cafion we had for either. We can give what affiftance we please, and when we pleafe, to any power in Europe that fhall ftand in need of it, without any treaty of alliance, or guarantee; and no nation in Europe can give us any affiftance, without expofing themselves to the neceffity of having a greater affiftance from us than they can give us. The Dutch, for example, whom we have been fo long taught to look on as our most natural allies, could they give us affiftance against any ftate in Europe, without thereby expofing themselves to the danger of being obliged to afk a greater affiftance from us, than it is in their power to give us? It is certain they could not. And for this reafon, I hope, that no demand will be made of the 6000 troops they are by treaty obliged to furnish us with: at leaft, I hope that they will be wife enough to give a negative to the demand, if it fhould be made by the advice of those who feem to be doing all they can to involve us in a land-war [123.] for if no fuch demand fhould be made, or if the Dutch fhould give a negative to the demand, the French monarch could not have the leaft pretence for attacking the Dutch on account of a war with us; and if he fhould threaten them, as the Noble Lord was pleased to fuggeft, every independent nation in Europe would refent, and would join in affifting the Dutch to repel fuch an infolent menace; in which cafe we should have no occasion to bribe any power in Europe to join with us in the war against France, nor should we be obliged to take a greater fhare of the war at land than might be confiftent with our present circumstances, and our vigorous prosecution of the war at fea.

Thus, Sir, it must appear, that no alliance we have with any power upon the continent, no not even that we have with the Dutch, can oblige us to engage in a land-war, as long as we remain without affistance from any of our allies. And if this be the cafe with regard to thofe with whom we have treaties of alliance now fubfifting, how much ftronger muft it be with regard to the electorate of Hanover, with which we

have not now, fo far as I know, any treaty of alliance fubfifting? But if we had, no alliance could oblige us to ruin ourselves by affifting our ally. For all defenfive treaties include, in their very nature, two conditions; one of which is, that the ally from whom the ftipu lated fuccours are demanded, is not itfelf involved in war; and the other condition is, that the ally who demands the ftipulated fuccours, fhall have provided fuch a force as, in all human probability, may, with thofe fuccours, be fufficient to repel the invading enemy: for no nation is obliged to fend its troops to the defence of an ally, when all it can raife are become neceffary for its own defence; nor is any nation, by virtue of an alliance, obliged to fend its troops to inevitable deftruction. These therefore are conditions inherent in the very nature of all defenfive treaties; and both may be pleaded as a full discharge from any obligation we can by alliance be under, to engage in a war upon the continent, for the fake of protecting Hanover against an invasion.

Now, Sir, if we are not bound either in honour, or in gratitude, or by alliance, to engage in a war upon the continent for fuch a purpose; can we be bound to do fo by any rule of common prudence? Upon this head, Sir, I will fay, that it is contrary to every rule of common prudence, for this nation to give the leaft ground for propagating an opinion, either in France, or any where else, that we will ever engage in a war upon the continent, for the fake of protecting Hanover; because fuch an opinion will expose Hanover to be attacked upon every difpute with this nation, and will make every prince whose affiftance may be neceffary for its defence, rife in his demands for what affiftance he is able and willing to give; to which I must add, that it will make the Emperor and empire refuse to fulfil the obligation they are under to protect the electorate of Hanover, unlefs they are hired at a very dear rate by this na tion to do fo. I fay, Sir, the obligation they are under; for by their conftitution they are obliged to protect every

member

member of the empire who is unjustly attacked; and no quarrel or war with this nation can ever be a juft caufe for attacking Hanover, as long as it preferves a neutrality in the war.

Thefe, Sir, will be the fatal effects of our giving any ground for entertaining an opinion, that we will engage in a war upon the continent, for the protection of Hanover, as often as it fhall be attacked upon what may be called our account and the certain confequence of this will be, that every prince in Europe who can attack Hanover, efpecially the monarch of France, will endeavour, at every turn, to extort con ceffions from this kingdom, by threaten ing to attack Hanover; because they all know, how expenfive and inconvenient it has always been for this nation to fup port a war upon the continent, and that it will then be more expenfive than it ever was heretofore. Whereas, if we once fhew, that no attack upon Hanover can give us fo much concern as to engage us in a war upon the continent, or divert us from profecuting any war of our own in that manner which is moft convenient for us, neither the French King, nor any other prince in Europe, will ever think of attacking Hanover upon our account: and if any of them fhould, we must trust to the empire, and the princes thereof, for taking care, that the French fhall never neftle in the north of Germany, as well as for taking care, that no neighbouring prince fhall make a conquest of the electorate of Hanover; for their jealoufy of the French will always prevent the former, and their mutual jealoufy will prevent the latter.

After having thus fhewn the effects and the confequences of the opinion that may be propagated in Europe, from our conduct upon this occafion with regard to Hanover, I muft obferve, Sir, that, upon this account, the treaties now under confideration give me infinite con

pofe ourselves to any expence, to any danger, rather than allow the electorate to be over-run by an invading enemy: nay, that we will run the risk of abfolute ruin; for this will be the confequence, if our public revenue should now be exhausted, and our public credit annihilated, by fupporting a war upon the continent for the defence of the electorate. And this gives me the greater concern, as there was not at prefent the leaft occafion for laying a foundation for fuch an opinion; because both the King of Pruffia, and the court of Vienna, had laid an interdiction upon any foreign troops entering Germany: and after fuch an interdiction we could not fuppofe, that the French would, in defiance of both these powers, attempt to invade the electorate of Hanover; or that they could ever have reached that electorate, which lies in the middle of Germany, had they been mad enough to make the attempt.

By this interdiction, Sir, the electorate was, without our interpofition, and without our putting ourselves to any expence, fo effectually guarantied against any invasion, that I am afraid it will be fuspected, by some of the neighbouring powers to Hanover, especially the King of Pruffia, that we were at the expence of these two treaties, not with a defensive, but an offenfive view; for with fuch a view treaties are often entered into, which from the terms in which they are conceived seem to be on. ly defenfive; and this treaty with Ruffia points fo directly against the King of Pruffia, that I am furprised the Noble Lord could fuppofe its being defigned against Sweden. If there had been any defign againft, or, any jealousy of that kingdom, formerly deemed the moft natural and convenient ally of this, the Ruffian troops ftipulated by the treaty, would thereby have been appointed to have been held in readinefs upon the frontiers of Ruffian Finland, instead of the frontiers of Livonia next to Lithuania; and the 7th article is almost a plain declaration of their being defigned against Pruffia, which is the only country where it could be fuppofed that these

troops

troops would have a facility of fubfifting immediately in an enemy's country, as, by the 12th article, the territories of Poland are exprefsly declared not to be the country defigned for this fort of fubfiftence.

As this treaty, Sir, points fo plainly and fo directly at the King of Pruffia, it cannot but excite his jealousy and his refentment. And the court of Vienna may likewife, perhaps, refent his Majefty's ftipulating to bring fuch a numerous army of foreign troops into the empire, without the authority, I am afraid with out asking the confent of the head of the empire: for whatever refpect his Majefty, as King of G. Britain, may owe to the Emperor of Germany; yet as a member of the Germanic body, he certainly owes very great refpect to its head. Nay, even the King of France, as guarantee of the treaty of Weftphalia, may, from this treaty, form a pretence for fending his numerous armies into the empire, in order to prevent its being over-run by Ruffians, and the Imperial diadem's being contemned by its own vaffals. Thus, by the measures we have taken for preferving the peace of Germany, we fhall expofe it to be difturbed; and by endeavouring, at a great expence, to prevent our being engaged in a land-war for the protection of Hanover, we shall render it almost unavoidable. Whereas, had we faved our money, and the pens of our negotiators, (I cannot fay their heads, for I doubt if they had any), we might have profecuted the war at fea and in America, without being diverted either by wars or treaties the continent of Europe. upon But, Sir, having thus laid a foundation for disturbances in Germany, what we have already done can be of no manner of fervice unless we proceed further. Fifty-five thoufand Ruffians, and 8000 Heffians, will be far from being fufficient for the protection of Hanover; especially if the King of Pruffia fhould, by our treaty with Ruffia, be provoked to join with France, and the Emperor and empire to remain unconcerned fpectators: for the King of Pruffa may bring 150,000 men into the VOL. XIX.

field, and the French can foon join him with at leaft an equal number; therefore, if poffible, we must bribe several other princes into our alliance. Nay, the treaty itself with Ruffia points out another; for their troops must march through fome part of Poland; confequently we must grant a fubfidy to the King of Poland, Elector of Saxony, if it were for nothing else but to obtain leave for thofe troops to march through the territories of that republic. The Noble Lord therefore vainly imagines, that thefe two are the laft fubfidy-treaties we shall ever be obliged to engage in; we muft now engage in feveral others: and if it should be laid down as a maxim, that we must take upon our felves alone the protection of Hanover, as often as we are engaged in war with any potentate who can attack it, I may venture to prophefy, that we shall never be without fubfidy-treaties as long as we have a fubfidy to give; which would certainly at latt render most of our men Jacobites, whatever effect it might have upon our horfes. This, I hope, the Noble Lord will endeavour to prevent; and I think he cannot more effectually do so, than by joining with me in an approbation of the motion now made to us, as it would put an end to the maxim upon which thefe two, and many former fubúdy-treaties, were founded.

The Speech of C. Plinius Cæcilius, who
Spoke next.
Mr Prefident,

Rom the general tenor of the argu

FR

more

more inclined to be of this opinion, as I find it was the opinion of the great Earl of Clarendon, in the reign of Charles II. who, in the apology which he left behind him, when, by a moft unjust and most ungrateful profecution, he was obliged to fly his country, has thefe remarkable words: "In my hum. ble opinion, the great misfortunes of the kingdom have proceeded from the war; to which it is notoriously known that I was always most averfe, and may without vanity fay, I did not only forefee, but declare the mifchiefs we fhould run into, by entering into a war, before any alliances made with the neighbouring princes." According to that great and honeft minister, therefore, alliances are neceffary for us before we enter into a war. And I will go further, I will fay, that they are neceflary even in time of peace; because, without treaties of alliance, and guarantee too, we could have no advantageous treaties of peace, nor could we be fure of being able to procure any allies when it becomes neceffary for us to enter into a war. Hofpitibus feros was the character given, many ages fince, to the inhabitants of this island; but if this maxim fhould pre vail, we might be called Peregrinis as well as Hofpitibus feros; and we fhould be looked on by all foreigners as fuch a felfifh people, that no nation would have any trade or commerce with us: nay, it is to be apprehended, that all the nations in Europe would combine against us, that we might be thereby taught to mix a little more humanity and fociality in our temper, and to convince us, that fuch a mixture was neceffary for our fafety, as well as interest.

I therefore hope, Sir, that the Noble Lords who have fupported this motion, will depart from the doctrine they feem to inculcate, and allow that treaties of alliance are sometimes neceffary for us; and if they do this, they muft allow, that it is neceffary for us to provide for fupporting our allies when they are in danger of being attacked, especially when they are brought into that danger by their fidelity and attachment to us. Upon this principle, Sir, if the treaties

now before us had been quite new in their kind, or fuch as had never before been thought of, they must be approved, because they are both neceffary for fupporting the house of Austria and the Dutch, as well as Hanover, in cafe any of them should be attacked by the French, in order to divert us from the profecution of a war at fea and in America. But neither of thefe treaties can be faid to be new in its kind. They are both founded upon, or rather a re vival and explanation of former treaties. That with Ruffia, as is mentioned in the 1ft and zd articles, is only a renewal and explanation of our defenfive treaty with that empire in 1742, and that in 1742 was only a renewal of that treaty which had the preceding year been made with the young Czar Ivan, who had, in the mean time, been set aside by the famous and fudden revolution which happened in the government of that empire. Then, with regard to the prefent treaty with Heffe-Caffel, it is only a renewal of that which was made in the year 1740, and which was approved of by both houfes of parliament. Surely, fuch a treaty of alliance is as neceffary for us, fhould we be engaged in a war with France, as it was when we were engaged in a war only with Spain; and therefore we have now as good, or more reafon, to approve of the prefent treaty with Heffe, than the parliament had to approve of that in the year 1740.

I fhall grant, Sir, that it would be very infolent and unjust in the French, to threaten to attack the Dutch, or the houfe of Auftria, in cafe they refufed to join with them in a war against us; but if they fhould, we are very far from being fure that the other powers of Europe would refent fuch an infolent menace, and much less that they would affift either to repel fuch an unjust attack. On the contrary, I am fure that they would not, fhould we refuse to take any fhare in the war upon the continent, and even refufe to furnish to the party fo unjustly attacked, the fuccours which we are, by treaty, obliged to furnish: but thofe fuccours we could not furrich without having fubfidy-treaties with

fome

fome of the other powers upon the continent, because we have no troops of our own to fpare; and I fhall always be for taking foreign troops into our pay upon fuch occafions, rather than for increafing the number of our own; becaufe fuch an augmentation would take a great number of our hands away from ufeful labour or manufacture; and when peace is reftored, and the newraised troops disbanded, it leaves a new load upon the nation, by an additional number of officers upon half-pay, and an additional number of penfioners up. on Chelsea college.

Thus it muft appear, Sir, that if nei ther we nor our fovereign had any thing to do with the electorate of Hanover, it would nevertheless be neceffary for us to have fuch treaties as these now under our confideration, in order to prevent its being in the power of the French to threaten and compel either the houfe of Auftria, or the Dutch, to join with them in the war against us. And these trea ties will have the fame effect with regard to Spain; for it is not to be doubted, but that the French will ftrongly folicit the court of Spain to join with them in the war against us, and perhaps even threaten them in cafe of a refufal: and however favourable the prefent minifters of Spain may be towards us; yet, confidering the strength of the French party in Spain, and the temptations which the French might throw in the way of that nation, I question much, if the Spanish ministers would venture to defpife fuch a menace, unless they were fure of being fupported by the houfe of Auftria; and this they could not be fure of, if we had not taken proper measures for preventing the house of Auftria's being attacked by any of the French allies in the north, or even in the empire itself; which, I think, we have effectually done by the two treaties now before us.

Now, Sir, with regard to the electorate of Hanover, I wish it had not been fo much talked of in this debate. I think we ought to avoid bringing it into any of our debates; because it is a topic which the difaffected will always make ufe of, for raifing jealoufies and diftrufts in the

populace against the illuftrious family now upon our throne; and as the people in every part of his Majesty's dominions are apt to have a jealousy of the people in every other part of his dominions, we may expect, that this topic will always be made ufe of by the factious and feditious for diftreffing the adminiftration, and for gaining a credit and influence among the people without doors; for within, I hope we shall always be able to judge without prejudice or partiality, and to distinguish between difaffection or faction, and true patriotifm. For this reafon I fhould have cho fen not to have faid any thing about Hanover upon this occafion; but as it has been fo often mentioned, I think myfelf bound to obferve, that it would be as infolent and as unjust in the French to threaten or attack Hanover, on account of a war with this nation, as to threaten or attack either the Dutch or the houfe of Austria; and yet, if a war should enfue between the French and us, I do not in the leaft queftion, but that the French would endeavour to divert us from a profecution of the war, by fea and in America, by an invafion of the electorate of Hanover. In fuch a cafe, I fhall moft readly grant, that both the Emperor and the empire would be obliged to defend the electorate; but I am very fure that they would not, because they could not, unless we had previously put ourfelves in a condition to give them a very powerful affiftance; and this we are obliged to do, at leaft, as much for the fake of Hanover, as for the fake of any other ally; for when the Elector of Hanover fucceeded to the throne of G. Britain, it of course established the clofeft, the firmeft, and the most natural fort of alliance between the two dominions. We are therefore obliged to protect the electorate as an ally. Nay, further, I will fay, that though, by the act of fettlement, his Majefly cannot, by his prerogative, involve us in a war merely for the fake of Hanover, which, if it had not been provided against, he might have done; yet we are in honour obliged to protect the people of that country, as our fellow-fubjects under the 3 C4

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