for their concurrence to the amendments, May 9.

The Commons referred these amendments to a felect committee, May 17.; and, on report, May 21. fome of them were difagreed to; and the reft were, with amendments to feveral of them, agreed to. The fame committee were ordered to draw up reasons to be offered to the Lords, at a conference, for difagreeing to some of the amendments. These reasons were reported on the 24th, and agreed to. A conference with the Lords was defired, and held next day; and the reasons were delivered to them. The Lords, upon taking the reasons into confideration, refolved to infift upon feveral of their amendments which had been difagreed to by the Commons, and, on the 27th, gave their reasons for fo doing at a new conference; which being reported prefently to the Commons, they ordered the report to be taken into confideration June 7. and at their rifing adjourned to the 6th.

Upon this there was, next day, a new conference with the Lords; and their Lordships having taken the amendments made by the Commons, to these two amendments, into confideration, they agreed to them, of which they acquainted the Commons the fame day by a meffage; and thus the bill was now at last made ready for the royal affent, which it received at the end of the feffion.

Accordingly, on the 7th, the reafons given by the Lords, for infifting upon feveral of their amendments, were taken into confideration; which occafioned long debates; for upon every one of them, except two, the question was put for their infifting upon their disagreement, which, if carried in the affirmative, would have occafioned the lofs of the bill; therefore the friends of the bill all united, and carried every one of these questions in the negative. And as to the two amendments on which no que ftion was put, they were both agreed to with amendments; the last of which requires an explanation, being a claufe which was added by the Lords, for giving all fuch as fhould ferve for the appointed time in the militia, a liberty to fet up and exercise any trade they pleafed in any town or place in G. Britain or Ireland: but the Commons thought that this would be too great an incroachment upon the rights and privileges of our cities and corporations; therefore they at first disagreed to the whole claufe; and now, by their amendment, they confined

Having finished the history of the bill, we fhall observe, that there was from the beginning, as we have been informed, a defign to provide cloaths, arms, and accoutrements, for the militia-men at the public expence, and to allow every one of them fo much a.day, by way of pay or wages, for every day they attended the militia exercise. But no provifion could be made for this in the bill; because such a provision would have made it a money-bill; and as the Commons have always infifted upon it, that the Lords can make no amendment to a money-bill; in order to prevent any difference between the two houses, and to leave the Peers at full liberty to make what amendments they might think fit, it was refolved to leave the expence of the militia to be regulated and provided for by a new bill to be paffed the next following feffion, when it could, with more certainty, be computed, what fum would be neceffary for these purpofes. However, it would, we believe, have been proper to have taken fome public and solemn method to have notified this defign to the people. Perhaps it might have been properly enough done, after the bill had paffed both houses, by an address from the Commons to his Majefty, praying, that in cafe he should be pleased to give his affent to the faid bill, he would be gra cioufly pleased to provide cloaths, arms. and accoutrements, for the militia, and to pay them fo much a-day for every day they fhould be out upon the militia-exercife before a certain time, and that

the

care to make good the expence. Such an addrefs might have been agreed to, and prefented, with the more freedom, confidering what his Majefty had faid, in his fpeech from the throne, at the beginning of the feffion: and fuch an addrefs appearing in the votes, and there by difperfed through the whole kingdom, would have obviated one of the chief objections made by ignorant people to the act as it now ftands.

We must likewife obferve, that the amendments made by the Lords, by which the number of militia-men were reduced to 32,000 men, being but about one half of what had been proposed by the Commons, was objected to both within doors and without; and would have been difagreed to, if the real friends to the bill had not been apprehenfive, that fuch a disagreement, if infifted on, would have occafioned the lofs of the bill; and confequently they thought that it was better to have too fmall a number of regular disciplined militia, than to have none at all.

There are two forts of invafion which ought to be provided against. One is, with a great force, and with a defign to conquer the kingdom; and the other is, with a fmall force, and with a defign only to land, and to plunder and lay waste some part of our extenfive coaft, and then to reimbark, and efcape with their plunder, before a fufficient force by fea or land can be fent to oppofe or intercept them. Of thefe two forts, we are certainly most exposed to the laft; because it may be much more fuddenly prepared and carried into execution, and because none of our rich cities upon the coaft have any fortifications to defend them against an invading enemy. We have nothing to defend us but the num, ber, discipline, arms, and courage of our men; and the militia-act, as it now ftands, will not certainly furnish us with a proper number for this purpose.

Suppofe, for example, the French fhould, in the winter-time, take advantage of a westerly wind, and land 4 or 5000 men near Exeter; as the militia of that county, which is one of the largest,

not, in a week's time, bring a fufficient force against them, even though we had then a regiment of regular troops in the county; and what havock might they not make in that city and its neighbourhood, in a week's time? It is true, it may be faid, that the act is defigned to have all the men in England discipli ned by rotation; and that, upon fuch an occafion, all or most of those who had been formerly of the militia, would voluntarily enter again into actual service. But to this there are two very plain and ftrong objections, In the first place, As every man is by the act allowed to ferve by substitute, it is to be feared, that no man will ever serve, who can spare to hire one to serve for him; and it is not to be questioned, but that there will always be a multitude of the lowest and most abandoned part of the people, who will be ready to ferve for a small hire. To which we fhall add, that the reduction of the number of our militia-men will very much contribute towards the leffening of this hire, and confequently towards the leffening the number of those that will ever ferve in perfon; and as the lieutenants will, it is believed, be always inclined to approve of a substitute who has, rather than of one who has never before served, it is to be feared, that our militia-men, like our regular troops, will always confift of the fame men, or very near the fame men, and thofe the lowest and most idle fellows in the whole country. Are thefe the men in whom we are to put our trust for defending us against a French invasion, or for preferving the liberties and privileges of the people?

In the next place, it may be objected, That fuppofing the act fhould have the defired effect, and that most of our men fit to bear arms, both rich and poor, fhould at once be inspired with such a love for their country, and fuch a regard for their own honour and future fafety, as to ferve in perfon, and make themselves acquainted with the ufe of arms, and with military difcipline; yet our lieutenants have, by the act, no power to embody fuch volunteers as

may

may offer themselves upon any particular occafion, nor have they any means provided for furnishing fuch voluntiers with proper arms and accoutrements. This was a very great omiffion, and therefore, it is hoped, it will be taken care of, in any future militia-bill, which it may be thought neceffary to pafs into a law; for this would be neceffary, even though the number of militia-men fhould be increased to what was at first propofed, which, we hope, it will be the very next feffion.

We fay, we hope fo; because if there be any danger to be apprehended from a well-difciplined militia, upon the plan of the prefent act, it must arife from the fmallness, and not from the largenefs of their number. The fmaller their number is, the more probable it is, that they will always confift of the lowest and most abandoned part of our people, and that we shall have few or none but fuch that know any thing of military difcipline, as muft appear from what we have already faid about the hire of fubftitutes. And if an ambitious king were provided with a well-difciplined militia of 30,000 private men, confifting of the very lowest and most abandoned of the people, while, at the fame time, few or none of the reft of the people were provided with arms, or understood any thing of military difcipline; can we think, that fuch militia-men would inquire, whether the imminent danger of an invafion pretended for drawing them out into actual service, and daily pay, had any foundation, or whether the lieutenants and officers appointed to draw them out and command them, were poffeffed of the eftates prefcribed by this act, especially if they faw many of themfelves advanced to the rank of officers? Whereas, if our militia were to confift of 60,000, or any greater number, the hire of fubftitutes would be fo high, and the rotation fo quick, that many men of fubftance and fome rank would chufe to ferve in perfon. Such men would make both the inquiries I have mention ed; and would mutiny, for fo it would be called, if they found they were to be drawn out and commanded exprefsly VOL. XIX.

contrary to law. Befide which, we fhould always have in the kingdom a great number of well-difciplined men not then in actual fervice, by whom we fhould be able to make head against thofe in actual fervice. At least it would make it very dangerous to attempt to make an illegal ufe of them; and this danger would make all of them more fhy of fubmitting to any illegal command, or obeying any illegal orders; for fecurity of fuccefs and impunity is generally one of the greateft incitements to villany, and the contrary one of the beft prefervatives of innocence.

The next bill of a public nature moved for, was that to make provifion for the quartering of foreign troops. It was moved for by the Lord Barrington, fecretary at war, Dec. 13.; and leave being given to bring it in, the Lord Barrington, Mr Chancellor of the Exche quer, and Mr Solicitor-General, were ordered to prepare and bring it in. It was presented next day by Lord Barrington, then twice read, and committed for the day following. On the 15th, it was committed, reported, and ordered to be ingroffed; and as it was very fhort, it was next day read a third time, and paffed nem. con. being intitled, A bili to make provision for the quartering of the foreign troops NOW in this kingdom. And fuch difpatch was given it in the other houfe, that it paffed through that house, and was returned to the Commons, without amendment, on the 17th; fo that it was ready for, and received the royal affent on the 18th, along with the before-mentioned bill for prohibiting the exportation of corn. [xviii. 618.]

The reafon for bringing in this bill fo early, and paffing it fo quickly, was an objection made by our innholders and other public houfes, which had never been made before, and which was, That they were not obliged to receive into, or give quarters to any foreign troops in their houfes [xviii. 524, 64.]; and this objection our government did not then think fit to difpute, as it was fo eafy at that time to put an end to the difpute by a new law. But if the King has a power to call over foreign troops in time of 4 X

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danger by our conftitution, that is to fay, by common law, and without a previous act of parliament for the purpose, one would think, that he had by the fame law a power to quarter the foreign foldiers fo called over, in the fame way as our own foldiers are, or may be quartered. Therefore this question is of much greater importance than it firft appears to be, as it feems to render doubtful the power of the crown to bring foreign troops into this kingdom in time of danger, without the confent of parliament regularly obtained, by bringing in and paffing a bill for the purpofe; and to determine this doubt either way might be attended with great danger; though the negative feems to be the leaft dangerous of the two, especially if due attention be always had towards propagating and preferving a true military fpirit a mong our own people in general.

[To be continued.]

From the report of the general officers, appointed by his Majefty's warrant of Nov. 1. 1757, to inquire into the causes of the failure of the late expedition to the coafts of France. Published by authori ty. [603.]

Copy of a letter, dated London July 15. 1757, from Captain (now LieutenantColonel Clerk, to Sir John Ligonier, and tranfmitted to Mr Secretary Pitt, with regard to Rochefort.

[Col. Clerk is a fon of Dr Clerk, phyfician in Edinburgh, lately deceased.]

SIR,

YOU have defired me to put down

Excellency in regard to Rochefort.

In returning from Gibraltar in 1754, I went along part of the western coaft of France, to fee the condition of fome of the fortifications of their places of importance, on purpose to judge, if an attempt could be made with a probability of fuccefs, in cafe of a rupture, and of the French drawing away their troops to Flanders, Italy, and Germany, in the fame manner as they did in the last war. I had heard, that Rochefort, though a place of the utmost importance, had been very much neglected. I went there,

and waited upon the governor in my regimentals; told him, that I was upon my way to England from Gibraltar; and that I came on purpose to see the place, the dock, and the men of war. He was very polite: I was fhewed every thing; went aboard ten ships of the line new built; and an engineer attended me in going round the place.

I was surprised to find, that though there was a good rampart with a revetement, the greatest part of it was not flanked but with redans; that there were no outworks, no covert way, and in many places no ditch; fo that the bottom of the wall was feen at a distance: that in other places, where the earth had been taken out to form the rampart, there was left about them a good height of ground, which was a disadvantage to the place that for above the length of a front there was no rampart, or even intrenchment; but as the ground was low and marshy at that place, being next the river, there were fome small ditches; which were dry, however, at low water; yet the bottom remained muddy and flimy.

Towards the river there was no rampart, no parapet, no batteries on either fide. Towards the land-fide there was fome high ground very nigh the place, perhaps at the distance of about 150 or 200 yards.

The engineer told me, that the place had remained in that condition for above feventy or eighty years.

I got no plan of the place, and put nothing down in writing; for I found,

me, and thought it very extraordinary that I fhould be allowed to go about and fee every thing.

I burnt even fome sketches and remarks I had by me upon other places, that they might have no hold of me, in cafe they fearched my baggage, and therefore could only expofe themfelves, as I had done nothing but what was open, above board, and with permiffion.

In re

However, as to utility, I was as much fatisfied as if I had got a plan. gard of the profile indeed, I have thought fince, that it would not have been amifs

if I had known for certain the exact height of the rampart. I think that it could not exceed twenty-five feet. In Martiniere's geographical dictionary, it is called only twenty feet high; perhaps the parapet is not included.

I told your Excellency, that I had never feen any plan of the place; but as there had been no alteration in the works for fo many years, I made no question but that fome old plan of it might be found which would correfpond exactly with what I faid. In the Forces de l'Europe, which I have, there is no plan of Rochefort; but I found one in the Duke of Argyle's edition, which I borrowed, and fhewed to your Excellency. It agrees exactly with what I faid, and with the fketch I drew of it before you from my memory, except that a regular ditch is reprefented every where, which is not the cafe.

The river may be about 130 yards broad. The entrance is defended by two or three small redoubts, which I did not fee, nor could I venture even to go down and examine the coaft.

What I mentioned to your Excellency of the method of infulting the place, confidering it upon the footing of an immediate affault, I have not put down; for, though it may be reasoned upon in a general view, yet many things can only be fixed and determined immediately upon the spot. I was told, that there are never any troops at Rochefort, but the marines. There might be about 1000 at that time.

By the expedition to Port L'Orient in 1746, it appeared to me, that the country-people in arms are very little better than our own; and that an officer who poffeffes himself, might march fafely from one end of a province to another, with only five companies of grenadiers, where there are no regular troops. They imagine at first, that they can fight, and their intentions are good till it comes to the point, when every body gives way almoft before the firing of a platoon.

In writing this I have obeyed with pleafure, as I have always done, your Excellency's commands.-I am, &c. ROBERT CLERK.

Memorial, of the actual force of France by land, and the fervices on which it is employed in the year 1757. Received July 28. 1757, and communicated to the generals who were fent out on the expedition. THE French army, at the beginning

of the prefent troubles, confifled only of 157,347 men, not including the militia and the invalids, viz.

French foot
Artillery
Foreign foot

King's houfehold, horfe
French horfe
Foreign horfe
Dragoons
Huffars
Light troops

In the month of August 1755, an augmentation was made of four companies of 45 men each, in every battalion of the king's regiment, and of four companies of 40 men each, in every common battalion of French foot; which made in all 29,620 men.

About the fame time an augmentation was made in the dragoons, which made up every regiment four fquadrons of 640 men; making in all 2560 men.

In the month of December of the fame year 1755, an augmentation was alfo made in the horse, of ten men a company; in all 5560 men.

The royal volunteers, and Fifcher's corps, were also augmented; we do not exactly know to what number; but, according to our advices, this augmentation came to about 680 men.

These feveral augmentations amount to 38,420 men, and confequently the French army (without reckoning the militia and the invalids, which I put at above 67,000) is compofed of 196,000 men. They have, it is true, raifed two new regiments in the country of Liege; but, notwithstanding, their regular troops are under 200,000 men.

The iflands of Minorca and Corfica, with the colonies in America, take up 25,000 men at leaft; they imbarked in the fpring 3 or 4000 men for different fervices in the two Indies; Marshal d'Etrées's army, if the regiments were complete, would amount to 92,000 men ; Marthal Richlieu's [Soubife's}is 32,655. 4 X 2

A