the country, deeply engaged in war.The plan had nothing to recommend it but its novelty, which was not of a captivating description: for while it went to overthrow a system already matured, and now acting upon in full force, it appeared perfectly uncertain and indefinite when the new plan could be called into action. The regular army had in the course of the last two years, received an addition of 33,000 effective men. The additional force bill was considered by his late Right Hon. Friend, as a great means of insuring a permanent supply of men. It had been approved by many general officers of tried knowledge and ability; and now that it was generally understood, and acted upon universally throughout the kingdom, the returns of the numbers it produced within these few weeks were an ample demonstration of its efficiency. The new plan, therefore, was in his opinion rather a bold measure, containing more speculation and calculation, than any likelihood of certain, clear and defined results.

Generals Norton, Pulteney, and Tarleton, likewise defended the additional force act, and disapproved of Mr Windham's new system, as too violent a change to be attempted in a period of war.

Mr Fox contended, that limited service was the practice in Prussia and in Germany; that it was adopted in our Indian army, and in the foreign corps in our service, and therefore ought not to be considered as a mere theory, tho' not generally and specifically practised in this country. In regard to the volunteers, Mr Fox said the lower order consisted of tradesmen, who, by his Right Hon. Friend's plan, would be trained at home; whereas, by the system which it would supersede, they are now liable to be sent to any part of the kingdom, and to be consolidated in regular corps with a description of men whom they considered their inferiors. These were not to be brought out at once to act against the enemy, but they would be thus placed in an improved state of discipline, which would make them, in case of invasion, excellent re cruits for the regular army. I am sanguine that no landing will be effected; but if there should, it is not one advantage gained by the enemy that would

ensure his ultimate success.--We must fight every inch of ground. It is not one battle lost that will decide the fate of the country, as the battle of Austerlitz decided the fate of Austria. A very different spirit prevails in England from that which is felt upon the Continent. From the scandalous practice of transferring territories from one Sovereign to another, and other causes, the affection that ought to subsist between the Sovereign and the subject is weakened, and nations easily yield themselves up to a new master; here these changes are unknown, and regarded with horror; besides, there is a spirit in the people, an attachment to the constitution, and the country, which would yield to no danger or difficulties. I approved always of the levy en masse, but I approve still more of my Rt. Hon. Friend's plan, and am, perhaps, more sanguine in my expectations of its success than he is. The arming of our population became the more an object of importance, as except the alliance of Russia, which is certainly valuable, but the advantages of which, connected with our home defence, are reduced to nothing by its distance, we have not one power fighting, or likely to fight for us, in Europe; not one! When this is the case, it must be wise to increase the army to a very great extent, perhaps, a greater than we are able to accomplish. I have no hesitation in saying, that the circumstances which have lately taken place in Europe, have weaned me from an opinion that I formerly entertained, that in peace we should be able to dispense with a great army. If peace cannot be obtained, and the war cannot be carried on with success, so as to restrain the growing strength of the enemy, the country must come to a dreadful option. It must revert to its original state, it must be completely insular, and you must be, as the poet describes you, tote orbe divisos Britannos. Our true policy, if we are to persevere, which he thought in all probability we were likely to be obliged to, was not to be panic struck, and not to consider it as absolutely necessary to be defended at every point of coast that may be open to the enemy.

The motion was carried without a division.

HOUSE

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Monday, April 21.

RUPTURE WITH PRUSSIA.

Lord Grenville presented the following message from his Majesty:

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"His Majesty thinks it proper to acquaint this House, that he has found himself under the necessity of withdrawing his Minister from the Court of Berlin, and of adopting provisionally measures of just retaliation against the commerce and navigation of Prussia. His Majesty deeply regrets this extension and aggravation of calamities, already so severely felt by the nations of the Continent, whose independence and prosperity he has never ceased to consider as intimately connected with those of his own' people. But measures of direct hostility, deliberately adopted against him, have left him no alternative.

"In a moment of confidential intercourse, without even the pretence of any cause of complaint, forcible possession has been taken by Prussia of his Majesty's Electoral dominions. Deeply as this event affected the interests of this kingdom, his Majesty chose, pevertheless, to forbear, on this painful occasion, all recourse to the tried and affectionate attachment of his British subjects. He remonstrated by amicable negociation, against the injury he had sustained, and rested his claim for reparation on the moderation of his conduct, on the justice of his representations, and on the common interest which Prussia herself must ultimately feel, to resist a system destructive of the security of all legitimate possession. But, when, in stead of receiving assurances conformable to this just expectation, his Majesty was informed that the determination had been taken of excluding, by force, the vessels and the commodities of this kingdom from ports and countries under the lawful dominion or forcible controul of Prussia, his Majesty could no longer delay to act, without neglecting the first duty which he owes to his people; the dignity of his crown, and the interests of his subjects, equally forbid his acquiescing in this open and unprovoked aggression. He has no doubt of the full support of his Parliament, in vindicating the honour of the British flag, and the freedom of the

QFFICIAL PApers.

G. R."

The following official documents on the subject were at the same time laid before Parliament :

No. I.-A short note from Mr Jackson, the British Minister at Berlin, inclosing a notification from Baron Hardenberg to Mr Jackson, dated the 26th of January, stating that the Court of Berlin had concluded an arrangement with France to save the North of Germany from the horrors of war, by which Prussia was to occupy Hanover till the conclusion of a peace between England and France.-No. II. is the proclamation of his Prussian Majesty, on taking temporary possession of Hanover, dated at Berlin, 27th January, (See Mag. for March, p. 223).

No. III. Note from Mr Secretary Fox, to Baron Jacobi Kloest, 17th March, 1806.

"The undersigned is commanded by his Majesty to state to Baron Jacobi Kloest, for the information of his Court, the great anxiety felt by his Majesty at the manner in which possession has been taken of the Electorate of Hano

ver.

If his Prussian Majesty judged it expedient, in order to prevent French troops from approaching so near that part of his frontier, to take to himself the military occupation of the Electorate, it does not appear to his Majesty, that it was by any means necessary that the civil government of that unhappy country should be subverted, or that an army more numerous, and consequently more injurious to the inhabitants, than necessity required, should be maintained there. His Majesty relies with the greatest confidence on his Prussian Ma-jesty's declaration, that the present occupation is merely temporary; but his Majesty cannot but express a wish, that the declaration on this point were more solemnly made in the face of Europe. The honour of the Court of Berlin, as well as the consideration mutually due to each other from two Princes so nearly connected in blood and alliance, seem

to call for a clear explanation on this important subject.

His Majesty on his part desires to be equally as explicit, and to put an end to all hopes, (if such indeed have been entertained by the Court of Berlin) that any convenience of political arrangement, much less any offer of equivalent or indemnity, will ever induce his Majesty so far to forget what is due to his legitimate rights, as well as to the exemplary fidelity and attachment of his Hanoverian subjects, as to consent to the alienation of the electorate.

"His Majesty learns with concern, that it is in agitation to give up Anspach, and other parts of his Prussian Majesty's dominions, to Bavaria, in consequence of a convention with France: but he does not pretend any right to interfere, or to give any opinion with respect to the propriety of the measures, whatever they may be, which his Prussian Majesty may deem eligible for the interest of his crown and people; at the same time it is to be observed, that his Majesty, whether in his capacity of King of Great Britain, or in that of Elector of Hanover, was in no ways a party to the convention alluded to, or responsible for its consequences. The cessions, therefore, which his Prussian Majesty may make to his Majesty's enemies, can surely never be alledged as a justification of taking to himself his Majesty's lawful inheritance.

His Majesty therefore hopes, that his Prussian Majesty will follow the honourable dictates of his own heart, and will demonstrate to the world, that whatever sacrifices the present circumstances may induce him to make with -respect to his own territories, he will not set the dreadful example of indemnifying himself at the expence of a third party, whose sentiments and conduct towards his Prussian Majesty and his subjects, have been uniformly friendly and pacific."

No. IV.-Note Verbale. "Untill the explosion of the last continental war, his Prussian Majesty had no other object in view, than to secure the tranquility of his Monarchy, and that of the neighbouring states. He was then able to effect this upon terms which met the entire approbation of every Court. He has been desirous of doing the same since the breaking out of the present

war. But the choice of the means has no longer been in his power. France has considered Hanover as her conquest, and her troops were on the point of entering it for the purpose of disposing of it definitively, according to the pleasure of the French Emperor, without the possibility of his Britannic Majesty's preventing it. The occupation of that country by his Prussian Majesty, and the shutting of the ports in the German seas, and that of Lubeck, against the British flag (as was the case during the possession of Hanover by the French), were the indispensible conditions of an arrangement by which the country is secured against the entry of foreign troops, and the quiet of the north of Germany preserved. This has not been obtained without painful sacrifices on his Majesty's part. Those of the House of Hanover are in no degree to be attributed to the King's measures, but are the inevitable consequences of a war, which his conciliating policy has in vain endeavoured to prevent. This war might have produced still more, serious consequences. The treaty between Prussia and France at least protects the northern states from farther evils; and could every power but duly appreciate how much they are indebted to the system he has adopted, the King would with justice obtain the gratitude of all."

No V. is the proclamation of Count Schulenberg, for excluding British commerce from the north of Germany, inserted in our last Mag. p. 302. No. VI.-Prussian Patent for finally annexing Hanover to Prussia.

"We, Frederick William, King of Prussia, &c. make known and declare as follows:

"The wish to secure our faithful subjects and the neighbouring states of the north of Germany during the war, and to preserve and confirm the duration of peace, was at all times the intention of our indefatigable endeavours. These wholesome measures were made known, upon some recent occasion, as the object of our late patent, dated Jan. 27, 1906, according to which, the electoral states of Brunswick Lunenberg in Germany were taken possession of by our troops, when the administration of the same passed into our hands. But in consequence of the exchange of the electorate of Hanover, in consideration

of

of the cession of three of the provinces of our Monarchy, and for the permanent tranquillity of our subjects and the neighbouring states, we have found it indispensibly necessary to enter into and conclude a convention with his Majesty the Emperor of the French and King of Italy; and as the electoral states of the House of Brunswick, situated in Germany, were obtained by the Emperor Napoleon by right of conquest, we hereby declare, that the rightful possession of the territory of that House has passed over to us, in consideration of the cession of three of our provinces, and is now subject to our power only; consequently, from the present time, the government and the administration of these countries will be administered simply in our name alone, and under our supreme authority.

"We therefore call upon all persons, whatever may have been the functions assigned them, to execute these functions only in our name, and under our authority.

"Count Schulenberg Kenhert, and the Commissioners who are attached to him, expect no less than that all the prelates, the burghers, and the inhabitants in general, will obediently conform themselves to the order of things, which a new æra has rendered necessary for their tranquillity and well-being; and in so doing, they will afford his Majesty a proof of their devotion to their country.

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"So, on our part, nothing shall be neglected to confirm them in the persuasion of our paternal affection, and our sincere wish to render them happy. (Signed) "FREDERIC WILLIAM. "SCHULENBERG. "HAUGWITZ."

the conduct of Prussia. Had there ex isted no connexion between that power and Great Britain, if his Prussian Majesty had not been bound by ties of alliance, of blood, of friendship and of gratitude, still one might have supposed that his true policy, a sense of his real interest, would have induced him to pursue a course different from that which occassioned the Message which had been just read. That Court had been engaged in confidential intercourse with England previous to the battle of Austerlitz; and if any reliance could be placed upon assurances, if any faith could be reposed upon treaties-we had a right to expect that she had been leagued with France from the beginning. This was manifested in various instances. -Her first open act was to occupy Hanover, under pretence of covering the retreat of the British and allied army, and of securing her own frontier against the danger which might result from the establishment of a French force in the Electorate of Hanover. And before time could be given for the first temperate representations, she took forcible possession of his Majesty's Electoral dominions. This was the second step in the gradation of the injuries offered to his Majesty. There was, however, a third step more general and more injurious in its object and consequences. His Prussian Majesty caused it to be notified to the British Minister at Berlin, that in obedience to a requisition from France, he must proceed to exclude the shipping of England, not only from Prussia, but from the ports of all the countries within the reach of her controul or influence. He could not perceive what other measures than those which had been resorted to, could be taken against a country, which was found, either from choice or necessity, to yield to every requisition of the enemy. The grounds upon which he would move an Address to his Majesty, which he held in his hand, were these: First, the necessity of evincing that a connexion did and ought to exist between England and Germany, and that we felt deeply for her interests. He was also anxious to convince Prussia, that there was not a Power in Europe, who could exclude British ships from her ports with impunity; and above all, he wished to mark our abhorrence of that abominable

minable principle, of one Power indem nifying itself at the expence of its weaker neighbour. He would acknowledge al so he had another powerful motive for proposing it, a motive in which he anticipated the perfect concurrence not only of every Noble Lord who heard him, but of every man in the country. He was anxious to convince his Majesty that they felt an insult offered to him as an insult offered to themselves, and that there was no part of his dominions in the possession of which they were not willing to defend and maintain him. His Lordship then read the Address, which was an echo of the Message.

Lord Hawkesbury and Lord Mulgrave expressed their approbation, not only of the address, but of all the measures adopted with respect to Prussia by Government. The address was of course agreed to nem, diss.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Monday, April 21.
RUPTURE WITH PRUSSIA.

Mr Secretary Fox presented to the House a message from his Majesty, similar to that presented by Lord Grenville to the House of Lords.

Wednesday, April 23.

The order of the day being read for taking said message into consideration,

Mr Secretary Fox rose, and spoke to the following effect:-"I am sure that it is impossible that the message we have now heard read, can fail to excite the strongest sensation in every temper and disposition of mind which can exist in this House. In the first place, when we hear it stated that his Majesty had abstained from appealing to his British subjects, on account of the violence and injustice which had been done to him in the seizure of his Electoral dominions, it is impossible not to feel grateful for that kindness and mildness which his Majesty has always shewn to the subjects of this realm. It is with the most extreme reluctance, that he could consent to involve them in war upon any ground, that was not immediately and directly connected with British interests. The next feeling which must be strongly excited by the message, is a feeling of just indignation at the conduct of the Court of Prussia. I hope that every

66

The origin of this proceeding is to be traced to the convention concluded at Vienna, on the 15th of December, between Count Haugwitz and the French Emperor; but when it is considered, what was the situation of Prussia at the time that its Sovereign concluded the treaty with France, it must be recollected, that its means of negociation were still greater than what it derived from its own resources, or its own armies. The Emperor of Russia, after he had left Austerlitz, gave the whole direction of the Russian troops, that remained in Germany, to the command of the King of Prussia. This country too had promised him a powerful assistance by pecuniary supplies, if he should be driven to a war with France. These were the means he possessed of giving weight to his negociations; and how did he apply those means? Why, to seize a part of the territories of one of those powers which had been supporting him in that rank and situation, which enabled him to conclude his treaty. (Loud Cries of Hear, Hear!) At first, he did not pretend to take Hanover absolutely, but with the power of restoring it. France, in the mean time, pressed for the cession of Anspach and Bayreuth. What then did the King of Prussia do? Certainly he could not expect, that the French Government would be able to negociate between him and his Britannic Majesty, that he should be allowed to retain Ha