Names of the Officers Killed, Wounded, and Missing, in the Battles of Talavera, of the 27th and 28th of July 1809. KILLED-27th July. General Staff-Captain Fordyce, 81st, Deputy Adjutant-General. Coldstream Guards - Lieut.-Colonel Ross. 2d Batt. 31st Foot.-Capt. Lodge. 1st Batt. 88th-Lieuts. Graydon and M'Carthy. 1st. Batt. Detach. Lieut. M'Dougal, 91st. 2d Batt. 87th-Ensign La Serre. Royal Engineers-Capt. Boothby, severely. Coldstream Guards-Capt. Bryan, severely. 29th Foot-Lieut. Popham, severely. 2d. Batt. 31st Foot-Capt. Coleman, Lieut. Geo. Beamish; Ensigns Gamble and Soden, slightly. 1st. Batt. 45th-Lieut. Col. Guard, severely. 5th. Batt. 60th-Capt. Wolf, ditto. 1st. Batt.61st-Major Coghlan, ditto. 2d. Batt. 87th--Capt. Macrae, severely; Capt. Somersall slightly; Lieut. Kavanagh ditto; Lieuts. Bagnall, Kingston, Johnson, and Carrol, severely; Ensign Moore, slightly; Ensigns Knox and Butler, severely. MISSING. 1st. Batt. Detachments-Capt. Poole, 52d; Capt. Walsh, 91st; and Lieut. Cameron, 79th. KILLED, 28th July. General Staff-Major-Gen. Mackenzie and Brig. Gen. Langworth. Coldstream Guards--Captain Becket. 43d Foot-Captain Gardner, Brigade Major. 23d Light Dragoons-Lieuts. King and Powell. 1st Bat. Coldstream Guards-Ensign Parker. Royal Artillery-Lieut. Wyatt. 1st Bat. 3d Guards-Capts. Walker, Buchanan, Dalrymple; Ensign Ram; Adjutant Irby. 2d Bat, 7th Foot--Lieut. Beaufoy. 1st Bat. 61st-Major Orpen, Captain James, Lieut. Haimes. 2d Bat. 83d-Lieut.-Colonel Gordon, Lieuts. Dahman, Montgomery, Flood, 1st Bat. 88th, Capt. Blake. WOUNDED. Gen. Staff--Maj. Gen. Hill, slightly, Brigadier Gen. A. Campbell, slightly. Ditto H. Campbell, severely, but not dangerously. Capt. Whittingham, Deputy Assistant Quarter-Master General, slightly. Capt. Blair, Brigade-Major to General Cameron, severely. Capt. Bouverie, Aid-de-camp to Sir Arthur Wellesley, slightly. Captain Ulysses Burgh, ditto, ditto. Capt. Zersen, Aid-de-camp to Gen. Langworth, severely. Capt. Craig, Aid-de-camp to General Sherbrooke, slightly. 3d Dragoon Guards-Captain Bryce, severely. 14th Light Dragoons-Col. Hawker, slightly; Capts. Chapman and Hawker, severely; Lieut. Ellis, ditto; Lieuts Wainman and Smith, slightly. 16th ditto-Lieut. Bence, slightly. land severely; Lord William Russell, 23d ditto-Capts. Howard and Frank. and Cornet Dodville, ditto. Royal Engineers-Lieut. Stanway, slightly. Royal British Artillery-Lieut.-Col. Framingham slightly; Captains Taylor and Baynes, ditto. Royal Staff Corps--Captain Todd, Lieut. Shancham, slightly. 1st. Bat. Coldstream Guards-Lieut. Colonels Stibbert and Sir William She ridan severely, but not dangerously; Capts. Millman and Christie ditto; Captains Collier and Wood slightly; Capt. Jenkinson severely, Ensign Sandilands, ditto, but not dangerously. 1st. Bat. 3d Guards-Lieut. Colonel Gordon, Major Fothringham, Captain Geils, Ensigns Atcheson, Towers, and Scott, all slightly. rst Bat. 3d Foot-Lieut. Col. Muter severely, since dead; Maj. Drummond, slightly. 2d Bat. 7th-- Lieuts. Kirwan and Mu-ter severely; Adjutant Page slightly. zd Bat. 24th-Lieut. Col. Drummond severely; Major Popham ditto; Capt. Collis ditto; Captain Evans ditto, since dead; Lieut. Vardy slightly; Ensigns Grant, Skene, Johnson, and Jessamin, severely; Adjutant Top slightly. 29th-Captain Gauntlett severely; Capt. Newbolt, slightly, Lieuts. Stanus, Leslie, Stanhope, severely; Lieut. Nicholson slightly. 2d Bat. 31st--Captain Nicholls slightly; Lieutenant Girdlestone slightly s Lieut. A. Beamish severely. e. taken in the battle of the 28th July. 1st Bat. 40th-Captain Colquhoun, Return of Ordnance, slightly. 1st Bat. 45th-Major Gwyn slightly; Lieut. Cole ditto. 1st Bat. 48th-Lieut.-Colonel Donnelian severely; Major Marston slightly; Captains Wood and French ditto ; Lieuts. Giles and Cuthbertson slightly; Ensign Vandermeulen severely. 2d Bat. 48th-Lieut. Johnson slightly; Ensign Kenny severely. 2d Bat. 53d-Major Kingscote slightly; Capt. Stawell ditto. 5th Bat. 6cth-Captain Gatliff, slightly; Captain Andrew ditto; Lieut. Zul. ke, Ritter, and Mitchell, severely; Ensign Altenstein ditto. 1st Bat. 61st-Capts. Furnace, Laing, Goodsman and Hartley,slightly; Lieuts. M'Lean and Tench ditto; Lieut. Colins severely; Lieut. Givan slightly; Ensign Brakenburg ditto; Adj. Drew severely. 2d Bat. 66th-Captain Kelly slightly; Captain Stuart severely; Capt. Adams, Lieuts. Morris, Dudgeon, Humbly, Morgan, and Steele, severely; Lieut. Shewbridge, Ensigns Cottar, and Macarthy, slightly. 2d Bat. 83d-Capt. Summerfield, slightly; Captain Reynolds, leg ampu tated; Lieut. Nicholson severely; Lieuts. Baldwin and Johnson slightly; Lieut. Abell severely; Lieut. Pyne slightly; Ensigns Boggie and Carey severely; Ensign Letoller slightly; Adj. Braham ditto. 2d Bat. 87th-Major Gough severely; Lieut. Rogers and Ensign Pepper slightly. 88th-Capt. Brown, Lieut. Whittle, and Ensign Whitelaw, severely. 1 Bat. Detachments-Major Ross, 38th, severely; Capt. M'Pherson, 35th, ditto; Captain Bradley, 28th, slightly; Captain Chancellor, 38th, ditto; Lieut. Gilbert, 28th, severely; Lieut. M‘Beth, 42d, ditto; Lieut. Fullerton, 38th, Lieut. Munroe, 42d, Lieut. Brown, 43d, slightly. MISSING. 23d Dragoons-Captains Allen and Drake, wounded, and missing, Lieut. Anderson ditto. 45th Foot-Capt. Leckey, Brigade. Major, missing. 48 h Ditto, 2d Bat.-Ensign Reeves missing. 97th Ditto-Lieut. Shipley ditto. 4 eight-pounders, 4 six ditto, 1 four ditto, six inch howitzer, 2 tumbrils, complete in ammunition; taken by Bri gadier-General A. Campbell's brigade. 6 pieces of ordnance, 1 six-inch howitzer; left by the enemy, and found in the woods. I standard, taken by the 29th regiment; 1 ditto, destroyed by ditto. 3 standards, taken by the King's German legion. MY LORD, Deleytosa, Aug. 8, 1809. I apprised your Lordship, on the 1st instant, of the advance of a French corps towards the Puerto de Banos, and of the probable embarrassments to the operations of the army which its arrival at Placentia would occasion; and these embarrassments having since existed to a degree so considerable as to oblige us to fall back, and to take up a defensive position on the Tagus, I am induced to trouble you more at length with an account of what has passed upoh this subject. When I entered Spain, I had a commu nication with General Cuesta, through Sir Robert Wilson and Colonel Roche, respecting the occupation of the Puerto de Ba nos and the Puerto de Perales, the former of which, it was at last settled, should be held by a corps, to be formed under the Marquis de la Reyna, to consist of two battalions from General Cuesta's army, and Perales was to be taken care of by the two from Bejar; and that the Puerto de Duc del Parque, by detachments from the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo. I doubted of the capacity of the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo to make the detachment to the latter, but so little of the effectual occupation of the former, that in writing to Marshal Beresford on the 17th July, I desired him to look to the Puerto de Perales, but that I considered Banos as secure, as appears by the extract of my letter, which I enclose. On the 30th, intelligence was received at Talavera that 12,000 rations had been ordered at Fuente Duenos for the 28th, and 24,000 at Los Santos for the same day, for a French corps which, it was believed, was on its march towards the Puerto de Banos. General Cuesta expressed some anxiety respecting this post, and sent me a message to propose that Sir Robert Wilson should be sent there with his corps. Sir Robert was on that day at Talavera, but his corps was in the mountains towards Escalona, and as he had already made hini self very useful in that quarter, and had been been near Madrid, with which city he had had a communication, which I was desirous of keeping up, I proposed that a Spanish corps should be sent to Banos without loss of time. I could not prevail with General Cuesta, although he certainly admitted the neces sity of a reinforcement, when he proposed that Sir Robert should be sent to Banos; and he was equally sensible with myself, of the benefit to be derived to the cause, from sending Sir Robert back to Escalona. At this time we had no further intelligence of the enemy's advance, than that the rations were ordered; and I had hopes that the enemy might be deterred from advancing, by the intelligence of our success on the 28th, and that the troops in the Puerto might make some defence; and that, under these circumstances, it was not desirable to divert Sir Robert Wilson from Escalona. On the 30th, however, I renewed my application to Gen. Cuesta, to send there a Spanish division of sufficient strength, in a letter to Gen. O'Donoghue, of which I enclose a copy, but without effect; and he did not detach General Basse court till the morning of the 2d, after we had heard that the enemy had entered Bejar, and it was obvious that the troops in the Puerto would make no defence. On the 2d we received accounts that the enemy had entered Placentia in two columns. The Marquis de la Reyna, whose two battalions consisted of only 600 men, with only twenty rounds of ammunition each man, retired from the Puerto and from Placentia, without firing a shot, and went to the bridge of Almarez, which he declared that he intended to remove; the battaions of Bejar dispersed without making any resistance. The General called upon me on that day, and proposed that half of the should army march to the rear to oppose the enemy, while the other half should maintain the post at Talavera. My answer was, that if by half the army, he meant half of each army, I could only answer, that I was ready either to go or stay with the whole British army, but that I could not separate it. He then desired me to chuse whether I would go or stay, and I preferred to go, from thinking that the British troops were most likely to do the business effectually, and without contest; and from being of opinion that to open the communication thro' Placentia, was more important to us than to the Spanish army, although very important to them. With this decision, General Cuesta appeared perfectly satisfied. The movements of the enemy in our front, since the 1st, had induced me to be of opinion, that despairing of forcing us at Talavera, they intended to force a passage by Escalona, and thus to open a communication with the French corps coming from Placentia. This suspicion was confirmed on the night of the 2d, by letters received from Sir Robert Wilson, of which I enclose copies; and before I quitted Talavera on the 3d, I waited upon General O'Donoghue, and conversed with hm upon the whole of our situation, and pointed out to him the possibility, that, in the case of the ene my coming through Escalona, Gen. Cuesta might find himself obliged to quit Talavera, before I should be able to return to him; and I urged him to collect all the carts that could be got, in order to remove our hospital. At his desire I put the purport of this conversation in writing, and sent him a letter to be laid before General Cuesta, of which I enclose a copy. The British army marched, on the 3d, to Oropesa, General Bassecourt's Spanish corps being at Centinello, where I desired that it might halt the next day, in order that I might be nearer it. About five o'clock in the evening, I heard that the French had arrived from Placentia at Navalmoral, whereby they were between us and the bridge of Al marez. About an hour afterwards, I received from General O'Donoghue the letter and its enclosures, of which I enclose copies, announcing to me the intention of General Cuesta to march from Talavera in the evening, and to leave there my hospital, excepting such men as could be moved by the means he already had, on the ground of his apprehension that I was not strong enough for the corps coming from Placentia, and that the enemy was moving upon his flank, and had returned to Santa Olalla in his front. I acknowledge that these reasons did not appear to me sufficient for giving up so important a post as Talavera, for exposing the combined armies to an attack in front and rear at the same time, and for abandoning my hospital; and I wrote the letter of which I enclose a copy. This unfortunately reached the General after he had marched, and he arrived at Oropesa shortly after day-light on the morning of the 4th. The question, what was to be done, was then to be considered. The enemy, stated to be 30,000 strong, but at all events, consisting of the corps of Soult and Ney, either united, or not very distant from each other, and supposed by Marshal Jourdan and Joseph Bonaparte, to be sufficiently strong to attack the British army, stated to be be 25,000 strong, were on one side, in possession of the high-road to the passage of the Tagus at Almarez, the bridge at which place we knew had been removed, altho' the boats still necessarily remained in the river. We On the other side, we had reason to expect the advance of Victor's corps to Talavera, as soon as General Cuesta's march should be known, and, after leaving 12,000 men to watch Venegas, and allowing from 10,000 to 11,000 killed and wounded in the late action, this corps would have amounted to 25,000. could extricate ourselves from this difficult situation only by great celerity of movement, to which the troops were unequal, as they had not had their allowance of provisions for several days, and by success in two battles. If unsuccessful in either, we should have been without a retreat, and if Soult and Ney, avoiding an action, had retired before us, and had waited the arrival of Victor, we should have been exposed to a general action with 50,000 men, equally without a retreat. We had reason to expect, that as the Marquis de la Reyna could not remove the boats from the river Almarez, Soult would have destroyed them. Our only retreat was, therefore, by the bridge of Arcobispo, and if we had moved on, the enemy, by breaking that bridge, while the army should be engaged with Soult and Ney, would have deprived us of that only resource. We could not take a position at Oropesa, as we thereby left open the road to the bridge of Arcobispo from Talavera by Calera; and, after considering the whole subject maturely, I was of opinion, that it was adviseable to retire to the bridge of Arcobispo, and to take up a defensive position upon the Tagus. I was induced to adopt this last opinion, because the French have now at least 50,000 men disposeable to oppose to the combined armies, and a corps of 12,000 men to watch Venegas; and I was likewise of opinion, that the sooner the defensive line should be taken up, the more likely were the troops to be able to defend it. Accordingly, I marched on the 4th, and crossed the Tagus by the bridge of Arcobispo, and have continued my route to this place, in which I am well situated to defend the passage of Almarez, and the lower parts of the Tagus General Cuesta crossed the river on the night of the 5th, and is still at the bridge of Arcobispo. About 2000 of the wounded have been brought away from Talavera; the remaining 1500 are there. and I doubt whether, under any circumstances, it would have been possible, or consistent with huma nity, to attempt to remove any more of them. From the treatment which some of the soldiers, wounded on the 27th, and who fell into the hands of the enemy, experienced from them, and from the manner in which I have already treated the wounded who have fallen into my hands, I expect that these men will be well treated; and I have only to lament, that a new concurrence of events, over which, from circumstances, I had and could have no controul, should have placed the army in a situation to be obliged to leave any of them behind. I have the honour to be, &c. ARTHUR WELLESLEY. MY LORD, Truxillo, Aug. 20. 1809. I wrote some days ago a letter to the French Commander in Chief, which I sent to him by Lieutenant-Colonel Wal. ters, to request his care and attention of the wounded officers and soldiers of the British army, who had fallen into his hands, in return for the care and attention which I had paid to the French officers and soldiers who had fallen into my hands at different times; and that he would allow money to be sent to the officers; and that officers, who should not be deemed prisoners of war, might be sent to superintend and take care of the soldiers, till they should recover from their wounds, when the officers should be sent to join the British army. I received a very civil answer from Marshal Mortier, promising that every care should be taken, and every attention paid to the British officers and soldiers who were wounded; but stating, that he could not answer upon the other demands contained in my letter, having been obliged to refer them to the Commander in Chief. Since the receipt of this letter, Mr Dillon, the Assistant Commissary, has arrived from Talavera, having been taken prisoner near Cevolla on the 27th of July, previous to the action, and having been allowed to come away. He reports that the British officers and soldiers, who are wounded, are doing remarkably well, and are well fed and taken care of; indeed, he says, pre"ferable to the French troops. I propose to send Colonel Walters, with another flag of truce, to-morrow, morning, and a letter to the Commander in Chief of the French army, requesting that a sum of money, which I shall send, may be given to the officers; and I shall endeavour to establish a cartel of exchange as soon as possible. I have the honour to be, &c. ARTHUR WELLESLEY. MY LORD, Truxillo, August 21. When I marched from Talavera on the 3d instant, with a view to oppose the French corps which we had heard had passed through the Puerto de Banos, and had arrived at Placentia, Sir Robert Wilson was detached, upon the left of the army, towards Escalona; and before I marched on that morning, I put him in communication with the Spanish General Cuesta, who, it had been settled, was to remain at Talavera. Iunderstood that General Cuesta put Sir Robert in communication with his advanced guard, which retired from Talavera on the night of the 4th. Sir Robert Wilson, however, did not arrive at Valida till the night of the 4th, having made a long march through the mountains; and as he was then six leagues from the bridge of Arcobispo, and had to cross the high road from O. ropesa to Talavera, of which the enemy was in possession, he conceived that he was too late to retire to Arcobispo, and he determined to move by Venta St Julien and Centinello towards the Tietar, and across that river towards the mountains which separate Castile from Estremadura. Some of Sir Robert Wilson's dispat.. ches having missed me, I am not aware by which of the passes he went through the mountains, but I believe by Tornavacas. He arrived, however, at Ba. nos on the 11th, and on the 12th was attacked and defeated by the French corps of Marshal Ney, which, with that of Soult, returned to Placentia on the 9th, 10th, and 11th, that of Ney having since gone on towards Salamanca. I enclose Sir Robert Wilson's account of the action. He has been very active, intelligent, and useful in the command of the Portugueze and Spanish corps with which he was detached from this army, Before the battle of the 28th of July, he had pushed his parties almost to the gates of Madrid, with which city he was in communication; and he would have been in Madrid, if I had not thought it proper to call him in, in expectation of the general action which took place on the 28th of July. He afterwards alarmed the enemy on the right of his army; and throughout the service, shewed himself to be an active and intelligent partizan, well acquainted ing, and possessing the confidence of the with the country in which he was acttroops which he commanded. Being persuaded that his retreat was not open by Arcobispo, he acted right in taking the road he did, with which he was well acquainted; and although unsuccessful in the action which he fought (which may be well accounted for, by the superior numbers and description of the enemy's troops,) the action, in my opinion, does him great credit. I have the honour to be, &c. SIR, Miranda de Castenar, Aug. 13. I have the honour to acquaint you, that I was on march yesterday morning to the road of Grenadella from Aldea Nueva, to restore my communication with the allied army, when a peasant assured us, that a considerable quantity of dust, which we perceived in the road of Placentia, proceeded from the march of a body of the enemy. I immediately returned and took post in front of Banos, with my piquets in advance of Aldea Nueva, selecting such points for defence as the exigency of the time permitted. The enemy's cavalry advanced on the high road, and drove back my small cavalry posts; but a piquet of Spanish infantry, cavalry a steady and well directed fire, that which I had concealed, poured in on the killed and wounded many of them. The two hundred Spanish infantry in advance of Aldea Nueva, continued, under the direction of Colonel Grant and their of ficers, to maintain their ground most gallantly, until the enemy's cavalry, and chaspeared on both flanks, when they were oseurs a cheval, in considerable bodies, apbliged to retreat. cavalry advanced in great numbers in every The enemy's chasseurs a cheval and direction, and pushed to cut off the legion posted between Aldea Nueva and Banos, but, by the steady conduct of officers and men, the enemy could only advance gra dually, |