fore us, I fhall therefore ftate what I have to say in as diftinct and regular a manner as I can; and for that purpose muft begin with obferving, that what the Noble Lord has been pleased to say, may be reduced to these three heads: 1. That the treaties now before us were defigned to engage us in a war chiefly and merely for the fake of Hanover; 2. That they would give offence to the King of Pruffia; and, 3. That we ought never to engage in a war upon the continent of Europe.

As to the first of thefe three heads, I fhall grant, Sir, that thefe treaties were entered into for the fake of Hanover. That they were defigned for nothing elfe but to prevent our being engaged in a land-war upon the continent of Europe, upon that account or any other, in cafe we fhould find ourselves forced to enter into a maritime war against France; and that these treaties were neceffary for this purpose, must appear evident to every one who confiders the circumstances of the French power and ours. That the French are more powerful at land than we are, I believe no one will deny; and that we are as yet more powerful than they are at fea, I believe, even the French themfelves will confefs, though they are very unwilling to allow any nation in the world to be fuperior to them in any thing. In thefe circumftances, Sir, what could we expect? If we attacked them at fea, or in America, fhould we doubt of their refolving to engage us in a war at land, by attacking fome of our allies upon the continent of Europe, unless we provided against it, by forming fuch a confederacy as would render us equal to their power at land, as well as fuperior to their power at fea? And as Hanover is, of all our allies upon the continent of Europe, the ally with whom we have the most intimate connection; could we doubt of their refolving to attack Hanover, the moment we attacked them at fea, if we neglected to guard against it by fuch a confederacy as I have mentioned? They would have done fo last fummer, Sir, if no fuch treaties as thefe had been upon the anvil: we thould

long before now have heard of another French army's being in Weftphalia, or perhaps in Lower Saxony; for can we think that a nation which has long been as ready to refent as to injure, would have tamely fubmitted to fee their fhips taken, and their people killed or imprifoned, if we had not prevented their attacking any of our allies, by the beginning of a grand alliance, which, if provoked, might have brought them as low, as ever they were brought by the laft grand alliance that was formed againft them?

Therefore, Sir, every one muft fee, that, in order to fecure Hanover, and thereby prevent our being engaged in a war upon the continent of Europe, it was neceffary for us to think of forming a powerful confederacy upon the continent, before we refolved to commit any fort of hoftilities against France, even fuppofing that Hanover were to be confidered only as one of the allies of G. Britain. But I will go further, Sir; I will fuppofe that neither we nor our fovereign had any thing to do with Hanover; upon this fuppofition, would it be confiftent with the interest of this nation, would it be confiftent with our fecurity, to look tamely on, and see the French neftle themselves in the north of Germany? To fuppofe that such an attempt would unite the whole Germanic body against them, is to fuppofe an impoffibility. They have, it is true, in the German empire, what they call a conftitution; but if there was a vis inertia in any body whatsoever, it may juftly be faid to be by their conftitution in the Germanic body, which renders it impoffible for that body to defend itfelf, or any of its members. Their military fcheme for fuch a purpofe is much like our wife militia-fcheme formed in the reign of Charles II.; one prince is to furnish one man, another half a man, another, perhaps, two or three men, each in proportion to his principality. It is even worse than ours; for these men and half-men, when furnished, are all to be under the generals of the empire, and each circle is not only to confent for itself, but to name its own offi

cers.

cers. Thus they have not really, and in effect, any conftitution at all in what is called the German empire. It is rather a confederacy of a great number of independent princes and ftates, who are not obliged to affift one another but when the cafus fœderis exifts; and thofe that are remote from the danger will never allow that it does exift, if they have no private view of their own. Thofe that are immediately expofed to the danger cry aloud, indeed, and claim the protection of the empire; but they are never heard by any of the reft who have no particular intereft: and therefore this huge inert body must have been long fince torn limb from limb, if the members had not, for many years paft, been wife enough to chufe a family for their head, that had power enough of its own to protect them; but that protection the Hanover member could not, up on the prefent occafion, have expected, if we had refolved to give no affiftance, This, Sir, the French court were fully apprised of; and therefore they would, laft fummer, have attacked Hanover, if they could have thereby expected to draw us into an unequal war upon the continent. But now fuppofing that they could not have expected to draw us in to fuch a war, by attacking, or even by poffeffing themselves of Hanover, or a ny other part of Germany; can we think, that they would not have found fome other method to draw us into fuch a war, if we had taken no method to prevent it? Suppofe his Moft Chriftian Majefty had fent to the States-General, and infifted upon their being obliged, by their guarantee of the treaty of Aix la-Chapelle, to affift him with their utmoft maritime force; and that he had demanded this affiftance under pain of his beginning a new war, as he ended the laft, by the attack of their town of Maeftricht; could they have refufed fuch a demand? If they had, could they have defended themfelves without a fufficient confederacy upon the cone tinent? Could they have formed fuch a confederacy without our affiftance? Therefore it is to be fuppofed, that the neutrality of the Dutch will, if a war

enfue, be chiefly owing to the two treaties now under our confideration. And if it were not for the fame cause, the French would not, perhaps, have tamely fuffered the neutrality either of Spain or Portugal. But when they perceived that we had engaged the powerful affiftance of the great empire of Ruffia, as well as of one of the chief princes of▸ Gemany, in case they should attack either Hanover, or any other of our allies, they from thence forefaw, that it would be in our power to form fuch a confederacy upon the continent as they could not contend with; and therefore they gave over all thoughts, not only of making fuch an attack, but of daring to prefcribe rules to the conduct of any court in Europe.

Thus, Sir, it must appear, that there treaties were defigned, and necessarily, as well as wifely defigned, for preventing our being engaged in a war upon the continent. They were made for the defence of our other allies upon the continent, as well as for the defence of Hanover; and they were not made for the defence of Hanover as a dominion belonging to his Majefty, but as an elec torate in alliance with the crown of G, Britain; which we are certainly bound to defend, as much as we are bound to defend any other ally, when unjustly at, tacked, and much more when unjustly attacked upon our account. Confequent, ly, neither of these treaties can have a ny thing to do with our act of fettlement; nor can any claufe in that act be fuppofed to be against our engaging in a war for the defence of the electorate of Hanover, or of any other of our allies upon the continent, when it appears evident that they are, or are like to be unjustly attacked: for if this could be fuppofed, it must be by the fame rule fuppofed, that every defensive alliance we have made, and every guaranty we have entered into, fince the acceffion of our prefent royal family to the throne, was treacherous and unjust, because it was engaging the public faith for our doing that which by our act of fettle. ment we could not do.

Now, Sir, with regard to the fecond Tt2 head

head which the Noble Lord was pleafed to infift on, That thefe treaties, particularly that with Ruffia, would give of fence to the King of Pruffia: In my o pinion, Sir, it will be fo far from gi. ving him offence, that it will give him great pleasure. We know that he is engaged in a defenfive alliance with France; we know that he has a very confiderable fubfidy from France, near fix times as much as we are obliged by this new treaty to pay to the great empire of Ruffia; and we know that he cannot well fupport the prefent expence of his army, even with all his ceconomy, without that fubfidy. If the prefent difputes between us and France fhould come to an open rupture, it is highly probably, nay, I think, it is almoft certain, that France will call upon him for the fulfilling of his engagements, and infift upon it that he is, in confequence thereof, at their defire, obliged to attack Hanover. From his extenfive knowledge of affairs, and from his faperior judgment, I think it is equally probable, and equally certain, that in cafe a war should enfue, he will conclude, that France is the aggreffor; and confequently that he is not, by his defenfive treaty, obliged either in honour or confcience, to give them any af fiftance; much lefs to attack, at their defire, a prince, and a near relation too, who has done him no injury. This would have thrown him into a very great perplexity, if we had made no fuch treaty with Ruffia: He muit either have forfeited, as the French court would have called it, his fubfidy, or he must have acted against both his confcience and his intereft. But by this treaty we have extricated him out of this difficulty. He may now anfwer, I must not venture to attack Hanover; becaufe, if I do, I fhall be attacked on one fide by the formidable power of the empire of Ruffia, and probably on the other by the houfe of Auftria, affifted by fome of the other princes of Germany; against which two attacks, even you France, with all your power, cannot protect me; efpecially as you are yourfelf engaged in a maritime war with

England, which it is impoffible for you to fupport, and which muft greatly disturb your finances by ruining your commerce.

This treaty with Ruffia will therefore, Sir, be fo far from being an offence, that, I am convinced, it will give great pleafure to the King of Pruffia; as it will furnish him with an opportunity to preferve the fubfidy he has from France, without being obliged to fecond or fupport them in any of their ambitious and unjuft fchemes against this nation, or any other nation in Europe; which, by his former conduct, he has fhewn, he has naturally no inclination to do: confequently we have no reason to fuppofe, nor could he fuppofe, that this treaty was defigned against him; but that it was defigned againit another power, which I have no occafion to name. And againft that nation we had great reafon to be upon our guard; because they have for many years behaved as if they had been a French colony. But, however they may for the future incline to behave, we have now no cause to fear what they may be able to do; as we have, by thefe treaties, provided fuch a refpectable army upon the continent, as will render it dangerous for any power in Europe to join with France againft us, and fuch a one as will encou rage thofe who are inclined to join with us, in cafe we fhould have, occafion for their affittance; which thofe very treaties will, in all human appearance, prevent, as they will leave us at liberty to apply our whole ftrength towards the profecution of the war in America. And even for this purpose our treaty with Hefle-Caffel may be of advantage to us; as their troops may be brought o ver to this kingdom, or fent to Ireland, for fepplying an equal number of our own, which, in cafe of a war, would be neceflary for us to fend to America, or to employ on board our feet for annoying the coafts of our enemy.

I come lafly, Sir, to the third head infifted on by his Lordfhip; which was his maxim, That this nation ought never to engage in any war upon the continent of Europe, no not even for that plaufible pretence called the preferva

tion of a balance of power at land: for this his Lordship muft mean, if he means any thing; becaufe, if he means, that we are never to engage unless when calted on, it means nothing; as no war can happen in Europe in which we may not expect to be called on by one of the parties concerned; nor can a war happen, in which this nation may not find an intereft in joining with one fide rather than the other. But however much fome gentlemen may now be inclined to look upon the balance of power as a chimera, it is certain that it has long been, and, I think, always ought to be very carefully attended to, and provided for, even by this nation. There fore our joining in a war upon the continent for preferving or reftoring a balance of power, may fometimes be wife and neccffary. Such a war may indeed be pursued too far, or continued too long. One ministry in Q. Anne's time purfued fuch a war too far, another ended it too foon. Both were blameable. But this can never establish it as a maxim, That we ought never to engage in fuch a war. One fole monarch of Europe might foon render himself mafter of this ifland, be ́cause he would be fuperior to us at fea. By a fole monarch, Sir, I do not mean his being in actual poffeffion of every kingdom and ftate upon the continent of Europe; but his being in poffeffion of fo much power, and fo great riches, as to give the law to all the reft, by menacing the nearest, and bribing, or, in modern language, fubfidizing the most remote. And whether the monarch of France might not foon become fuch a monarch, if this nation fhould lay afide all regard for the balance of power, I hope your Lordships will ferioufly confider.

The prefent, Sir, is not the first time that fuch a defign has been formed. The house of Auftria attempted it in the reign of Charles V.; and he would have accomplished it, had it not been for the wisdom and vigour of Francis II. His dividing his power, and afterwards refigning his crown, put an end to any fuch defign in the house of Auftria. But his fon, and fucceffor in Spain, Philip II. resumed the defign; which our

wife Q. Elifabeth quickly perceived; and, notwithstanding her having fo much to do at home, the foon took proper measures to defeat it. For this purpofe, fhe did not hesitate a moment upon engaging in a war on the continent, by firft affifting the Proteftants in France, against the Spanish faction in that kingdom; and afterwards fupporting the malecontents in the Netherlands, against the King of Spain, their then fovereign. Upon the decline of the power of Spain, the power of France rofe apace; so that even Cardinal Richlieu began to form the defign of making the King of France fole monarch of Europe. Our Charles I. did fomething against it; but he did nothing in a right way; and by his aiming fo openly at abfolute power at home, he rendered himfelf unable to oppose any foreign defign, or to fupport himfelf upon the throne. His immediate fucceffor Oliver Cromwell, was indeed an ufurper; but he was a man of fenfe, and great cunning: for by not feeming to aim at it, he got what Charles loft both his crown and his life for, by too openly aiming at it. He indeed, for his own glory, and the good of his country, joined at firft with France against Spain; but it is thought, that before his death he began to think of joining in a confederacy against France. Whereas Charles II. inftead of endeavouring to preferve the balance of power, became himfelf a penfioner to France; and was never right but once, I mean, when he entered into the triple alliance. But he foon became forry for it; and I am for. ry to fay, that through his whole reign he feems to have been an enemy to his country, and a friend to its most dangerous enemies. His brother and fucceffor again loft his crown, by refafing to join in a war upon the continent againit Lewis XIV.; for indeed both the brothers feemed fucceffively to defire only to be the delegate tyrant of thefe kingdoms, under the fupreme tyrant at Verfailles. After them, by good luck, orrather by a remarkable providence, we got a fovereign who had fome regard to the liberties of Europe, as well as the liberties of this country. The Prince of O

range,

range, from the moment he got the better of the French party in Holland, never dropt the defign of reftoring and fecuring the balance of power, which had been very near overfet by the ambitious fchemes of Lewis XIV. and the flavish concurrence of our Charles and James II. I fay, Sir, the French party in Holland; for it is now evident, that those who in that country called themselves the repu blicans, and were thought to be fo by the deluded populace, were all in the interest, and some of them perhaps in the pay of France. But the Prince of Orange, by his own addrefs, and the contempt which the French court in all their measures fhewed for the Dutch, got at laft the better of the French pen. fioners in England, as well as Holland; and the laft of the many great actions of his life was, the concluding of the grand alliance, which, under the wife conduct of the Duke of Marlborough, put an end to the ambitious views of France, and prevented their being renewed, until we fatally took it into our heads, that the overgrown power of the houfe of Auftria was become dangerous to the liberties of Europe.

Will any one fay, Sir, that it was wrong in us to engage in the grand alliance? Will any one fay, that because a French faction may prevail in Holland, it would be wrong in us, whilft it does fo, to engage in a grand alliance with other potentates, even though the liberties of Europe fhould be brought into as great danger as they were at that time? Let us then refolve, Sir, to engage as often as fuch a neceffity recurs, as often as there appears to be a dignus vindice nodus; that is to fay, as often as the balance of power is like to be brought into imminent danger, either by an attack upon ourselves or upon any of our allies. I fay upon ourselves, Sir; because by an attack upon our trade and plantations in America, the balance of power in Europe may now be irrecoverably overturned. The power of France by land is now become fo much fuperior to that of any of their neighbours, that they may, by menaces, prefcribe rules to the conduct of all their next neigh

bours, that is to fay, to all those they can immediately attack by land: fo that they now want nothing for rendering their monarch the fole monarch of Europe, but money enough to bribe fome of those powers that are at a distance; and this they will get, if they can poffefs themfelves of any confiderable part of our trade and plantations; for this will not only increase their fund for bri bing, but put it out of our power to bribe against them: whereas, if in any future war we can not only fecure our own trade and plantations, but demolish thofe of the French, as the French will not then have it in their power, we shall not have occafion, to bribe any of the remote powers of Europe; because, if they are left to act impartially according to what is their real intereft, they will, without any fubfidy, be always ready to join us, in a confederacy for eftablishing their own independency_as well as that of their neighbours. For which reafon I am the more ready to agree to thefe fubfidy-treaties, because I hope they will be the laft. We often before entered into fubfidy-treaties, for which there was no reason that was tru ly British; but for the two now under confideration, the reason is fo truly Britifh, that I think we could not otherwife have fecured the independency of this kingdom, or the commerce and plantations belonging to it, upon which the fuperiority of our naval power must always depend.

Should the Noble Lord's motion be agreed to, Sir, and the news of it fent over to France, as it certainly would, the very next dispatch would tell them, that the nation was in a flame, and that the government would not be supported by the people. The Jacobites are always ready to fay fo, but they would then be believed by the French minifters, and in that cafe I should expec an immediate invafion for however much the French may threaten, they will never actually invade this country, unless they believe that our government will not be fupported by the people. In 1744, M. Saxe believed it, and he actually prepared to invade us; but by

moft