TIVE DISCOURSES.

40. THIS kind of difcourfes must have been very ancient; fince, doubtless, from the earlieft period of men converfing together, they deliberated upon their co non intereft, and offered their advice to each other. But neither thofe of the laudatory nor judicial kind could be introduced till mankind were fettled in communities. The early practice of fuafory difcourfes appears from facred writ, where we find, that when MOSES was ordered upon an embally into Egypt, he would

have excufed himself for want of eloquence. And Homer reprefents the Greeks at the fiege of Troy, as anxiously running to hear their generals harangue them. Nor is this part of oratory lefs confpicuous for its utefuluefs to mankind than for its antiquity; being highly beneficial either in councils, camps, or any focieties of men. How many inftances have we upon record, where the fury of an enraged multitude has been checked and appeased by the prudent and artful perfuafion of fome particular perfon? The story of Menenius Agrippa, who pacified the commons of Rome, when they withdrew from the fenators, and retired, out of the city, by his fable of the Belly deferted by the other members, is well known. And how often have armies been fired to the most dangerous exploits, or recalled to their duty, when ready to mutiny, by a moving fpeech of their general?

41. The principal heads of arguments, proper for advice, are thefe taken from the nature of the thing under confideration.

42. (1.) Pleafure often affords a very cogent argument in difcourfes of this nature.

43. (2.) Profit, or advantage, has no lefs influence upon mankind than the former; and when it refpects things truly valuable, it is a very just and laudable motive.

44. (3.) Honour, than which no argument will fooner prevail with generous minds, or infpire them with greater ardour.

45. But although a thing confidered in itself appear beneficial if it could be attained, yet the expediency of undertaking it may ftill bequeftionable: in which cafe the following heads, taken from the circumstances which attend it, will afford proper arguments to engage in it.

46. (1.) The poffibility of fucceeding may fome times be argued as one motive to this end.

47. (2.) But an argument founded upon probability will be much more likely to prevail.

48 (3.) But as even probability is not a motive ftrong enough with many perfons to engage in the profecution of a thing which is attended with confiderable difficulties, it is often neceffary to represent the facility of doing it, as an additional reason.

49. (4.) If the thing advised can be shown to be in any respect necessary, this will render the motive ftill much ftronger for undertaking it.

50. (5.) To thefe heads may be added the confideration of the event, which in fome cafes carries great weight with it. As when we advise to the doing of a thing from this motive, That whether it fucceed or not, it will yet be of fervice to undertake it..

31. These are the principal heads which furnish

DISCOURSES.

52. IN judicial controverfies there are two parties; the plaintiff or profecutor, and the defendant or perfon charged. The subject is always fomething paft, and the ends propofed by them Cicero calls equity or right; the former of which arises from the laws of the country, and the latter from reason and the nature of things.

53. All judicial causes are either private or public. Private caufes, or civil causes, relate to the right of particular perfons. Public caufes are those which relate to public justice and the government of the ftate; which are alfo called criminal, because by them crimes are profecuted, whether capital, or of a lefs heinous nature. We need only take the heads of the arguments from this last kind, because they are more copious, and easy to be illuftrated; whence fuch as agree to the former will fufficiently appear.

54 (1.) The conje&ural state. When the accufed perfon denies the fact, there are three things which the profecutor has to confider; whether he would have done it, whether he could, and whether he did it. And hence arife three topics; from the will, the power, and the figns or circumftances which attended the action. The affections of the mind discover the will; as paffion, an old grudge, a defire of revenge, a refentment of an injury, and the like. The fecond head is the power of doing a thing; and there are three things which relate to this, the place, the time, and opportunity. The third head comprehends the figns and circumftances which either preceded, accompanied, or followed, the commiffion of the fact. So threats, or the accused person being seen at or near the place before the fact was committed, are circumstances that may probably precede murder; fighting, crying out, bloodshed, are fuch as accompany it; palenefs, trembling, inconfiftent anfwers, hefitation, or faltering of the fpeech, fomething found upon the perfon accufed which belonged to the deceased, are fuch as follow it.

55. These are the topics from which the profe cutor takes his arguments. The bufinefs of the defendant is to invalidate thefe. Therefore fuch as are brought from the will, he either endeavours to fhow are not true, or fo weak as to merit very little regard. And he refutes thofe taken from the power, by proving that he wanted either opportunity or ability; as, if he can show, that neither the place nor time infifted on was at all proper; or that he was then in another place. In like manner he will endeavour to confute the circumstances, if they cannot be directly denied, by

Showing

fhowing that they are not fuch as néceffarily accompany the fact, but might have proceeded from other caufes, though nothing of what is alleged had been committed; and it will be of great fervice to affign fome other probable caufe. See CRIME, JURY, MANSLAUGHTER, MURDER, TRIAL, &c. 56. (2.) The definitive state, which is principally concerned in defining and fixing the name proper to the fact; though orators feldom ufe exact definitions, but commonly choofe larger descriptions, taken from various properties of the fubject or thing defcribed. The heads of argument in this ftate are much the fame to both parties. For each of them defines the fact his own way, and endea vours to refute the other's definition.

57. (3.) The third ftate is that of quality, in which the difpute turns upon the juftice of an action. And here the defendant does not deny he did the thing he is charged with; but afferts it to be right and equitable, from the circumftances of the cafe, and the motives which induced him to it.

58. (4.) Laftly, a fact is fometimes rather excufed than defended, by pleading that it was not done defignedly, or with any ill intent. This is called conceffion; and confifts of two parts, apology and intreaty. The former represents the matter as the effect of inadvertency, chance, or neceffity. SECT. V. Of the CHARACTER and ADDRESS of an ORATOR.

59. HAVING confidered and explained the first part of invention, which furnishes the orator with fuch arguments as are neceffary for the proof of his subject, we are next to fhow what are the proper means to conciliate the minds of his hearers, to gain their affection, and to recommend both himself and what he says to their good opinion and esteem. This is by Quintilian called propriety of manners. And he adds, it is neceffary," that every thing appear eafy and natural, and the difpofition of the fpeaker be difcovered by his words."

60. There are four qualities fuited to the cha. racter of an orator, which should appear in his discourses, to render what he says acceptable to his bearers; and these are, avisdom, integrity, benevolence, and modefly.

61. It is the orator's bufinefs to confider the various characters and circumftances of life, with the different bias and way of thinking they give to the mind; that he may fo conduct himself in his behaviour and manner of speaking as will render him most acceptable, and gain him the good efteem of those whom he addreffes.

SECT. VI. Of the PASSIONS.

62. As it is often highly neceffary for the orator, fo it requires his greateft fkill, to engage the paffions in his intereft. Where perfons will neither be convinced by reason, nor moved by the authority of the speaker, the only way left to put them upon action, is to engage their paffions.

63. The paffions may be feparately referred, either to demonftrative, deliberative, or judicial discourses; though they are not confined to any of them.

64. i. To the demonftrative kind we may refer joy and ferrow, love and hatred, emulation and contempt.

65. ii. To deliberative difcourfes may be referred fear, hope, and shame.

66. iii. To judicial difcourfes may be referred anger and lenity, pity and indignation.

67. These are the paffions with which an orator is principally concerned. In addreffing which, not only the greateft warmth and force of expreffion is often neceffary, but he muft likewife first endeavour to imprefs his own mind with the fame paffion he would excite in others. A man may convince, and even persuade others to act, by mere reafon and argument. But that degree of eloquence which gains the admiration of mankind, and properly denominates one an orator, is never found without warmth or paffion. Paflion, when in fuch a degree as to route and kindle the mind, without throwing it out of the poffeffion of itfelf, is univerfally found to exalt all the human powers, It renders the mind more enlightened, penetrating, vigorous, and mafterly, than it is in its calm moments. A man actuated by a strong paffion becomes much greater than he is at other times. He is at no lofs for words and arguments. He tranfmits to others, by a fort of contagious fympathy, the warm fentiments which he feels; his looks and geftures are all perfuafive; and nature here shows herfelf infinitely more powerful than art.

PART II.

OF DISPOSITION.

98. AS Invention fupplies the orator with ne ceflary materials, fo Difpofition directs him how to place them in the moft proper order. What is here chiefly intended by it is, the placing the feveral parts of a discourse in a juft method and dependence upon one another.

69. Writers are not all agreed in determining the parts of an oration: though the difference is rather in the manner of confidering them than in the things themselves. Cicero mentions fix, viz. Introduction, Narration, Propofition, Confirmation, Confutation, and Conclufion.

SECT. I. Of the INTRODUCTION.

70. THE defign of the introduction is to prepare the minds of the hearers for a fuitable reception of what is to follow. For this end, three things are requifite; that the orator gain the good opinion of his hearers, that he fecure their attention, and give them fome general notion of his subject.

71. (1.) To ensure the good opinion of those to whom the difcourfe is made, it is not unusual to commend them for their virtues, and those especially which have a more immediate relation to the present fubject. Sometimes the orator expreffes his gratitude for paft favours; at other times he declares his concern for them and their interest.

72. (2.) As to Attention, Cicero says, "We shall be heard attentively on one of thefe three things; if we propose what is great, necessary, or for the intereft of thofe to whom the difcourfe is addreffed."

73. (3.) Some general account of the fubject of the difcourfe is always neceffary. For every one expects to be foon informed of the defign of the fpeaker, and what he proposes to treat of.

74. These are the heads which commonly fur

when they confift of contrary parts: because the turn of them is most acute and pungent. Such is that of Micipfa in Salluft: What ftranger will be faithful to you' who are an enemy to your friends?" Orators manage enthymemes in the fame manner they do fyllogifms; that is, they in vert the order of the parts, and confirm the propofition by one or more reafons: and therefore a rhetorical enthymeme frequently confifts of 3 parts, as a fyllogifm does of 5. Though, ftrictly speak ing, a fyllogifm can confift of no more than 3 parts, and an enthymeme but of two. See EN

THYMEME.

90. II. The other method of reafoning is the analytic, in which the orator conceals his intention concerning the point he is to prove, till he has gradually brought his hearers to the defigned conclufion (See ANALYTIC.) They are led on, ftep by step, from one known truth to another, till the conclufion be ftolen upon them, as the natural confequence of a chain of propofitions.

91. Under the analytic may b comprehended reafoning by example. Rhetoricians ufe this word in a different fenfe from the common acceptation. In oratory the word example is used for any kind of fimilitude; or, as Voffius defines it, "When one thing is inferred from another, by reafon of the likeness which appears between them." Hence it is called an imperfect induction, which infers fomething from feveral others of the like nature, and has always the greatest force when the examples are taken from facts. But comparisons are fometimes made between facts and other things, to infer fome difference or oppofition between them. In comparing two facts, on account of fome difagreement and unlikeness, the inference is made from the difference between one and the other in that particular respect only.

92. Thus we have given a brief account of the principal methods of reafoning used by orators. As to the difpofition of arguments, or the order of placing them, fome advife to put the weaker, which cannot wholly be omitted, in the middle: and fuch as are stronger, partly in the beginning, to gain the esteem of the hearers and render them more attentive; and partly at the end, because what is last heard is likely to be retained longeft: But if there are but two arguments, to place the Aronger firft, and then the weaker; and after that to return to the former, and infift principally upon it. But this must be left to the prudence of the speaker. Nor ought arguments to be crowded too close upon one another; for that takes off from their force, and does not leave the hearers fufficient time duly to confider them.

SECT. V. Of CONFUTATION.

93. THE forms of reasoning here are the same as have been explained under confirmation. Confutation, however, is often the more difficult task; becaufe he who is to prove a thing comes ufually prepared; but he who is to confute it is frequently left to a fudden anfwer. Therefore, not only a good judgment, but a readiness of thought is neceffary. But, in all difputes, it is of the greateft confequence to obferve where the ftrefs of the controverfy lies. In confutation, what the adversary has advanced ought carefully to be confi

dered, and in what manner he has expreffed himfelf. Thofe arguments that are foreign to the fubject may in a very few words be shown to be infignificant. There ought also to be a diftinction made between fuch things as relate to the subject, according to their importance. Those that appear to have no great weight should be flightly remarked; and are generally better turned off with an air of neglect, a pungent queftion, or an agreeable jeft, than confuted by a ferious and laboured anfwer. But thofe, which relate to the merits of the caufe, may be confuted either by contradiding them, or by fhewing fome mistake in the reasoning, or their invalidity when granted.

94. Things may be contradicted several ways. What is apparently falfe may be exprefsly denied. And what the adversary cannot prove, may likewife be denied." It is a handfome way of contra. dicting a thing, by fhowing that the adverfary himfelf maintained the contrary. An adverfary is never more effectually filenced than when he is charged with contradictions; for this is stabbing him with his own weapon. Sometimes a thing is not in exprefs terms denied, but represented to be utterly incredible. And this method expofes the adverfary more than a bare denial.

95. There is likewife an ironical way of contradicting a thing, by retorting that and other things of the like nature upon the adverfe party. Such an unexpected return is fometimes of great fervice to abate the confidence of an adverfary.

96. A ad method of confutation is, by obferving fome flaw in the reafoning of the adverfe party. Syllogifms may be refuted, either by fhowing fome mistake in the premises, or that the conclufion is not juftly deduced from them. Enthymemes may be refuted, either by fhowing that the antecedent is falfe, or the confequent not juftly inferred from it. As to induction and example, by which the truth or equity of a thing is proved from its likeness to other things; the reasoning is invalid, if the things fo compared can be shown not to have that fimilitude or agreement on which the inference is founded.

97. The last method of confutation is, when the orator does in fome fenfe grant the adversary his argument, and at the fame time fhows its invalidity. This is done by a variety of ways, according to the nature of the subject. Sometimes he allows what was faid may be true; but pleads, that what he contends for is neceflary. At other times he pleads, that although the contrary opinion may feem to be attended with advantage, yet that his own is more just or honourable. Such was the cafe of Regulus. (See REGULUS.) Another way of confutation is, by retorting upon the adversary his own argument. The orator takes this advantage where an argument proves too much, that is, more than the perfon intended, who made ufe of it. Inverfion resembles this, by which the orator fhows, that the reasons offered by the oppofite party make for him. Sometimes the charge is acknowledged, but the crime thifted off to another. Another method is, to alleviate the charge, and take off the force of it, by fhowing, that the thing was not done with that intention which the adversary infinuates.