The Pamphleteer

I have lately read the memoirs, historical, political and military (so called) of General Carascosa, on the revolution of the kingdom of Naples. If he had written them in Italian for the Italians, it would have been superfluous to have answered them, but he has caused them to be written in French; and I should be sorry for my unhappy country and for myself, if any foreigner was persuaded to believe in the contents of only one out of the 564 pages of this large volume. These memoirs tend to throw discredit on the inhabitants of the Two Sicilies who took a part in, or approved of, the change in public affairs; that is to say, on ninety-nine out of a hundred of the nation. As to myself, the General has made me act, speak and think as best suited his views. When a more convenient time shall arrive, I shall answer these memoirs minutely, when it will be seen that even the small number of truths they contain are greatly distorted. At present I confine myself to a few observations, which being founded on incontestible facts, and on the assertions of the General himself, will prove in what estimation these memoirs ought to be held by the public.

1st. The General concludes (page 28) that the nation in general did not like the revolution, and that it was the result of a faction, or of the carboneria; and he employs the first pages of his work in explaining the causes which led the people to desire a political change. In page 23, the General makes the number of the carbonari up to the moment in which this change took place, amount to the twenty-fifth part of the population, that is, to nearly three hundred thousand men; he adds, that from that day the number of the carbonari increased beyond measure. If, then, we suppose them to be only doubled, the numbers will be six hundred thousand; and who does not see that this proportion of the inhabitants of the Two Sicilies comprehends almost all the individuals capable of taking any part in the national regeneration? And wherefore should the Austrians again take possession of this country, if the whole nation had not declared itself against arbitrary power? Why are the lower order of the people continually punished with stripes, while the most distinguished patriots perish on the scaffold?

2nd. In pages 22 and 23, General Carascosa represents the carboneria, that is to say, the mass of the nation, as entirely destitute of feelings of morality, and always seeking anarchy, or at least democracy. But in page 195, he is obliged to allow, that instead of abandoning themselves to anarchy, the liberal party whom he identifies with the carbonari, arrested all criminals, collected the contributions, and that I, by the assistance of this party, succeeded in completing the army with veterans, or rather with dismissed soldiers. But he adds, that all this was done to give a specious appearance of morality to the revolution, as if six hundred thousand men belonging to a sect of anarchists could adopt such a jesuitical hypocrisy. Besides, can he deny, that among this immense number of persons, who, according to his assertions, sought only the destruction of social order, not one individual was found to write a single article against the reigning family?-Hypocrisy, he will reply.

3d. I ask of the General, who, become the champion of the holy alliance, highly disapproves of conspiracies, why in our long and frequent conferences from 1814 to 1820, he never pointed out to me a more noble or more legitimate method of throwing off the yoke of arbitrary power? The Swiss, the Dutch, the English against the Stuarts, the Americans had not the talent of devising any other. I ask him why, in Ancona in 1814, he, together with myself and about twelve other generals, conspired against absolute power, when one of us was sent to Genoa, to confer with Lord William Bentinck? I ask him, why in December 1820, being at that time minister of war, he co-operated in the destruction of the Constitution of

Spain which had been swore to, as he himself says in page 236? Finally, I must remind him, that when I had the command-in-chief of all the forces of the united kingdom, and the superior officers and generals of the army were presented to me in a body, he himself addressed me aloud in these words, "What you have done, has rendered you superior to all of us lieutenantgenerals, your colleagues, and hence we see you with pleasure at the head of the army, and we will obey you." Why did he thus express himself, if he disapproved of what I had done? Why did he gather the fruits of a revolution which was contrary to his principles, by occupying the situation of minister of war, a situation he would never have obtained without it?→ Why did he take the oath?

4th. The General in several pages of his book abuses the national parliament; and in page 184, he says, that almost all the deputies were chosen by the carbonari by force of arms; yet he afterwards declares, (page 186) that only seventeen of them were carbonari.

5th. All the documents published by the General go to prove the partial disorders which took place in his division. What general, desirous of exposing the faults of his troops, cannot find means of so doing? But can he assert that a single cry was heard in favor of absolute power? His troops disbanded without seeing the enemy, as soon as they heard that, with a few troops and a small body of militia, I was abandoned without reinforcements to the Austrian army which surrounded the Abruzzi. famous circular, page 425, completed the loss of confidence among those he commanded, and occasioned the fatal disorders which he narrates with so much complacency.,

His

6th. As to what regards myself, among the many things he mentions, the inconsistency of which I shall notice at a proper time, he pretends that at the moment in which I entered Naples at the head of the Constitutional army, I was not safe in my own ramp. After having, in his usual manner, put words of his own into my mouth, he confesses, that in the course of that very day, the troops and the national guards would have put him to death, if I, seeing his danger, had not made him take hold of my arm, which was sufficient to ensure his being treated with respect. (Page 117.) In page 41, the General says, that though I was desirous of a constitution, I should never have attempted it, if the government latterly had not shown some suspicion of my conduct. But he contradicts himself in page 33, when he asserts, that a month before the political change, I had combined the whole plan of the revolution, which being deferred by various accidents, I ordered the chief of my staff, Deconcilis, never to speak to him again on the subject. I shall now relate a circumstance, upon which I cannot, as I have been in so many other cases, be any longer silent. Some days before the breaking out of the revolution, he came to my house, having in his hand the Memoir of M. Pradt upon the Spanish revolution. I assured him in the presence of Colonel Deconcilis, that I had arranged every thing in readiness to overthrow absolute power; that ten thousand national guards organized and equipped, with several regiments, were only waiting my orders; but that nevertheless, having only the good of the nation in view, and remembering also that he was my senior, I would with pleasure give up to him the direction of the enterprise. Carascosa, however, adduced many reasons in which I could not agree, and refused my offer, so that afterwards I took care to leave him in ignorance of my intended operations. He praises me much for resigning in the assembled parliament my command-in-chief (page 182), but he suggests that in my heart I was unwilling so to do; an unusual method this of writing history with impartiality. The General condemns me (page 189), because on my resignation of the command I walked on foot among the people, as if during my command I had

fallen into the opposite extreme.-Why does he not relate, that having presented me in the first days of the political change in the name of the Duke of Calabria, with an order on the Treasury, that I might appear with more splendor during my command, I would not accept it? In short, after the General has employed many pages in explaining his manœuvres, which were always performed at the distance of about fifty leagues from the enemy, he comes to the conclusion, that the Austrians, who by forced marches from the Po had succeeded in surrounding the Abruzzi, would never have begun hostilities, if I had not provoked them to it, and that otherwise they would have left me time for assembling the whole of the division, and of forming an intrenched camp at Aquila, for which operations I should have required at least a month. It is then the decided opinion of General Carascosa, that I was wrong in attacking the Austrians, and in distrusting their kindness and pacific intentions; while he, on the other hand, was perfectly right in shutting himself up in his headquarters, nine days' march behind me, notwithstanding the instructions he received from the Prince Regent. In the 5th article of the instructions signed by the Duke of Calabria, it is said, "If the enemy shall declare himself by advancing with the greater part of his troops on the Abruzzi, General Carascosa shall assist General Pepe by his manœuvres and by his troops." This is one of the documents which General Carascosa forgot to insert among the 564 pages of his volume, but which will be found in my narrative published in London in 1822. This circumstance, alone, is sufficient to convince the public, that the fatal reverses, which we unfortunate Neapolitans experienced in 1821, ought not to be imputed to the nation at large.

THE END OF NO. XLVII.

CONTENTS OF NO. XLVIII.

I. Summary of the ADMINISTRATION of the INDIAN

GOVERNMENT, from October 1818 to January

1823. By the Marquess of HASTINGS