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position, it is absolutely necessary to have seen it. It is a complete mass of miserable peasantry, without clothing, without organization, and with few Of ficers that deserve the name.

"The General and principal Officers have not the least confidence in their troops; and what is yet worse, the men have no confidence in themselves.

"This is not an exaggerated picture; it is a true portrait," &c. P. 15. It was found that the grand army under Castanos and Palafox did not

exceed 40,000 men, nor that under Blake 30,000. This, considering the character of these armies, was scarcely sufficient to keep in check the French army, which was already in Spain, far less to resist the immense reinforcements which were pouring in. In the provinces there was no armed force whatever, nor any efforts making to raise one, either for home defence, or for reinforcing the armies. The British army soon found itself dependent upon its own exertions for supplies of The Junta kind. every seem never to have thought of establishing magazines, either for its use, or that of their own army. By the most absurd negligence and stupidity, Sir David Baird's army was kept eight days from landing, nor, when permission arrived, was its situation much bettered. Sir John Moore writes to Lord William Bentinck:

"I am sorry to say, from Sir David Baird, I hear nothing but complaints of the Junta of Corunna, who afford him no assistance. They promise every thing, but give nothing; and after waiting day after day for carts, which they had promised to procure for the carriage of stores, his Commissary was at last obliged to contract for them at an exorbitant price, and then got them. This is really a sort of conduct quite intolerable to troops that the Spanish Government have asked for, and for whose advance they are daily pressing." P. 21. He concludes with the following anticipations :

"I have no objection to you, or Mr

Frere, representing the necessity of as many more British troops as you think proper. It is certain, that the agents which our Government have hitherto employed, have deceived them. For affairs here are by no means in the flourishing state they are represented and believed to be in England; and the sooner the truth is known in England, the better. But you must observe, my Lord, that whatever is critical must now be decided by the troops which are here; the French, I suspect, are ready, and will not wait. I differ only with you in one point when you say the chief and great obstacle and resistance to the French will be afforded by the English Army. If that be so, Spain · is lost. The English Army, I hope, will do all that can be expected from their numbers; but the safety of Spain depends upon the union of its inhabitants, their enthusiasm in their cause, and in their firm and devoted determi

:

nation to die rather than submit to the French nothing short of this will enable them to resist the formidable attack about to be made upon them. If they will adhere, our aid can be of the greatest use to them; but if not, we shall soon be out-numbered, were our force quadrupled.

"I am, therefore, much more anxious to see exertion and energy in the Government, and enthusiasm in their Armies, than to have my force augmented. The moment is a critical one-my own situation is particularly so-I have never seen it otherwise; but I have pushed into Spain at all hazards ;-this was the order of my Government, and it was the will of the people of England. I shall endeavour to do my best, hoping that all the bad that may happen, will not happen; but that with a share of bad, we shall also have a portion of good fortune." P. 21, & 24.

These bad omens were not long of being verified. News arrived that the Estremaduran army had been completely defeated at Burgos; that Valladolid had been abandoned without resistance, and that the British army, without having effected its junction, was thus left completely uncovered. In these circumstances, the General thought it neces

sary

sary to call in Sir John Hope's corps, which had already advanced beyond Madrid, and to stop the advance of General Baird beyond Astorga. He was thus enabled to wait and determine whether the main body of the French army was to be pushed forward upon him, or whether it would take another direction, and enable him to effect his junction. The remarks which he writes to Mr Frere on the state of things appear to us to display very profound sagacity, and extensive views of military operations.

"I have been unable hitherto to understand the movements and positions of the Spanish armies; but I have taken it for granted that they were formed from local circumstances, and a knowledge of the country, of which I was ignorant. I should otherwise have said they were upon a scale much too great for the strength of their armies. I begin to fear that this is the case, and that, if their system be not changed, we shall all of us very soon be beaten in detail. To cover and protect the British army, whilst upon its march from such distant points in order to unite, never seems to have been in the con

templation of the Spanish generals; and
now, from the position the French have
taken, the accomplishment of it is be-
come exceedingly precarious.-The
difference hitherto between the position
of the Spanish and French armies, as
they have struck me, is this-the
French, in order to concentrate, or to
strenghthen either flank, move upon
the chord, the Spaniards upon the cir
cumference; the movements of the one
are short, and can be easily concealed,
those of the other extended, and expo-
sed to be interrupted.
P. 33.

The intelligence of the affair at Burgos was soon succeeded by another still more disastrous, contained in the following letter from General Leith:

my of General Blake, in which was lately incorporated the infantry of the Marquis de la Romana's division, has been defeated in several attacks since the have not time to enter into detail of 5th inst. and is entirely dispersed. I this unfortunate reverse, carrying with it such serious consequences, for fear of delaying the intimation of that which is so essential to make known in general terms to the Commander of the Bri Galicia. The Estremaduran army has tish army advancing from Portugal to also experienced a reverse at Burgos. In short, the British army has nothing to depend upon in Las Montanos de Santander. In Asturias there are but a few battalions, totally undisciplined; and, by the last accounts, the French occupy from Reynosa to Burgos. Except what remains of the Estramuduran army, (of the position of which I am ignorant) and the British army, there is nothing to prevent the enemy from advancing towards Leon and Valladolid that I know of. I very much suspect that he will avail himself of this movement, to attack in detail the army of Palafox and Castanos, united nominally; and all of which are placed under the command of the Marquis de la Roma

na.

The army has suffered principally from famine; and I do not think that it is possible to re unite those who are flying in all directions, nearer than Astorga and Oviedo. It does not appear that there has been any want of spirit in the men; and in many instances, especially of the divisions of the North, distinguished conduct. Some of the new Officers have not behaved so well. Santander was in the power of the enemy, after possessing the roads of Escudo and Reynosa. The accounts of their having entered that town are not yet received, however. The different attacks have been at Zornosa (between Durango and Bilboa,) Valmaseda, Arantia; and the total deroute, after a defeat at Espinosa de las Montanax. A

bout 7000 re-assembled at Reynosa on the 13th inst. but without any order; from thence they retreated after dark, half starved and straggling mob, without and have arrived in this valley, as a officers, and all mixed in utter confuNever has there been so injudicious and ruinous a system begun and "I regret to inform you that the ar. persisted in, as that which has led

"Renedo Valley of Caqueringa, Pro
vince of Las Montanos de Santan.
der, 15th Nov. 1808.

66 SIR,

sion.

to

to the serious disasters of the present P. 40.

moment.

The following letter from General Moore to one of his brothers, gives a lively picture of his views on the present state of affairs.

"Upon entering Spain, I have found affairs in a very different state from what I expected, or from what they are thought to be in England.

"I am in a scrape from which God knows how I am to extricate myself. But, instead of Salamanca, this army should have been assembled at Seville. The poor Spaniards deserve a better fate, for they seem a fine people; but have fallen into hands who have lost them by their apathy and ******

"The Junta, jealous of their Generals, gave them no power; but kept them at the head of separate armies, each independent of the other. Thus they have prevented any union of action.

"They took no pains to recruit the armies, or to furnish them with arms and clothing. In short, during the interval that the French were weak, they did nothing either to overpower them before their reinforcements arrived, or to meet them with superior numbers when reinforced.

"When I marched into this country, in three divisions, from Corunna, Lisbon, and round by Madrid, instead of finding any army to cover the junction of the three corps, until our supplies and stores came up, which were necessary to enable us to act; I found that the Spanish armies were placed on each flank of the French; one in Biscay, and the other on the river Alagon; at such a distance as to be able to give no sort of support to each othet, or to combine their movements; and leaving it also in the power of the French to attack either army with their whole force, as soon as they were ready.

"That the Spaniards must be driven from Madrid is inevitable; they have no force to resist. When they will bring up, or if they will bring up at all, I cannot guess. In this province, and throughout Old Castile, there is no mark of any intention to make any effort. The French cavalry are overrunning the plains, raising contributions, to which the people submit without resistance.

"There may be more character in other parts. Enthusiasm, and an obstinate determination, not to submit_to the French yoke, may do much. But even in this case the Government has been improvident: arms, ammunition, and other means are wanting.

"The probability therefore is, that the French will succeed; and if they do, it will be from no talent having sprung up, after the first effort, to take advantage of the impulse and of the en thusiasm which then existed.

"I understand all is fear and confusion at Madrid.

"Tell James it is difficult to judge at a distance. The Spaniards have not shewn themselves a wise or a provident people. Their wisdom is not a wisdom of action; but still they are a fine people; a character of their own, quite distinct from other nations; and much might have been done with them. Perhaps they may rouse again. Pray for me, that I may make right decisions : if I make bad ones, it will not be for want of consideration.

"I sleep little, it is now only five in the morning; and I have concluded since I got up, this long letter. P. 44.

Soon after, a letter arrived from Sir David Baird, who, with the first division of his infantry, had arrived at Astorga. His views seem to be still more gloomy than those of Moore; he deprecates any farther advance till he has united the whole of his army; and he concludes as follows:

"As it could never be intended by the British Government that our army should engage in the defence of this Country unaided and unsupported by any Spanish force, I confess, my dear Sir John, I begin to be at a loss to discover an object at this moment in Spain: it being very evident that the Spaniards are not at this moment in a situation to be capable of assembling a force competent to offer any serious resistance to the progress of the French arms.

"It is very remarkable that I have not procured the least intelligence, or received any sort of communication, from any of the official Authorities at Madrid, or either of the Spanish Generals." P. 49.

Gen

General Moore, however, notwithstanding these unfavourable circumstances, determined still to form the junction of his different divisions, and to attempt something for the relief of the Spaniards, and the honour of the British name. Romana and Blake indeed both informed him, that a strong body of French troops, sufficient to prevent this junction, had arrived in Leon; but he afterwards learnt that these reports had arisen merely, amid the great dearth of authentic intelligence, from detached parties of horse spreading themselves over the country. General Hope had now passed Madrid, and there seemed to be a fair prospect of the three divisions of the army being speedily united, when news arrived of the compleat defeat of the only Spanish army remaining. The Spanish force had been drawn up in a manner which has attracted the general censure of military observers; the two wings being placed at a distance from each other, without even the appearance of a centre to connect them together. This arrangement was not quite so irrational as may at first sight appear; for, considering the undisciplined character of the troops, it was only in the mountains of Biscay and Arragon, that they could have any chance of maintaining themselves; while in the intermediate plain of Old Castile, they could scarcely have stood the first shock of the French armies. By this means, however, it became easy for Buonaparte, according to his usual system, to turn his whole force successively against both wings, and beat them in detail. Blake's army had already, after an honourable struggle, been completely defeated and dispersed. That of Castanos, having a greater force accumulated against it, was vanquished still more easily; and though the slaughter seems not to have been very great, yet the rout and dispersion were very complete. Mr Stuart com municated immediate intelligence of this disaster to General Moore, who October 1809.

There

at once formed the determination of falling back upon Portugal. In several letters to the different officers, he explains the motives of this resolution. He conceived, that as there was nothing now to prevent the French, who were in Old Castile, from pushing forward, his junction with General Baird was become impracticable, and even that with General Hope, doubtful.All that he could expect was, that the latter, by rapid marches, might be able to join him, and their united army reach Lisbon, to which Sir David Baird might repair by sea. they might either act as a diversion in favour of the Spaniards, or they might be ready to co-operate with them in any quarter where the spirit of resistance, which in the North seemed entirely asleep, should chance to arise. If forced to leave Lisbon, they could land in Andalusia, which seemed the only part of Spain from which any thing now was to be hoped. He would thus be reinforced by the part of the army which had been left in Portugal, and could either afford the Spaniards any assistance which was likely to be useful to them; or, should this appear impracticable, would be enabled to effect his retreat unmolested.

General Moore called a council of officers, not to ask their advice, but merely to communicate his determination to them. The narrator here candidly admits, that

The idea of retreating was very ge nerally disapproved of at Salamanca by the Army. The murmurs against it from Officers of rank were heard in every quarter. Even the Staff Officers of Sir John Moore's family lamented it, and, for the first time, doubted the wisdom of his decision. He, however, afterwards learnt, that General Hope agreed with him completely on this, as on all other points. P. 72.

It seems still difficult to form a correct opinion on this much-contested question. The above determination was evidently founded, in part, on a mistaken expectation that Buonaparte,

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after defeating all the Spanish armies, would immediately push forward to prevent the junction of the English divisions; whereas it proved, that he preferred advancing against Madrid. Independent of this consideration, we would say that the retreat was advantageous in a military, but disadvantageous in a political point of view. It certainly afforded both the safest and most efficient mode of disposing of the army but the entire abandonement of the Spanish cause, which it must, in the first instance, have seemed to involve, and the general despondency thence arising, were evils perhaps more than sufficient to counterbalance these advantages. Of this indeed General Moore seems to have been sensible; for, after learning that, by the new direction of the French force, his junction would be rendered practicable, he chose rather to form it, than to proceed in his former plan.

Meanwhile, not only weakness, but treachery, reigned in the Spanish councils. No man had hitherto maintained a higher reputation for loyalty and ability than Morla. This man, whether from the beginning of the revolution, or whether after seeing fortune inclining with such mighty preponderance on the side of the usurper, had determined to sacrifice fame and duty at the shrine of interest. But his treachery was veiled by such deep dissimulation, that not the slightest suspicion arose. On the contrary, he had acquired the entire confidence of the Junta, especially in every thing that related to military affairs. They appointed him President of their Military Board; they intrusted him with the defence of Madrid, and they fixed upon him to concert operations with the English Generals. At his instigation, the Spanish Generals had been compelled to abandon that cautious system which they had hitherto pursued hence their immediate discomfiture, which might otherwise have been delayed, if not averted. How he pro

ceeded with Madrid it is needless to say. Nor was he less industrious in the third part of his plan. His great object was to draw the English army into the centre of Spain, where Buonaparte, doubtless, expected to be able to surround and overwhelm it.— With this view, he procured a conference with General Hope and Lord William Bentinck. These able officers do not seem to have entertained any suspicion of his real designs; they merely complain, that no specific plan was presented to them, and that all they could make out was, that Morla was anxious, that as much of the British army as possible should be united in the centre of Spain. This wish he again urged in a letter to Gen. Moore written on the 2d of December, at the very moment he was treating with Buonaparte for the surrender of Madrid. Mr Frere, who was not a military man, became an easy convert to this opinion, and urged it in those wellknown letters, written with considerable acuteness and ingenuity, but in a stile of petulance and asperity, altogether indecent and undiplomatic. He even went so far as to prefer a request, that a Col. Charmily, whom he sent to Moore, should be examined before a council of war, in the evident expectation of controlling the opinion of the commander in chief by that of his inferior officers. Moore seems to have behaved with extreme propriety on this trying occasion; and while he shews a deep sense of the injurious conduct adopted towards him, carefully avoids its leading to any quarrel by which the public service might be injured. By these channels, however, he learned that Buonaparte was directing his principal efforts against Madrid, and that this city was exhibiting symptoms of resistance. Sir John never seems to have been sanguine on this subject; less so, indeed, we think, than he was entitled to be; since even on the French accounts it appears evident, that, had its chiefs been tolerably able

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