beattie, his friend. He found Dr Beattie at home, who immediately went off; but unfortunately Capt. B. had expired five minutes before they reached the ship.

The Prosecutor then asked Mr Snape if Captain B. was ever made acquainted with the person who killed him?

A. He was when the Captain was lying on the sofa, he looked round, and asked who had shot him; saying, "was it a great gun?" The Second Lieutenant, Mr Schultz, told him it was the prisoner; on which he replied, " I know, I know ;" and looking round, said, "If I have injured any of you, God forgive me." I requested to hear if he had any thing particular to say, when he replied, "I have two sisters; tell them I am very sorry for the trouble I have given them."

Mr Galbraith, surgeon, was then examined. He said, "the balls or slugs entered the lower part of Capt. B's back, a little to the right side, and passed out at the belly, a little below the navel. Near the last wound, under the integuments, I could feel two hard substances, which I supposed to be slugs. I then reported to the Lieutenant that the Captain was mortally wounded. He was carried below to his own co

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