of the Prince of Orange was under the common guarantee of the two powers, for the King had acknowledged the political changes in Holland only under this condition for several years. This Prince had expected that his claims, secured by the stipulations of Prussia and France, should be satisfied. The Batavian Republic had been willing to enter into an accommodation, but the Emperor Napoleon forbade it. Neither the recollection of this circumstance, nor the consideration of the ties of blood which united his Majesty to the Prince, nor the declaration, twenty times repeated, that the King could not desert the rights of his brother-in-law, could prevent his being added to the heap of victims. He was the first who was deprived of his paternal property. Eight days before he had received from the Emperor a letter condoling with him, in the customary forms, on the death of his father, and wishing him joy on his undisturbed succession to the states of his house. None of these circumstances are unimportant; each throws a light on the whole.

Cleves had been allotted to Prince Murat. Scarcely become a Sovereign, he wished likewise to be a conqueror. His troops took possession of the Abbeys of Essen, Werden, and Elten, under the pretext that they appertained to the duchy of Cleves, though they were entirely territories newly acquired, and there was not the shadow of a connection between them and the ceded provinces. Great labour was employed in vain to give even a colour to this outrage. Wesel was to belong to the new Duke, not to the Emperor Napoleonthe King had never resolved to give up the last fortress on the Rhine into the power of France. Without a word by way of explanation, Wesel was annexed to a French department.

The existing state of the Austrian Monarchy, and of the Porte, had been mutually guaranteed. The Emperor Napoleon certainly wished that Prussia should be bound by this guarantee, for in his hands it was an instrument which he might employ as suited his policies; a pretence for demanding sacrifices in any contest which his ambition might occasion. He himself, however, did not observe it longer than it contributed to his interests. Ragusa, though under the protection of the Porte, was taken possession of by his troops. Gradisca and Aquileia were wrested from Austria, under nearly the same pretexts which had been employed when the French seized the three Abbeys.

In all political proceedings it was naturally taken for granted that the new states, formed by France, were states, in the pro

per sense of the term, and not French provinces; but it cost the Cabinet of St Cloud only a word to deprive them of their independence. The appellation the Great Empire was invented, and that empire was immediately surrounded with vassals.

Thus the e was no trace of the treaty left; yet Prussia proceeded to shut her ports against England, and still considered herself as having obligations to fulfil.

The Emperor at length informed his Majesty, that it was his pleasure to dissolve the German Empire, and form a Confederation of the Rhine; and he recommended to the King to establish a similar Confederation in the North of Germany. This was according to his customary policy; a policy which had long been crowned with success, at the moment of the birth of any new project, to throw out a lure to those Courts which might occasion difficulties in the execution of such a project. The King adopted the idea of such a confederation; not that the advice he received made the least impression on him, but because, in fact, it was rendered necessary by circumstances; and because, after the accession of the Princes who had acceded to the Confederation of the Rhine, a close union between those of the north became more than ever the condition of their safety. The. King took measures to establish this league, but on other principles than those of the model presented to him. He made it his pride to collect the last of the Germans under his banners; but the rights of each he left unimpaired, and honour alone was the bond of the league.

But could France advise the King to any measures which should be productive of advantage to Prussia? We shall soon see what is to be expected, when France makes professions of favour.

In the first place, care had been taken to introduce into the fundamental statute of the confederation of the Rhine an article which contained the germ of all future innovations. It provided, that other Princes should be received into this Confederation, should they desire it. In this manner all relations in Germany were left indeterminate; and as the means were still reserved to detach and annex to this league the weaker states, either by promises or threats, it was but too probable that in time this Confederation would be extended into the heart of the Prussian Monarchy. And that this might no longer remain doubtful, but be manifest to every one, the first attempt was immediately made. Fortunately, it was made on a Prince, who knows not fear, and considers independence as the highest object of his ambition.

The French Minister at Cassel invited the
Elector

Elector to throw himself into the arms of his master. Prussia, it was alledged, did nothing for her allies! It is true, Napoleon knows how to manage his better; and every one sees that Spain and Holland, and the Kings of Wirtemberg and Bavaria, have to thank their alliance with him for peace, independence, and honour.-Prussia did nothing for her allies! Napoleon, on the contrary, would reward the accession of the Elector by an enlargement of his territory.

This treachery was expressed towards an ally of Prussia, at the very moment when the King was advised to form an alliance of which Hesse was to be the first bulwark; endeavours were made to detach from him a power, whom family connections, alliances, and relations of every kind, united in the closest manner to his Majesty's person.

It

But even these hostile steps were not sufficient. Does any one wish to know what was the lure by which it was hoped to gain the Elector of Hesse, and what was the augmentation of territory with the expectation of which he was flattered? was the Prince of Orange, the brother-inlaw of the King, that Prince who had been twice deceived in the most shameful manner, who was now to be robbed the third time; he still possessed the territory of Fulda. This was promised to the Elector; and it would have been given, had the Elector consented to accept it, and had not Prussia taken up arms.

His Majesty saw the system of usurpation advancing every day. He saw a circle, continually becoming narrower, drawn round him, and even the right of moving within it beginning to be disputed with him, for a sweeping resolution forbade a passage to any foreign troops, armed or not armed, through the States of the Con federation. This was to cut off, contrary to the rights of nations, the connection between the detached Hessian provinces; this was to prepare pretexts on which to act; this was the first threat of punishment aimed at a magnanimous Prince, who had preferred a defender to a master.

But even after this, his Majesty cannot reflect on it without admiration; the King considered, whether a combination might not be found, which should render this state of things compatible with the maintenance of peace.

The Emperor Napoleon appeared to be solicitous to remove this doubt. Two negociations were then carrying on at Paris, one with Russia, the other with the English Ministry. In both these negociations the intentions of France against Prussia were evidently manifested.

By the treaty which the Emperor of

Russia has refused to ratify, France offer. ed, in conjunction with Russia, to prevent Prussia from depriving the King of Sweden of his German territories. Yet for many months, the Cabinet of St Cloud had continually pressed the King to seize those states, with the threefold view first, to revenge himself on the King of Sweden; secondly, to embroil Prussia with all other powers; and, thirdly, to purchase her silence with respect to the subversion of Southern Germany. But the King had long been aware that such were the views of France; and his unfortunate dispute with Sweden was painful to him. He had, therefore, been careful to provide against every sus picion of self-interested motives, and he confided his explanations to the Emperor Alexander. The scene now again changed; and Napoleon, who had so long been the enemy of the King of Sweden, was suddenly transformed into his protector.

It is not superfluous to remark, that, in this insidious treaty of the French Emperor, in order to satisfy the honourable interest which the Court of St Petersburgh took in the maintenance of the rights of the King of Naples, he promised the latter an indemnification; engaging to prevail on the King of Spain to cede to him the Balearic islands. He will act in the same manner with respect to the augmentation of territory he pretends to bestow on his allies.

These were all preludes to the steps he took against Prussia-we now approach the moment which determined his Majesty.

Prussia had hitherto derived nothing from her treaties with France but humiliation and loss; one single advantage remained. The fate of Hanover was in her power, and it must remain, unless the last pledge of the security of the North were annihilated. Napoleon had solemnly guaranteed this state of things, yet he negociated with England on the basis of the restoration of the Electorate. The King is in possession of the proofs,

War was now in fact declared-declared by every measure taken by France. Every month produced a new notification of the return of his army; but, on one frivolous pretext or another, it was still continued in Germany; and for what purposes? Gracious Heaven! to eradicate the last trace of Sovereignty among the Germans-to treat Kings as Governors appointed by himself -to drag before military tribunals citizens only responsible to their own Governments; to declare others outlaws who lived peaceably in foreign states under foreign Sovereigns, and even in the capital of a German Emperor, because they had pub

lished

lished writings in which the French Government, or at least its despotism, was attacked; and this at the time when that same Government daily permitted hired libellers to attack, under its protection, the honour of all crowned heads, and the most sacred feelings of nations.

The French troops were in no manner diminished, but continually reinforced and augmented, and continually advanced nearer to the frontiers of Prussia and of her allies, ́till they, at length, took a position which could only menace Prussia, and were even assembled in force in Westphalia, which certainly was not the road to the mouths of the Cattaro.

It was no longer doubtful that Napoleon had determined to overwhelm Prussia with war, or to render her for ever incapable of war, since he was leading her from humiliation to humiliation, till she should be reduced to such a state of political degradation and feebleness, that, deprived of every defence, she could have no other will than that of her formidable neighbour.

The King delayed no longer. He as sembled his army. General Knoblesdorf was sent to Paris with the final declaration of his Majesty. Only one measure remain. ed which could give security to the King, which was the return of the French troops over the Rhine. Gen. Knoblesdorf had orders to insist on this demand; it was not the whole of the King's just demands, but it was necessary that it should be the first, since it was the condition of his future existence. The acceptance or refusal of it must shew the real sentiments of the French Emperor.

Unmeaning professions-arguments, the real virtue of which were known by long experience were the only answer the King received. Far from the French army being recalled, it was announced that it would be reinforced; but, with a haughtiness still more remarkable than this refusal, an offer was made, that the troops which had advanced into Westphalia should return home, if Prussia would desist from her preparations. This was not all; it was insolently notified to the King's Minister, that the cities of Hamburgh, Bremen, and Lubeck, would not be suffered to join the Northern Confederation, but that France would take them under her protection; in the same manner as, in the other confederation, she had given away cities, and promulgated laws, without permitting any other power to make the least pretension. The King was required to suffer a foreign interest to be introduced into the heart of his Monarchy.

Another contrast of conduct incensed the King to the utmost. He received from the

Emperor a letter full of those assurances of esteem, which certainly, when they do not accord with facts, ought to be considered as nothing, but which the dignity of Sovereigns renders a duty to themselves, even when on the eve of war. Yet a few days afterwards, at a moment when the sword was not yet drawn-when the Minister of the Emperor endeavoured to mislead those of the King, by assurances of the friendly intentions of France-the Publiciste of the 16th of September appeared, with a diotribe against the King and the Prussian state, in a style worthy of the most disgraceful periods of the revolution, insulting to the nation, and what, in other times than ours, would have been considered as amounting to a declaration of war.

The King can treat slanders, that are. merely abusive, with contempt; but when these slanders contribute to explain the real state of things, it would be unwise to treat

them so.

The last doubt had now disappeared; troops marched from the interior of France towards the Rhine. The intent to attack Prussia was clear and certain. The King ordered a note to be transmitted by Ge neral Knoblesdorf, containing the conditions on which he was ready to come to an accommodation. These conditions were, 1. That the French troops should immediately evacuate Germany.

2. That France should oppose no obstacle to the formation of the Northern Confederacy; and that this confederacy might embrace all the larger and smaller states not included in the fundamental act of the Confederation of the Rhine.

3. That a negociation should immediately be commenced for the adjustment of all differences still in dispute; a preliminary article of which should be, the restoration of the three Abbeys, and the separation of the town of Wessel from the French Empire.

These conditions speak for themselves; they shew how moderate the King, even at this moment, has been in his demands, and how much the maintenance of peace, if France wishes peace, depends upon France herself.

The term peremptorily fixed by the King for the decision of peace or war has elapsed. His Majesty has not receivedthe answer of the Cabinet of St Cloud; or rather, the preparations made around him daily give that answer. The King can henceforth confide the safety and honour of his crown only to arms. He takes them up with pain, because the chief object of his wishes was, not a glory purchased by the tears of his people, but by their tranquillity; for his cause is just. Never has

a So

a Sovereign made greater sacrifices to peace. He pushed his condescension to the last limit that honour would allow. Every thing which was directed against him personally he passed over in silence. The opinions of the ignorant, and the reflections of the slanderous, he despised, animated with the constant hope that he would be able to conduct his people, without injury, to that period which must sooner or later arrive, when unjust greatness shall find its bounds; and ambition, which obstinately refuses to acknowledge any limits, shall at length o'erleap itself.

The motives which induce his Majesty to take up arms are not to satisfy his resent. ments, to increase his power, or to render a nation uneasy which he shall always esteem, as long as it confines itself to its just and natural interests; but to avert from his kingdom the fate which was preparing for it; to preserve to the people of Frederick their independence and their glory to rescue unfortunate Germany from the yoke by which it is oppressed, and to bring about a safe and honourable peace. The day on which he shall effect this will be the proudest of his life. The events of the war which is now beginning are in the disposal of the Supreme Wisdom. His Majesty leaves it to others to indulge in premature exultation and gratuitous insult, as he has for a long time allowed them the miserable satisfaction arising from unjust invectives. He leads to an honourable combat an army worthy of its former glory. He reigns over a people of whom he may be proud; and while he is ready to shed his blood for them, he knows what he may expect from their energy and affection., Princes, the honour of the German name, who can confide in his gratitude and honour, and who, fighting by his side, are not dubious of victory, have joined their banners with his; and a Sovereign, who adorns with his virtues one of the first thrones in the world, is penetrated with the justice of his cause. Every where his arms are blessed by the voice of his people; and even where they are silent from fear, their impatience is the greater. With so many motives to be conscious of her strength, Prussia may well be permitted continually to confide in her high destiny.

Head Quarters, Erfurt, Oct. 9. 1806.

RUSSIAN MANIFESTO.

"We, Alexander the First, by God's grace, Emperor and Autocrat of all the Russias, declare and make known to all our faithful subjects, that, in our in

.power.

"But, notwithstanding this interference, the daily increase of the French power, the situation of our allies, threatned by its aggrandisement and unbounded ambition, compelled us to take an active part in this war. We took up arms, but we did not cease to wish for peace; and we also declared, in our ukase of September 1, 1805, that the object of our arming was to preserve the sacred inviolability of treaties, and to restore the general tranquillity. The misfortunes which attended the arms of our allies operated against the realiza. tion of our views; however, the principles upon which they were grounded remained unchanged. At the commence. ment of the present year, the French Government manifested an inclination approximating to peace: We accordingly issued orders to enter into discussions with them immediately.

"The restoration of a peace, consistent with the dignity and security of our empire, the advantage of our allies, and the general tranquillity of Europe, were laid down as the fundamental basis of those discussions. But, to our regret,

the

the conditions of peace agreed to with France, by M. D'Oubril, were neither consistent with the dignity of our Empire, nor with the security of our allies.— We refused to ratify those conditions.

"But, at the same time, to afford a proof of the immutability of our principles, which, under various circumstances, had been ever directed to the same end, we at that time made known the conditions on which we were disposed to renew our negotiations with the French Government.

"The bases proposed by us are so moderate, that they cannot be rejected, without an open menace of the general safety; and they are so consistent with the advantage of every power concerned, that in case of their being accepted, a general peace must not only follow, but be confirmed to Europe upon the most permanent footing.

"Thus must peace, or the continuance of the war, be the consequence of these measures. We wish for peace; but if no lasting peace can be obtained, grounded upon mutual advantage, then it will be necessary, for the honour of the Russian name, the character of our engagements, and the general deliverance of Europe, to proceed to extremities, which, on these considerations, cannot but appear to us as absolutely indispensible.

"We are convinced that the providence of the Most High, who is the defender of truth, will assert with his strong arm the justice of our cause.

"We are convinced that each of our faithful subjects, animated with the love of their Country, impelled by a sense of honour, and surrounded by examples of patriotic zeal, will speedily unite their powerful efforts with our own, as soon as the safety of Russia, the voice of glory, and our command, shall call upon them to co-operate for the public good.

"In this firm reliance upon the help of God, and the zeal of our faithful subjects, we have thought it necessary to inform you beforehand of our views; and, in so doing, to afford you a new proof, that, in all our undertakings, we neither seek the extension of our territory, nor the fleeting glory of victories; but that it is our wish and endeavour to secure the general safety, the preserNov. 1806.

vation of our allies, and the dignity of our Empire.

"Given at St Petersburgh, August 20. and in the sixth year of our Government.

"ANDRE BUDBERG."

BRITISH DECLARATION.

THE negociation in which his Majesty has been engaged with France having terminated unsuccessfully, his Majesty thinks proper to make this public declaration to his subjects, and to Europe, of the circumstances which have led to an issue which his Majesty deeply regrets. He has no object nearer to his wishes than the conclusion of a securé and permanent peace. He laments the continuance of a war affecting the happiness of so many nations, and which, even amidst all the successes that attend his arms, is so burdensome to his faithful and affectionate people. But he is confident that there can arise on this occasion no other sentiment, either in his own dominions, or in any part of Europe, than that of an increased conviction, that the restoration of general tranqillity is retarded only by the injustice and ambition of the enemy.

The French Government, unsatisfied with its immense acquisitions on the Continent, still openly perseveres in a system destructive of the independence of every other power. War is pursued, not for security, but for conquest; and negociations for peace appear to be entered into for no other object than that of deluding the neighbouring powers into a state of false security, while France is herself preparing, arranging, and executing her unremitted projects of encroachment and aggression.

Her conduct, in the recent discussions, has afforded but too many proofs of this disposition.

The negociation originated in an offer made by the French Government of treating for peace on the basis of actual possession, which was stated to admit of mutual compensation; and a distinct assurance was added, that his Majesty's German dominions, which had been attacked without even the pretence of any cause of hostility, should be restored.

Such a proposal appeared to his Majesty