days, nor means of procuring any. By different letters which he wrote at the commencement of his retreat, it appears that he had hoped to maintain a footing in Galicia. It does not appear exactly at what time, and from what motives, this design was given up. It would seem, however, that the circumstances of nothing being done by the Spaniards, either in the South or North, the very harassing nature of the retreat, the consequent loss of baggage and equipments, and general exhausted state of the army, had finally determined him to consult its safety alone, and to return to England.

On the arrival of the army at Lugo,

it was consiederd that the march to

Corunna was much,shorter than to Vigo, and that the former place was more convenient for embarking troops. Orders were therefore given to the transports to proceed round to it. It does appear that this plan was adopted somewhat too late. Its propriety seems to have been evident, from the moment that the resolution was taken of falling back by the way of Astorga, rather than by that of Orense.

The remainder of the retreat was conducted with a disastrous degree of rapidity, rendered necessary by the pressure of a superior army in its rear. The army, however, being collected at Betanzos, somewhat greater order was observed in the rest of its march. Its arrival at Corunna, and the subsequent events, must be fresh in the recollection of our readers. The author estimates the force of the British en

gaged at somewhat less than 15,000, that of the enemy at fully 20,00. The accounts of Sir John Moore's conduct and fall is interesting.

It was the opinion of Sir John Moore, that the presence of the chief in command near to the point where the great struggle occurs, is often most useful*.

Perhaps Sir John Moore learnt this doctrine from the practice of one of his masters in the art of war, Sir Ralph Abercromby,

He probably thought it peculiarly requisite to follow this rule here, as the position of his right wing was bad; and if the troops on that point gave way, the ruin of the army was inevitable.

Lord William Bentinck's brigade, consisting of three incomparable regiments, the 4th, 42d, and 50th, maintained this dangerous post. The Guards were in their rear; and, to prevent the right being turned, Captain Napier was dispatched to desire General Paget to bring up the reserve to the right of Lord William Bentinck.

Sir David Baird leading on his division had his arm shattered with a grape shot; and was forced to leave the field.

the heights, and the two hostile lines of infantry mutually advanced, beneath a

The French artillery plunged from

shower of balls.

They were still separated from each other by stone walls and hedges, which intersected the ground: but as they closed, it was perceived that the French line extended beyond the right flank of the British; and a body of the Enemy were observed moving up the valley to turn it. An order was instantly given, and the half of the 4th Regiment, which formed this flank, fell back, refusing their right, and making an obtuse angle with the other half. In this positionthey commenced a heavy flanking fire; and the General, watching the manœuvre, called out to them, "That was exactly what I wanted to be done."

He then rode up to the 50th regiment, commanded by Majors Napier and Stanhope; who got over an inclosure in their front, and charged most gallantly. The General, ever an admirer of valour, exclaimed, "Well done the fiftieth well done, my Majors * They drove the Enemy out of the village of Elvina, with great slaughter.

199

In

cromby, under whom he commanded the reserve in Egypt; and though he possessed his full confidence, yet he told the author, that in the hottest fire he usually found Sir Ralph at his elbow.

Sir John used this expression from having recommended them for the rank they held. The Honourable Major Stanhope was second son to Earl Stanhope, and ne

phew to the late Mr Pitt. The General entertained a sincere friendship

In this conflict Major Napier, advancing too far, was wounded in several places, and taken prisoner; and Major Stanhope unfortunately received a mortal wound.

Sir John Moore proceeded to the 42d, addressing them in these words, "Highlanders, remember Egypt." They rushed on, driving the French before them, till they were stopped by a wall. Sir John accompanied them in this charge, and told the soldiers that he was "well "pleased with their conduct."

He sent Captain Hardinge to order up a battalion of Guards to the left flank of the Highlanders; upon which the of ficer commanding the light company conceived that, as their ammunition was nearly expended, they were to be relieyed by the Guards, and began to fall back but Sir John, discovering the mistake, said to them, "My brave 42d, "join your comrades, ammunition is coming, and you have your bayonets." They instantly obeyed, and all moved

66

forward.

Captain Hardinge now returned, to report that the Guards were advancing. While he was speaking, and pointing cut the situation of the battalion, a hot fire was kept up, and the Enemy's artil lery played incessantly on the spot.Sir John Moore was too conspicuous. A cannon-ball struck his left shoulder, and beat him to the ground.

He raised himself, and sat up with an unaltered countenance, looking intently at the Highlanders, who were warmly engaged. Captain Hardinge threw himself from his horse, and took him by the hand, then, observing his anxiety, he told him the 42d were advancing upon which his countenance immediate. ly brightened.

His friend Colonel Graham now dismounted, to assist him; and, from the composure of his features, entertained hopes that he was not even wounded d; but, observing the horrid laceration and effusion of blood, he rode off for surgeons.

The General was carried from the field on a blanket, by a serjeant of the 42d, and some soldiers. On the way he ordered Captain Hardinge to report his wound to General Hope, who assumed

the command.

P. 214.

Several very interesting details are given by private friends, of his behaOctober 1809

viour during his last moments. The first is by Captain Hardinge.

“I had been ordered by the Commander in Chief to desire a battalion of the Guards to advance; which battalion was at one time intended to have dislodged a corps of the enemy from a large house and garden on the opposite side of the valley; and I was pointing out to the General the situation of the battalion, and our horses were touching, at the very moment that a cannon-shot from the enemy's battery carried away his left shoulder and part of the collarbone, leaving the arm hanging by the

flesh.

"The violence of the stroke threw him off his horse, on his back. Not a muscle of his face altered, nor did a sigh betray the least sensation of pain. he pressed mine forcibly, casting his

“I dismounted, and, taking his hand,

eyes very anxiously towards the 42d regiment, which was hotly engaged; and his countenance expressed satisfaction, when I informed him that the regiment was advancing.

"Assisted by a soldier of the 42d, he was removed a few yards behind the shelter of a wall.

"Colonel Graham Balgowan and Captain Woodford about this time came up; and perceiving the state of Sir John's wound, instantly rode off for a surgeon.

"The blood flowed fast; but the attempt to stop it with my sash was useless, from the size of the wound.

Sir John assented to being removed in a blanket to the rear. In raising him for that purpose, his sword, hanging on the wounded side, touched his arm, and became entangled between his legs. I perceived the inconvenience, and was in the act of unbuckling it from his waist, when he said, in his usual tone and manner, and in a very distinct voice, It is as well as it is. I had rather it should go out of the field with 'me.'

"Here I feel that it would be improper for my pen to venture to express the admiration with which I am penetrated, in thus faithfully recording this instance of the invincible fortitude, and military delicacy of this great man.

"He was borne by six soldiers of the 42d and Guards, my sash supporting him in an easy posture.

66

Observing the resolution and composure

"He spoke to the surgeons on their examining his wound, but was in such pain he could say little.

"After some time, he seemed very anxious to speak to me, and at intervals got out as follows: Anderson, you know that I have always wished to die this way.' He then asked, Are the French beaten?' which he repeated to every one he knew as they came in. I hope the people of England will be satisfied!-I hope my Country 'will do me justice!'- Anderson,— you will see my friends as soon as you 'can. Tell them-every thing.-Say to my mother,'-Here his voice quite failed, and he was excessively agitated. - Hope-Hope-I have much to say 'to him, but cannot get it out-Are Colonel Graham-and all my Aides. de Camp well?' (a private sign was made by Colonel Anderson not to in. form him that Captain Burrard *, one of his Aides-de-camp, was wounded in the action.) I have made my will, and have remembered my servants.• Colbourne has my will, and all my

papers.'

and then said to me, Anderson, reand tell him member you go to

it is my request, and that I expect he ' will give Major Colbourne, a Lieute'nant-Colonelcy.-He has been long 'with me, and I know him most worthy of it.' He then asked Major Colbourne, if the French were beaten ?' And, on being told they were on every point, he said, 'It's a great satisfaction 'for me to know we have beaten the French.-Is Paget in the room?" On my telling him, no; he said, Re'member me to him.-It's General Paget I mean he is a fine fellow.-I feel myself so strong-I fear I shall be long dying. It is great uneasiness-It is great pain. Every thing Francois says is right. I have the greatest confi. 'dence in him.'

"He thanked the Surgeons for their trouble. Captains Percy and Stanhope, two of his Aides-de-camp, then came into the room. He spoke kindly to both, and asked Percy *, if all his Aidesde-camp were well?

"After some interval he said, 'Stanhope f-remember me to your sister.' He pressed my hand close to his body, and in a few minutes died without a struggle.

"This was every syllable he uttered, as far as I can recollect, except asking occasionally to be placed in an easier posture,"

"P. ANDERSON. Lieut.-Col." P. 223.

Upon the whole, we are of opinion that this volume will add to the reputation of General Moore; that it will shew him to have possessed not merely (of which there could be no doubt) the talents of a General of division, gallantry, activity and precision of movement; but also those which are peculiarly required in a commander in chief, extensive views, foresight and mature reflection. Even if we should conceive him to have erred in some particular measures, this is no more than must be expected from the ab

lest

* The Honourable Captain Percy, son of Lord Beverley.

The Honourable Captain Stanhope, third son to Earl Stanhope, and nephew to the late Mr Pitt.

lest officers, especially in a campaign, so essentially different from any which has recently been experienced by a British army. The retreat was certainly glorious to the military character of this country; the enemy, notwithstanding the superior numbers with which they pressed upon, us never attacked without being repulsed. The loss of our army, though certainly considerable, seems to have arisen chiefly. from the impossibility of maintaining strict discipline on so long a march, and particularly retreat. Nor, while we do justice to British valour, must we forget that that valour has repeatedly proved unavailing, even in less arduous circumstances, when not seconded by the skill of the commander. The following account of the manner in which General Moore employed his time during his advance into Spain, gives a strong view of his industry :

He always rose between three and four in the morning, lighted his fire and candle by a lamp which was placed in his room, and employed himself in writ. ing till eight o'clock, when the officers of the family were assembled for breakfast.

After breakfast he received the General Officers, and all persons with whom he had business; and the necessary orders were issued. His pen was frequently in his hand in the forenoon also; for he wrote all his letters himself. He always rode before dinner for an hour or two, either to view the troops, or to reconnoitre the country.

His table was plentiful; and the company varied from fourteen to twenty officers. He was a very plain and moderate eater, and seldom drank more than three or four glasses of wine, conversing with his officers with great frankness and cheerfulness. His portfolio was usually opened again before he went to bed; but, unless kept up by business, he never sat up later than ten o'clock.

P. 62.

Since we are in the midst of Spanish affairs, it is difficult to refrain from hazarding some reflections on that ques

tion, regarding her probable prospects of securing her independence, which has been so eagerly and so variously discussed. To the extravagant and romantic hopes which were inspired by the first movements of that people, there seems to have succeeded, in this country, an entire despondence, and even sentiments of decided hostility to every thing Spanish. Public opinion is generally extreme and precipitate; and we doubt if the turn which it has now taken be much more reason. able than that which it assumed at the first unexpected appearance of resistance in that country. The grounds upon which men are generally anticipating a speedy and fatal issue to this eventful struggle are doubtless plausible; yet to those who look a little deeper, there will still appear circumstances sufficient to encourage hopes of a different result.

The ground of unfavourable anticipations with regard to Spanish affairs rests chiefly on two deficiencies; on the want of ability in her councils, and of courage in her armies. These, certainly, are not trifling wants; but, on the contrary, such as, if without remedy, must preclude all hopes of a favourable issue. But the question is, whether they arise from any radical deficiency in the character of the nation; whether they did not necessarily spring from the singular situation in which it stood; and whether they are not wants which time is likely to supply.

The government is weak: this requires no proof. It has been too justly observed, that "it has exhibited only the faults of popular governments, combined with the failings of decrepit monarchies." (Ed. Rev.)

But upon a little consideration we shall find that this is no more than might naturally be expected under the peculiar circumstances, A free government, and great public emergencies, have indeed the most sure and powerful tendency to call forth ta

lents

lents, and to form great men. But this effect is not instantaneous; it requires time to shew itself. Great men must be formed by discipline and experience; and after being formed, they must have opportunities to produce and display themselves. No government perhaps was more inimical to their growth than the ancient one of Spain, both from being absolute, and from the political unimportance into which it had sunk. Now, when in consequence of the peculiar circumstances of the French usurpation, the despotic head was suddenly struck off, the nation merely lost the unity of an absolute, without having yet time to acquire the energies of a free government; they were managed at first even worse than by their ancient rulers. Still we have no doubt that a popular government, and the necessity for talents, will in time produce the effect of calling them forth. This process has not indeed proceeded with all the rapidity that might be wished.Yet affairs are not conducted so very ill as at first; an evident anxiety appears to place proper officers at the head of the army; and in regard to domestic arrangements, the most liberal system has been adopted. This last circumstance, with the fermentation at present prevailing in the public mind, seems to promise, that improvement will proceed with accelerated rapidity.

Good councils would little avail, unless there were hands to execute them. If the armies do not stand, what resistance can be expected? Upon this subject we must observe, that it is when fighting in the open field only that this cowardice has become se conspicuous. Now, by the experience of all ages, new levies have been found unfit to contend with veterans. Before we can expect the Spanish armies to do this, we must give them time to become regulars, which they certainly will in two or three campaigns, and perhaps sooner:

In services for which new troops are fit, such as the defence of towns, the Spaniards have surpassed the glory of every other nation; and they seem also to be prosecuting a partisan warfare with considerable success.

If we look into the early part of the history of the French revolution, we shall find all the military disorders so much complained of in the Spanish: the same shameful routes and dispersions; the same quarrels between the generals, and foolish interferences of the civil bodies; the same deficiency in every species of supply and equipment. Yet in two years all these evils were surmounted, and the French arms triumphed in every direction.

From all these considerations, if Spain could by any means be kept afloat for two or three years, we should entertain very little doubt indeed of her final success. But the important and doubtful question remains whether this time will be allowed her; whether the enemy will not, by an overwhelming rapidity, crush at once all the buds of future energy. It is certainly impossible to restrain our fears, when we consider the nature of the power which is to be brought against them. Yet there are not wanting resources, which, if duly managed, may be sufficient to protract the contest, and to balance the inferiority of the Spanish troops. These are chiefly mountains and fortresses. The latter of these are not indeed very strong in themselves, but are capable, it appears, of being rendered so, by the patriotism of the inhabitants. With regard to the mountains, although they have never stopt the advance of the French armies to any particular point, yet they seem, from experience, to offer very great facilities for that species of irregular warfare, which alone the Spaniards at present are fit to carry on. None of the mountainous districts have hitherto been found tenable by the enemy. A stronger instance

cannot