fome of the other courts of Europe, in order to be well affured, that it would not be in the power of France to form a dangerous confederacy against us.

It is therefore evident, I think, that we entered precipitately into both these treaties; and as rafhly refolved upon protecting Hanover, at the expence of this nation, against being attacked by France; for I must fuppofe, that we foon found it impoffible to draw the house of Auftria into the confederacy, without engaging in a greater expence than this nation was able to fupport. Upon being convinced of this, what ought we then to have done? Surely, common fenfe fhould have taught us, that we had nothing elfe to do, that we could do nothing else, but refolve upon embracing the other meafure I have mentioned, to give over any further concern for the electorate of Hanover, to confine the war to our own element, the fea, and with the man of true courage to fay, Et me in mea virtute involvo.

The fubfidies we had thus inconsider ately engaged to pay to Heffe-Caffel and Ruffia, we muft, indeed, have continued to pay during the ftipulated term, if demanded. But this was all the expence we had any occafion to put our felves to, even after concluding thefe treaties. We had no occafion to take either of their troops into British pay; much less had we occafion to give France a pretence for invading Hanover, by bringing any of their troops over here: for confidering the general, and, I believe, fincere unanimity, which appeared among our people, for fupporting his Majefty, and for revenging the infults put upon us by France, I will be bold to fay, that the apprehenfion of an invafion was as ridiculous a panic as a ny fet of men was ever seized with; and always will be fo, whilft we have a fuperiority of naval power, and are generally unanimous amongst ourselves. Our gentlemen, yeomen, and farmers do not, it is true, underftand the punctilios in the modern exercife of the firelock, fo well as the veterans of a French army; but these punctilios are of no fervice after an enemy has broke in pell-mell a

mongft them; which our people would foon do upon any French army that fhould land in this ifland, as fuch an army could not long continue without fighting, or chufe what fort of ground they pleased to fight in.

This the French are fully fenfible of; and therefore I am convinced, they never will invade us, unless they are superior at fea, or are fure of being joined by a great part of our own people. For this reafon, we ftood in no need of any fo reign troops, or any foreign ally, for defending us here at home. And fince we found we could not form a confederacy upon the continent, fufficient for the defence of Hanover, without engaging in a greater expence than we were able to fupport, what occafion could we have for any new treaty? I was therefore surprised when I first heard of our treaty with the King of Pruffia. I have always had the highest efteem for that prince, and I know that no man can have a higher than his virtues deferve. But could we fuppofe, that, by means of the King of Pruffia alone, we could defend Hanover against France? If we could have fuppofed it, the fituation in which he then was, with respect to both the courts of Vienna and Petersburg, fhould have prevented our having fo much as a thought of trusting to his affiftance, or of entering into any new treaty with him for that purpose. We could not be ignorant of the jealousy which the court of Ruffia then had of his power; we could not be ignorant of the refentment which the court of Vienna then had against him, on account of Silefia; therefore with half an eye we might have feen, that our engaging at that time in any new treaty with him, would certainly detach both those courts from any connection with this nation, and that it would probably throw both of them into the arms of France. How this came not to be foreseen by our minifters, I do not know; but it was forefeen, and foretold, by many gentlemen I converfed with, after we had heard of our treaty with Pruffia, and long before we had heard of the treaty between the courts of Vienna and Versailles.

Before we entered into this treaty with 4 F 2 Pruffia,

Pruffia, it was therefore manifeft to every one who confidered the circumftances of Europe, that we could not by any fuch treaty propofe to defend Hanover against the French; but, on the contrary, that we might thereby produce what his Majefty very juftly called, an unnatural union of councils abroad, and thereby expofe Hanover more than it was before What then ought we to have done? Surely, to refolve upon the first of the two measures I have mentioned, and to avoid entering into any new treaty, or having any thing further to do with any of the powers upon the continent of Europe, than to take care that they fhould obferve an exact neutrality in the war between France and us. In this cafe, it is true, the French would probably have formed a defign to attack Hanover: but it is fo inconfiftent with the dignity of the Imperial diadem, and fo contrary to the intereft, as well as the conftitution of the empire, to allow an electorate of the empire to be over-run by the French, without any juft caufe, that both the court of Vienna, and the diet of Ratisbon, might of themfelves have refolved to prevent it, had they once feen, that this nation was refolved to give itself no concern about the fafety of that electorate. Whilft the court of Vienna had any hopes of bringing this nation into its terms, by our concern for the fafety of Hanover; whilst the princes of the empire had any hopes of fqueezing large fubfidies from this nation, for af fifting us to protect Hanover; we cannot wonder at their pretending to have no concern for the dignity of the Imperial diadem, or the intereft or conftitution of the empire: but as foon as they had found, that all fuch hopes were at an end, their regard for their own honour, as well as intereft, would have begun to operate, and would probably have operated with effc&; for the French would not have dared to attack Hanover, if they had been under any apprehenfion, that fuch an attack might have engaged them in a war with the emperor and empire, at a time they were engaged in 2 war with this nation.

Thefe confiderations make me think,

that if the court of Versailles had had the direction both of this court and that of Berlin, it could not have advised a measure more adapted to its own interest, than that of our entering into this treaty at the time we did; and therefore the great opinion I have of the wisdom and forefight of the King of Pruffia makes me fufpect, that the terms proposed by the court of Vienna for a new grand al liance or confederacy against France, were fuch as he had reason to fear we would agree to... I say, fear; becaufe a confederacy between the empire of Ruffia, the houfe of Auftria, and the kingdom of G. Britain, might probably have drawn in fuch a number of the other powers of Europe, as would have fhaken the French monarchy from its very foundation; and if that monarchy had been reduced as low, or perhaps lower than it was by the grand alliance in Q. Anne's time, the King of Pruffia had great reason to fear confequences fatal to him, from the refentment of the house of Auftria, and the jealoufy of the court of Ruffia; for against thefe he never had, he never can have a fure dependence upon any thing human, but the friendship and the power of France. His future fafety therefore, nay, I may fay, his very being, depended upon his preventing our clofing with the terms of confederacy propofed by the court of Vienna. How was he to do this? He knew the ardent defire we had, and in. deed ought to have had, if it had been poffible, to provide for the fafety of our fovereign's electoral dominions; he knew the averfion the people of this country had conceived against being engaged in a war upon the continent of Europe; he had then nothing to do, but, by fome means or other, to fuggeft to us, that we might provide for the former without engaging in the latter, by entering into a new treaty with him. And we were fo blinded by our defire on one fide, and our averfion on the other, that we did not forefee the confequences which fuch a treaty might probably preduce. The confequences were perhaps foreseen by h's Pruffian Majesty: but he had much lefs to dread from a fuccesful confede.

racy

racy between France, Auftria, and Ruffia, than from a fuccessful confederacy between G. Britain, Auftria, and Ruffia because in the former cafe he was pretty fure, that the French would at laft take all the care they could of him; therefore the latter was by any means to be prevented: and the preventing of it might even be privately pleaded as a merit with the court of France.

But had we foreseen the confequences, we muft at the fame time have foreseen, that a treaty with Pruffia could no way anfwer the end for which it was intended, and confequently we could have no reafon for entering into any fuch treaty. As thefe confequences might eafily have been forefeen, fo they very foon became apparent: for Ruffia prefently refused to accept of the fubfidy we had promifed, and were ready to pay; and Auftria, in four months time, entered into a treaty of alliance with France, to which it was evident that Ruffia would very foon accede. This treaty, however, fo far as appeared, was an alliance merely defenfive; and confequently could have produced no effect, if no attack had been made in Europe upon any of the allied powers: nay, it would not have warranted France's making an attack upon Hanover; and I doubt much, if either Auftria or Ruffia would have agreed to France's making any fuch attack, if the King of Pruffia had made no attack upon Saxony or Auftria. I fhall not pretend to inquire into what right the King of Pruffia had, or what neceffity he was under, to attack Saxony or Auftria; but this I will fay, that he could not have done a kinder office to France, than to attack them at the time and in the manner he did; because it gave efficacy to the alliance which that crown bad juft entered into with the courts of Vienna and Petersburg, and laid the Queen of Hungary under a neceffity to call for the affiftance of France; and perhaps to make fuch conceffions to that crown, as may hereafter appear to be inconfiftent with the intereft of this nation in particular, as well as of Europe in general; for the French have feldom, if ever, appeared to be fo generous, as

to give their affistance without fome felfifh view of their own.

Befide this unlucky confequence of the King of Pruflia's attack upon Saxony and Auftria, that attack was attended with another confequence equally fatal to Europe, and equally beneficial to France; for it gave that crown not only a pretence, but the appearance of a right to fend their numerous armies into Germany, and to attack every prince of the empire that should oppose the march of thofe armies, especially after the diet of the empire had declared in favour of the houfe of Austria.

When these things are duly confidered, I believe it will appear, that this nation owes no great obligation to Pruffia, either for the treaty he last made with us, or for the attack he has fince made upon Saxony and Austria; and now I fhall inquire, whether we are by that treaty, or by any former treaty, obliged to affift him in the present war. Upon this occafion, I fhall not enter into that nice distinction he has made between the firft aggreffion and the first open act of hoftility [xviii. 493.]; for this is a diftinction which no party in a defenfive alliance is ever obliged to make, otherwise it would always be in the power of any one party in a defenfive alliance, to involve the reft in a war whenever it pleased. The first open act of hoftility is what must always constitute the cafus fœderis; and if any one of the parties in a defenfive alliance commits the firft open act of hoftility, it frees the reft from any obligation they are under, by that alliance, to affift him, even though he should be afterwards attacked in his own territory, by those whom he had first attacked. From whence we mutt conclude, that this nation is under no obligation to affift the King of Pruffia in the prefent war, either from the laft treaty we made with him, or from any former treaty of alliance or guaranty, provided we, upon this occafion, gave him no countenance or encouragement to begin the attack: which I hope we were fo far from doing, that we declared pofitively against it, as we certainly ought to have done.

But

But now let us examine, what we are obliged to do from generofity, from friendship, and from our regard for the Proteftant caufe in Germany. In all thefe refpects, I fhall moft readily admit, that we are under the higheft obligation to protect and support the King of Pruf fia in defence of his juft rights, if it were in our power to do fo. But can this be fuppofed to be in our power, confidering the circumftances which Europe has been thrown into, firft by our treaty with him, and next by his attack upon Saxony and Auftria? If it was not in our power, in conjunction with Ruffia and Auftria, to protect Hanover against France, it cannot furely be in our power to protect either Hanover or Pruffia against France, Austria, and Ruffia. And a faint and fruitless attempt to do fo, would be like throwing up a weak mound against a mighty inundation, which only makes it ruth in with greater impetuofity, and spread wider its devaftation.

What then are we to do in the prefent unfortunate conjuncture? Certainly, to give ourselves no concern, much lefs to put ourselves to any expence, about the prefent war upon the continent of Europe; but to purfue, with the utmost vigour, our own juft and neceffary war against France, at fea and in America; and to wait till some future accident gives a turn to the prefent fyftem of affairs in Europe: for every one muft allow, that the prefent fyftem is far from being natural, and therefore it is not probable that it will long continue. The three great powers now in alliance may probably fall out among themfelves, either about the conduct of the war, or the terms of any future treaty of peace; and any fuch accident, which we ought diligently to watch for, may furnish us with an opportunity to interpofe again, in the affairs of Europe, with advantage to ourfelves, as well as to the common caufe: but our putting ourselves to any expence, either about forming an army of observation, (which I am afraid will be made an army of vain oppofition), or about afifting the King of Pruffia, will only tend to prevent any fuch acci

dent's happening, or our being able to make the proper advantage of it when it does happen. From all which I must conclude, that our giving 200,000 1. for either of thefe purposes, is fo far from being neceffary or prudent, that it may be attended with confequences pernicious to the true intereft of this nation, and to that of Europe in general, especially the electorate of Hanover, which I heartily with it were in our power to protect from any insult or invafion.”

To this is was answered in general, That fome of the other princes of Germany might perhaps join with the King of Pruffia, or at least affift him privately with a large fum of money, which, with the addition of this 200,000 1. might enable him to prolong the war; and in the mean time fome accident might happen for diffolving the powerful alliance now formed against him and as the grant of fuch a small fum could no way affect the profecution of our war by fea and in America, we ought to make him fuch a fmall compliment, even though we were under no obligation by treaty to affift him.

The first refolution of March 10. art. 5. was occafioned by the vote of credit, as it is called, agreed to the preceding feffion; and fhews how much his Majelly deferves fuch confidence from his parliament: for though that vote of credit was for a million [xviii. 437.], yet, by this refolution, it appears, that his Majefty raised but 700,000 1. upon that credit; and of what was fo raised and employed, an exact account was laid before parliament in this feffion, every article of which appeared to be so just and neceffary, that no objection was made to any of them.

And this prevented any oppofition being made to the first refolution of May 19. art. 32. which was founded upon the King's meffage prefented May 17. [255, 6.]. A like meffage was at the fame time fent to the Lords. Their Lordships voted a moft loyal addrefs to the King upon the occafion, and agreed to this article, when it came before them by way of a claufe of appropriation, without any oppofition.

With regard to the refolutions of the ways and means committee, we have occafion to make remarks only on two of them, thofe of Jan. 24. and March 14. That of Jan. 24. art. 3. met with little or no oppofition within doors, becaufe of the neceffity we were under but by many without doors it was thought one of the worst ways we could take for raifing of money; because every fort of lottery muft give to every one who is able to purchase a ticket, the hopes of adding to his fortune without either industry or frugality, and confequently must diminish the induftry of those who incline to be idle, and increafe the luxury of thofe who incline to be extravagant; and as fuch inclinations are but too general among the people of every fociety, no wife government will ever voluntarily promote any fcheme that may furnifh the people, efpecially thofe of the poorer fort, with any ground for entertaining fuch hopes. This was the objection made to the lottery itfelf; and when the fcheme of the lottery appeared in public, a multitude of objections were presently made to it, which it would be too tedious to give an account of but in general it may be obferved, that if our lotteries could be drawn at a lefs expence to the public, a much better fcheme might certainly be contrived; for the reafon of having fo many claffes, and all of them to be determined by the drawing of one, was to leffen the public expence, by fhortening the time of drawing; whereas it might, it is thought, be leffened by leffening the number of commiffioners: but this we shall leave to those who have now the conduct of our public affairs, and who seem refolved to carry them on, not only with vigour, but with as much parfimony as is confiftent with that vigour.

As to the refolution of March 14. [515], it is furprifing there was not a much greater fum fubfcribed upon it, confidering how foon the fubfcription propofed by the refolution of April 28. was filled: for every one of the claffes for life annuities with furvivorships, therein propofed, was very advantageous

to the fubfcribers; and a subscriber upon the fifth class, had he lived till he was 85, might have had fuch a princely revenue coming in yearly, during the reft of his life, that I wonder the chance did not tempt numbers to fubfcribe into that clafs. A man of 50 years of age has not, it is true, an equal chance to live above 17 years; but if a million had been fubfcribed into that clafs, and one only of the fubfcribers had lived till he had been 85, though he was not perhaps a fubfcriber for above 100 l. yet, from that time, he would have had an annuity of 50,000 1. coming in yearly, during the reft of his life; and if five of them had arrived at that age, they would have had each an annuity of 10,000 l. coming in yearly during the reft of their refpective lives.

[To be continued.]

Anecdotes concerning Marefchal Keitb. Taken from a letter, dated Sept. 24. 1757, from gentleman in the country to his friend at Ediaburgh, first published in the Edinburgh Magazine.

[The memoirs of this great man which our readers have in their hands [405], were written by Andrew Henderson, A. M. fometime a probationer in the prefbytery of Edinburgh, who in 1746 wrote what he called The hiftory of the rebellion. He went foon after to London, and has written feveral pieces there, probably for bread.

As we made fome corrections in the me

moirs, in which we are juftified by the gentleman who writes this letter, and expreffed an apprehenfion that more corrections might be made by perfons who knew all the facts, we now readily infert thefe anecdotes, by which some more miflakes are corrected, and fome defects are fupplied.]

That the Velt-Marefchal and his brother [fays this gentleman] were for fome time, in their childhood, under the care of Mr Thomas Ruddiman, is true; but the praife of their education, or even of their learning the La tin tongue, must not be afcribed to him. Bp Keith, a blood-relation of the family, was tutor to the Earl from his beginning the grammar, and read with him the hiftory of Titus Livius from beginning to end. The Velt-Marefchal was three years younger; he having been born June 14 1696, O. S. and the Earl, April 2. 1693. His educa