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and may, in an enlarged sense, be termed philology. Each of these the philosopher necessarily pre-supposes granted ere he can proceed a single step in exhibiting or interpreting his system, since either being annulled the others vanish: they are therefore co-essential to all discussion.

10. If hence perfect logic and perfect language be essential to the philosopher's acquiring and conveying a perfect system of knowledge; and if the former must depend also upon the proofs and perfection of the latter, it is clear he must alternately improve his logic and language by his system, and his system by his logic and language, while they are altogether reciprocally dependent or co-essential. The minutest portion of knowledge involves, therefore, words, thoughts, and things, in tri-une relation, and man, can but approach perfection in his knowledge as in his works, and this by an alternity which is infinite.

11. Again, analytically: if the primary relations of the universal system be the ultimate result, or educts of its analysis; and if the philosopher man as subject, knowledge as view, and universal existence as object, be the necessary universal substructure and constituents of the universal system, they are the proper matter of such universal analysis.

12. Now the philosopher must either relinquish all claim to knowledge and existence, or admit something which knows, and something which acts, (for nothing exists but in action); and if something which knows and acts, he must also admit something which is known and something which is acted on. Farther also the knowledge and existence are neither that which knows and that which acts, nor that which is known and that which is acted upon, but the effects of their concurrence. All existence is therefore the effect of action, and passion, and consequently of an agent and patient; and all knowledge is the effect of the concurrence of that which knows and that which is known.

15. It is hence clear that there are two universal kinds of effects, those of knowledge and those of existence, the first of which may be called intelligent or internal, and the latter exigent or external; and as the effects denominated external are those of an agent and patient, and in like manner the effects denominated internal arise with the agency and re-agency of that which knows and that which is known; and if the philosopher must know or admit existence and the external, it follows that it can be only by an agency and re-agency, or concurrence between that which knows and that which exists or acts; and this concurrence must necessarily produce a third kind or universal distinction of effects differing from those either of the external or internal, and which as produce of these two may be called medial, or sentient, being the effects of sensation in man.

14. It follows that the actions, passions, and effects denominated internal, external and medial, constitute all knowledge, existence, and sensation, accord with the relations of the synthetical view upon which this analysis is founded, and compose together the totality of the universal system and on the other hand it is evident that: action, passion, and effect, are co-essential to the external, internal and medial, and these latter to each other in strict tri-unity.

15. Such are the principles and relations resulting from an universal or descending analysis which goes from the whole to its parts or constituents; but it has appeared that there are also general and particular relations of the system comprehended in the universal; and as the general are but collections of particulars, it is only expedient for completeness, by particular analysis, to ascertain the particularity, generality, and in a word, the universality of these principles.

16. The particulars of the universe are either those of knowledge, existence or sensation ;-take then for the purpose of this latter analysis any particular sensible thing (because such is the effect of the concurrence of that which knows and that which exists, and therefore involves with them the principles of all things) and abstract in thought, or separate therefrom every of its sensible qualities or characters, its colour, sound, shape, taste, &c. there still remains a something called substance in which no sensible quality appears, and is acknowledged by consciousness as a mere passivity.

17. Examine now the sensible qualities, thus abstracted or separated, one by one, and further abstract or separate them from the sensations had of them, they are no longer the sensible qualities of a substance, but they remain upon, and are acknowledged by, consciousness as mere action.

18. From the latter abstraction or separation a something yet remains, which is not this action, but a mere passivity or sentient in concurrence with which this action resided or arose, and as such acknowledged by consciousness. But this passivity differs from that before mentioned, since consciousness places the first external to the mind and the latter internal; the latter is therefore an internal passivity or sentient, and the former an external passivity or sub


19. And both these conceptions of external and internal passivity are something distinct from consciousness, and all that remains to the mind; if therefore by a last effort of abstraction, we again separate or distinguish these conceptions from consciousness, consciousness regards itself as mere action; but this action differs from that before named, for consciousness places the former external to the mind, and this latter internal; the latter is therefore an internal activity, and the former an external activity.

20. It appears then that from the external action and passion the mind cognizes effects which are denominated external subsistences or material things. From the external action with the internal passivity the mind cognizes a second class of effects, which it places neither internal nor external but between the two, and which may therefore be denominated medial or effects of sensation. Thirdly, from the internal action and passion the mind cognizes a third class of effects which should be denominated internal or intellectual subsistences or conceptions; and finally action, passion, and effect refer as principles to existence, and the internal, external and medial to knowledge as relations.

21. Thus it appears also that the same universal principles result from this particular analysis which before sprung from the universal; that the agencies, passivities (or re-agencies) and efficiencies (or effects) of the internal, external and medial constitute all knowledge, existence and sensation, and consequently are universal; while it is, as before, evident that action, passion and effect are co-essential to the external, internal and medial, and these latter to each other in strict tri-unity.

22. This process has therefore afforded the first principles or relations, and entire outline of the philosophic plan of the universal system, of which the logical and philological plans are the mere counterparts or impressions, in deve loping which the philosopher discovers no new objects, or relations, but merely placing himself upon new ground, takes a different view of the system. Accordingly, in the first of these views we regard the universe objectively; in the second subjectively, and in the latter representatively. They are modes of comprehension or knowledge only, and disclose not the essence of the universe, which being the primary condition of knowledge must lie beyond its sphere unknowable. And here human reason is bound to do

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homage to ignorance and acknowledge a being and dependence it cannot know.

23. Now, since the two latter plans are copies or impressions of the former, their developement is a subsequent business of the philosopher; meanwhile he is bound, in the first instance, to take logic and language as he finds them, because no otherwise could proceed his attempt to interpret that system with which they are co-essential. It is expedient therefore that we drop the farther consideration of logic and philology, while we proceed in the developement of the philosophic plan or system of knowledge or science with reference to its objects.


24. The preceding analysis of knowledge and existence teaches that the primary relations or principles of science are what have been termed the internal, external, and medial, and that each of these by an appropriate action and passion, is the basis of a peculiar class of effects, and hence to each must belong a distinct science, being the three sciences immediately subordinate to philosophy or universal science.

25. Accordingly there is a science of the external, which comprehends every object of external existence or subsistence, and therewith all material nature. It is therefore termed physics, or natural philosophy.

26. Secondly, there is a science of the medial, compre hending whatever belongs to sensation, and may therefore be named æsthetics or philosophy of sense.

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27. And, thirdly, there is a science of the internal which comprehends whatever belongs to the internal subject or

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