of our redemption; which could only have been accomplished by the incarnation of an infinite person. The mystery of our redemption is necessarily connected with the necessity of satisfying divine justice. The doctrine of the necessity of satisfaction is necessarily connected with the doctrine of the universal corruption of men, who had provoked divine justice; and that corruption is a fact fully recognised by reason, and confirmed by experience, as well as by the confession of men in all ages.

"The mysteries of Scripture are sublime, interesting, and useful; they display the divine perfections, lay a foundation for our hope, and inculcate humility, reverence, love, and gratitude. What is incomprehensible must be mysterious, but it may be intelligible as far as revealed: and though it connect with things above our reason, it may imply nothing contrary to it. So that, in all respects, the contents of the Bible are suited to convince the serious inquirer that it is the word of God." The reverse of all this is to be found in the principles of infidelity, which abound with contradictions the most absurd and incomprehensible.1 But though some of the truths revealed in the Scriptures are mysterious, yet the tendency of the most exalted of its mysteries is practical. If, for example, we cannot explain the influences of the Spirit, happy will it be for us, nevertheless, if we experience that the fruits of the spirit are love, joy, peace, long-suffering, gentleness, goodness, faith, meekness, temperance. If we cannot comprehend all that we read in the sacred pages, let us, notwithstanding, submit, adore, and profit by them; recollecting that the sublimest truths, and the profoundest mysteries of religion, are as level, perhaps, to the capacity of the meanest as of the highast human intellect. By neither are they to be fully fathomed. By both they may be easily BELIEVED, on the sure testimony of divine revelation. As simple and important facts, which connect time with eternity, and heaven with earth, they belong equally to men of every

1 See pp. 24-31. supra, for a summary of the contradictory doctrines proposed by the most eminent opposers of revelation, in order to evade the reception of the Scriptures as a standard of religious belief. The absurdity of their notions is well exposed in the following compendium, executed by the author of the ' Connoisseur,' (one of those numerous collections of periodical essays, which reflect so much honour on British literature); who has thrown together a few of the principal tenets held by free-thinkers, under the title of

"THE UNBELIEVER'S CREED."

"I believe that there is no God, but that matter is God, and God is matter; and that it is no matter, whether there is any God or no.

"I believe that the world was not made; that the world made itself; and that it had no beginning; that it will last for ever, world without end.

"I believe that man is a beast; that the soul is the body, and the body the soul; and that after death there is neither body nor soul.

"I believe that there is no religion; that natural religion is the only religion, and that all religion is unnatural.

"I believe not in Moses; I believe in the First Philosophy; I believe not the Evangelists; I believe in Chubb, Collins, Toland, Tindal, Morgan, Mandeville, Hobbes, Shaftesbury; I believe in Lord Bolingbroke," [Hume, Voltaire, Diderot, Boulanger, Volney, and Thomas Paine ;] "I believe not St. Paul.

"I believe not revelation; I believe in tradition; I believe in the Talmud; I believe in the Koran; I believe not the Bible; I believe in Socrates; I believe in Confucius; I believe in Sanchoniathon; I believe in Mahomet; I believe not in Christ.

"Lastly, I believe in all unbelief."

CONNOISSEUR, No. 9. (Chalmers's Edition of the British Essayists, vol. xxx. p. 48.)

order, and are directly calculated to produce those emotions of awe and reverence, of faith and hope, and reliance on the divine presence, providence, justice, and benevolence, of which the consequence must be in the highest degree MORAL.

II. OBJECTION 2.

The Scripture doctrine of redemption is inconsistent with the ideas which are now generally received concerning the magnitude of creation.

-

ANSWER. From what is known, by sensible experiment, of the world in which we live, it is not unreasonable to infer, that in space there must be contained a multitude of similar worlds, so great, that, with respect to our limited faculties, it may be termed infinite. We may conclude upon similar grounds that, in each of these worlds, there exists a race of intelligent beings. But, "let creation be as extensive as it may, and the number of worlds be multiplied to the utmost boundary to which imagination can reach, there is no proof that any of them, except men and angels, have apostatised from God. If our world be only a small province, so to speak, of God's vast empire, there is reason to hope that it is the only part of it where sin has entered, except among the fallen angels; and that the endless myriads of intelligent beings in other worlds, are all the hearty friends of virtue, of religion, and of God. There is nothing inconsistent with reason in supposing that some one particular part of it should be chosen out of the rest, as a theatre on which the great author of all things would perform his most glorious works. Every empire that has been founded in this world has had some one particular spot where those actions were performed whence its glory has arisen. The glory of the Cæsars was founded on the event of a battle fought very near an inconsiderable city: and why not this world, though less than twenty-five thousand miles in circumference,' be chosen as the theatre on which God would bring about events that should fill his whole empire with glory and joy? It would be as reasonable to plead the insignificance of Actium or Agincourt, as an objection to the competency of the victories there obtained (supposing them to have been on the side of righteousness), to fill the respective empires of Rome and Britain with glory, as that of our world to fill the whole empire of God with matter of joy and everlasting praise. The truth is, the comparative dimension of our world is of no account: if it be large enough for the accomplishment of events, which are sufficient to occupy the minds of all intelligences, that is all that is required." Admitting then the probability of the conjecture that there is a plurality of worlds (for it amounts to no more than a conjecture), the inhabitants of these worlds, as intelligent agents, are either sinners or not sinners. If they are not sinners, they do not need a Saviour or a Redemption; and if they are sinners, who can tell whether God has been pleased to provide

1 Fuller's Gospel its own Witness, p. 211. The whole of Mr. Fuller's chapter entitled Redemption consistent with the Magnitude of Creation,' will abundantly repay the trouble of perusal for its profound, original, and satisfactory refutation of the objection now under consideration. On the subject of a plurality of worlds, much valuable and curious matter may be found in Mr. Maxwell's Plurality of Worlds or Letters, Notes, and Memoranda, philosophical and critical; occasioned by Dr. Chalmers's Discourses on the Christian Revelation viewed in connection with the modern astronomy.' 8vo. London, 1820.

salvation or redemption for any of them? The whole obedient rational creation and kingdom of God may derive immense advantage from what was exhibited in this our comparatively little globe; and in that case (as we have already remarked), it does not signify how small and mean the stage. God is glorified, and his subjects are benefited, without their directly sharing the redemption, concerning which the Scriptures give no intimation.1

III. OBJECTION 3.- The Doctrine of a future judgment is improbable; and the twofold sanction of rewards and punishments is of human invention.

This objection was first made, in the last century, by Mr. Collins, (from whom later infidels have copied it), who asserted that it was "greatly improbable that God should especially interpose to acquaint the world with what mankind would do altogether as well without."2 "But surely this harmonises with the whole scheme that the same person by whom God carried on his gracious design of recovering mankind from a state of vice, who felt our infirmities, and was tempted as we are, should be appointed the final judge of all men, and the dispenser of future retribution. This is a reward of his sufferings and pious obedience. It must impress the wicked with awe, to think they shall be accountable to him whom they have rejected and despised. It must animate and encourage the virtuous to look forward to the appearance of him as their judge, whom they have contemplated with so much gratitude, esteem, and veneration, as their guide to immortality; and in whose service they have been patient and persevering. And that this benevolent friend of mankind should be ordained to judge the world in the name of the Universal Father, shows to all, that it is the will of God, that the decisions should be equitable and merciful."3 That Jesus shall be the judge, is one circumstance relative to that life and immortality, to give the fullest assurance of which was a principal object of his mission.

Connected with the doctrine of a future judgment, is that of the twofold sanction of rewards and punishments; against which Lord Bolingbroke asserts that it" was invented by men, and appears to be so by the evident marks of humanity that characterise it. The notions whereon it is founded, savour more of human passions than of justice or prudence. He intimates, that it implies the proceedings of God towards men, in this life, to be unjust, if they need rectifying in a future one."4

Yet he acknowledges, that "the doctrine of rewards and punishments in a future state has so great a tendency to enforce civil laws, and to restrain the vices of men, that reason, which cannot decide for it on principles of natural theology, will not decide against it on principles of good policy." He adds, "A Theist who does not believe revelation, can have no objection to the doctrine in general."5

Solomon observed, that all events in this world come alike to all. An equal retribution is not made in this life. The Gospel gives us 1 Scott's Reply to Paine's Age of Reason, p. 74. See also Bp. Porteus's Works, vol. iii. p. 70.

2 Deism fairly stated, p. 35.

3 Leland's View, &c. vol. iii. let. 2d, pp. 61, 62.

4 Works, vol. v. pp. 514-516. 4to. Fragments of Essays, No. 71.

5 Works, Fragments of Essays, No. 42, vol. v. pp. 322. 327; vol. iv. pp. 59, 60.

the reason of this, namely, that the present is a state of trial to fit us for a future and better condition of being. And the doctrine of a righteous retribution in the world to come, explains the whole scheme of God's proceedings towards mankind in a manner consistent with his equity, wisdom, and goodness. The inequalities that subsist in a state of trial call forth to exercise, and improve those virtues which are necessary to fit us for the enjoyments of futurity; while the assurance of an equal retribution hereafter is a means of reforming the wicked, of deterring the vicious from greater enormities, and of animating the good to higher attainments. His Lordship asserts, respecting this life, "that justice requires that rewards and punishments should be measured out in various degrees and manners, according to the various circumstances of particular cases, and in a due proportion to them." Facts prove, however, that this is not the case. If, therefore, there be no righteous recompense hereafter, injustice must characterise the divine government. The Christian doctrine removes the groundless aspersion, and vindicates the ways of God to man.

Lord Shaftesbury argues against the doctrine of future rewards and punishments, as "a mercenary and selfish motive to virtue, which should be practised because it is good and amiable in itself. By making this a considerable or the principal motive to duty," he says, "the Christian religion in particular is overthrown, and the greatest principle, that of love, rejected." Yet he acknowledges, that "the hope of future rewards, and the fear of future punishments, how mercenary and servile soever it may be accounted, is yet, in many instances, a great advantage, security, and support to virtue, till we are led from this servile state to the generous service of affection and love." He offers many considerations to prove that it is so. Again, he allows, that "if by the hope of reward be understood the hope and desire of virtuous enjoyments, or of the very practice of virtue in another life, it is far from being derogatory to virtue, and is rather an evidence of our loving it. Nor can this principle be justly called selfish." These concessions are a complete answer to his own objection; for the Christian looks for his reward only to higher improvement in useful knowledge and moral goodness, and to the exalted enjoyments which result from these.

"Now, though virtue should be regarded for its own sake, and God should be obeyed because it is right, and his commands are just and good; yet is it not another proper reason to choose virtue because it makes us happy? Man is formed not only with a love of what is right, and has ideas of gratitude and duty, but he has also a natural desire of life and happiness, and fear to lose these; and a desire of well-being may conspire with the rest in the discipline of his mind, and assist the growth of more liberal principles. If, in the scheme of the Divine government in this state, integrity produces more enjoyment than vice, and if it does the same in the future state, no virtue requires us to neglect such considerations. Religion does not entirely exclude self-love. It is a part of our constitution. If 1 Works, vol. v. p. 493, &c. Fragments of Essays, No. 68.

2 Characteristics, ed. 1738, 8vo. vol. ii. pp. 55. 58. 60. 63. 65. 271–273. 279 ; vol. i. ed. 1737, 8vo. p. 97.- Wit and Humour, part ii. sect. 3. Inquiry concern. ing Virtue, p. 3. sect. 3. Moralists, part ii. sect. 3.

the universal Ruler holds forth, as the parent of intelligent beings who desires their happiness, a crown to contending virtue, it seems unjust, ungrateful, and arrogant to disdain the motive. Further; when this respect to a future recompense is the effect of a deliberate trust in the Judge of the universe, an acquiescence in his government, and a belief that he is the rewarder of such as faithfully seek him, and disposes us to well-doing, it becomes religious faith, the first duty of rational beings, and a firm bond of virtue, private, social, and divine. In this view the conduct of Moses is celebrated, Heb. xi. 24, &c. and this is the peculiar faith of a Christian, who trusts that God is faithful who has promised."1

Jesus himself, the most disinterested character that ever existed on earth, "for the joy that was set before him, endured the cross, despising the shame."2 To practise virtue habitually, without any attention to, or concern about, our own happiness, is impossible, incompatible with the state of humanity, and with the general frame and constitution of the world. The Deity formed the universe to be happy. To each creature he gave but a very limited sphere of action. The general happiness of his wide creation, therefore, must be accomplished by each being happy in his own separate little department. Now, in order to secure this individual felicity, to whom could the care of each be more properly committed, than to the person who is most interested in his welfare, that is, to himself. The wise and kind Creator and Ruler of all has, therefore, given every creature in trust, as it were to himself, to advance his own highest perfection and felicity. In order to engage each to be careful about, and attend more particularly to, his own happiness, he has implanted in every one, instincts, affections, and passions, that centre in the individual, and prompt to a concern for self.

If any one be deaf to the calls of private affection, and neglect an attention to his own highest perfection and happiness, he is guilty of disobedience to the Author of his frame and the former of the universe, he is unfaithful to the trust reposed in him, and occasions a chasm and deficiency of order and happiness in that part of the creation which is particularly committed to his care. This would, perhaps, appear more evident, if we were to suppose every man entrusted to another to promote his happiness, and this other neglected him. The effect, however, respecting the general happiness, the duty, and the transgression of it, are the same, to whomsoever the charge be committed. The Christian, therefore, by looking to future glory and felicity, as a motive to, and the reward of, piety, benevolence, and purity, is not merely promoting his own private happiness; he is fulfilling an important duty to his Maker, and adding his share to the measure of general felicity and harmony through the wide creation of God. He co-operates, in his narrow sphere, with the Deity himself, by taking care that that part of his works, which is entrusted to him, shall be as perfect and as happy as he can make it, and as conducive as possible to the general felicity. For such is the constitution of human beings, that no individual can be happy himself, 1 Alexander's Prelim. Diss. to Paraphr. on 1 Cor. xv. pp. 23, 24.- Brown's Essay on the Characteristics, ess. ii. sect. 6 and 9.- Toulmin's Int. Evid. Diss. vi. pp. 128-132. - Watson's Answer to Gibbon, pp. 38-41. 2 Heb. xii. 2.