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upon the continent of Europe ; which up a war upon the continent of Europe, we ought never to think of upon our it must be much more expensive to us own fole account. Against any power than che last. And how shall we be a. in Europe we are able, and shall always ble to support such an expence for
any best vindicate our own quarrels by our number of years ? It is supposed, that felves alone ; as we can with advantage the expence of this year, for supporting attack any one of them by sea, and the maritime war we are like to be ennone of them can attack us by land : gaged in, will amount to near feven mil. therefore we ought never to engage in a lions; consequently we must suppose, war upon the continent, but when call. that if we at the same time engage in a ed upon by those whose protection it is land war, our expence will amount to our interest to espouse, and when those ten millions yearly. · How shall we raise who call upon us defire no more of our the money? We must borrow, if we affiftance than we can easily spare; can, fix or seven millions yearly; but if which, I am sorry to say, is now but we should find lenders who are both able very inconsiderable, as we were taught and willing to lend, which is far from by experience towards the end of last being certain, we have no fund to mort
Though we were then called up. gage but the sinking fund, and even on, and engaged without any particular that would be exhausted in three or four quarrel of our own; yet before the end years. In the mean time what a dan. of it we were very near become bank. gerous situation would our public credit rupt; and should have become absolute. be in? If that should give way, we ly so, had the war lafted but another should be ruined at once. year: for most of the subscribers to our money would be like what superstition laft iubicription would have been total of old faid of the devil's money; it ly ruined, if the peace had not happen. would all turn to glass : nay, it would ed before their being obliged to make be worse ; for a hundred guinea bankthe fifth payment upon that subscrip- note not intrinsically worth near so tion; as many of them had borrowed much as a hundred glass guineas. Upon money at moft extravagant premiums such dismal catastrophe, every man to make their former payments, and that had any gold or silver would lock would have been utterly unable to it up, and never issue a shilling of it but ! make their future, if peace had not for necessary subsistence. In such a case ensued, notwithstanding the indulgence it would be impoflible for the people to granted them by parliament, with re- find money to pay their taxes: so that Ipect to the time of making their fifth instead of being able to carry on a land. and fixth payments upon that fubscrip- war, we should be unable to carry on a. tion. [x: 115,50.]
ny war, either by land or fea; or even If this was our case, Sir; in a war of to preserve the internal tranquillity of but four years continuance, and a war the country; for both our soldiers and in which we were called upon to engage; failors would mutiny for want of pay : what must our case be in a war in which and what might be the consequence, no we call upon others to assist us, and a one can foretel ; but every one must war which may last ten years, as that foresee, that it would be more fatal to in Q. Anne's reign did, notwithstand- the rich than to the poor. ing the many glorious victories we ob. I do not present you, Sir, with this tained, and the almost uninterrupted fuc- ugly prospect, in order to advise our a. cess we met with? When we are called greeing to a dishonourable and insidious opon engage in a war upon the con- peace, but only to prevent our going tinent, we may confine our expence to into such measures as muft necessarily what we can easily spare ; but when we end in such a peace ; for such are the upon
others to engage, we must exmeasures that these two treaties seem to tend it to whatever they may plcafe to prognosticate. They can be calculated glemand; confequently, if we now light for nothing else but a war upon the con.
tinent of Europe ; and as neither the gaged in ; but if unsuccessful, which I balance of power, nor the barrier, the have shewn to be by much the most protwo great objects of the care of our an. bable, it would certainly end in the ut. cestors, now seem to be in any danger, ter ruin of this nation at least, if not of we can have no call for engaging in all those who, by our subsidies, may be such a war. If we had, I do not see induced to become our allies. how this treaty with Ruflia could be of I know, Sir, it may be said, that any service: for as much the greatest both our treaty with Ruflia, and our treapart of their troops are, by the treaty, ty with Hesse: Caffel, are merely defento make only a diversion, I doubt much sive, and can never occasion any war if they would march either to Flanders apon the continent of Europe, unless the or che Rhine. On the contrary, they French should attack Hanover, or preseem plainly to be defigned for making vail with some of the neighbouring an attack upon the King of Prussia, as powers to attack that electorate, on ac. we may judge, both from the place count of the disputes they have with where they are to be held in readiness, this nation. But we know what proand the proximity of the countries where. jects may be formed by sovereign powers, in they are to make the proposed diver- under the umbrage of defensive allianfion; and likewise from this treaty's be- ces. The project of 1742 is a proof of ing a renewal and extension of our trea- this. Our then treaty with Russia was ty with Ruflia in 1742, which, every one in appearance only a defensive alliance, knows, was expressly designed against but it was to be a foundation for a very Profba, and was part of a project then offensive one. The King of Prussia formed for dividing the bearikin; which knows this, and will certainly provide project was firft conceived here, after- against it upon this occafion in the same wards licked into form at the court of way he did upon that: he will throw Vienna, and sent back to this country, himself into the arms of France; but he but with a protest, that the Queen of must do so now without any reserve. Hungary did not defire to have any Besides, Sir, I must observe, that our fhare of the bearíkin. [v. 32. 583-] treaty with Heffe-Cassel cannot be said
By that fatal project, Sir, we threw to be purely defenfive. The ftipulated the King of Prullia into the arms of number of troops is to be held in reaFrance, and thereby produced the fol- diness, and furnished, for the good lowing war in Germany, which cost this of his Majesty's kingdoms, and states ; nation so many millions. Will not his and it may be thought for the good of Prussian Majelty have good reason, from his states in Germany, to add to them this renewal of that treaty, to apprehend some of the states in their neighboura renewal of that project? He then in- hood; I believe no one will say that it deed soon shewed that he had not enga. would not: and every neighbouring ged too far, or entered too deeply into the prince will make the application to himambitious views of France; but as he self; which will give the French a precannot expect that the Queen of Hun- tence to enter Germany as guarantees gary will now have the same modera- of the treaty of Westphalia. tion, it will force him now to engage By these two treaties, Sir, we really with the court of France upon their own seem to be seeking an opportunity for ferms: and as France and Pruflia will kindling a war upon the continent, by find allies, both in Germany and the giving the French a pretence for atNorth, these treaties seem to forebode tacking Hanover, and a power to preour being engaged in as heavy a land- vail with some of the neighbouring prin. war as this nation was ever engaged in; ces to join with them in the attack : and a land-war from whence, if success. neither of which they could ever acquire ful, we can expect as little advantage, from any disputes they have with this whatever may accrue to Hanover, as nacion ; for if a war ihould from these from any such war we ever before en. disputes enlue between them and us, I
believe no one fuppofes, that the electo. already provided near 100,000 men for rate of Hanover either woold or could the defence of Hanover ; whereas this furnish us with any affiftance, or that we kingdom is as yet in so defenceless a should desire
such affiftance ; and if condition, that I do not believe we the French should without any pretence could, in a week's time, draw four regi. fend an army into Germany, it would ments together to oppose an invasion, unite the whole Germanic body against in any part of the island, except just them. It might do more: it might here about London. Nay, I am told, raise a new confederacy against them; that a very large sum of money has alin which case we hould be called upon, ready been issued on account of this and might then furnith some affiftance, treaty with Heffe - Cassel, though the because such a confederacy would stand treaty has not yet been approved, nor in need of no greater aflilitance than we any money granted on that account by could easily spare.
parliament; which issue I take to be But now suppose, Sir, that the French inconsistent with our conftitution, and should, without any pretence, send an directly contrary to the appropriationarmy into Germany to attack Hanover, clause in an act of last session, as that and that the Germanic body, and all money was issued merely for the securithe other powers of Europe, should look ty of his Majesty's German, and not tamely on to see them poffefs themselves for the security of his Majesty's British of that electorate; would it be in our dominions. But from this, and many power to prevent it? should we be any other instances, we may see how little way obliged to endeavour to prevent it? the constitution, or the laws of this kingThe contrary is expressly provided for dom, are regarded by our ministers, by our act of settlement, which may be when they stand in competition with justly deemed our second magna charta. the security, or the interest of the elecIt is thereby enacted, That in case the torate of Hanover; for which reason, I crown should come to any person, not think it is high time to give a check to being a native of England, this nation such conduct in our ministers; and there. shall not be obliged to engage in any fore I shall conclude with moving for war, for the defence of dominions not
our passing a censure upon both these belonging to this crown. Now, as both treaties. these treaties are plainly calculated for the defence of Hanover, and can no
The speech of L. Piso, zubo spoke next. way be supposed to be calculated for a
Mr President, ny I
N all controverted pointsupon any
act subject whatever, it is business settlement; and, consequently, I must of those who are led by some prejudice think, that it was highly criminal in a to engage upon the wrong side of the ny minister to advise our entering into question, to avoid order and perspicuity them, without a previous act of parlia- as much as posible : like shopkeepers ment for repealing, or at least suspend. who sell damaged or insufficient wares, ing pro hac vice, this clause in the act they take care to darken their windows. of settlement. And yet, notwithftand. On the other hand, with respect to those ing our manifest inability to defend Ha- who engage upon the right side of any nover, without the unpurchased con- queftion, it is their duty, and it ought currence of the Germanic body, not. to be their endeavour, to state their arwithstanding its being so directly con- guments in the most distinct, regular, and trary to the act of settlement, we seem clear manner; that those who have any more intent upon providing for the de. eyes or understanding may see the confence of that elektorate, in case of a nection, and consequently must admit war with France, than upon providing the conclusion. Now, as I am to em. for the defence of this kingdom : for, in- brace that which I am fully convinced cluding the troops of Hanover, we have is the right fide of the question now beVOL. XIX.
us, I shall therefore state what I long before now have heard of another have to say in as distinct and regular a French army's being in Westphalia, or manner as I can; and for that purpose perhaps in Lower Saxony; for can we muft begin with observing, that what think that a nation which has long been the Noble Lord has been pleased to say, as ready to resent as to injure, would may be reduced to these three heads : have tamely submitted to see their ships 1. That the treaties now before us were taken, and their people killed or im. designed to engage us in a war chiefly prisoned, if we had not prevented their and merely for the sake of Hanover; attacking any of our allies, by the be2. That they would give offence to the ginning of a grand alliance, which, if King of Prussia; and, 3. That we provoked, might have brought them as ought never to engage in a war upon low, as ever they were brought by the the continent of Europe.
last grand alliance that was formed aAš to the first of these three heads, I gainst them ? Mall grant, Sir, that these treaties were Therefore, Sir, every one must see, entered into for the sake of Hanover. that, in order to secure Hanover, and That they were designed for nothing thereby prevent our being engaged in a else but to prevent our being engaged war upon the continent of Europe, it in a land-war upon the continent of Eu was necessary for us to think of forming rope, upon that account or any other, a powerful confederacy upon the contiin cafe we should find ourselves forced nent, before we resolved to commit a-. to enter into a maritime war against ny sort of hostilities against France, eFrance; and that these treaties were ven supposing that Hanover were to be necessary for this purpose, muft appear confidered only as one of the allies of evident to every one who considers the G. Britain. But I will go further, Sir; circumstances of the French power and I will suppose that neither we nor our ours. That the French are more power. fovereign had any thing to do with Haful at land than we are, I believe no noyer; upon this fuppofition, would it one will deny; and that we are as yet be consistent with the interest of this na. more powerful than they are at sea, I tion, would it be consistent with our sebelieve, even the French themselves will curity, to look camely on, and see the confess, though they are very unwilling French neftle themselves in the north of to allow any nation in the world to be Germany! To suppose that such an atsuperior to them in any thing. In these tempt would unite the whole Germanic circumstances, Sir, what could we ex. body against them, is to suppose animpect? If we attacked them at fea, or poffibility. They have, it is true, in in America, should we doubt of their the German empire, what they call a resolving to engage us in a war at land, constitution ; but if there was a vis in, by attacking fome of our allies upon the ertiæ in any body whatsoever, it may continent of Europe, unless we provi- justly be said to be by their constitution ded against it, by forming such a confe- in the Germanic body, which renders deracy as would render us equal to their it impoffible for that body to defend itpower at land, as well as fuperior to self, or any of its members. Their mi. their power at sea ? And as Hanover litary scheme for such a purpose is much is, of all our allies upon the continent like our wife militia-scheme formed in of Europe, che ally with whom we have the reign of Charles II. ; one prince is the most intimate connection ;
to furnish one man, another half a man, doubt of their resolving to attack Ha- another, perhaps, two or three men, nover, the moment we attacked them each in proportion to his principality. at sea, if we neglected to guard against It is even worse than ours; for these it by such a confederacy as I have rren men and half.men, when furnished, are tioned? They would have done so last all to be under the generals of the emsummer, Sir, if no such treaties as these pire, and each circle is not only to conhad been upon the anvil : we ihould lene for itself, but to name its own off
Thus they have not really, and ensue, be chiefly owing to the two treain effect, any constitution at all in what ties now under our confideration. And is called the German empire. It is ra- if it were not for the same cause, che ther a confederacy of a great number French would not, perhaps, have tameof independent princes and Itates, who ly suffered the neutrality either of Spain are not obliged to assist one another but or Portugal. But when they perceived when the cafus fæderis exists; and those that we had engaged the powerful afliftthat are remote from the danger will ance of the great empire of Rusia, as never allow that it does exist, if they well as of one of the chief princes of have no private view of their own. Gemany, in case they should attack eiThose that are immediately exposed to ther Hanover, or any other of our allies, the danger cry aloud, indeed, and claim they from thence foresaw, that it would the protection of the empire; but they be in our power to form such a confeare never heard by any of the rest who deracy upon the continent as they could have no particular interest: and there. not contend with ; and therefore they fore this huge inert body must have been gave over all thoughts, not only of malong since torn limb from limb, if the king such an attack, but of daring to members had not, for many years past, prescribe rules to the conduct of any been wise enough to chuse a family for court in Europe. their head, that had power enough of its Thus, Sir, it must appear, that these own to protect them; but that protec. treaties were designed, and necessarily, tion the Hanover member could not, up- as well as wisely designed, for preventon the present occasion, have expected, ing our being engaged in a war upon if we had resolved to give no affittance, the continent. They were made for the
This, Sir, the French court were ful. defence of our other allies upon the conly apprised of; and therefore they would, tinent, as well as for the defence of Halast summer, have attacked Hanover, if nover; and they were not made for the they could have thereby expected to defence of Hanover as a dominion be. draw us into an unequal war upon the longing to his Majesty, but as an elec; continent. But now supposing that they torate in alliance with the crown of G, could not have expected to draw us in. Britain ; which we are certainly bound to such a war, by attacking, or even by to defend, as much as we are bound to possessing themselves of Hanover, or a. defend any other ally, when unjustly'at, ny other part of Germany; can we tacked, and much more when unjusly think, that they would noć have found attacked upon our account. Consequent, fome other method to draw us into such ly, neither of these treaties can have a. a war, if we had taken no method to ny thing to do with our act of fetileprevent it? Suppose his Most Christian ment; nor can any clause in that ad be Majesty had sent to the States-General, fupposed to be against our engaging in and infifted upon their being obliged, a war for the defence of the electorate by their guarantee of the treaty of Aix of Hanover, or of any other of our alla-Chapelle, to afliqt him with their ut- lies upon the continent, when it appears most maritime force; and that he had evident that they are, or are like to be demanded this allistance ander pain of unjustly attacked : for if this could be his beginning a new war, as he ended supposed, it must be by the same rule the last, by the attack of their town of supposed, chat every defensive alliance Maestricht; could they have refused we have made, and every guaranty we such a demand? If they had, could have entered into, since the accession of they have defended themselves without our present royal family to the throne, a fufficient confederacy upon the con. was treacherous and unjust, because it tinent ? Could they have formed such was engaging the public faith for our a confederacy without our aslistance ? doing that which by our act of settle. Therefore it is to be supposed, that the ment we could not do. neutrality of the Dutch will, if a war Now, Sir, with regard to the second