LECTURE XLVIII.

THE concluding Lectures of this course of moral and religious Instruction will be on the subject of SINCERITY.

In the present imperfect state, where the goodness of the best of men is exceedingly circumscribed, and the wisdom of the wisest confined within very narrow limits, a mind superior to Deceit, and fraught with Integrity is the most that can be expected. In the present state, where absolute perfection is not to be found, we must only look for Sincerity in the most finished characters. Indeed, Sincerity is human perfection, and the same word, in Scripture, is used to express them both. Where this is wanting there can be no moral worth, and the

highest intellectual attainments are indeed but as "sounding brass or a tinkling cymbal." Sincerity constitutes true identity of character, as this is a quality which belongs to it at all times and in all circumstances. It depends not upon the changing fashions of the world, nor bends in low submission to the humours of a fantastic, or to the vices of a degenerate age; but like some rare and cu rious piece of antiquity, it is always highly esteemed for its own solid worth and beautiful simplicity. Nevertheless, it happens in this, as in other cases, that the general approbation of Sincerity has occasioned many affectations and counterfeits of it; it may not therefore be amiss just to mention the principal of these, before we proceed more directly to explain and recommend this inestimable virtue.

And in the first place, some persons, as a proof of their sincerity, are mightily zealous about certain opinions and practices, (both in religious and common

matters,) which are of an indifferent "nature. For this they plead conscience and a sincere regard to truth. But are not truth and conscience too sacred to be interested in matters of such trifling importance? Whoever will impartially consider how trivial in general the subject of their zeal is, and yet how warm and severe their tempers are, will, I am apt to think, ascribe their conduct rather to superstition or conceit, than simply to integrity of heart and a well informed understanding. Far would I be from discouraging a spirit of inquiry in all matters relating to Religion, and an ardent zeal in its defence. These are necessary to constitute Sincerity. I would only wish that zeal should be founded on proper principles, that it should be placed upon proper objects, and that it should be under the direction of Prudence and Discretion. Whilst therefore, we possess that sincerity of mind which will lead us, `upon proper occasions, boldly to profess and vindicate, what appears to us, after the most diligent and impartial examination to be

the Truth, let us not mistake Bigotry, Folly, and Prejudice, for Sincerity; but let all our opinions be built on the solid foundation of reason and Scripture; let us unite with the wise and good in things important; indulge liberty in things indifferent, and exercise unbounded charity in all things.

Again, some persons, in order to make the world imagine that they are sincere, are much addicted to the reproving of others for their faults. Now, to reprove another with a prospect of success,--though this is one of the most indispensable and sacred duties of friendship, benevolence and Religion,-yet is it, perhaps, of all the duties which they require, the most delicate and difficult. To do it unseasonably, and in an angry, impertinent or sour manner, would seem as if we did it to vent our malice, or to gratify our pride, and to please ourselves, rather than to do good to others. It is indeed true, (and let the truth be deeply engraven on

our memories,) that one grain of integrity is worth all the mere politeness in the world. Whenever it becomes necessary or highly proper to speak an ungrateful truth, the honest man will speak it, whatever be the consequence. Set before him the highest worldly ho→ nours and advantages on the one side, and the interests of truth and virtue on the other, and he hesitates not a moment which he shall prefer; he is resolved to maintain his integrity, whatever it may cost him, and thinks that to forfeit his innocence and honour, or to have been guilty of one act of dissimu lation, is the greatest misfortune which can possibly befal him. Nevertheless, as I before observed, to reprove others unseasonably, or in an angry, impertinent or sour manner, seems to argue malice or pride, and a desire of gratifying ourselves rather than of doing good to others. It must be confessed that honesty has often been alleged in excuse for rudeness and impertinence; but surely