LECTURE XXVII.

BEFORE I dismiss the subject of Social Morality, one Virtue remains to be considered more at large, as it lies at the foundation of all society, and is the first principle of Morals; I mean Truth. Previously to the consideration of the nature and indispensable obligation of this prime virtue of social life, I shall lay before you some observations on its opposite vice, Falsehood.

To begin then with the nature of a Lie, I observe that it consists in declaring a thing to be true which we believe to be false, with an intention to deceive. Now as it is possible to convey our sentiments to others by actions as well as by words, it follows that we may incur the guilt

of this crime, not only by our words, but also by our actions. If we keep this definition in our thoughts, we shall be enabled to perceive all the possible methods by which we may convey a wrong intelligence without being chargeable with a wilful falsehood, and consequently know what the laws of Truth require, and how ineffectual are all attempts to evade them. "A Lie, then I say, consists in declaring a thing to be true which we believe to be false, with an intention to deceive." All these circumstances must be united before a man can be justly charged with this breach of morality. If a person believes a thing to be true, and relates it as such, which in fact is not so, he is mistaken indeed, but he may nevertheless be innocent. In this case he himself is deceived, and consequently may deceive others with the most upright intention. Through the imperfection of human knowledge it frequently happens that the best of men assert à falsehood; but so long as they

themselves believe the truth of what they assert, and have a design to inform, and not deceive others, their veracity remains unimpaired. It is true persons may be highly blameable in taking a thing for granted, and spreading a report of it, upon slight and trivial grounds; but then their fault consists, not in violating their word, but in credulity of temper, rashness of speech, or hastiness of decision. And as it is possible, through ignorance and mistake, to assert a falsehood without incurring the guilt of a lie, so on the contrary, it is possible to be deeply involved in this guilt, at the same time that we assert what is really true. If, for instance, a person declares a thing to be true which he believes to be false, though in the event it should chance to fall out as he had said, yet as he believed the contrary, and meant to deceive, he is, in the sight of God and in the judgment of reason a Liar. Again, as Truth lies in the substance of the thing represented, and not in the form

of representation, and as custom has affixed a determinate meaning to particular phrases as well as words, it is possible to convey to others the knowledge of a truth in words which, literally taken, are false. It is upon this principle that we vindicate the use of Parables and Allegories, and all figurative modes of expression. In these cases, there being no intention to deceive, there is no ground to impeach our veracity. We may speak figuratively and yet speak truly : we may speak literally, and yet in such a manner that the gesture and accent shall alter the meaning, and be known to do so by those we converse with. The great rule therefore is, that we use these signs in their customary signification, and that we desire to be rightly understood. Nor is even an intention to deceive simply and of itself in all cases criminal. If there be no falsehood uttered for this purpose, and people have no right to be informed of the truth; and if we do not, either by words or signs, signify an intention of

giving them this information, we may with innocence deceive them, or more truly suffer them to deceive themselves. Thus, if a robber supposes we shall go a certain road to a certain place, we may intentionally deceive him by taking a different path, or by not going at all. If we know that some impertinent people, who officiously pry into the concerns of their neighbours, have formed wrong notions of our schemes and intentions, we may purposely deceive them by acting contrary to their expectations. It is by no means incumbent upon us to acquaint the whole world with all we know. We may in many cases be silent, though we are convinced that our silence will be wrongly interpreted. The general rule by which we should govern our conduct is this, when we speak, or profess to communicate our sentiments, at all times, both by our words and actions, to declare the truth, but we are not obliged in all circumstances, and upon all occasions, to declare our sentiments to others,