out refource. The Elector of Saxony, whether invited or not, was not comprifed in the union of Francfort; and as every fovereign is growing lefs, as his next neighbour is growing greater, he could not heartily with fuccefs to a confederacy which was to aggrandize the other powers of Germany. The Pruffians gave him likewife a particular and immediate provocation to oppose them: for when they departed to the conqueft of Bohemia, with all the elation of ima ginary fuccefs, they paffed through his dominions with unlicensed and contemptuous difdain of his authority. As the approach of Pr. Charles gave a new profpect of events, he was eafily perfuaded to enter into an alliance with the Queen, whom he furnished with a very large body of troops. [vi. 481.]

The King of Pruflia having left a garrifon in Prague, which he commanded to put the burghers to death if they left their houfes in the night, went forward to take the other towns and fortreffes; expecting, perhaps, that Pr. Charles would be interrupted in his march. But the French, though they appeared to Follow him, either could not, or would not overtake him.

In a fhort time, by marches preffed on with the utmoft eagernefs, Charles reached Bohemia; leaving the Bavarians to regain the poffeffion of the wafted plains of their country, which their ene mies, who fill kept the ftrong places, might again feize at will. At the approach of the Auftrian army, the courage of the King of Pruffia feemed to have failed him. He retired from poft to poft, and evacuated town after town, and fortress after fortrefs, without refiftance, or appearance of refiftance, as if he was refigning them to the rightful

Owners.

It might have been expected that he fhould have made fome effort to fecure Prague, but after a faint attempt to difpute the paffage of the Elbe, he ordered his garrifon of 11,000 men to quit the place. They left behind them their magazines, and heavy artillery; among which were feven pieces of remarkable excellence, called the Seven Electors.

But they took with them their field-cannon, and a great number of carriages laden with ftores and plunder, which they were forced to leave in their way to the Saxons and Auftrians, that haraffed their march. They at laft entered Silefia with the lofs of about a third part. [vi. 584.]

The King of Pruffia fuffered much in his retreat: for befides the military ftores, which he left every where behind him, even to the cloaths of his troops, there was a want of provifions in his army, and confequently frequent defertions and many difeafes; and a foldier fick and killed was equally loft to a flying army.

At laft he re-entered his own territories; and having ftationed his troops in places of fecurity, returned for a time to Berlin; where he forbade all to speak either ill or well of the campaign.

To what end fuch a prohibition could conduce, it is difficult to difcover. There is no country in which men can be forbidden to know what they know; and what is univerfally known, may as well be spoken. It is true, that in popular governments feditious difcourfes may inHame the vulgar; but in fuch governments they cannot be reftrained, and in abfolute monarchies they are of little effect.

When the Pruffians invaded Bohemia, and this whole nation was fired with refentment, the King of England gave or ders in his palace that none fhould mention his nephew with difrefpect. By this command he maintained the decency neceffary between princes, without inforcing, and probably without expecting obedience but in his own prefence.

The King of Pruffia's edict regarded only himself; and therefore it is difficult to tell what was his motive, unless he intended to fpare himself the mortification of abfurd and illiberal flattery, which, to a mind ftung with difgrace, must have been in the highest degree painful and difgufting.

Moderation in profperity, is a virtue very difficult to all mortals; forbearance of revenge, when revenge is within reach, isfcarcely ever to be found among princes. Now was the time when the Queen of Hungary might perhaps have made peace

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on her own terms; but keenness of refentment, and arrogance of fuccefs, withheld her from the due ufe of the prefent opportunity. It is faid, that the King of Pruffia, in his retreat, fent letters to Pr. Charles, which were fuppofed to contain ample conceffions; but were fent back unopened. The King of England offered likewise to mediate between them; but his propofitions were rejected at Vienna; where a resolution was taken, not only to revenge the interruption of their fuccefs on the Rhine, by the recovery of Silefia, but to reward the Saxons for their feasonable help, by giving them part of the Pruffian dominions.

In the beginning of the year 1745 died the Emperor Charles of Bavaria: the treaty of Francfort was confequently at an end; and the King of Pruffia being no longer able to maintain the character of auxiliary to the Emperor, and having avowed no other reason for the war, might have honourably withdrawn his forces, and on his own principles have complied with terms of peace. But no terms were offered him. The Queen purfued him with the utmost ardour of hoftility; and the French left him to his own conduct, and his own destiny.

His Bohemian conquests were already loft, and he was now chafed back into Silefia; where, at the beginning of the year, the war continued in an equilibration by alternate loffes and advantages. In April, the Elector of Bavaria, feeing his dominions over-run by the Auftrians, and receiving very little fuccour from the French, made a peace with the Queen of Hungary upon eafy conditions, and the Auftrians had more troops to employ against Pruffia.

But the revolutions of war will not fuffer human prefumption to remain long unchecked. The peace with Bavaria was fcarcely concluded, when the battle of Fontenoy was loft, and all the allies of Auftria called upon her to exert her utmoft power for the prefervation of the Low Countries; and a few days after the lofs at Fontenoy, the firft battle between the Pruffians and the combined ar my of Auftrians and Saxons was fought at Niedburg in Silefia. [vii. 291.] VOL. XIX.

The particulars of this battle were va. rioufly reported by the different parties, and published in the journals of that time; to tranfcribe them would be tedious and useless, because accounts of battles are not easily understood, and because there are no means of determining to which of the relations credit fhould be given. It is fufficient that they all end in claiming or allowing a complete victory to the King of Pruffia, who gained all the Auftrian artillery, killed 4000, took 7000 prifoners, with the lofs, according to the Pruffian narrative, of only 1600 men.

He now advanced again into Bohemia; where, however, he made no great progrefs. The Queen of Hungary, though defeated, was not fubdued. She poured in her troops from all parts to the reinforcement of Pr. Charles, and determined to continue the struggle with all her power. The King faw that Bohemia was an unpleafing and inconve nient theatre of war, in which he should be ruined by a mifcarriage, and fhould get little by a victory. Saxony was left defencelefs; and if it was conquered, might be plundered.

He therefore published a declaration against the Elector of Saxony [vii. 386.]; and, without waiting for a reply, invaded his dominions. This invafion produced another battle at Standentz; which ended, as the former, to the advantage of the Pruffians [vii. 481.]. The Auftrians had fome advantage in the beginning; and their irregular troops, who are always daring, and always ravenous, broke into the Pruffian camp, and carried away the military cheft. But this was easily repaired by the fpoils of Saxony.

The Queen of Hungary was ftill inflexible, and hoped that fortune would at laft change. She recruited once more her army, and prepared to invade the territories of Brandenburg. But the King of Pruffia's activity prevented all her defigns. One part of his forces feized Leipfic, and the other once more deleated the Saxons; the King of Poland fled from his dominions; Pr. Charles retired into Bohemia. The King of Pruffia entered Drefden as a conqueror, exacted very fevere contributions from the whole 5 II

country,

country, and the Auftrians and Saxons were at laft compelled to receive from him fuch a peace as he would grant. He impofed no fevere conditions except the payment of the contributions, made no new claim of dominions, and, with the Elector Palatine, acknowledged the Duke of TuscanyforEmperor.[vii. 605.] The lives of princes, like the hiftories of nations, have their periods. We fhall here fufpend our narrative of the King of Pruffia, who was now at the height of human greatnefs, giving laws to his enemies, and courted by all the powers of Europe. What will be the event of the prefent war, it is yet too early to predict. His enemies are powerful; but we have seen thofe enemies once conquered, and there is no great reafon to imagine that the confederacy against him will last long.

Extracts of a paper published by the court of Vienna, intitled, Remarks upon the Pruffian declarations, circular refcripts, and memorials. [xviii. 594.]

pieces are,

[About the beginning of March laft was published at London, a pamphlet of feven sheets 4°, intitled, Four pieces, containing a full reply of the Emprefs-Queen to all the motives of the King of Pruffia for making war. That of which we here give extracts is the third. The other three A circular refcript by the EmprefsQueen to her minifters at foreign courts, dated Sept. 2. 1756.— The Emprefs-Queen's answer to the Pruffian motives, or declaration of war; which we had before inferted entire [xviii. 590.]. A brief account, fetting in a true light fome of the many infringements of the peace committed by Pruffia.]

HE difpute between the parties at war, refolves chiefly into this queftion, Which of them began first to make extraordinary warlike preparations?The King of Pruffia acknowledges that he first commenced hoftilities, fo that there is no difpute on this head.

His Pruffian Majefty thinks himfelf authorised to keep continually, both in times of peace and war, a formidable ftanding army, always ready for action, which he augments confiderably from time to time. For this purpofe there are, fometimes artfully, and often by open force, throughout al

most all Europe, carried away, fubjects from their lawful fovereigns, children from their parents, fathers from their children, ecclefiaftics from their parifhioners; and yet he will not allow the neighbouring powers, who naturally may apprehend at least a poffibility of fome hoftile defign, to be jealous or diftruftful. He will not permit them to concert with other courts, equally at a lofs what to think of him, proper meafures for their own fecurity, or to complete their troops on the usual footing, and furnish their new fortifications with the neceffary artillery, and other things requifite. If they do, he will affume a right boldly to ask them, fword in hand, about the reason and design of fuch military preparations; threatening, if a fpeedy anfwer, and fuch as he would have it, is not returned, and the preparations discontinued, immediately to march his always-ready and tremendous army against them.

To have juftified its conduct, the court of Berlin ought to have taken care, 1. To beware of manifeft contradictions; 2. To fet in a clear light the certainty of the pretended impending danger of being attacked; 3. To produce a legal proof, that the pretended discovery betrayed truly offenfive measures. But fince this is not done, the pillaged documents must needs lofe their odious effect.

I. As to contradictions:-The King of Pruffia, in his declaration when he entered Saxony, engaged his word, That that electorate fhould be treated as a facred depofitum. But the memorial of his minifter at Ratisbon, M. de Plotho, fays, That the military executions upon the Saxon fubjects for delivering provifions and forage, were agreeable to the laws of war. Thus the facred depofitum is looked upon as a spoil, made ufe of, and ruined by an enemy. [xviii. 453.It was given out, That the King of Pruffia had long ago had in his hands copies of thofe originals which were taken out of the cabinet at Drefden. But the papers being fince printed, thefe pretences appear to be abfolutely falfe. In M. Klinggraff's first memorial, Aug. 18. 1757, notice is ta.

ken

ken of an offenfive alliance between the two Empreffes against the King of Pruffia, and entered upon in the beginning of the then current year [xviii. 449.]. But now, for proof of this, nothing can be produced but the 4th article of a treaty concluded ten years ago, and which contains no offenfive measures at all. Had the King of Pruffia had the aforementioned copies long ago, he certainly would have publifhed them fooner, as he had reason to expect that the originals might have been removed out of his reach.- -Ten inftances of contraditions are condefcended on in whole.

II. As to the danger of his being at tacked, all that the King of Pruffia can alledge, amounts to no more than this, That the courts of Petersburg, Drefden, and Vienna, did not rely entirely on the peace, with regard to their moft dangerous and turbulent neighbour, but acquainted one another with their apprehenfions, and provifionally took proper measures for their future fecurity. His Pruffian Majesty could not but forefee the confequences of his violent and felfish behaviour towards all his neighbours. He boasts of having prevented an Auftrian attack by his firft invading the Austrian dominions: from which an argument diametrically oppofite to that in the Pruffian declaration may be drawn, viz. That the party preventing another by a war, must have been the firft in making preparations for war; for in the Pruffian declaration it is afferted, That if his Pruffian Majefty had had any dangerous defign againft the EmprefsQueen, he could eafily have executed it two months before the armies in Bohemia and Moravia could have been af fembled. [xviii. 492.]

The noble fpirit fo much boafted of by the King of Pruffia, for the defence of the liberties of Germany, can have no place among his motives for making war; and leaft of all his religious zeal for protecting the Proteftant intereft in the empire. Both thefe pretexts are however laid down as the caufe of taking poffeffion of a neighbouring pro. vince, the property of a Proteftant comember of the empire; and for gaining

over to his intereft all other Proteftant ftates of the empire, in order to oppress a Catholic power and co-eftate of the fame empire, but with a fecret view of deftroying both parties without diftinction, and fetting the power of the house of Brandenburg beyond any limits.

III. As to the documents: - In private affairs, no judge would admit of things violently taken from the party accufed, as good evidence: in political affairs there are no precedents of fuch violence which are held to be justifiable by the law of nations. But it may be afked, Do the originals of the pieces fo published, actually exist? And if they do, are their contents truly the same as they are related? They are communicated only by way of extracts; hence there is juft caufe to fufpect, that fuch paffages as did not fuit the publisher, were purpofely left out, or disguised.

Suppose the documents to be genuine, the court of Berlin will not gain its caufe. It is contrary to justice, to attack a neighbouring ftate for no other reason than its being ftronger than the reft, and confequently more capable of dif turbing the peace. But if a war is kindled up by a dangerous neighbour, it is prudent and juft to reduce him by joint force, and to provide for futurity. The Imperial court of Ruffia has no lefs intereft in the fupport of the houfe of Auftria, than this houfe has in the undifturbed tranquillity of the Ruffian monarchy, and both courts in the defence of the republic of Poland, against the aggrandizing views of Pruffia: and no better method could be taken to provide for the common welfare and future fafety, than the union of the two courts effected by the treaty of Petersburg in 1746, obliging each other to unite their strength for fetting proper bounds to the overgrown power of Pruffia, if his Pruffian Majefty, not fatisfied with the great acquifitions he had made, fhould again proceed to hostilities againft either of the contracting parties, or the republic of Poland, their ally. Such is the purport of the 4th fecret ar ticle of this defenfive treaty, which the Pruffian memorial pretends to be offen5 H 2

five.

five. Plainer words could not be ufed. The parties became bound religioufly to obferve the peace concluded at Drefden with the King of Pruffia, and irrevocably to continue the renunciation of Silefia and Glatz, without having any regrefs to the rights fo renounced, until the King of Pruffia himself, by firft at tacking Auftria, Ruffia, or the republic of Poland, fhould make such a cafe to exist. Thus it was in the power of his Proffian Majefty, by only omitting hoftilities, to have rendered this article of no effect.

The author of the Pruffian memorial would allow of fuch a right only in cafe of an immediate attack upon Auftria, but not in cafe of a war between the King of Pruffia and any of the Auftrian allies, alledging, that in the latter cafe, the moft the Empreis-Queen could be authorifed to do, would be, to fend the fuccours ftipulated to the party attacked, without freeing herself on that account from the particular engagements between her and the King of Pruflia But this pretended principle is newly adopted. For in 1744 another was put in practice, under the chimerical pretext of being obliged, as a member of the empire, to aflift the Elector of Bavaria againft Auftria with the whole force of Pruffia. Why? There was a folemn condition, fine qua non, of the famous union-treaty of Francfort [vi. 469,80.], that Pruffia fhould have fome confiderable part of Bohemia for a recompenfe. The King then abfolutely denied that he acted contrary to the peace of Bre. flau, fo recently concluded.

The electoral houfe of Brandenburg has, in former times, given many inftances of defenfive treaties, by which the partition of conquefts was ftipulated. One js, the treaty with France, concluded at Konigsberg, Feb. 4. 1656. A fecond is, the folemn treaty concluded between the houfe of Brandenburg and the crown of Sweden, at Stetin, in 1653, for adjufting the differences about their limits, and the reftitution of Pomerania, thefe things being left undetermined by the treaty of Weftphalia, Other treaties were concluded between the fame parties

in 1656. All these notwithstanding, the fame Elector of Brandenburg foon after, viz. in 1658, entered into a defenfive alliance with the houfe of Austria against the crown of Sweden, in which the Elector made this a condition, “That the ceffions made to the crown of Sweden by the treaty of 1653, for fettling the limits, fhould be reftored to the electoral houfe of Brandenburg, whenever a rupture fhould happen with Sweden." And the Elector was greatly furprised when he was informed, that fome ill-minded courts conftrued this, convention as offenfive. This is the prefent cafe of Auftria, in regard to its defenfive treaty with Ruffia. See Puffendorf of the affairs of Brandenburg, 1.7. §52.

A partition of conquefts was alfo ftipulated by the treaty of friendship and commerce concluded April 19. 1621, between Chriftian IV. King of Den mark and James I. King of G. Britain; and the diplomatic collections are full of conventions of this kind.

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How will the author of the Pruffian memorial reconcile the actions and ma-pe xims of his King with those of the an cient electoral house of Brandenburg, and thereby fave his newly-adopted principle, That according to the law of nature, received among all civilized nations, it was not allowed, in a defensive treaty, to ftipulate any thing but the number of troops to be furnished to the ally, without participating of the war carried on against the other contracting party? Such treaties are indeed fometimes to be met with: but it was never looked upon as unlawful to affift an ally with the utmost efforts; Eundem omnibus viribus adjuvare, are terms used in almoft every treaty.

Tranfacting powers fettle an eventual fuccour according to circumftances, and the indemnification or recompenfe for fuch fuccour is either a fubfidy in money, or part of the conquefts to be made. The convention of Petersburg in 1746was of the last kind; and its principal contents were directly made known [viii. 621.], in order to acquaint every power, that if either of the contracting

powera