nions, and entered into alliances for the preservation or enlargement of those foreign dominions, we shall find from our hiftory, that they never at last got much benefit from any foreign alliance. To begin with Edward I. for I think I need not go any further back; as he was one of the wifeft princes, and one of the best Englishinen that ever fwayed the English fceptre, the principal view of the whole of his glorious reign was, to have united all the people of the British ifles under one fovereign; and he would probably have fucceeded had he lived feven years longer. Did he feek any foreign alliance for this purpofe? No, Sir; although he was poffeffed of a very fine territory upon the continent, although another very extenfive country upon the continent had been ungenerously invaded and taken from his grandfather, yet he neither fought to preferve the one, nor to recover the other, by facrificing the true intereft of this kingdom. It is true, indeed, after he had loft the former, I mean Guienne, by one of the moft perfidious even of Gallic perfidies, he was provoked to endeavour to recover it by a foreign alliance. For this purpofe, by means of fubfidies, he engaged feveral princes of Germany and the Netherlands in an alliance with him, in order to attack France upon the fide of Flanders. What was the confequence? After he had landed with his troops in Flanders, they took money from France, and deferted him: nay, he would have been murdered by the very people from whom he expected af fiftance, if he had not been faved by the generofity of one of the demagogues who had declared againft him. This convinced him that he could not recover Guienne without neglecting the principal view of his reign, and thereby facrificing the true intereft of this kingdom; therefore he gave over thoughts of recovering it by force, and prefently concluded a truce with the French King, whereby he left him in poffeffion of Guienne: but, after fome years, got it reitored by treaty, in confequence of an award made by the Pope, which entirely fatisfied Edward, for he never thought of recover ing the dominions taken from his grandfather, much lefs of entering into any foreign alliances for that or any other purpose. But his grandfon, Edward III. forgetting, or not recollecting what had happened to his grandfather, put himfelf to a great expence in forming alli ances with the Emperor, and several other princes of Germany, when he projected his first war against France. What was the confequence? Without the af fiftance of any of his allies he obtained a glorious victory at fea, but with the afliftance they gave him he could obtain no laurels at land. On the contrary, he was deferted by most of them when he had moft occafion for their affiftance; and was forced to agree to a truce. This experience made him alter his conduct; for he began, carried on, and glorioully ended the next war, by the famous treaty of Bretigny, without any foreign alliance or affiftance. In the next reign, Sir, there were no foreign alliances entered into, though we were almoft continually engaged in foreign wars and I muft observe, that though the French King had provided a fleet of above 1200 tranfport-fhips, not flat-bottomed boats, and an army of above 60,000 men, all ready to imbark at Sluice in Flanders, in order to invade this kingdom; yet we then disdained to think of any foreign alliance, or of bringing over any foreign troops for our protection, though the King then upon our throne had no reafon to put any great confidence in the affections of his people; and had then fent all the troops he could moft depend on with his uncle the Duke of Lancaster, to Spain. And as to the alliance which our Henry V. made with the Duke of Burgundy, it re lated only to that King's claim to the crown of France: but even as to that alliance I muft obferve, that it was deferted by the Duke of Burgundy, as foon as he could make a fafe and honourable peace with the King of France: may, he not only deferted the alliance he had fo folemnly entered into, but joined with the French against our Henry VI. in whofe reign our bloody civil wars began between the houfes of York and and Lancaster; and though that war lafted fo long, and with fuch various fuccefs, yet neither fide ever thought of fupporting themselves by a foreign alliance; at least it may be justly faid, that by fuch alliances they never did obtain any folid support. The next foreign alliance I am to take notice of, Sir, was that made by our Edward IV. with the last Duke of Bur. gundy, by which his Majefty was induced, or rather seduced, to be at a great expence in railing an army, and to invade France; but when he arrived there, he foon found he had been deceived by the Duke, who refused to perform any one article of the treaty; fo that Edward was glad to accept of the peace offered him by the cunning Lewis XI. of France. The reign of Henry VII. again may be called a reign of foreign negotiations, treaties, and alliances: but moft of them feem to have been defigned for nothing else but to amufe the people here at home, and to squeeze money from his parliament; for none of them produced any other effect, except that of putting it into the power of the King of France to unite Bretagne to his crown, from whence this nation has fo often been fince threatened with an invafion. And every one that knows any thing of our history, must know how much Henry VIII. was duped, firft in the alliance he made with his father-inlaw, Ferdinand of Spain, and next in the alliance he made with the Pope, the Emperor, and others, against France. In short, from the whole tenor of our history it will appear, that our foreign alliances have generally produced no effect, or effects that were inconfiftent with the true intereft of this country. And this muft neceffarily, from our fituation, be always our cafe. It is against our intereft to acquire any territory upon the continent of Europe; confequently it must be against our intereft to attack any country in Europe by land upon our own account and we may give affiftance to our friends when they have occafion for it, without entering into any alliance, or ftipulating any thing from them but money, or advantages in trade; for as to their assistance, we can never have a`* ny occafion for it, whilst we preserve our fuperiority at sea. The prefervation of this fuperiority, Sir, ought always to be our chief attention and this it is alone which makes it neceffary for this nation to attend to the prefervation of a balance of power' upon the continent of Europe; because if any one state should conquer, or obtain the abfolute direction of all the rest, that state would become fuperior to us in naval power, which is the only thing, humanly speaking, we have to fear. To prevent this, therefore, it may fometimes become necessary for us to enter into foreign alliances; that is to fay, when the balance of power is in real and immediate danger, and a fufficient confederacy cannot be formed for its prefervation, without our joining with all our force in that confederacy; which was the cafe in the year 1701, when the grand alliance was formed by K. William; and if that prince had been wise enough to provide by the articles of that alliance, for a cafe that might then have been eafily foreseen, we fhould not now have had any occafion to fear the power of France, either in Europe or America. When I say this, Sir, every one must suppose, I mean the Emperor Jofeph's dying without heirsmale, and his brother Charles's fucceeding him in the Imperial throne, as well as in all the Austrian dominions; for in this cafe it ought certainly to have been provided, by the terms of the grand alliance, or at leaft when we formed the project of conquering Spain for Charles, that fome one of the other princes of Europe fhould fucceed to the crown of Spain. I fay, if this provifion had been made, there would have been no neceffity for putting an end to the grand alliance, by concluding a feparate peace with France, until that kingdom had been fo reduced, as to put an end to its again disturbing the tranquillity of Europe, or our repofe in America, by any of its ambitious views but by neglecting to make any fuch provision, a separate peace with France became abfolutely neceffary, as foon as the cafe happen ed; ed; and in fuch a negotiation, I believe a confeffed fuperiority, if we make a proper ufe of our naval power, and the numbers of troops we may raise in our plantations. They have, it is true, more numerous regular troops in Europe than we have; but by our fuperiority at fea we may prevent their fending any. great numbers of their troops to America: we may even prevent its being poffible for them to fubfift any great army in America, fhould they find an oppor ber of troops thither. Therefore, in cafe of a war with France, we have no occafion for any ally, either for our defence at home, or for fecuring our fuccels abroad; but, on the contrary, both may be rendered precarious by our having any allies, because the affistance they can give us will be by much overbalanced by the affistance we must give them, which would run us into fuch an expence, as muft, in a very few years, put an end to our public credit. Having now fhewn, Sir, the only cafe when it may become neceffary for this nation to enter into foreign alliances, I believe I may venture to fay, that I have no fuch regard for the opinion of the Earl of Clarendon, as the Noble,tunity by ftealth to fend a great numLord who spoke laft was pleased to profefs. And, in the particular cafe men tioned, I must think, that the Lord Clarendon's opinion was ridiculous: for what allies could K. Charles II. have occafion for in a war with the Dutch? Surely, this nation was then able, without any ally, to vindicate its honour, as well as its rights, against the Dutch. I cannot therefore think, that the Earl of Clarendon was fo great a minifter as he has been reprefented: on the contrary, the fale of Dunkirk, which now appears to have been folely his project, must convince every one, that he was either a very weak, or a very difhoneft minister and if one of the articles of impeachment against him had any truth in it; I mean that of his having held correspondence with Cromwell and his accomplices; we may prefume, that he, by advifing the fale of Dunkirk to the French, intended to ruin his mafter; for that measure alone was enough to have driven K. Charles again out of the kingdom, if the former rebellion, and his own familiar and facetious difpofition, had not rivetted him in the affections of the people. As I am of opinion, Sir, notwith ftanding what was faid by Lord Claren don, that K. Charles had no occafion for any allies in his war against the Dutch; foI am of opinion, that we have now no occafion for any allies in a war against France, if fuch fhould be the event of our prefent difputes with that nation. It is not our intereft to attack them any where but at fea and in America; it is not in their power to attack us any where but at fea and in Ameri*ica and in both these places we have When I reflect, Sir, upon the confequences of a stop being put to our publie credit, I must fay, I am furprised to hear any one make fo light of that danger, as the Noble Lord who spoke last seem. ed to do. The last war againft France, in which we engaged with a number of allies, made us every year contract a new debt of near four millions Sterling, one year with another for the difference between the national debt as it ftood on the 31st of December 1741, and on the 31st of December 1749, amounts to upwards of twenty-feven millions [iv. 356. xiv. 284.]; which for feven years, the longest we can reckon the war to have continued, is near four millions a-year. And I muft obferve, that the expence of the war yearly increafed upon us, so that the new debt we contracted in 1747 amounted to near fix millions, and the new debt we contracted in 1748 amounted to near seven millions; and this over and besides the whole produce of the finking fund, and all we could raife annually within the year. If we fhould now call for allies, and thereby begin a new war upon the continent of Europe, can we fuppofe that it will cost us less yearly than the laft laft did? Muft not we fuppofe that it will cost us more, as we now call upon our allies for their affiftance, whereas in the laft war our allies called upon us? Therefore it may be reasonably fuppofed, that we must begin this new war at the fame expence as we ended the laft, that is to fay, at the rate of running into a new debt of fix or feven millions yearly, which in seven years would amount to near fifty millions. Where fhall we find funds whereon to borrow fuch fums of money? where fhall we find creditors that have fuch fums to lend? In my opinion, Sir, it would be impoffible for us to find either funds or creditors, if the war upon the continent fhould fo long continue; therefore the danger of a ftop being put to our public credit, is fo far from being chimerical, that I think it is unavoidable; and if this fhould happen, how would it be poffible for us to continue the war? But this would not be the only fatal confequence. Such a stop would bring all our paper credit into difrepute, and confequently a run upon our bank, and all our bankers: every one would be for realizing; and the little gold or filver left among us, would be locked up in the coffers of the rich, fo that it would be impoffible for our people to find money either to carry on their trade, or to pay their taxes; and what confufions and diftreffes this would produce, I tremble to think on. money I must therefore be of opinion, Sir, that if the Emperor and princes of Germany will not, without our affiftance, undertake to defend Hanover, as they are in duty bound to do, it is not only imprudent, but impoffible for us to undertake its defence. It muft at laft be over-run by the French, without its being in our power to recover it. Whereas if we fhould allow it to be at firft over-run, and confine ourfelves entirely to a profecution of the war at fea and in America, we may at last bring both the court and kingdom of France into fuch distress, as to make them glad, not only to restore Hanover, but to make good all the damage they have done to it. And as this is the only measure VOL. XIX. which I think it is either prudent, or poffible for us to pursue, I cannot approve of either of the treaties now under our confideration; confequently I must be for concurring with the Noble Lord in the motion he has been pleased to make. [This Journal to be continued.] The life of Admiral BLAKE. OBERT BLAKE was born at Bridge R water, in Somersetshire, in Auguft 1598; his father being a merchant of that place, who had acquired a confiderable fortune by the Spanish trade. Of his earliest years we have no account, and therefore can amufe the reader with none of those prognostics of his future actions, fo often met with in memoirs. In 1615 he entered into the univerfity of Oxford, where he continued till 1623, though without being much countenanced or careffed by his fuperiors; for he was more than once difappointed in his endeavours after academical preferments. It is obfervable, that Mr Wood (in his Athenæ Oxonienses) afcribes the repulfe he met with at Wadham college, where he was competitor for a fellowship, either to want of learning or ftature. With regard to the first objec tion, the fame writer had before informed us, that he was an early rifer, and ftudious, though he sometimes relieved his attention by the amusements of fowling and fifhing. As it is highly probable, that he did not want capacity, we may therefore conclude, upon this confeffion of his diligence, that he could not fail of being learned, at least in the degree requifite to the enjoyment of a fellowship; and may safely afcribe his difappointment to his want of ftature, it being the cuftom of Sir Henry Savil, then warden of that college, to pay much regard to the outward appearance of those who folicited preferment in that fociety. So much do the greatest events owe fometimes to accident or folly! He afterwards retired to his native place, "where he lived," fays Clarendon," without any appearance of ambition to be a greater man than he was, 3 L but In 1640 he was chofen burgess for Bridgewater by the Puritan party, to whom he had recommended himself by his disapprobation of Bp Laud's violence and severity, and his non-compliance with those new ceremonies which he was then endeavouring to introduce. When the civil war broke out, Blake, in conformity with his avowed principles, declared for the parliament; and, thinking a bare declaration for right not all the duty of a good man, raised a troop of dragoons for his party, and appeared in the field with fo much bravery, that he was in a fhort time advanced, without meeting any of those obstructions which he had encountered in the university. In 1645 he was governor of Taunton, when the Lord Goring came before it with an army of 10,000 men. The town was ill fortified, and unfupplied with almost every thing neceffary for fupporting a fiege. The ftate of this garrifon encouraged Col. Windham, who was acquainted with Blake, to propofe a capitulation; which was rejected by Blake with indignation and contempt. Nor were either menaces or perfuafions of any effect; for he maintained the place under all its difadvantages, till the fiege was raifed by the parliament's army. He continued, on many other occafions, to give proofs of an infuperable courage, and, a fteadiness of refolution not to be fhaken; and, as a proof of his firm adherence to the parliament, joined with the borough of Taunton in returning thanks for their refolution to make no more addreffes to the King. Yet was he fo far from approving the death of Charles I. that he made no fcruple of declaring, that he would venture his life to fave him, as willingly as he had done to ferve the parliament. In February 1648-9, he was made a commiffioner of the navy, and appoint ed to ferve on that element, for which he seems by nature to have been defigned. He was foon afterwards fent in pursuit of Prince Rupert; whom he shut up in the harbour of Kinsale in Ireland for feveral months, till want of provi. fions, and defpair of relief, excited the Prince to make a daring effort for his escape, by forcing through the parlia ment's fleet. This defign he executed with his ufual intrepidity, and fucceeded in it, though with the lofs of three fhips. He was purfued by Blake to the coast of Portugal, where he was received in. to the Tagus, and treated with great diftinction by the Portuguese. Blake coming to the mouth of that river, fent to the King a messenger, to inform him, that the fleet in his port be longing to the public enemies of the commonwealth of England, he demand`ed leave to fall upon it. This being re fused, though the refusal was in very foft terms, and accompanied with declarations of esteem, and a prefent of provifions, fo exafperated the Admiral, that, without any hesitation, he fell upon the Portuguese fleet, then returning from Brafil, of which he took seventeen ships, and burnt three. It was to no purpose that the King of Portugal, alarmed at fo unexpected a deftruction, ordered Prince Rupert to attack them, and retake the Brafil fhips. Blake carried home his prizes without molestation, the Prince not having force enough to pufue him, and well pleased with the opportunity of quitting a port where he could no longer be protected. Blake foon fupplied his fleet with provifions, and received orders to make re prifals upon the French, who had suffered their privateers to moleft the English trade; an injury which, in those days, was always immediately refented; and, if not repaired, certainly punished. Sailing with this commiffion, he took in his way a French man of war valued at a million. How this fhip happened to be fo rich, we are not informed; but as it was a cruifer, it is probable the rich lading was the accumulated plunder of many prizes. Then following the unfortunate Rupert, whofe feet, by storms and battles, was now reduced to five fhips, into Carthagena, he demanded leave of the Spanish governor to attack |