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II. The evidence against the Admiral may be reduced to the following particulars.

1. If the Admiral had taken the men on board, that were ordered to be shipped at Gibraltar, and landed them at St Philip's, the place might have held out till the arrival of Adm. Hawke.

2. If he had landed the officers and recruits, to the number of about 100, which he had on board, it would have been a fignal service to the garrison.

3. The men might have been landed at any time during the fiege with great eafe, and little hazard.

4. No attempt was made to land these

officers and recruits.

5. If each fhip had made fail in proportion to her diftance from the fhip the was to engage, all would have engaged nearly at the fame time, and the engagement would have become general during the time the French lay to.

6. The wind and weather was fuch as admitted each fhip's making fail in proportion to her distance from the enemy; and if they had done fo, the line might have been kept as well as with the fail they made.

7. When the fignal to engage was made, the van bore right down upon the French van, and their whole fleet was then lying to, waiting to receive us.

8. The rear did not bear right down on the enemy, but flanting; and foon after the fignal to engage was made, the Admiral, feeing that the Louifa and Trident, the fhips next ahead of him, did not make fail, attempted to back his main and mizen topfails, and hauled up the forefail, to give time for them to get into their station.

9. The fail made by the van carried them about three knots an hour, but they might have made fuch fail as would have carried them fix.

10. The rear, though they were three times the diftance from the ships they were to engage, yet made no more fail than the van; confequently must have been three times as long in coming equally near to them.

11. As the van went right down, and the rear flanting with the fame fail, the

rear would not have been so near the enemy as the van in equal time, fuppofing the diftance at first to have been the fame.

12. The Admiral, while he was yet at a great diftance from the enemy, began to fire; and the men were obliged to lower the metal, and fire at an elevation; for not being in point-blank distance, the fhot would, if fired horizontally, have drooped, and took the water before it reached the enemy's fhip.

13. While he was thus firing to no effect, at more than half a mile distance from the enemy, he ordered his fails to be laid aback, and made a signal for the ships aftern of him to fhorten fail.

14. It was near twenty minutes after this when he first made fail again with his divifion; and the French having filled and ftood on, foon after his laying his fails aback, i. e. within about forty minutes after the fignal to engage, he never afterwards engaged them at all.

15, When the French centre and rear were observed to outfail us, no fignal or example was given to croud fail, and clofe with the van, without regard to order of battle; though if this had been done, he might have prevented the damage that was fuftained from the fire of the French fhips as they came up.

16. He did not make the general fignal to chafe after the engagement.

17. He did not return off Mahon, nor make any farther attempt to affift the caftle of St Philip.

III. The evidence tending to justify these facts, or controvert them in favour of the Admiral, may be reduced to the following articles, answering the articles of the charge.

1. The Admiral was not answerable for not taking the men on board from Gibraltar, but the commanding officer of the garrifon, who refused to fend them on board.

2. It would have been imprudent in the highest degree, to have attempted to land these men after the French fleet was discovered, and it was a right meafure immediately to call all the frigates and cruifers in.

3. 4. It is granted that men might

have been landed; but this does not af fect Mr Byng, because he had no opportunity to attempt it; neither could thefe men have done more fervice in the garrifon than they did on board the fleet, which upon the whole was fhort of complement, and had many sick and unsfkilful hands.

5. 6. It is granted, that if each fhip had failed in proportion to her diftance from the ship she was to engage, a general engagement would have been brought on while the French lay to; and that the wind and weather permitted fuch fail to be made. But as the enemy was lying to, the fail which the Admiral did make was the most proper upon the whole: for the fail he made was a fignal, what fail the other fhips fhould go down with; and a croud of fail would have been attended with great difadvantages and hazard. Befides, there was the greatest reason to suppose the French would continue to lie to, as they were then known to be at least equal to us; and if they had continued to lie to, the Admiral would, by the course and fail he made, have brought their centre and rear to action, so as effectually to have fuccoured his van; nay he would have done fo if no impediment had happened while they did lie

to.

7. The van went right down because they were not aftern of the enemy.

8. The rear did not bear right down, because they were aftern of the enemy; and if they had borne right down, they would have left the enemy ahead; be fides, in going right down, the veffels are exposed to be raked by the enemy, and a risk is run of being beaten before it is poffible to engage; fo that the rear went down properly both as to courfe and fail. And though the Admiral might have left the Louifa and Trident inftead of fhortening fail for them, yet in that cafe he must have gone down without his force.

9. 10. 11. These articles, granting the facts, are all anfwered in the anfwers to articles 5. & 6.: but the difference between the time when the Admiral began to engage, and the time when

the van engaged, was not forty minutes; and when he was impeded by an accident, he would have been very near the enemy in a very short time without altering his courfe, or making more fail.

12. The people on board the Ramillies began to fire without orders, but not till a quarter of an hour after the enemy had ftruck her with their fhot; and the metal was lowered because the ship was borne down a little on that fide, and therefore it was neceffary to lower the metal to bring the guns parallel with the horizon.

13. That the Admiral, when he was yet at too great a distance properly to engage, laid his fails aback, is true; but this was made necessary by an accident, and the concurrence of many circumftances with it. The fignal for the line of battle ahead was continued the whole day, because it was thought moft advantageous to preferve that order during the action, as that was the order in which the enemy lay to, at least till fome rifing circumftances made a different fignal neceffary.

When the Intrepide, the fternmoft fhip of the van divifion, was disabled, the Revenge, which was the headmoft fhip of the rear divifion, came close up to her; but could not pass her, because the fignal for the line of battle ahead required him to keep his station behind her.

For the fame reasons the fhips next aftern of the Revenge, which were the Louifa and the Trident, were obliged to fhorten fail, as they must otherwise have paffed the Revenge and Intrepide, which would have broke the line, and carried them out of their station.

In the mean time the people on board the Admiral's fhip, which was next aftern of the Trident, had begun to fire; and the fmoke preventing the Admiral from feeing what had happened to the Intrepide, he made no fignal for her to quit the line. Being prevented also by the smoke from feeing that the Trident had laid her fails aback, he continued his courfe till he brought her under his lee bow. This fituation of the Trident made it neceffary for the Admiral to fufpend his fire, otherwife he must have

fired into her; it alfo became neceffary that he should lay his fails aback, and make the fignal for thofe aftern of him to do the fame, or elfe he would have been foul of the Trident, and the fhips aftern would have been foul of him. It is urged against him, that he might have kept clear of the Trident, by going to leeward of her, without fhortening fail; but it is alledged in his defence, that he could not do this immediately, because he did not fee her, and that, all circumstances confidered, it was impoffible for him to get clear of the Trident without laying his fails aback.

14. As foon as ever he was difengaged from the Trident, he made fail, and ordered the fhips aftern to do the fame; but was not afterwards able to engage the enemy, as they outfailed him.

15. The Admiral, when he faw the French going, did make a fignal for more fail; and it was not in his power to join the van before the French had got the length of them.

16. He had not force fufficient to juftify making the general fignal to chase, which he lamented to thofe about him. 17. He did not return to Mahon, because he was not in a condition to come to a fecond engagement; and if the French had come back to us, we should probably have fuffered a total defeat.

On the 18th of January the Admiral gave in his defence, in writing, as fol

lows.

GENTLEMEN,

When I confider that the charge exhibited against me is of fo criminal a nature, fo copious in its circumftances, and depends on fuch a multiplicity of facts, I cannot but be very fenfible of the inconvenience I labour under, in being, by the practice of courts-martial, denied the aid of counfel on this occafion; and this the rather as I am fo little verfed in the method of defence, having, during the courfe of fo long a fervice, never yet been reduced to the neceffity of studying it. What I shall therefore now lay before this court, will have nothing more than plain truth to fupport it; an advocate

altogether fufficient, where the candour and capacity of my judges will, I am perfuaded, fupply any defects and omiffions which may proceed from my inadvertency or inexperience.

For

It is my misfortune to have laboured under the disadvantage of a popular, and almoft national prejudice. what reafons this fpirit has been raised, and by what means propagated, is not the bufinefs of this court to determine; but I have the fatisfaction to find the time arrived, when I have an opportunity of approving my innocence before judges whofe integrity is above corruption, and when my profecutors are perfons (for such indeed are the prefent) who defire nothing more than equal and impartial juftice, and ftand indifferent to my condemnation or acquittal. By this means I am at once fecured from being borne down by popular clamour, or crushed beneath the weight of an overbearing power.

It has been faid, and indeed very induftriously echoed through the whole kingdom, That the lofs of St Philip's caftle was folely owing to my mifconduct, and that Minorca might have been relieved, if I had done my duty. As this national calamity has been urged in order to excite a national reproach against me, I must beg leave, in the first place, to refute this afperfion. And fhould this part of the accufation be once clearly answered, and the prejudice removed, certain I am the charge of perfonal cowardice in the action will foon

vanish: for I am confident, had it not been convenient, nay I may fay neceffary, for fome perfons to fhelter themfelves from the former part of the charge, no man living would ever have thought of calling upon me for a juftification with refpect to the latter.

I

It may seem somewhat fingular, that being accused of two offences, one whereof is capital, the other not; fhould appear more folicitous to acquit myself of that which is only a mifdemeanor, than of that which directly affects my life. But how little regard foever I may be reprefented to have had for my, honour, permit me to fay, I ftill

retain so just a fenfe of its value, as to prefer death to the difgrace that ought to attend the author of fo inglorious a calamity to his country. If then I can acquit myself of this imputation, (which I am confident I can), I fhall with fpirit proceed to my defence against the charge of cowardice, and treat it with the contempt it deferves. One favour I have to beg of the court, that the two charges may be kept diftinct, and by no means blended together; as the fate of Minorca did not at all depend upon this backwardness (as it is called) in time of action.

rious, yet permit me to observe, that the contrary was with an uncommon ftrain of industry and confidence afferted. Nor indeed am I surprised at its gaining an almost univerfal credit, when the ga zette, a paper fuppofed to be published by authority, was prostituted to spread a falfe lift of the ftrength of both the fleets among the people, not only by undervaluing the enemy's force, of which it is poffible the writer might be ignorant, but by over-rating mine, in which it is impor fible he should be innocent. [xviii. 295.] I do not plead the fuperiority of the enemy as a reason for not attacking them, The firft, and what I think the prin- but only why fuch an attempt might cipal part of my defence, confists in fa- not only poffibly, but most probably, tisfying this court, that I did the utmost be unfuccefsful; fince it is evident, that, in my power to relieve Minorca.— If notwithstanding my previous information of their ftrength, I did not hesitate to attack, and do the utmost in my power to defeat them. And I have the rather been induced to particularife this circumftance, because you will find, by a letter to me from the admiralty [xviii. 500.], that the only reason pretended for the difmiffion from my command, was, retreating from an inferior force. Now, inftead of my retreating from an inferior force, that a fuperior force retreated from me, when the fleet was unable to purfue, I fhall manifeft beyond all contradiction; and cannot help obferving, that perhaps I am the firft inftance of a commander in chief whofe difgrace proceeded from so unfortunate a mistake.

in the course of this I fhould happen, from the neceffity of felf-defence, to glance fome blame upon others, I hope to ftand excused; efpecially as my in nocence in many respects is so intimately connected with their neglect, that a vindication of the one must neceffarily inforce an expofition of the other: A hard neceffity, I must confefs, and imposed upon me much against my inclination; fince no man in my fituation would wish to'contend with fuch potent adverfaries. I defire not to become an accufer: but if the lofs of Minorca must be imputed, either to me, or those who fent me on the expedition, 'they who have fo falfely fixed the imputation on me, in order to protect themselves, can with little fhew of juftice complain of my retorting a charge fo unjustly applied to me.- But to proceed:

In order to determine whether I did my utmoft on this occafion, I apprehend, the confideration of what I could do fhould be previous to any determination of what I ought to have done. And give me leave to lay it down as an undeniable fact, and which I fhall prove, That the French fleet was fuperior in the fize of their fhips, weight of me tal, and number of men [xviii. 499.], besides their advantage in point of failing, which enabled them to fight or avoid fighting as beft fuited their purpofes. Though this fact is now fo noto

I would afk, With what view or intention I was fent out on this expedition? If it be answered, To protect or relieve Minorca, which is the feeming language of my inftructions; I would again ask, Did thofe who fent me apprehend that Minorca could be invaded before my arrival, and the descent covered by a fuperior fquadron, when they fent me out with fo inadequate a force?-If they did, their conduct is injuftifiable; if they did not, their ignorance is inexcufable.

This I prefume is fufficient to unravel the political fecret, why the enemy's force has been fo induftriously leffened, and mine fo extravagantly magnified;

when

when at the fame time it is known to almoft every man in the fquadron I commanded, that it confifted of feveral of the worst-conditioned fhips, and moftly the worst-manned, of any perhaps in his Majesty's navy.

I think I may venture to affirm, that it was not foreseen or expected that the fleet in the Mediterranean would come to action; fince it will appear from my very inftructions themfelves, that no fuch service was ever supposed probable, or that the enemy could have a force fufficient to venture an engagement at fea. In thefe [84.], you will find, I am ordered, if, on my arrival at Gibraltar, the French fleet should have paffed out of the Mediterranean, to fend a detachment under the command of Adm. Weft after them to North America. Can it be meant, that I was to detach eight fhips out of the ten? as no lefs would have been neceffary to infure fuccefs, and make the fuperior force ordered in my inftructions. Again, I am ordered, when arrived at Minorca, to affift the garrifon with Lord Robert Bertie's regiment, and as many gunners and men as I could fpare out of the fleet. Does not this fuppofe the fea to be open, and the fleet unopposed? or the order would be abfurd: for how could it be expected I fhould difarm the fquadron, by fending part of its proper complement (which please to obferve the fufileers were) on fhore, when the whole was too little to fecure fuccefs at fea? I am farther ordered, if Minorca was not attacked, to block up Toulon.What! block up a fuperior fleet with an inferior? And all this fervice, you will please to obferve, was expect ed from a fleet, which when collected was ftill inferior to the enemy's. I fay collected; because, as the island was actually attacked, it is indifputable the fhips then at Mahon might have been blocked up, and taken or deftroyed by the enemy; as they did not quit the harbour until two days after the French had arrived off the island, and part of their troops were landed in the neighbourhood of Mahon.

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Does not all this evince, that fighting

was the least intentional part of my inftructions? And if the admiralty had expected an engagement, is it not to be fuppofed they would have fent more fhips, as fo many fine fhips, manned, or nearly fo, then lay at Spithead; and would have afforded me the ufual and neceffary fupply of firefhips, tenders, hospital and ftore fhips; instead of avoiding any answer to my request, that a frigate might be added to my fquadron, to repeat fignals, in case of meeting with the enemy before I joined the fhips then in the Mediterranean? But indeed I was pofitively affured before my departure, from the highest naval authority, that the enemy could not fit out more than fix or seven ships of the line at most.

Under thefe unfavourable circumftances, without fuch intelligence of the enemy's force as could enable me to judge of it, determined to do my duty, I took the command of the fquadron, fuch as it was, many fhips foul, and one in particular, viz. the Intrepide, reported unfit for the voyage. With these I proceeded as expeditiously as poffible: and though it has been maliciously given out, (yet not even pretended in my charge), that I loitered at Portsmouth, I fhall produce feveral letters and orders which will incontestably prove, that I departed thence the very first moment I was enabled to fail. Why the admiralty poftponed this service to others, made me wait, and manned my fhips the last, I must leave them to account for.

When arrived at Gibraltar, I received certain intelligence that a descent was actually made on the island of Minorca, that the harbour and the whole island was in the enemy's poffeffion, excepting the castle of St Philip, which was then befieged by a very confiderable force at land, and the fiege covered by a strong fquadron at sea fuperior to mine. Every person there concluded the place loft, and all relief impracticable; and the engineers were of opinion [86.], that it was abfolutely impoffible to land men, even if the fea had been open, and the enemy had erected batteries on the two fhores near the entrance of the harbour.

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