ESSAY XXX. OBSERVATIONS on the CONSTITUTIONAL HA APPILY for the majority of mankind, who cannot be supposed to poffefs leisure or ability to engage in very elaborate or profound difcuffions, there are few questions of real importance and general concern which do not admit of being fimplified; or of being fo concisely and clearly stated, as to enable any man, not palpably deficient in knowledge or understanding, to form a true judgment concerning them. The interesting question refpecting the Establishment of a Regency during the incapacity of the reigning Sovereign, which, at a recent period, engroffed the public attention, appears to me of this description. Divested of the beauties of language, the pomp of declamation, and the graces of elocution, and reduced to the level of plain truth and common fense, the very fhadow of doubt and difficulty feems to vanish. In order to decide upon this question with propriety, two confiderations obviously present them felves to our notice and enquiry: I. Whether I. Whether any pofitive law exifts, or any precedents of fufficient authority can be adduced, to determine what was the legal and conftitutional mode of proceeding in the late extraordinary circumstances?-And, if not, II. What decifion, in this cafe, must be pronounced most agreeable to the principles of the English Government, the analogy of the Conftitution, and most likely to fecure the public welfare and happiness? It is univerfally admitted, that no law exifts, by which, provifion is made for preserving unimpaired, the energy of the executive power, during the total incapacity of the reigning Sovereign. Recourfe must therefore be had to precedents; but a very flight knowledge of English history will fuffice to show, that there are no precedents to be found which can or ought to be confidered as of the leaft authority, or which were in any degree applicable at the late alarming crifis. The precedent moft relied upon, occurs in the reign of Henry VI. who fucceeded his father while yet in his infancy. No Regency having been previously appointed by legislative authority, the two Houses of Parliament took upon them to confirm the late King's verbal nomination of the Dukes of Bedford and Glocefter to the government of the realms of France and England; reftraining however the authority of the latter, upon whom they conferred the title of Protector only, by fuch limitations as they deemed proper and expedient. But, are the irregular pro ceedings ceedings of a Parliament convened almoft 400 years ago, in a dark and barbarous age, before the principles of civil government were underftood, or thofe maxims of policy on which we at prefent lay the greatest ftrefs were established; in a word, before the Constitution itself exifted; Are thefe obfolete and arbitrary acts-acts which afford an unbounded scope for the indulgence of aristocratic and democratic ambition, to be elevated by us to the rank of a conftitutional precedent, and to be now, after the lapfe of fo many centuries, for the first time, regarded as poffeffing the authority and force of legal obligation? How abfurd and extravagant is the idea! The proceedings of that affembly may indeed be properly exhibited to our view, not as a precedent to be followed, but as an example to be deprecated and fhunned: For, had the Duke of Bedford, the King's elder uncle, and a prince of uncommon talents and unblemished integrity, been recognized Regent of the realm with full and undivided powers, in all human probability the fatal difafters of that unfortunate reign-difafters refulting from that daring spirit of faction and unprincipled ambition which the Protector had not fufficient authority to repress, would have been effectually prevented; and thofe dreadful scenes of national anarchy and confufion had never been exhibited, which ended in the downfal and ruin of the royal Houfe of Lancaster, and in the elevation of the Houfe of York: though, in confequence of the neceffary and beneficial revolution revolution effected by Henry IV. and sanctioned by parliamentary authority, that Monarch and his defcendants poffeffed a title to the Crown, not inferior, in validity, to that of the House of Brunfwick. But the proceedings of the Convention in 1688, which declared the abdication of King James II. and the confequent vacancy of the, Throne, and which placed the Crown of these realms on the head of the Prince of Orange, were alfo urged for the purpose of demonstrating the proper and legal extent of parliamentary authority. If a Convention can elect a King, " a fortiori," a Parliament may elect a Regent. But this is mere fophiftry. It is evident that no political system, or Constitution, can ever make provision for cafes which imply its previous fubverfion. The Revolution of 1688, furnishes, I acknowledge, the noblest of all precedents. It exhibits the glorious precedent of a brave and free people rifing up as one man, to wreft the fceptre of Government from the hands of a Tyrant. At that period, the ends for which all just Government was originally instituted, could only be fecured by a violation of the regular and established forms of the Conftitution. Though the fofter term, abdication, was adopted by way of indulgence to the unhappy prejudices then too prevalent, this pretended abdication was really and truly a depofition: and, under colour of the legal maxim, "Nemo eft hæres viventis," the claim of the heir-apparent was wifely and effectually barred; and the Prince and Princefs of VOL. II. Orange L Orange were, in the name of all the people of England, declared King and Queen. Whoever attempts to justify these proceedings by an appeal to the letter of the Law, and the forms of the Conftitution, will find himself miserably embarrassed. The political rectitude of these acts, rests upon much higher grounds-upon the basis of the public happiness, and of the common rights of human nature. The unrivalled excellence of the English Conftitution, I readily admit; and in the regular courfe of Government, the wisdom of the maxims on which it is founded is ftrikingly apparent. But if the sacred and unalienable rights which this Constitution is intended to guard, be violated on the part of the Monarch, a temporary violation of its forms becomes indifpenfably neceffary on the part of the people, in order effectually to protect, and ultimately to restore it. But, how is this illuftrious precedent applicable to the late extraordinary fituation of public affairs? Will any one pretend that it was neceffary, in the cafe now under confideration, to violate the forms of the Conftitution, in order to preferve its effence, and to re-establish it upon a more permanent basis? No-the object was merely to establish a conftitutional precedent, in a cafe which happily for the Nation never indeed before occurred, but which certainly did not require or admit of any deviation from those wife and falutary political maxims, which have long been juftly regarded as the bulwarks of the English Conftitution.-And this renders it proper, II. To |