being as the earth. In one word, if matter be matter only because it is extended, by consequence all extension is matter; you cannot show any attribute different from extension, by virtue of which matter is matter. The impenetrability of bodies can only result from their extension; we can conceive no other grounds of it, and so you must grant that if spirits were extended they would be impenetrable, wherefore they would not be different from bodies by penetrability. After all, according to the common doctrine, the divine extension is neither more nor less impenetrable or penetrable, than that of body. Its parts, call them virtual as much as you please; its parts, I say, cannot be penetrated one by another, but they may be penetrated by the parts of matter. Do not you say the same thing concerning the parts of matter; they cannot penetrate one another, but they can penetrate the virtual parts of the divine extension? If you will but attentively consult common sense, you will perceive that when two extensions are penetratively in the same place, the one is as penetrable as the other; it cannot therefore be said that the extension of matter differs from any other sort of extension by impenetrability; it is therefore certain that all extension is matter, and consequently you only take from God the name of matter, and attribute to him the thing itself, when you affirm that he is extended since therefore, it was not possible for you to have done otherwise, you ought not to wonder that Simonides durst not deny that God was matter, neither durst he affirm it; he chose rather to be silent. We must remember that the most subtle Cartesians maintain that we can form no idea of a spiritual substance; we only know by experience that it thinks, but we know not what is the nature of that being whose modifications are thoughts; we know not what is the subject in which these thoughts exist, or the ground that supports them. Simonides perhaps, was hereby obliged not to say that God was a spirit; he could not conceive what a spirit was. A Jesuit who wrote a commentary upon Cicero's books "De Natura Deorum," does not blame Simonides for being so reserved, and wishes the ancient poets and philosophers, and the heretics had imitated him. What he observes concerning the incomprehensibility of God, deserves to be transcribed here: "What Tertullian imputes to ignorance, others have ascribed to modesty; and I wish the ancient philosophers and poets, and the heretics who came after them, had in this matter been as reserved as Thales or Simonides was; he would never have imputed to the divine nature, things so absurd, impious, and blasphemous, or ever have broached such detestable errors, as bold, impudent, and despicable men have done. All men are naturally very desirous of knowledge, but especially of the Deity; whereby we may perceive that God would be known by us, but he hath set certain bounds to our knowledge, beyond which we neither ought nor can proceed; and hath, as it were, erected pillars, and engraven thereon with his own finger, a ne plus ultra: for in things divine there are holy recesses into which the great God will not permit us to enter; but if any, puffed up with rashness and confidence, will presumptuously attempt it, the farther he goes the more he will be surrounded by darkness; so that he will be obliged to acknowledge the unsearchable majesty of the divine nature, and the imbecility of the human mind, and confess with Simonides, the longer I consider, the matter appears to me the more obscure.' As Pomponius Mela relates of a certain cave that with a delightful pleasure at first allured those that entered; till going still farther, a certain horror, and the majesty of the inhabiting Deity, forced them to retire. After * Lescaloperius in Ciceron. de Natura Deorum, l. i, p. 84, 85. ans. wards he quotes a remarkable passage of St Augustin. A French author looked upon Simonides' modesty as a pious action, and thence took occasion to inveigh against the boldness of the Eunomi"Remember," says he, "the pious modesty of Simonides, who having asked but one day of king Hiero to discourse of the divine essence before him, demanded afterwards two days, and then three, protesting that the more he thought upon it, the more he found it difficult to perform his promise for my part, I have no doubt but this humble acknowledgment of his ignorance was more acceptable to the Supreme Being, as much a heathen as Simonides was, than the boldness of a Eunomius and of that kind of Arians who followed him, and boasted of comprehending God as fully as he could comprehend himself." answer. Du Plessis Mornai, in the chapter wherein he proves by reasons and authorities, that it is impossible to comprehend God, did not forget Simonides' He observes, without quoting any body, that this poet taught very well that God is wisdom itself. He says in another place, that Aristotle in his Metaphysics mentions and commends the known answer of Simonides to Hiero, importing, in short, that none but God is a metaphysician, that is, can speak of things that are above nature. In perusing the Metaphysics of Aristotle, I could not find that passage; be that as it may, the thought is very good, and is of the same import. Some divine s would not have made the same acknowledgment that Simonides did, that he could not give a definition of God. A proof of this may be seen in the preceding remark; but here is an author who speaks more plainly to the purpose. It is the famous Peter Charron, a prebend of Condom. "The Deity," says he,* being so high, far removed from us and * 66 our capacity, that we know not at all what he is, either afar off or near. It is on one side, the greatest and most outrageous presumption to decide and determine concerning him, as the atheists do, who in all their objections speak of him as of a limited Being, circumscribed, and of necessity such and such, saying, if there were a God, he must have been so and so; and being so, he would, should, and might, do this thing, and the other which is not done: so, on the other hand, it is an error to think to find any reason sufficiently demonstrative, to prove and establish evidently and necessarily what God is. At this we ought not to be surprised, but might well remain astonished if we should meet with such reasons, for it is not possible that human comprehension, or the capacity of any created being, should be able to reach so far. Deity, is what cannot be known, nay even perceived; between finite and infinite there is no proportion, no transition. Infinity is altogether inaccessible, nay imperceptible: God is the one, true, and only infinite. The most exalted understanding, the highest stretch of imagination, are as far from comprehending him, as the lowest and meanest apprehension. The greatest philosopher, and the most learned divine, know not more or less of God, than the meanest tradesman. Where there is no passage, no way, no access, there can be neither far nor near-God, Deity, Eternity, Omnipotence, Infinity, are only words, and nothing more to us: they are not things that can fall under human understanding—if all we speak and affirm concerning God were rigorously canvassed, it would be found only vanity and ignorance. Wherefore it was the saying of a great and ancient doctor, that, 'to speak of God even the things that were true, was most dangerous.' The reason of which sentence is, because not only such and so sublime truths were debased in passing through our senses, understandings, and mouths, but we even do not know, nor can be certain that they are true. It is by chance we find them: for we are altogether blind, and know neither what he is, nor what he operates. But to speak of God with doubting and uncertainty, and as it were groping in the dark, and by conjecture, is dangerous, and we know not if God will approve it; unless it be because we have such confidence in his goodness, that he takes well what is said of him with a good intention, and to honor him as much as we can. But, besides, who knows if this reliance on him be pleasing to him, and that the divine goodness be such as to accept what is done with a good intention, and to do him honor? This indeed is the duty and effect of human goodness, created, and finite: but who knows if that which is divine, uncreated, and infinite, be of a like nature? And even it is not universally agreed as to that which is human, what are its rules and offices-therefore the fittest course that can be taken by one that is desirous to think, and to frame an idea of the Deity, is, that the soul, after a universal abstraction from all things, raising itself above all, as in a vacuum, indeterminate, and boundless, with a profound and pure silence, an awful astonishment, an admiration full of a timorous humility, raise in itself an imagination of a luminous abyss, without bottom, without banks, without shores, without high or low, without laying hold upon, or attaching itself to anything present to the imagination, only to lose itself, to be immerged, and yield itself to be swallowed up in that infinity. To which, come very near these ancient sentences of the saints: the true knowledge of God is an entire ignorance of him: to approach God is to know him to be a light inaccessible, and to be swallowed up by it. It is knowing him in some measure to be sensible, that being above all, he cannot be known: eloquently to praise him, is with astonishment and terror to be silent, and in silence to adore him in the soul. But because it is extremely difficult, and next to impossi |