POLITICS. Speeches on a motion for paffing a cenfure on the treaties with Ruffia and HeffeCaffel, by T. Genucius 281. and L. Pifo 285. POETRY, &c. A farewell to fantastic love 291. An epiftle to Chloe ib. To Cupid ib. Epigram on felf-conceitedness 292. To Mr Garrick, on his erecting a temple and statue to Shakespear ib. On Spring ib. An infcription for Lady Meldrum ib. Characters, &c. of DOUGLAS, a tragedy. Mr Hume's dedication of his Four Differtations 293. Extracts from the Critical and Monthly Reviews 294, 6. A polity for employing the POOR 298. A receipt for dreffing rice 299. A charge against Lord BLAKENEY, in relation to his defence of St Philip's 299. An abstract of the ACT for laying additional duties on ftamped paper, news-papers and almanacks, advertisements, wine-licences, and coals exported 301. and of that for further encouraging the herring-fishery 319. HISTORY. An account of the battle near Prague,|| and of the siege of that place, by a Pruffian officer, &c. 304, 5, 6. A declaration by the French minifter at Ratifbon, upon the troops of his nation entering the empire 309. A fupplement to it by the Emprefs-Queen 310. Military operations on the Lower Rhine 311. Affairs in the Plantations 313. A further account of the difafter at Bengal 314. An account of the lofs of the Doddington Indiaman 316. -Return by Meff. Pitt and Legge to the citycompliments 318. The recruiting-act fufpended 319. Fleets fail ib. Acts paffed ib. The King's fpeech 320. The work for carrying on the inland navigation in Ireland begun 320. The King's charity to the poor of that kingdom ib. Stirling guildry's compliments to Mess. Pitt and Legge, and their answers 321. The Huafon's-bay fleet, and three Eaft-India fhips, in Leith road 322. Capt. Burton and his ship loft ib. Succefs of Mr Whitefield's charityfermon at Glasgow ib. LISTS, TABLES, &c. 323.328. Meteorological journals 323. The new ministry 326. Proceedings of the POLITICAL CLUB, continued from p. 228. The fubftance of feveral speeches made, Dec. 10. 1755, on the treaties with Russia and Heffe-Caffel. [xviii. 481.] to propofe what I think would be right rious confideration, I must take upon me for us to do upon an affair of fuch extraordinary importance. But I must first give my reafons for what I intend to conclude with, though I am far from being fo fully prepared as fuch a copious fubject would require; for, confidering the number of paft tranfactions, and the length and variety of the treaties. with which the two treaties now under our confideration have a connection, fhould have wished to have had a much Sf longer longer time to confider them, in order brought here, but they did us very little to have brought my thoughts into a regular method, and to have explained, in the clearest and shorteft manner, my reasons for that cenfure which these two treaties to me appeared, at firft view, to deferve. However, I fhall do the beft I can; and if there should feem to be a little confusion in my way of expreffing myself, I hope your Lordships will excufe it, on account of the little time I have had to prepare. I shall begin, Sir, with allowing it to be highly probable, that we may foon be involved in a war against France, at fea, and in America; but I cannot fee any probability of our having an occafion to involve ourselves in a war upon the continent of Europe. The balance of power at land, that plaufible pretence formerly made use of for involving us in expenfive alliances and bloody wars, does not now feem to be in any danger; even our good allies the Dutch do not now feem to be in the leaft apprehenfive of it and as to the balance of power at fea, it evidently depends upon our exerting our whole ftrength on that element alone, and applying to that purpose alone, all the money which it is poffible for us to raife; therefore Our engaging at this time in any expenfive alliance upon the continent of Europe, is not only unneceffary, but muft Jeffen the probability, if not prevent the poffibility, of our being fuccefsful in the war we are now like to be engaged in; which is for the protection of our navigation, our commerce, and our colohies, nay, for the prefervation of this very island itself. Can the Ruffians be of any fervice to us in either of these refpects? can the Heffians? As to the Ruffians, Sir, from the very treaty itself it appears, that they are not defigned for any fuch fervice; and as to the Heffians, though they may by the treaty be brought over to this ifland, or fent to Ireland, yet it is exprefsly ftipulated, that they fhall not ferve on board our fleet, or be fent to any of our colonies, and as to their being brought over hither, I hope never to fee them again in this ifland. They were once fervice; I even doubt if they would have fought, if we had happened t have occafion for it: fo that after our maintaining them here for fome time, they were fent home again safe and found, and well fed, and well paid. Soon after which they left us, in the very middle of the war, and when we had moft occafion for their fervice. They not only left us, but joined with our enemies against us. And we have now lefs reafon than ever to put any trust in them, confidering whofe power they are like very foon to fall under; the power of a convert to Popery, who of courfe must be a bigot in that religion, as we may judge from the experience we had of our K. James II. Befides this, Sir, the very treaty itself furnisheth us with a strong reason for not bringing them again into this island, and even for not fending them to Ireland, if we have any regard for our fellow-fubjects in that kingdom. By the treaty it is exprefsly ftipulated, that notwithftanding their being in our fervice, and in our pay, they fhall ftill'continue under the fole jurifdiction of his Moft Serene Highness the Landgrave of Heffe Caffel; fo that if any of them should murder or rob any of our people, we can neither try nor punish them by our own laws or our own judges [xviii. 462. 563.]. I cannot think any Englishman had the penning of this article; for an Englishman would furely have made an exception as to any crimes they might commit against his own countrymen: and a time has been, when the paffing of fuch an article under the great feal would not have escaped with a bare cenfure. Thus it must appear, Sir, that peither the Ruffians nor the Heffians can be of any fervice, either for the protec tion of our commerce and colonies, or for the prefervation of this island; and therefore I cannot comprehend why we fhould have entered into these treaties, or put ourselves to any fuch expence. Surely we are not going to form an army of mercenaries upon the continent, in order to attack France by land. This would again bring us into a heavy war upon upon the continent of Europe; which up a war upon the continent of Europe, it must be much more expenfive to us than the laft. And how hall we be able to fupport fuch an expence for any number of years? It is fuppofed, that the expence of this year, for fupporting the maritime war we are like to be engaged in, will amount to near feven mil lions; confequently we must fuppofe, that if we at the fame time engage in a land war, our expence will amount to ten millions yearly. How shall we raise the money? We must borrow, if we can, fix or feven millions yearly; but if we should find lenders who are both able we ought never to think of upon our own fole account. Against any power in Europe we are able, and fhall always beft vindicate our own quarrels by our selves alone; as we can with advantage attack any one of them by fea, and none of them can attack us by land: therefore we ought never to engage in a war upon the continent, but when called upon by those whose protection it is our intereft to espouse, and when thofe who call upon us defire no more of our affiftance than we can eafily fpare; which, I am forry to fay, is now but very inconfiderable, as we were taught by experience towards the end of laft war. Though we were then called up. on, and engaged without any particular quarrel of our own; yet before the end of it we were very near become bank rupt; and should have become abfolutely fo, had the war lafted but another year: for most of the fubfcribers to our laft iubicription would have been total ly ruined, if the peace had not happened before their being obliged to make the fifth payment upon that fubfcription; as many of them had borrowed money at most extravagant premiums to make their former payments, and would have been utterly unable to make their future, if peace had not enfued, notwithstanding the indulgence granted them by parliament, with reIpect to the time of making their fifth and fixth payments upon that fubfcription. [x. 115,50.] If this was our cafe, Sir, in a war of but four years continuance, and a war in which we were called upon to engage; what must our cafe be in a war in which we call upon others to affift us, and a war which may last ten years, as that in Q. Anne's reign did, notwithstanding the many glorious victories we obtained, and the almost uninterrupted fuccefs we met with? When we are called upon to engage in a war upon the continent, we may confine our expence to what we can eafily fpare; but when we call upon others to engage, we must extend it to whatever they may pleafe to demand; confequently, if we now light and willing to lend, which is far from being certain, we have no fund to mortgage but the finking fund, and even that would be exhausted in three or four years. In the mean time what a dangerous fituation would our public credit be in? If that should give way, we should be ruined at once. Our paper money would be like what fuperftition of old faid of the devil's money; it would all turn to glafs: nay, it would be worfe; for a hundred guinea banknote is not intrinfically worth near fo much as a hundred glass guineas. Upon fuch a difmal catastrophe, every man that had any gold or filver would lock it up, and never iffue a fhilling of it but for neceffary fubfiftence. In fuch a cafe it would be impoffible for the people to find money to pay their taxes: fo that instead of being able to carry on a landwar, we should be unable to carry on any war, either by land or fea, or even to preferve the internal tranquillity of the country; for both our foldiers and failors would mutiny for want of pay: and what might be the confequence, no one can foretel; but every one muft foresee, that it would be more fatal to the rich than to the poor. I do not present you, Sir, with this ugly prospect, in order to advise our agreeing to a dishonourable and infidious peace, but only to prevent our going into fuch measures as muft neceffarily end in fuch a peace; for fuch are the measures that these two treaties feem to prognofticate. They can be calculated for nothing elfe but a war upon the con tinent of Europe; and as neither the balance of power, nor the barrier, the two great objects of the care of our anceftors, now seem to be in any danger, we can have no call for engaging in fuch a war. If we had, I do not fee how this treaty with Ruffia could be of any fervice for as much the greatest part of their troops are, by the treaty, to make only a diverfion, I doubt much if they would march either to Flanders or the Rhine. On the contrary, they feem plainly to be defigned for making an attack upon the King of Pruffia, as we may judge, both from the place where they are to be held in readiness, and the proximity of the countries where in they are to make the propofed diverfion; and likewife from this treaty's being a renewal and extenfion of our treaty with Ruffia in 1742, which, every one knows, was exprefsly defigned against Pruffia, and was part of a project then formed for dividing the bearfkin; which project was firft conceived here, afterwards licked into form at the court of Vienna, and fent back to this country, but with a proteft, that the Queen of Hungary did not defire to have any fhare of the bearskin. [v. 32. 583.] By that fatal project, Sir, we threw the King of Pruffia into the arms of France, and thereby produced the following war in Germany, which coft this nation fo many millions. Will not his Pruffian Majefty have good reason, from this renewal of that treaty, to apprehend a renewal of that project? He then indeed foon fhewed that he had not engaged too far, or entered too deeply into the ambitious views of France; but as he cannot expect that the Queen of Hungary will now have the fame moderation, it will force him now to engage with the court of France upon their own terms: and as France and Pruffia will find allies, both in Germany and the North, these treaties feem to forebode our being engaged in as heavy a landwar as this nation was ever engaged in; and a land-war from whence, if fuccefsful, we can expect as little advantage, whatever may accrue to Hanover, as from any fuch war we ever before en gaged in; but if unsuccessful, which I have fhewn to be by much the most probable, it would certainly end in the ut ter ruin of this nation at least, if not of all thofe who, by our fubfidies, may be induced to become our allies. I know, Sir, it may be faid, that both our treaty with Ruffia, and our treaty with Heffe-Caffel, are merely defenfive, and can never occafion any war upon the continent of Europe, unless the French fhould attack Hanover, or prevail with fome of the neighbouring powers to attack that electorate, on account of the difputes they have with this nation. But we know what projects may be formed by fovereign powers, under the umbrage of defenfive alliances. The project of 1742 is a proof of this. Our then treaty with Ruffia was in appearance only a defensive alliance, but it was to be a foundation for a very offenfive one. The King of Pruffia knows this, and will certainly provide againft it upon this occafion in the fame way he did upon that: he will throw himself into the arms of France; but he must do fo now without any reserve. Befides, Sir, I must observe, that our treaty with Heffe-Caffel cannot be faid to be purely defenfive. The ftipulated number of troops is to be held in readinefs, and furnished, for the good of his Majefty's kingdoms, and flates; and it may be thought for the good of his ftates in Germany, to add to them fome of the ftates in their neighbourhood; I believe no one will fay that it would not: and every neighbouring prince will make the application to himfelf; which will give the French a pretence to enter Germany as guarantees of the treaty of Weftphalia. By these two treaties, Sir, we really feem to be feeking an opportunity for kindling a war upon the continent, by giving the French a pretence for attacking Hanover, and a power to prevail with fome of the neighbouring prin ces to join with them in the attack: neither of which they could ever acquire from any difputes they have with this nation; for if a war fhould from thefe disputes enfue between them and us, I believe believe no one fuppofes, that the electo. rate of Hanover either would or could furnish us with any affiftance, or that we fhould defire any fuch affiftance; and if the French fhould without any pretence fend an army into Germany, it would unite the whole Germanic body against It might do more: it might raife a new confederacy against them; in which cafe we should be called upon, and might then furnish fome affiftance, because fuch a confederacy would ftand in need of no greater affiftance than we could eafily fpare. them. But now fuppofe, Sir, that the French fhould, without any pretence, fend an army into Germany to attack Hanover, and that the Germanic body, and all the other powers of Europe, fhould look tamely on to fee them poffefs themfelves of that electorate; would it be in our power to prevent it? fhould we be any way obliged to endeavour to prevent it? The contrary is exprefsly provided for by our act of fettlement, which may be justly deemed our fecond magna charta. It is thereby enacted, That in cafe the crown fhould come to any perfon, not being a native of England, this nation fhall not be obliged to engage in any war, for the defence of dominions not belonging to this crown. Now, as both thefe treaties are plainly calculated for the defence of Hanover, and can no way be fuppofed to be calculated for any thing elfe, I must look upon them to be exprefsly contrary to the act of fettlement; and, confequently, I maft think, that it was highly criminal in any minifter to advise our entering into them, without a previous act of parliament for repealing, or at leaft fufpending pro hac vice, this claufe in the act of fettlement. And yet, notwithftanding our manifeft inability to defend Hanover, without the unpurchafed concurrence of the Germanic body, notwithstanding its being fo directly contrary to the act of fettlement, we feem more intent upon providing for the defence of that electorate, in cafe of a war with France, than upon providing for the defence of this kingdom: for, including the troops of Hanover, we have VOL. XIX. already provided near 100,000 men for the defence of Hanover; whereas this kingdom is as yet in fo defenceless a condition, that I do not believe we could, in a week's time, draw four regi ments together to oppofe an invafion, in any part of the ifland, except juft here about London. Nay, I am told, that a very large fum of money has already been iffued on account of this treaty with Heffe-Caffel, though the treaty has not yet been approved, nor any money granted on that account by parliament; which iffue I take to be inconfiftent with our conftitution, and directly contrary to the appropriationclaufe in an act of last feflion; as that money was iffued merely for the security of his Majesty's German, and not for the fecurity of his Majesty's British dominions. But from this, and many other inftances, we may fee how little the conftitution, or the laws of this kingdom, are regarded by our minifters, when they ftand in competition with, the fecurity, or the intereft of the electorate of Hanover; for which reason, I' think it is high time to give a check to fuch conduct in our minifters; and therefore I fhall conclude with moving for our paffing a cenfure upon both these treaties. The Speech of L. Pifo, who spoke next. Mr Prefident, TN all controverted points, upon any Ibi controverted points, upon any of thofe who are led by fome prejudice to engage upon the wrong fide of the queftion, to avoid order and perfpicuity as much as poffible: like fhopkeepers who fell damaged or infufficient wares, they take care to darken their windows. On the other hand, with refpect to those who engage upon the right fide of any queftion, it is their duty, and it ought to be their endeavour, to ftate their arguments in the moft diftinct, regular, and clear manner; that thofe who have any eyes or underftanding may fee the connection, and confequently must admit the conclufion. Now, as I am to embrace that which I am fully convinced is the right fide of the queftion now beT t fore |