that no member of the other house, while he continued fo, would be fo imprudent as to receive any reward, or indeed any favour from the crown; because, if he did, his own declaration would be an accufation against him, upon which he would be obliged to ftand his trial before a judicature which, confidering the number of judges, can never be fteady in its judgments, and in a cafe which cannot be thoroughly cleared up by proofs of any kind, but must always, in a great measure, depend upon the opinion his judges have of his innocence and merit. In fuch a cafe, and before fuch a judicature, where no man can be certain either of the number or of the perfons of those that are to be his judges, I am fure no wife man would run the risk of expofing himself to a trial, by accepting of any reward or gratuity from the crown, while he continued a member of the other houfe; and, if the expectation of an immediate reward be allowed to be a great incitement to worthy actions, as, I believe, it will, it must be allowed, that the paffing of this bill into a law, would very much difcourage all those who may hereafter be members of the other house, from endeavouring to ferve the publick in any other capacity, which would very much derogate from the prefent character of that branch of our legiflature, and might at laft render it contemptible, or fo factious, that it would be impoffible to govern the fociety according to the forms prescribed by our conftitution.

This bill therefore, my Lords, if it fhould be paffed into a law, would not only be inconvenient and dangerous to those who may hereafter happen to be members of the other house, but it would be of the most dangerous confequence to our conftitution: for, if the members of the other house were of no service to their country, in any capacity but that of their being members of one of the branches of our legislature; and if they did nothing, as fuch, but agree to what was propofed by the minifters of the crown, which would be the case under a juft and wife admini

ftration; the house itself would become contemptible among the people, and this would make it eafy for fome future ambitious prince to overturn our conftitution, by laying that houfe entirely afide. On the other hand, if a majority of the members, in order to recommend themselves to the notice of their country, fhould become factious, and oppofe even the jufteft and wifeft measures that could be propofed by the administration; unless the complexion of the houfe could be changed by a new election, which, confidering the popularity of an oppofition to court-meafures, would always be extremely precarious, the conftitution would be brought into an impoffibility of exifting: for the crown would be under a neceffity of yielding to the factious majority in the house of Commons, or of attempting to govern without a parliament. If in this attempt the crown fhould fucceed, our conftitution would be overturned, and an abfolute government established; and late experience has shewn us what we are to expect from the crown's yielding to a turbulent faction in the other houfe; for fuch a faction would never be fatisfied with any reasonable conceffion: from one conceffion they would afpire to another, till at last they had left the crown nothing to yield; and thus a commonwealth would again be established, which of course would foon deviate into a fole tyranny, under fome one or other of the factious leaders.

From what I have faid, my Lords, I think it is evident, that the methods proposed by this bill for preventing corruption, are both improper and dangerous; yet, fo great an enemy am I to corruption, fo fond am I of every method that may in the least contribute to prevent it, that I should agree to the bill now under our confideration, if I thought it would have the least effect. But I am fully convinced, that it will be found altogether ineffectual. I am really furprised, how any Lord can imagine it will have the leaft effect. If we fuppofe a man so abandoned to all virtue and honour, as to betray his coun try for the fake of a fecret bribe or pen

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fion,

trouble about what has been, or may be done in the other house; and yet I find the chief objection made ufe of against this bill, is, that the other house may make a wrong use of it. Shall we, my Lords, refufe to do right, because another affembly may do wrong? Shall we refuse to give a man a fword for defending himself, when we know he is in danger of being attack'd, because he may turn the point, and stab himfelf with it? This, my Lords, is a very ftrange fort of argument. But, now I am up, I fhall beg leave to fhew, that there is nothing new intended by this bill, nor any power given to the other house, but what they have already.

Before I do this, my Lords, I muft observe, that upon a question for going into a committee to confider of a bill for preventing corruption, I was furprised to hear the Noble Lord that fpoke laft, find fault with those who had endeavoured to fet in a true and clear light the monftrous deformity, and the fatal effects of that political diftemper; for furely, the more fenfible we are of its deformity and fatal confequences, the more we shall abhor the crime; and the more we abhor it, the more ready every one will be to agree to our fpending one day at least, in endeavouring to find a remedy for the contagious diftemper. I fhall grant, that none of your Lordships have attempted to justify corruption; I hope no Lord will ever dare to do fo in this house: but without doors it has been justified as a necessary means of government; nay pamphlets, or rather libels upon the nation, have been wrote for this very purpose, and supposed to have been countenanced by those whose bufinefs and duty it was to have fuppreffed them. But tho' none of your Lordfhips have endeavoured to juftify corruption, yet I cannot think, that thofe who oppofe this queftion, are fo fenfible of its fatal effects as they ought to be; for, fuppofe this bill imperfect, fuppofe the methods propofed ineffectual, yet this can be no reafon for our refufing to go into a committee upon the bill we may be able to amend the

bill, fo as to make it a perfect and effectual bill; and as the Noble Lord who fpoke last seems to think, that by an able and willing physician, a specifick may be found for every political diftemper, I hope he will give us his affiftance; for I make no queftion of his ability, and I hope he will not, by his giving his negative to this question, give me any room to doubt of his will.

How the Noble Lord came to imagine, that a Gentleman who had received a just reward from the crown, or that any Gentleman would be excluded, by this bill, from having a feat in the other house, I cannot comprehend. My Lords, I have perufed the bill with all poffible care, and I can find no words by which any man is excluded from having a feat in the other house, unless he refufes to take the oath prefcribed by the bill. But the Noble Lord fays, the other house may, upon his making the declaration propofed, exclude him by a vote of their houfe. That is to fay, they may expel him. In this cafe, can it be faid, that the Gentleman is excluded by this bill? No, my Lords; he is excluded by their vote; and that vote cannot be founded upon this bill, but upon the common law, or upon the laws now in being against penfioners. Therefore, this bill contains no extenfion, nor the least innovation of any of the laws now in being, with respect to those that have, or have not a right to fit and vote in the houfe of Commons; nor can that house, by this bill, acquire any right or power but what they now enjoy.

I shall grant, my Lords, that no member ought to be expelled by the other houfe without a juft caufe; but, in this refpect, it must be allowed, that the members of the other houfe are the fole and abfolute judges. Suppose they should by a vote expel a Gentleman unjustly, can that vote or sentence be now questioned in any other judicature or affembly? My Lords, it is now as abfolute and as irreversible as it can be, fhould this bill be paffed into a law; and, if they have hitherto made no wrong use of this abfolute and uncontroulable power, why should we fufpect their do

ing fo in time to come? With refpect to the rewards and gratuities that are given by the crown for real publick fervices, they are always well known, and openly acknowledged; they have always been fo: and, as the other house has never yet thought of looking upon any of them as a penfion or bribe, or of expelling a member on account of his having received fuch a reward or gratuity, tho' the receiving of it was openly and without any legal compulfion avowed, can we think that a Gentleman's acknowledging, in pursuance of an act of parliament, the receipt of fuch a gratuity or reward, will any way alter the conduct of the other house in this refpect With regard to fuch gratuities or rewards, let the future conduct of the other house be what it will, it can be no way influenced by this bill; because, as fuch rewards and gratuities are publickly given, and as publickly received, a proof can never be wanting; the other houfe will always hear of them, tho' no fuch bill as this fhould ever pafs,; and they may, if they have a mind, expel the receiver, either upon his own acknowledgment, or upon a proof, or upon common fame; but I must deny, that they can load him with infamy, or make the world believe that he is a corrupt betrayer of his truft.

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Real infamy, my Lords, is a punishment that can be inflicted by nothing but the juftice of the fentence; for, when a court or affembly decrees that to be a * crime which is really a virtue, or finds a man guilty that to the world appears to be innocent, the infamy recoils upon the judges, and their fentence does honour to the perfon condemned. This would be the cafe, if ever the other houfe fhould unjustly expel a man for receiving a juft reward for fome publick fervice: the nation he had ferved, and the King who had rewarded him, would rife up in his vindication; and a fentence of infamy, as well as diffolution, would certainly be paffed upon fuch a factious affembly. But, if corruption fhould ever fpread over a majority of the other house if a minifter fhould, by flattery, gain the abfolute direction of

his fovereign, and by bribes and penfions, the direction of the house of Commons; no man will fuppofe, I believe, that fuch a houfe would ever expel a member for receiving a gratuity or reward from the crown; and though a fentence of infamy might very probably be paffed upon the whole affembly by the nation, yet, no fentence of diffolution would ever be paffed upon it by the crown. It is this, my Lords, that may render the other house both contemptible and factious. It may become a ministerial faction for oppreffing the people and betraying the fovereign : then, indeed, it will become contemptible; the very name of parliament would, in a fhort time, become hateful to the people; and then it would not only be eafy for an ambitious prince, but happy for the nation, to have the use of parliaments laid entirely afide.

The danger therefore of not preventing corruption in the other house is very great; and as to the dangers pretended to arife from the methods propofed by this bill for preventing it, there is not the leaft foundation for them; because they arise not from this bill, but from a fuppofed abuse of power in the other house; and this, I have fhewn, that houfe is as liable to run into, fhould this bill never pafs, as they can be supposed to be, after it is paffed into a law. Nay, they will be more liable to run into an abufe of their power, fhould no fuch bill as this be ever paffed; because a corrupt house of Commons, under the influence of an arbitrary and wicked minifter, may more probably run into an abuse of their power, against the friends and fervants of their country, and continue that abufe longer, than a factious houfe of Commons can be fuppofed to do, against the friends and fervants of the crown; for this plain reafon, because the crown may, and certainly will put an end to the power of the latter, as foon as they begin to abuse it; but the crown will never put an end to the power of the former, as long as the King happens to remain under the direction of fuch a minifter. There is not

there

therefore the least shadow of reafon for faying, that the methods proposed by this bill for preventing corruption can be inconvenient or dangerous, either to the conftitution, or to thofe who may hereafter happen to be members of the other house; and, as to their being improper, because of the trifling gratuities members may fometimes receive from the crown, the objection, I think, is as ill founded. My Lords, if a Gentleman of the other house should receive a horse, a watch, or any other trifle from the crown, I can fee no impropriety in obliging him to declare it: if he receives it upon any honourable account, I am fure he will, he ought to declare it, whether he obliged by law to do fo or no; and, I am fure, there is no impropriety in our taking every method that can be thought of, for preventing the members of the other houfe from receiving a prefent from the crown upon any difhonourable confideration.

Now, my Lords, with regard to the effect this bill may have upon the abandoned, I fhall grant, the fin of perjury will have very little effect upon them; but the penalties of perjury will have an effect even upon the most abandoned, otherwife we must fuppofe, that the laws now in being against penfioners are ridiculous. When a crime can be fecretly committed, I fhall grant, it is a great encouragement to its being often committed; but all crimes are committed under an expectation of secrecy, yet, we find they are often difcovered: and corruption is not one of that fort of crimes that may the moft fecretly be committed, becaufe there must always be at least two perfons concerned; and if we should lay a penalty upon the corruptor as well as the corrupted, these companions in iniquity may, as others do, impeach one another. Therefore our adding the penalties of perjury to the penalties already by law inflicted, will certainly have fome effect upon the most abandoned, and the fin of perjury will, I hope, prevent fome from accepting of any corrupt gratuity from the crown; for tho' it be wrong to accept of any fuch gratuity, yet, it has been,

and may often be accepted, without the receiver's fuppofing he thereby betrays that truft which is repofed in him by his country.

But the Noble Lords, who have spoke against this bill, are all under a mistake when they fuppofe, that the penalties, already by law inflicted can, even in cafe of a discovery, be made effectual against every fort of corruption; and, to fhew this, my Lords, I must observe, that corruption is of four forts. It is either by way of penfion during pleafure; or by way of penfion during a term of years; or, it is by way of a fum of money paid for the whole dirty work of a feffion; or by way of a fum paid and repeated for every particular infamous jobb. The first two forts were long thought fo innocent, that it was a question, whether fuch men should be excluded from their feats in the other houfe, and therefore it became neceffary to exclude them by exprefs ftatute, under the penalties mentioned in thofe ftatutes; but before a man can be fubjected to thofe penalties, it must be proved, that he had a penfion settled upon him by fign-manual, or fome other fort of grant, either during pleasure or for a term of years: from thence it is plain, that neither of the two other forts of corruption can be brought within these, ftatutes, or fubjected to the penalties thereby inflicted; and this, I believe, is the chief reason that those penalties could never be recovered; because, if there are, or have been any penfioners in the other house, thofe penfioners have been paid annually without any fign-, manual, or other grant for establishing them, and fuch penfioners or corrupt, perfons are neither excluded by thofe ftatutes, nor fubject to the penalties thereby inflicted. But, will any Lord fay, that fuch infamous corruption is not prohibited by law? My Lords, thofe that receive a fum of money for the dirty work of a feffion, or for any particular infamous jobb, are excluded from their feats in the other house by common law; and therefore it was unneceffary to make any exprefs ftatute for excluding them.. If the fact could

be