A body of 6 or 7000 men muft alfo be reckoned, which they are obliged to keep in garrifon at Toulon, Marseilles, Cette, Antibes, &c. at hand for that part of the coaft. According to this calculation, then, there are 160,000 regular troops employed; there will remain about 40,000 men for all the garrifons from Sedan to the frontiers of Swifferland, as alfo for thofe of Roufillon and Guienne, without Speaking of Flanders and the coaft. We reckon about 20,000 men placed from St Valery to Bergue; fo that we have all the reason to believe, that there cannot be 10,000 men more from St Valery to Bourdeaux. Copy of a paper given by Sir John Ligonier to Sir John Mordaunt, before he fet out on the expedition, and laid before the board, Nov. 14. by the latter. Here is a chance in the best-concerted military enterprises, which every man of long fervice muft have experienced. What fhare then must be left to fortune in an expedition where neither the country, nor the number of troops you are to act againft, is known with any precifion! The capacity of the generals may fupply this want of intelligence; but to give them any positive plan, or rule of action, under fuch circumftances, I apprehend would be abfurd. If I am rightly informed, the great point his Majefty has in view by this expedition, and the alarming the coafts of France, is the hopes of making a powerful diverfion in favour of his Royal Highnefs the Duke, as well as the King of Pruffia, who defires and preffes much this very measure. In the execution of this general plan, a project of giving a mortal blow to the naval power of France is in his Majefty's thoughts, by attacking, and deftroying, if poffible, the dock, fhipping, and naval ftores, at Rochefort. A plan of that place, given by one of his Majesty's engineers, who was there in 1754, feems to encourage the attempt: and it must be owned, that without fuch authority it could hardly be believed that a place of that great importance could be left in fo defenceless a condition. In all doubtful dangerous military attempts, the advantages that may accrue from fuccefs ought to be weighed against the damage and misfortunes that may be the confequences of a repulfe; and that, well confidered, may in prudence determine the choice. If an attempt is to be made upon Rochefort, it will be the part of the admiral to know the coafts, to bring the troops to the nearest place, to cover their landing by the difpofition of his fhips, and to deftroy any barbet batteries which the enemy may have upon the fhore; ftill remembering, that if the troops are landed at too great a distance from the place, the defign will become dangerous, and probably impracticable. Suppofing the troops landed, it must be left to the confideration of the generals, whether they should not march with the proper precautions directly to Rochefort, to prevent any fuccours being thrown into the place; at the fame time that the marines fhould be employed in making a good intrenchment for the fecurity of the ftores to be landed from time to time, as well as of a retreat in case of neceffity. We are told the country in the neighbourhood is low and marshy: that circumftance might be of great advantage in this undertaking, because in that case troops cannot march by ouvertures dans la campagne; but muft follow the dikes or caufeys; which may be easily defended by coupures or redoubts. A fafe and well-fecured communication between the camp and the fea, from whence you are to receive your fupplies of all kinds, is abfolutely neceffary: the whole depends upon it. But this being done, I fhould not be much in pain for the fafety of the troops: an inferior number dares not approach you; and one fuperior will not be eafily affembied without your knowing of it: and at all events you have fecured a retreat to the fhips. I would advise to procure guides upon the fpot, and paying them greatly when faithful: there are numbers of Proteftants in that province that wish you well, and and would be glad to go on board with you. As for a coup de main, it may perhaps fucceed beft at your coming up; as the enemy may be in great hurry, furprise, and confternation, at fuch an unexpected vifit, and not have had time to make his difpofitions. But if that is not thought proper, it may fucceed as well after the place has been thoroughly reconnoitred, and you have fixed the spots where you defign to direct your greatest efforts: and if the enemy fee any preparations for a regular attack, they will lefs fufpect a coup de main. Bergen-op-zoom was taken by a coup de main after a long fiege. St Philips was taken by fcaling-ladders and a coup de main, though the garrifon was 3000 ftrong, after a fiege of 56 days. The neceflity of dividing a fmall garrifon in a place of fuch circumference as Rochefort, may facilitate the fuccefs of a bold attempt. Capt William Phillips delivered next day to the board the original of this paper; with directions to inform them, that Sir John Ligonier was defirous the board fhould understand that the paper was intended not as inftructions, but only hints, which he had put upon paper, and read to Sir John Mordaunt, who thereupon defired a copy.The following paragraph was added, which Sir John Ligo. nier directed Capt Phillips to inform the board was not in the copy given to Sir John Mordaunt, viz. "When Sir John Ligonier wrote this paper, of which Sir John Mordaunt defired a copy, he knew nothing of the difpofition of the French troops. The small number of those troops that could be upon that coaft, by the difpofition produced at the cabinetcouncil [623.] leffened very much the neceffity of the precautions to be taken for a communication or landing." Extracts of the fecret inftructions given to Sir John Mordaunt, dated, Aug. 5. 1757. [Sir Edward Hawke's inftructions were of the fame tenor, mutatis mutandis.] GEORGE R. Whereas we have determined, with the bleffing of God, to profecute the juft war in which we are engaged against the French King, with the utmoft vigour; and it being highly expedient, and of urgent neceflity, to make some expedition that may caufe a diverfion, and engage the enemy to employ in their own defence, a confiderable part of their forces, deftined to invade and opprefs the liberties of the empire, and to fubvert the independency of Europe; and, if poffible, to make fome effectual impreffion on the enemy, which, by disturbing and fhaking the credit of their public loans, impairing the ftrength and refources of their navy, as well as dif concerting, and, in part, fruftrating their dangerous and extenfive operations of war, may reflect luftre on our arms, and add life and ftrength to the com. mon caufe; and whereas we are perfua ded, that nothing, in the prefent fitua tion of affairs, can fo fpeedily and effentially annoy and diftrefs France, as a fuccefsful enterprise against Rochefort; our will and pleasure is, That you do ticable, a defcent, with the forces under attempt, as far as fhall be found pracyour command, on the French coast, at or near Rochefort, in order to attack, if force that place; and to burn and depracticable,and, by a vigorous impreffion, docks, magazines, arfenals, and hipftroy, to the utmost of your power, all Ping, that shall be found there, and exert fuch other efforts as you fhall judge most proper for annoying the enemy. either have fucceeded or failed; and in After the attempt on Rochefort fhall cafe the circumftances of our forces and fleet fhall, with profpect of fuccefs, fill admit of further operations, you are next to confider Port L'Orient and Bour deaux, as the most important objects of our arms, on the coaft of France; and our will and pleasure is, That you do proceed fucceffively to an attempt on both, or either of thofe places, as fhall be judged practicable; or on any other place that shall be thought most advifeable, from Bourdeaux homewards to Havre, in order to carry and spread, with as much rapidity as may be, a warm alarm along the maritime provinces of France. In cafe, by the bleffing of God upon our arms, you shall make yourself mafter of any place on the coast of France, our will and pleafure is, That you do not keep poffeffion thereof; but that, after demolishing and deftroying, as far as may be, all works, defences, magazines, arfenals, fhipping, and naval flores, you do proceed, fucceffively, on the ulterior operations of this expedition, according as any of them fhall be judged advifeable, and may be performed within fuch time as fhall be confiftent with your return, with the troops under your command, fo as to be in England at, or about, as near as may be the end of September, unlefs the circumftances of our forces and fleet shall neceffarily require their return fooner; and you are to land the troops at Portsmouth, or fuch other of our ports as the exigency of the cafe may fuggeft. by his Majefty's inftructions, judge of the practicability of the fervice, on the fpot, according as contingent events, and particular circumftances, may require; the King judging it highly prejudicial to the good of his fervice, to give particular orders and directions with regard to poffible contingent cafes that may arifse.” Extract of a letter from Sir Edward Hawke to Mr Secretary Pitt, dated, Ramilies, in Bafque road, Sept. 30. 1757. It having been thought neceffary, in order to fecure a fafe landing for the troops, to found and reconnoitre the fhore of the main; as foon as the fort [Aix] had furrendered, I directed RearAdm. Broderick, with Capts Denis, Douglas, and Buckle, to perform that fervice, and make their report to me. It was the afternoon of the 24th before they returned. After maturely confiAug. 11. 1757. Sir John Mordaunt dering the report, I was of opinion they wrote to Mr Pitt from the ifle of Wight might land; on which Sir John Moras follows." Having, fince my ar daunt defired a council of war might be rival here, converfed with Sir Edward affembled to confider of it. There it was Hawke, and Vice-Admiral Knowles, granted by every body, that the landing both feem of opinion that it is poffible, could be effected. In confidence of their from the nature of the navigation to Rochefort, the fleet may be detained, judgment, and knowledge of their own even in fight of the coaft of France, for for not proceeding to attempt taking profeffion, we affented to their reasons a week or ten days, without being able Rochefort by efcalade.He defired a to get into the road, or off the ifle of fecond council; which was affembled Aix; during which time an alarm will neceffarily be given in thofe parts. This early on the 28th. Immediately the conjuncture and fituation, if it should difpofition was made for the landing, unconjuncture and fituation, if it should der the direction of Rear-Adm. Brodehappen, appears to me fo very delicate, rick, and all the captains of the fquaand equally to the other general officers dron. Part of the troops were actually on the expedition, who may, by acci- in the boats, when I received a letter dent to the firft in command, come to from Mr Broderick, viz. “ be under the fame difficulty, (the fuccefs prepared all the boats, with proper ofof our undertaking depending, as I ap- ficers, to land the troops, agreeable to prehend, on the fuddennefs of its exeyour order; but am to acquaint you, cution), that I fhould be glad, if it is that the generals are come to a refolution thought proper, to have a direction how not to land to-night, and to wait till I am to act in that cafe." day-light, when they can have a full view of the ground where they are to land. I am, &c." Mr Pitt answers him, Aug. 13. "With regard to the fuppofed cafe, as ftated in your letter,I am commanded by the King, to fignify to you his Majefty's pleafure, That you, or fuch other officer on whom the command may devolve, do, in conformity to the latitude given Sir, I have Though, before I came here, this place was represented as very difficult of accefs, and fo narrow that fhips could not lie in fafety from the forts, nay, the pilots made many baulks before we came in; yet I find it a fafe, fpacious road, in which all the navy of England, merchant-fhips included, may ride without the least annoyance; and that a fquadron may, at any time, by lying here, prevent any armament from Rochefort, and ruin all the French trade to Rhé, Oleron, or the continent within thefe iflands. Extracts of the council of war beld Sept. 25. The council having taken the faid report [that of Adm. Broderick,&c.] into confideration, and examined the pilots, it appears, that there are but two landing-places; and that the troops could not be reimbarked from either of them in bad weather, the fwell of the fea making fo great a furf on the fhore that no boats would be able to approach it to take the troops off, (the ableft pilot having informed the council, that he had been at anchor seven weeks in this road, and not a boat been able to pafs or repafs). And it likewife appears to the council, that in cafe the troops should be overpowered by fuperior numbers of the enemy, they could have no protection from the cannon of the fleet, the fhoal water preventing their coming within gunshot. All which being taken into confideration, together with the long detention of the troops in the isle of Wight, and our meeting with contrary winds, fogs, and calms, upon our paffage; the feveral informations received of troops affembled in the neighbourhood, and the great im probability of finding the place [Rochefort] unprovided, or of furprising it, or confequently fucceeding in an enterprise founded on the plan of an affault or efcalade merely, and the uncertainty of a fecure retreat for the troops if landed; the council are unanimoufly of opinion, that fuch an attempt is neither advifeable nor practicable. Signed by the Admirals Hawke, Knowles, Broderick, and Capt. George Bridges Rodney; and by the Generals Mordaunt, Conway, Cornwallis, and Col. George Howard. Copy of the council of war held Sept. 28. The council of war being affembled, at the defire of Sir John Mordaunt, proceeded to take under confideration, whether it is advifeable to land the troops, to attack the forts leading to and upon the mouth of the river Charente; and after mature deliberation are unanimoufly of opinion, that it is adviseable to land the troops for that purpose, with all poffible difpatch. Signed as the preceding. Extract of a letter from Sir John Mordaunt to Mr Secretary Pitt, dated, Ramilies, Rade de Bafque, Sept. 30. I am quite unhappy that the great national object, the taking of Rochefort, was not at this period practicable: and what adds to my unhappinefs is, that the King fo ftrongly ordered it. But when his Majefty reads the particular events and circumftances, I flatter myfelf he will not be diffatisfied with our proceedings. Whilft the fortifications of the fort on the ifle d'Aix were blowing up, we thought it right to make fome attempt; and agreed on landing, and attacking the forts leading to and upon the river Charente. Orders were accordingly given on the 28th, for our landing the fame night with the whole army. At one in the morning, Rear-Adm. Broderick, with most of the captains, and all the fea-officers of every kind, with all the boats that could be got, were ready to affift; and most of the troops for the firft imbarkation were on board. Unfortunately, fuch a high wind fprung up from the fhore, that all the fea-officers gave their opinion that the landing fhould not be attempted; that the boats must be towed fo very flowly, the tranfport-boats, by reports to me, could not fome of them make any way at all; that it would be day-light before the first imbarkation could poffibly be landed; and all agreed it would be fix hours before that body of troops could be fupported by the landing of a fecond imbarkation: add to this, that the fhips could not come near enough to help to cover the landing, and the garrison of Rochelle was within two leagues. Under thefe circumstances, and the ftrong reprefentation of the fea-officers, the the general officers unanimoufly agreed to fend the troops back again to their transports. A list of the gentlemen who were examined by the board of inquiry. Lt-Gen. Sir John Mordaunt, commander in chief of the land-forces. Vice-Adm. Charles Knowles. Maj. Gen. Henry Seymour Conway. Maj.-Gen. Edward Cornwallis. We conceive another cause of the failure of the expedition to have been, that, instead of attempting to land, when the report was received, on the 24th of September, from Rear-Adm. Broderick and the captains who had been fent out to found and reconnoitre, a council of war was fummoned and held on the 25th, in which it was unanimoufly refolved not to land, as the attempt upon Rochefort was neither advisable nor Col. James Wolfe, quartermaster-general upon practicable. But it does not appear to the expedition. Col. George Howard. Col. Thomas Brudenell. us, that there were then, or at any time afterwards, either a body of troops or Lt-Col. Robert Clerk, chief engineer upon the batteries on the fhore, fufficient to have expedition. Capt. Thomas Ofbert Mordaunt. For the particulars of their examinations, we muft at prefent content ourselves with the accounts already inferted from the news-papers [603.]. Sir John Mordaunt's speech in this Report, is ver. batim as we have inferted it. [604.] ·Report of the general officers to his Majefly May it please your Majefty, E the under-written general officers do, in obedience to your Majefty's command, most humbly report to your Majefty the principal causes of the failure of the faid expedition, as they ap pear to us, viz. It appears, that one caufe of the expedition having failed, is the not attacking Fort Fouras by fea, at the fame time that it would have been attacked by land, agreeable to the first defign, which certainly must have been of the greateft u tility towards carrying your Majefty's inftructions into execution. It was at firft refolved by Sir Edward Hawke, (Thierri the pilot of the Magnanime having undertaken the fafe conduct of a fhip to Fort Fouras for that purpose), but after wards laid afide, upon the reprefentation of Vice-Adm. Knowles, that the Barfleur, the fhip defigned for that fervice, was on ground, at the diftance of between four and five miles from the fhore. But as neither Sir Edward Hawke, nor the pilot, could attend, to give any infor. mation upon that head, we cannot prefumé to offer any certain opinion thereupon. prevented the attempting a defcent, in pursuance of the inftructions figned by your Majefty: neither does it appear to us, that there were any fufficient reasons to induce the council of war to believe, that Rochefort was fo far changed in refpect of its ftrength, or posture of defence, fince the expedition was firft refolved on in England, as to prevent all attempts of an attack upon the place, in order to burn and destroy the docks, magazines, arfenals, and shipping, in obedience to your Majesty's commands. And we think ourselves obliged to remark upon the council of war of the 28th of September, that no reason could have exifted fufficient to prevent the attempt of landing the troops previous to that day, as the council then unanimously refolved to land with all poffible difpatch. We beg leave alfo to make one other obfervation, That after its being unanimoufly refolved to land, in the council of war of the 28th, the refolution was taken of returning to England, without any regular or general meeting of the faid council: but as that whole operation was of fo inconfiderable a nature, we do not offer this to your Majefty as a caufe of the failure of the expedition, fince we cannot but look upon the expedition as having failed, from the time the great object of it was laid afide in the council of war of the 25th. All which is most humbly fubmitted to your Majefty's wifdom. Privy-Garden, MARLBOROUGH. |