fund, the presumption of law is, that each paid his proportion of the same; and a joint action cannot be maintained. Lombard v. Cobb, 2 Shepley, 222. TENANT FOR LIFE. (Cutting of timber.) Tenant for life has no right to cut and carry away timber trees for sale; and if they be thus cut, they become the personal property of the reversioner, and he may maintain replevin for them. Richardson v. York, 2 Shepley, 216.

TENANT AT WILL. (Trespass.) A tenant at will, in actual possession of the land, may maintain an action of trespass, quare clausum, against a stranger to the title, for cutting and carrying away trees. Howard v. Sedgley, 2 Shepley, 439. TIME. (Reasonable-to rescind contract.) What is or is not a reasonable time, within which a party may rescind a contract, where no time is fixed by its terms, is a question of law. Kingsley v. Wallis, 2 Shepley, 57.

2. (Same.) In the absence of all testimony, tending to show that so long a period was necessary, it was held, that a delay of two and a half months was beyond a reasonable time. Ib. 3. (Reasonable demand.) When an act is to be performed upon reasonable demand, the party on whom the demand is made, is entitled to such time as is necessary to prepare himself to perform the act. Sewall v. Wilkins, 2 Shepley, 168.

4. (Same.) And as it was necessary for the party, on whom such demand was made, to travel to a place two hundred miles distant, in the months of March and April, to transact business with persons there, and to procure and to make papers, before the act could be performed; it was held, that he was entitled to a longer time than ten days. Ib.

TITLE. (Expenses incurred under mistake of.) If one knowingly, though passively, suffers another to purchase and spend money on land, under an erroneous opinion of title, without making known his claim, he shall not afterwards be permitted to exercise his legal right against such person. Carr v. Wallace, 7 Watts, 394.

TRESPASS. (Assent to act of.) If one in the act of commit

ting a trespass, by taking the personal property of another, receive his assent thereto, upon an agreement that the right to the property shall be determined by reference to a third person, trespass vi et armis will not afterwards lie to recover the value of the property, although the right clearly be in the plaintiff. Patterson v. Peironnet, 7 Watts, 337.

TROVER. (Estray.) A neglect by one who takes charge of an estray for the owner, to pursue the course prescribed by the statute, does not make him liable to an action of trover, unless he uses the estray or refuses to deliver it up on demand. Henry v. Richardson, 7 Watts, 557.

2. (Same.) Riding a horse taken up as an estray for the purpose of discovering the owner, is not such an act of conversion, as will support an action of trover. Ib.

3. (Conversion.) After a mortgage of goods had been put on record, the mortgager, who remained in possession, assigned the goods and aided the assignee in clandestinely removing them. out of the state. In trover by the mortgagee against the assignee and one B, who at the request of the mortgager carried away a portion of the goods and delivered them to the assignee, it was held, that if B did not act in concert with the assignee, or with intent to deprive the plaintiff of his property, the mere removal of a portion of the goods, from one place to another, at the request of the mortgager, was not of itself a conversion, because the mortgager, having rightful possession, might lawfully direct such removal, if it was not done with an intent to injure the mortgagee and deprive him of his property; or if the mortgager had such intent and was confederate with the assignee, yet if B did not know it or assent to it, his act done at the request of the mortgager would not be a conversion. Strickland v. Barrett, 20 Pick. 415.

TRUST. (For the benefit of one who is insolvent.) A benefactor may provide for a friend the means of subsistence for himself and family without exposing his bounty to the debts or improvidence of the beneficiary. He has an individual right of property in the execution of the trust, of which he cannot be de

prived by an execution against the trustee. Holdship v. Patterson, 7 Watts, 547. VENDORS AND PURCHASERS. (Transfer of property.) Where L. made a bill of sale, not under seal, of a horse to W. and F., warranting it from all incumbrances, and acknowledging the receipt of payment therefor by notes, and at the same time took back from them a writing, stating that the horse was purchased by them of L., and was to remain his property until the notes were paid, but that W. and F. were to have possession of the horse until the notes became due; and W. and F. took possession of the horse, and before the notes were due sold him to B., (exhibiting the bill of sale from L. as evidence of their title,) who was thereby induced to make the purchase, and who had no notice of any claim of L. The notes not being paid, L. demanded the horse, and on refusal to give it up, brought an action of trover. It was held, that L. was entitled to recover, either because he had not parted with his original title, or because he had acquired a new one by way of mortgage. Lane v. Borland, 2 Shepley, 77.

2. (Delivery.) Where a bill of sale was made of a quantity of boards to secure a debt due, and the vendor, pointing towards the boards then lying in several piles in a lumber-yard at a distance but within sight, said to the vendee, there are your boards, take care of them, and make the most of them; and the vendee thereupon went away, and suffered them to remain in the same place, without any other act on his part, for two months, when they were attached as the property of the vendor; it was held, that there was no such delivery, as would enable the vendee to hold the boards against the attaching officer. Cobb v. Haskell, 2 Shepley, 303.

WITNESS. (Promisor.) By St. 1799, c. 57, upon the death of one of two makers of a joint promissory note, the promise becomes several, and in an action upon such a note against the executor of the deceased promisor, the survivor is a competent witness for the executor, being first released by him. Reed v. Boardman, 20 Pick. 441.

2. (Recollection of.) A witness being sworn to tell the whole truth, he ought to do what is reasonable to enable him to perform that duty faithfully and sincerely, according to the spirit of his oath; and he may lawfully be required to look at memoranda or papers within his power, to aid his recollection. Chapin v. Lapham, 20 Pick. 467.

III. MISCELLANEOUS CASES.

In the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.

AN application was made to the court, for an injunction to restrain Mr. Collier from selling a cheap edition of Marryatt's new novel, “The Phantom Ship," on the ground, that the copyright had been purchased from the author by Messrs. Carey and Hart. It was contended, in favor of the application, that the author, at the time of the sale of the copy right, was a resident of the state of Pennsylvania, and, as such, had a right under the law of 1831, to dispose of his works in the same manner as any other American citizen.

Against the application, it was urged, that captain Marryat was not a resident of the country, and therefore was not entitled to avail himself of the provisions of the law. In the spring of 1837, he came to the United States, and travelled over a considerable part of the country. During his stay, he visited Philadelphia, and, while there, filed a declaration of his intention to become a citizen of the United States. It appeared, that, during the whole time of his stay in this country, he not only considered himself a British subject, but was an officer in the British navy; and, that, during the recent troubles in Canada, he offered his services to be 14ployed as an officer in the provincial army.

Mr. Justice BETTS said, that the only question for the court to decide was, whether capt. Marryat was a resident of the country. The term resident had been decided to mean a permanent inhabitant of the state. It was evident, that a man who was a mere transient visitant, whose family, business, and relations were all abroad, could not be considered a resident, and the filing of a declaration of an intention to become a citizen could not make him one. The court therefore decided against the application.

LEGISLATION.

MASSACHUSETTS. The legislature of this state, at the annual session thereof, which terminated on the 10th April, 1839, passed one hundred and sixty-six statutes, and ninety-two resolves. The acts are almost all of a local, private or special character.

Shop-breaking. Every person, who shall break and enter, in the night time, any office, shop, or warehouse, adjoining to, or occupied with a dwelling house, with intent to commit the crime of murder, rape, robbery, larceny, or any other felony, shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison not more than twenty years. Chap. 31.

Riots. Whenever any property of the value of fifty dollars or more shall be destroyed, or be injured to that amount, by any persons to the number of twelve or more, riotously, routously, or tumultuously assembled, the city or town, within which said property was situated, shall be liable to indemnify the owner thereof, to the amount of three fourths of the value of the property so destroyed, or of the amount of such injury thereto; to be recovered in an action of the case in any court proper to try the same: provided, the owner of such property shall use all reasonable diligence to prevent its destruction or injury by such unlawful assembly, and to procure the conviction of the offenders. And any city or town, which shall pay any sum under the provisions of this act, may recover the same against any or all of the persons who shall have destroyed or injured such property. Chap. 54.

Attachment. Provisions, necessary and intended for the use of a family, not exceeding fifty dollars in value, are exempted from attachment. Chap. 75..

Notaries Public. The fees of notaries public for the services