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Remarks on the Prejudices entertained against the House of Stuart.

TO THE EDITOR.

SIR-The following was written as a note, at the end of the last volume of Hume's history. As it may tend to correct some mistakes prevalent on a subject, certainly very interesting to Scotland, I should be happy to see it inserted in your Miscellany :

S.

WHILE the House of Com

mons were stripping Charles of his illegal exercise of regal power, they were doing so likewise with respect to those rights and prerogatives which he was justly entitled to; these he held by the same tenure that they did theirs as members of parliament; which rights and prerogatives they had repeatedly sworn to maintain to him and his successors. And while thus employed, they were usurping and assuming to themselves privile ges unheard of till then, and contrary to Magna Charta, the then laws of the kingdom. Some of these privileges are continued to this day, and have been exerted with a vigour truly astonishing, especially in the case of what is called breach of privilege. There was no definition of this offence, which might also be extended to any length the house chose to vote it, and at the same time, was not cognisable in any court of law. Besides, it cannot be denied, that Charles had not carried these stretches of power so far as the Tudor family did, who are as much extolled by the English of this day, as the Stuart family are vilified. And he was driven to these irregularities by the commons, who, from the very first year of his reign, withheld from him those supplies which were necessary for carrying on the affairs of the nation;

add to this, that the commons engag-
ed him in expensive wars, as far as we
can judge, for the purpose of increa→
sing his pecuniary embarrassments.
The very
monies raised by him in an
objectionable manner, were applied to
the exigencies of the state, not to his
own private purposes; one of his
greatest errors was, in making this ap-
plication to the extent he did.

Had William been placed in his si
tuation, he would have probably made
a different application of this money.
It is remarkable, that the tax-gather-
ers of that day were as much bent on
reducing the amount of the receipts,
as those of the present day are in in-
creasing theirs; probably they did
not, in Charles's time, get a per cen-
tage on the amount of their collec-
tions. By these manoeuvres, a sub-
sidy, which was originally 700,0001.
when the vaule of money was three
times more than in 1642, was dwin-
dled down in Charles's reign to 50,0001.
while the commons affected to consi-
der a subsidy then, as equal to one
in that of Elizabeth, a mockery of
terms, which shows the spirit by.
which they were actuate d.

This interesting period should be studied by every British subject. Unfortunately, the prejudices entertained by Englishmen against the Stuart family, fomented, no doubt, by the endeavours of the descendants of those men who opposed Charles and his sons, do not allow them to give these princes, particularly Charles I. and II. any credit for those inestimable benefits they conferred on the English nation. To mention a few of them only, I shall state the abolition of the high commission and the star-chamber-the habeas corpus and navigation actsCharles I. never interfering in the elections of members of parliamenttheir great attention to the improve. ment of the navy, the signals now in

use being invented by James II.—their expending moneyalmost entirely forthe use of the public, at a time when it was withheld by the House of Commons, for the purpose of destroying the regal power and authority. That these princes committed great faults cannot be denied ; but if it shall be considered how much they gave away in the course of 10 years, of those privileges exercised by their predecessors, some allowance should be made for their errors. The English drove Charles II. and his brother James into the arms of Roman Catholic princes, who be friended them in their adversity, yet the very people, who, after murdering their father drove them to form these connexions, made it a crime in them to have allowed the religion and the habits of their benefactors to make any impression on minds, then so young, and liable to the impressions of those about them.

It is to the oppression of the Eng lish, and the avarice and venality of the Scots, that the partiality of these two kings to the Roman Catholic religion was owing; for both Charles I. and his father James were extremely attached to the tenets and discipline of the Church of England; and this attachment was imputed to the former as a crime, both by the Scots nation, and the leading party in England, the Puritans, particularly by the great body of the citizens of London, worse, if possible, than the others, and more dangerous from their local situation.

I may add, that nine-tenths of the people in London who eat calves-head every 30th January, know very little of the history of the two countries during this period; nor have we had, since his time, a more virtuous and well-intentioned or patriotic prince on the throne than Charles I.

While the princes of the Stuart race had their faults, it should not be

forgotten how much the English nation were benefited by the conces sions, voluntary, in many instances, made by them in favour of their people, and their efforts to raise England in the scale of European nations.

HOR.

The Observer. No. XXIII.
Consilium proprium.
HERE is nothing by which, on

THE

many occasions, a man may render himself more useful to others, than by giving them advice. It often happens that persons have abundance, nay, even a superfluity, of every thing external, who yet are very defective in regard to that good sense and knowledge of the proper mode of conducting themselves, from the want of which the possession of these advantages may in effect rather be detrimental to them than otherwise, and serve only to make their follies more glaring, and to give a wider of destructive consequence to range their errors and their vices. In these circumstances, the benefit is incalculable that may be derived from the friendly admonitions of a judicious counsellor, whose experience at once qualifies him to instruct, and gives him the authority necessary to render his instruction effectual. Under this happy influence, the wild sallies of irregular passion may be seasonably checked; the fatal effects prevented of a blind temerity; and that regular and orderly conduct maintained which is both most respectable in itself, and of which, in every view, the results are most salutary and beneficial. An office of so much importance for those in behalf of whom it is exercised, is naturally honourable to him who discharges it. The qualifications necessary to his doing so with advantage are of that kind which are least accidental or fortuitous. They are in every case the fruit of volun

tary

tary and continued application of mind. They have in themselves an intrinsic excellence, of which they cannot be divested; and they are what confers upon our nature its truest honour, its most real and most desirable distinction.

The commerce alluded to would always be such as it has been now described on the one side, thus useful-on the other, so respectable, were it always entered into with proper views, and in the spirit essential ly and rightly adapted to it. But here, as in other instances in human affairs, abuses are frequent. Advice is often sought when the design is any thing rather than to profit by it. And it is given when there is neither the necessary capacity, nor indeed any real care for the interests of those upon whom it is bestowed.

If it were truly from a desire of information or direction that advice was in every case sought, then, unquestionably, the application for it would never be deferred till after the step was actually taken, or till something nearly equivalent had happened in respect of that, on account of which eventually the advice was solicited. But nothing is more common than such a preposterous procedure. A man will go up to another apparently most anxious to have the benefit of his counsel in regard to a matter which he represents as of the very utmost consequence to him. He unfolds his case at great length, exhibiting very particularly the difficulties which press upon him, as it is considered under one view or another. He seems to be quite lost in his deliberations, and would be thought to have had no design in preferring the present suit but that he might be helped out of the perplexing situation from which he finds such difficulty in extricating himself, and when he is so much in dan

ger of making a wrong and fatal choice. The benevolence of him whom he addresses is interested by a statement thus fraught with cir cumstances to excite attention and sympathy. He puts himself to some trouble in considering the case. He patiently goes over all the particulars by which the result should be effected; and, having formed his opinion with as much care and solicitude as if on the issue were suspended something in which he him self was most immediately and closely concerned, he goes to acquaint his petitioner with the conclusion of his reflections on the subject. He does not wish to impose any thing on him, of the propriety of which he may not be fully satisfied. He enters with him, therefore, anew into the business, exhibiting at length the reasons which have guided him in his determination, and, with this explanation, leaving it of course to himself either to follow his coun-el, or to adopt whatever other measures may seem to him more proper or advisable. That he should have found the sentiments of his friend not entirely to coincide with his own, he would not have been surprised, neither would it have displeased him that, such a difference existing, it should be his choice to adhere rather to what he himseif judged most advantageous, than, where so much was in dependence, to give a dangerous preference to the sentiments of another. But he has certainly cause to be dissatisfied when, in the course of conversation, he comes to understand, that long before he had ever been consulted, every thing was com pletely and finally arranged as to the line to be pursued in respect to those very matters which, it was pretended, were so wonderfully perplexing, and as to which it was alleged that so much weight was to be attached to

his advice. There is something so singularly strange, indeed, so unprincipled, in this sort of conduct, that it may well appear surprising how any reasonable being, much more, any person pretending to an honourable character, should be guilty of it. Unquestionably, it will be thought that the motives which lead to so apparently unaccountable a proceeding must ever be of the most urgent and most irresistible kind. But, in truth, they are nothing less. They are more commonly such as hardly to deserve to be called by that name-a mere desire of talking-a wish to appear engaged in considerable affairs, or a thirst for flattery, and, in all likelihood, unmerited praise.

The faults on the part of those who give advice are not less frequent or considerable. There are some who are never satisfied with any appearance of things that actually come before them, who would always be making changes in some respect or another, and who, in short, seem to think nothing right which either they themselves have not done in the first instance, or which they have not, as they conceive, more or less rectified and improved. These people are ever putting themselves forward to give counsel to those who have no desire of such assistance from them, carping at matters which, it may be, they do not understand, and suggesting corrections, of which, in such circumstances, it is not difficult to perceive what will be the real value and importance. The dread of giving offence is so strong in the minds of others that, while they do not altogether decline giving an opinion, which would certainly be the most candid and honourable procedure, they adjust with so much solicitude the opinion which they give to what they imagine to be the wishes of those who require this service, that

they are much more likely to betray than really to benefit them; and so inconsiderate are others, that, as if not aware how much superior commonly the influence of example is to that, of precept, they are prone to give advices which are in direct contradiction to the daily tenor of their own lives.

It is perfectly obvious, that the same opinion is by no means to be entertained, nor the same expectations to be formed, in respect to advices given or received under such circumstances of abuse, as may properly be conceived where they are in a state of freedom from those corruptions. When there is no sincere intention to make any use of an advice, the case remains in effect just as if that advice had never been asked, with this difference only, that, by the abortive proceeding which takes place upon such an occasion, a sort of insult is offered to the one party, while the other is guilty of acting in a manner at once base and contemptible. Where advice is not given in such a way as to afford a probability of its being useful, it were better that it should be altogether withheld. No good end is answered by it in the mean time, and a bar is even thrown in the way, of those advantages which at future periods might be derived from counsels more salutary, or more wisely adjusted to existing circumstances.

That advice may, on any occasion, be attended with beneficial effect, it will be quite indispensable that that idea of superiority should be as much as possible held out of view, which seems to force itself upon the imagination as almost necessarily implied in the department of giving counsel. That pride which would revolt at the very appearance of any thing dictated to it with a tone of authority, may be led often, with the greatest ease,

into every measure which may be judged expedient, by the bare assumption, on the part of him who undertakes the office of guiding it, of a reasonable civility and politeness. When credit is taken by any person for greater wisdom or capacity than he allows to others, which may be considered as in some degree the case, when he takes it upon him to give them advice, it were assuredly fit that this pretension were tempered, at least, by the semblance of modesty, and by a reasonable care to avoid every thing unnecessarily offensive. Whenever it is possible by any means of insinuation or address, not inconsistent with truth or propriety, to increase the chance of any advice that is offered, being favourably received, this is an undoubted reason for making use of their assistance, if, in the first instance, it is understood to be of any consequence that that advice should be followed. But, further than this, it is not fit that such indulgence should go. To flatter a man in his errors or his faults is the most consummate cruelty. It takes away entirely the probability of his ever correcting in himself what he is thus taught by the corroborating verdict of another judgment, in addition to his own, even to value himself for and to approve. The effect of such ill-placed and vicious complaisance may be yet more extensively fatal, by poisoning his mind, and producing in it a general repugnance to all counsels, however sound, in which there is the least infusion of bitterness, or which trench in the slightest degree upon any preconceived opinion or favourite inclination. The same or a similar consequence to that which, in one case, is to be apprehended from extreme lenity in giving counsel, may proceed in another from the opposite extreme of rigour, and an apparently eager desire of finding January 1812.

fault. The inference which will very probably be deduced from instances of this latter kind is, that the blame so liberally charged is more in the imagination of him who pretends to see it, than in the conduct of him who is assailed on account of it; which habit of thinking, if it has time to grow, and to strengthen itself in the mind, may lead eventually to a difficulty of perceiving the reprehensibility of what is most plainly obnoxious to censure, and to doubts respecting the justness of the charges made, even by candour itself. Though the part of giving advice, in any degree painful, is not a very gracious one, yet will not a true friend shrink from it, if he has any expectation that, by assuming it, he may really be of use? Neither, on the other side, if there is any fairness of sentiment, will this freedom be offensive, or defeat its own purpose. It is the office of judgment to direct as to the occasions, the time and the manner of giving advice. But in all these cases, universally, the whole conduct, it is obvious, should be of a piece, and nothing admitted by which the effect of salutary precept may be counteracted, and rendered nugatory through the influence of pernicious examples.

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