strong enough to relieve the country from its ar- the treaty of Campo Formio, respecting the con- | unpopular throughout France, but no party was cerns of the German Empire, encouraged by the advance of the Russians, again resorted to arms. Thus was formed the third great confederacy against France, which was sustained by immense subsidies furnished by Mr. Pitt out of the increased means now placed at his disposal. The scene of warfare at the close of 1798, and throughout the year 1799, was extended over the whole surface of Italy, along the banks of the Rhine, amid the marshes and canals of Holland, and among the lakes and mountains of Switzerland. France, after gigantic efforts, lost all Italy, with the exception of Genoa, but re-ple; and with a view to present himself before tained her borders upon the Rhine and the barriers of the Alps. Russia withdrew from the contest in the autumn of 1799. The Directory had now become extremely Europe as governed by a spirit of moderation, This SPEECH OF MR. PITT ON AN ADDRESS TO THE THRONE APPROVING OF HIS REFUSAL TO NEGOTIATE WITH BONAPARTE FOR A PEACE WITH FRANCE, DELIVERED IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, FEBRUARY 3, 1800. INTRODUCTION. On the 25th of December, 1799, the day after he was inaugurated as First Consul of France, Bonaparte addressed a letter to the King of England, written with his own hand, and couched in the following terms: "Called by the wishes of the French nation to occupy the first magistracy of the Republic, I think it proper, on entering into office, to make a direct communication to your Majesty. The war which for eight years has ravaged the four quarters of the world, must it be eternal? Are there no means of coming to an understanding? How can the two most enlightened nations of Europe, powerful and strong beyond what their safety and independence require, sacrifice to ideas of vain greatness the benefits of commerce, internal prosperity, and the happiness of families? How is it that they do not feel that peace is of the first necessity as well as of the first glory? These sentiments can not be foreign to the heart of your Majesty, who reigns over a free nation, and with the sole view of rendering it happy. Your Majesty will only see in this overture my sincere desire to contribute efficaciously, for the second time, to a general pacification, by a step speedy, entirely of confidence, and disengaged from those forms which, necessary perhaps to disguise the dependence of weak states, prove only in those which are strong the mutual desire of deceiving each other. France and England, by the abuse of their strength, may still for a long time, to the misfortune of all nations, retard the period of their being exhausted. But I will venture to say it, the fate of all civilized nations is attached to the termination of a war which involves the whole world. Of your Majesty, &c. BONAPARTE." From the feelings expressed by Mr. Pitt in the preceding speech, we should naturally have expected him to embrace this overture with promptitude, if not with eagerness. But the resentment which he justly felt at the evasive and insulting conduct of the Directory during the last negotiation, seems wholly to have changed his views, and he rejected the proposal in terms which were too much suited to awaken a similar resentment in the new French rulers. The reply of Lord Grenville went back to the commencement of the war, declaring it to have been "an unprovoked attack" on the part of the French. It assumed, that "this system continues to prevail," and that on the part of England "no defense but that of open and steady hostility can be availing." In reference to peace, it pointed to the restoration of the Bourbons, as "the best and most natural pledge of its reality and permanence;" and while the English minister did not "claim to prescribe to France what shall be her form of government," he did say, as to any ground of confidence in the one recently organized, “Unhappily no such security hitherto exists; no sufficient evidence of the principles by which the new government will be directed; no reasonable ground by which to judge of its stability." The French minister, Talleyrand, replied to these remarks in a pointed note, and Lord Grenville closed the correspondence in a letter reaffirming his former positions. These communications were laid before the House of Commons, February 3d, 1800, when an Address was proposed by Mr. Dundas, approving of the course taken by ministers. He was followed by Mr. Whitbread, Mr. Canning, and Mr. [afterward Lord] Erskine, who complained in strong terms of the uncourtcous language used by Lord Grenville. Mr. Pitt then rose, and without making any defense on this point, or touching directly upon the question, "Why should we not now treat?" took up the subject on the broadest scale, going back to the origin of the war, the atrocities of the French in overrunning a large part of Europe during the last ten years, the genius and spirit of the Revolution, the instability of its successive governments, his motives for treating with such men on a former occasion, and the character and deeds of Bonaparte from the commencement of his career as a military chieftain. This was the most elaborate oration ever delivered by Mr. Pitt. Of the vast variety of facts brought forward or referred to, very few have ever been disputed; they are arranged in luminous order, and grow out of each other in regular succession; they present a vivid and horrible picture of the miseries inflicted upon Europe by revolutionary France, while the provocations of her enemies are thrown entirely into the background. It will interest the reader to compare this speech with the reply of Mr. Fox, in respect to the standpoint of the speaker. That of Mr. Fox was this, that peace is the natural state of human society, and ought, therefore, to be made, unless there is clear evidence that the securities for its continuance are inadequate. Mr. Pitt's stand-point was this, that as the war existed, and sprung out of a system of perfidy and violence unparalleled in the history of the world, it ought not to be ended except on strong and direct evidence that there were adequate securities for the continuance of peace if made. The question was whether the new government under Bonaparte offered those securities. But Mr. Pitt showed great dexterity in treating this government as merely a new phase of the Revolution, and thus bringing all the atrocities of the past to bear on the question before the House. His speech was admirably adapted to a people like the English, jealous of France as their hereditary rival, conscious of their resources, and prepared to consider a continuation of the contest, as the safest means of defending "their liberties, their laws, and their most holy religion." Some of the facts referred to in this speech have been already explained in connection with Mr. Fox's reply on this subject, as given on a preceding page. For the convenience of the reader, however, these explanations will, in a few instances, be given again. SPEECH, &c. SIR, I am induced, at this period of the de- would, in any case, be impossible to separate the bate, to offer my sentiments to the House, both present discussion from the former crimes and from an apprehension that at a later hour the at- atrocities of the French Revolution; because tention of the House must necessarily be exhaust- both the papers now on the table, and the whole ed, and because the sentiment with which the hon- of the learned gentleman's argument, force upon orable and learned gentleman [Mr. Erskine] be- our consideration the origin of the war, and all gan his speech, and with which he has thought the material facts which have occurred during its proper to conclude it, places the question pre- continuance. The learned gentleman [Mr. Ercisely on that ground on which I am most desir-skine] has revived and retailed all those arguous of discussing it. The learned gentleman ments from his own pamphlet, which had before seems to assume as the foundation of his reason- passed through thirty-seven or thirty-eight ediing, and as the great argument for immediate tions in print, and now gives them to the House treaty, that every effort to overturn the system embellished by the graces of his personal delivof the French Revolution must be unavailing; ery. The First Consul has also thought fit to and that it would be not only imprudent, but al-revive and retail the chief arguments used by all most impious to struggle longer against that order of things which, on I know not what principle of predestination, he appears to consider as immortal. Little as I am inclined to accede to this opinion, I am not sorry that the honorable gentleman has contemplated the subject in this serious view. I do, indeed, consider the French Revolution as the severest trial which the visitation of Providence has ever yet inflicted upon the nations of the earth; but I can not help reflecting, with satisfaction, that this country, even under such a trial, has not only been exempted from those calamities which have covered almost every other part of Europe, but appears to have been reserved as a refuge and asylum to those who fled from its persecution, as a barrier to oppose its progress, and perhaps ultimately as an instrument to deliver the world from the crimes and miseries which have attended it. the opposition speakers and all the opposition publishers in this country during the last seven years. And (what is still more material) the question itself, which is now immediately at issue the question whether, under the present circumstances, there is such a prospect of security from any treaty with France as ought to induce us to negotiate, can not be properly decided upon without retracing, both from our own experience and from that of other nations, the nature, the causes, and the magnitude of the danger against which we have to guard, in order to judge of the security which we ought to accept. one of which I say, then, that before any man can concur in opinion with that learned gentleman; Three opinions, before any man can think that the sub- must be held by stance of his Majesty's answer is any those who are other than the safety of the country gotiation. required; before any man can be of opinion that, to the overtures made by the enemy, at such a time and under such circumstances, it would have been safe to return an answer concurring in the negotiation-he must come within one of the three following descriptions: He must either believe that the French Revolution neither does now exhibit, nor has at any time exhibited such circumstances | ted that they since have violated all those prinof danger, arising out of the very nature of the ciples; but it is alleged that they have done so system, and the internal state and condition of only in consequence of the provocation of other France, as to leave to foreign powers no ade- powers. One of the first of those provocations quate ground of security in negotiation; or, sec- is stated to have consisted in the various outondly, he must be of opinion that the change rages offered to their ministers, of which the exwhich has recently taken place has given that ample is said to have been set by the King of security which, in the former stages of the Rev- Great Britain in his conduct to M. Chauvelin. olution, was wanting; or, thirdly, he must be In answer to this supposition, it is only necesone who, believing that the danger exists, not un- sary to remark, that before the example was dervaluing its extent nor mistaking its nature, given, before Austria and Prussia are supposed nevertheless thinks, from his view of the present to have been thus encouraged to combine in a pressure on the country, from his view of its plan for the partition of France, that plan, if it situation and its prospects, compared with the ever existed at all, had existed and been acted situation and prospects of its enemies, that we upon for above eight months. France and Prusare, with our eyes open, bound to accept of in- sia had been at war eight months before the disadequate security for every thing that is valua- missal of M. Chauvelin. So much for the accuble and sacred, rather than endure the pressure, racy of the statement. or incur the risk which would result from a farther prolongation of the contest.1 In discussing the last of these questions, we shall be led to consider what inference is to be drawn from the circumstances and the result of our own negotiations in former periods of the war; whether, in the comparative state of this country and France, we now see the same reason for repeating our then unsuccessful experiments; or whether we have not thence derived the lessons of experience, added to the deductions of reason, marking the inefficacy and danger of the very measures which are quoted to us as precedents for our adoption. the war. I. Unwilling, sir, as I am to go into much deOrigin of tail on ground which has been so often trodden before; yet, when I find the learned gentleman, after all the information which he must have received, if he has read any of the answers to his work (however ignorant he might be when he wrote it) still giving the sanction of his authority to the supposition that the order to M. Chauvelin [French minister] to depart from this kingdom was the cause of the war between this country and France, I do feel it necessary to say a few words on that part of the subject. French government. as to the origin of the war. of Mr. Erskine I have been hitherto commenting on the arguments contained in the Notes. I contradiction come now to those of the learned gentleman. I understand him to say that the dismissal of M. Chauvelin was the real cause, I do not say of the general war, but of the rupture between France and England; and the learned gentleman states particularly that this dismissal rendered all discussion of the points in dispute impossible. Now I desire to meet distinctly every part of this assertion. I maintain, on the contrary, that an opportunity was given for discussing every matter in dispute between France and Great Britain as fully as if a regular and accredited French minister had been resident here; that the causes of war, which existed at the beginning, or arose during the course of this discussion, were such as would have justified, 2 Mr. Erskine here observed that this was not the statement of his argument. Mr. Pitt replied that he had not yet come to Mr. Erskine, but was speaking of the statement made by the French government in their Note. It can not be, however, that Mr. Pitt had that Note before him when he made these ing words: "As soon as the French Revolution had remarks. The passage referred to is in the followbroken out, almost all Europe entered into a league for its destruction. The aggression was real long time before it was public. Internal resistance was excited; its opponents were favorably received; their extravagant declamations were supported; the French nation was insulted in the person of its agents; and England set particularly this example by the dismissal of the minister accredited to her. pendence, in her honor, and in her safety, long time Finally, France was, before war was declared."-Parl. Hist., vol. xxxiv., p. 1201. It is obvious that the writer is here giving a mere general summation of supposed wrongs, without professing to arrange them in the exact order of time. He does not say, as Mr. Pitt represents, that "one of the first of those provocations" was the ill treatment of French ministers, of which in fact, attacked in her inde Inaccuracy in dates seems to be a sort of faError in the tality common to all who have written note of the on that side of the question; for even the writer of the note to his Majesty is not more correct, in this respect, than if he had taken his information only from the pamphlet of the learned gentleman. The House will recollect the first professions of the French Republic, which are enumerated, and enumerated truly, in that note. They are tests of every thing which would best recommend a government to the esteem and confidence of foreign powers, and the reverse of every thing which has been the system and practice of France now for near ten years. It is there stated that their first princi- the example was set by the King of Great Britples were love of peace, aversion to conquest, ain." He does not even mention Austria or Prusand respect for the independence of other coun- sia, much less does he speak of their being tries. In the same note it seems, indeed, admit-couraged to combine in a plan for the partition of In distributing his opponents into these three France," by "the example" referred to. And yet classes, Mr. Pitt follows his usual course of opening it is only by assuming this that Mr. Pitt makes out his speech with a striking statement which reaches his argument, and then sneers at "the accuracy of forward into the subsequent discussion. the statement." "en twenty times over, a declaration of war on the part of this country; that all the explanations on the part of France were evidently unsatisfactory and inadmissible, and that M. Chauvelin had given in a peremptory ultimatum, declaring that if these explanations were not received as sufficient, and if we did not immediately disarm, our refusal would be considered as a declaration of war. After this followed that scene which no man can even now speak of without horror, or think of without indignation; that murder and regicide from which I was sorry to hear the learned gentleman date the beginning of the legal government of France.3 Ground of M. dismissal. Having thus given in their ultimatum, they added, as a further demand (while we Chauvelin's were smarting under accumulated injuries, for which all satisfaction was denied) that we should instantly receive M. Chauvelin as their embassador, with new credentials, representing them in the character which they had just derived from the murder of their sovereign. We replied, "he came here as the representative of a sovereign whom you have put to a cruel and illegal death; we have no satisfaction for the injuries we have received, no security from the danger with which we are threatened. Under these circumstances we will not receive your new credentials. The former credentials you have yourselves recalled by the sacrifice of your King." as a private What, from that moment, was the situation of Sent out of M. Chauvelin? He was reduced to the the country situation of a private individual, and was individual required to quit the kingdom under the provisions of the Alien Act, which, for the purpose of securing domestic tranquillity, had recently invested his Majesty with the power of Here, again, Mr. Pitt founds his attack upon a mistake. Mr. Erskine, as reported in the Parlia mentary History, did not say the beginning of legal government," but "when France cut off her most unfortunate monarch, and established her first republic, she had an embassador at our court."Vol. xxxiv., p. 1289. His language may have been confused or obscure, but it is hardly conceivable that Mr. Erskine, through any haste or inadvertence, could have been betrayed into the absurdity of say ing that there never was a legal government in France until the 21st of January, 1793. Nor does Mr. Pitt appear to have understood Mr. Erskine more correctly when he represents him, a few sentences before, as affirming that the dismissal of M. Chauvelin "rendered all discussion of the points in dispute impossible." No statement of this kind appears in the printed speech. He and his friends only maintained that the treatment of this gentleman, after the imprisonment and death of Louis XVI., was so harsh and irritating as to defeat all the objects of negotiation. It was a matter of public notoriety that informal communications did pass between the two governments; but the agents of France were denied all public and accredited character, an indignity (as Mr. Erskine and his friends maintained) which was tantamount to breaking off all friendly intercourse, and which threw upon England, in their view, the responsibility of the war which followed. government no ities on the part removing out of this kingdom all foreigners suspected of revolutionary principles. Is it contended that he was then less liable to the provisions of that act than any other individual for| eigner, whose conduct afforded to government just ground of objection or suspicion? Did his conduct and connections here afford no such ground? or will it be pretended that the bare act of refusing to receive fresh credentials from an infant republic, not then acknowledged by any one power of Europe, and in the very act of heaping upon us injuries and insults, was of itself a cause of war? So far from it, that even the very nations of Europe, whose wisdom and moderation have been repeatedly extolled for maintaining neutrality, and preserving friendship with the French Republic, remained for years subsequent to this period without receiving from it any accredited minister, or doing any one act to acknowledge its political existence. In answer to a representation from the belligerent powers, in December, 1793, A refusal to recCount Bernstorff, the minister of guze the new Denmark, officially declared that ground of hostil "it was well known that the Na- of the French. tional Convention had appointed M. Grouville minister plenipotentiary at Denmark, but that it was also well known that he had neither been received nor acknowledged in that quality." And as late as February, 1796, when the same minister was at length, for the first time, received in his official capacity, Count Bernstorff, in a public note, assigned this reason for that change of conduct: So long as no other than a revolutionary government existed in France, his Majesty could not acknowledge the minister of that government; but now that the French Constitution is completely organized, and a regular government established in France, his Majesty's obligation ceases in that respect, and M. Grouville will therefore be acknowledged in the usual form." How far the court of Denmark was justified in the opinion that a revolutionary government then no longer existed in France, it is not now necessary to inquire; but whatever may have been the fact in that respect, the principle on which they acted is clear and intelligible, and is a decisive instance in favor of the proposition which I have maintained. Aggressions Is it, then, necessary to examine what were the terms of that ultimatum with which we refused to comply? Acts of hos- of France. tility had been openly threatened against our allies; a hostility founded upon the assumption of a right which would at once supersede the whole law of nations. The pretended right to open the Scheldt we discussed at the time, not so much on account of its immediate importance (though it was important both in a maritime and commercial view) as on account of the general principle on which it was founded. On the 4 When the Austrians and Prussians, who invaded France under the Duke of Brunswick, were driven back, the French in return attacked the Austrian Netherlands, and became masters of the country by the battle of Jemappe, November 6th, 1792. They their example, shown what they understood to be freedom; they had sealed their principles by the deposition of their sovereign; they had applied them to England by inviting and encouraging the addresses of those seditious and traitorous societies, who, from the beginning, favored their views, and who, encouraged by your for French doctrines, and anticipating their success in this country-who were hailing the progress of those proceedings in France which led to the murder of its King; they were even then looking to the day when they should behold a National Convention in England formed upon similar principles. And what were the explanations they offered on these different grounds of offense? Explanations As to Holland: they told you the of the French. Scheldt was too insignificant for you to trouble yourselves about, and therefore it was to be decided as they chose, in breach of positive treaty, which they had themselves guaranteed, and which we, by our alliance, were bound to support. however, after the war was over, Belgium should have consolidated its liberty (a term of which we such people, and to defend citizens who have suf fered, and are now suffering, in the cause of liberty."-Alison, vol. i., p. 592, third edition. same arbitrary notion they soon afterward discovered that sacred law of nature which made the Rhine and the Alps the legitimate boundaries of France, and assumed the power, which they have affected to exercise through the whole of the Revolution, of superseding, by a new code of their own, all the recognized principles of the law of nations. They were, in fact, actually ad-bearance, were even then publicly avowing vancing toward the republic of Holland, by rapid strides, after the victory of Jemappe, and they had ordered their generals to pursue the Austrian troops into any neutral country, thereby explicitly avowing an intention of invading Holland. They had already shown their moderation and self-denial, by incorporating Belgium with the French Republic. These lovers of peace, who set out with a sworn aversion to conquest, and professions of respect for the independence of other nations; who pretend that they departed from this system only in consequence of your aggression, themselves, in time of peace, while you were still confessedly neutral, without the pretense or shadow of provocation, wrested Savoy from the King of Sardinia, and had proceeded to incorporate it likewise with France. These were their aggressions at this period, and more than these. They had issued a universal declaration of war against all the thrones of Europe, and they had, by their conduct, applied it particularly and specifically to you. They had passed the decree of the 19th of November, 1792, proclaiming the promise of French succor to all nations who should manifest a wish to become free; they had, by all their language as well as immediately forced the passage of the Scheldt (the principal river of the country) down to the sea. This had been closed for nearly one hundred and fifty years, out of regard to the rights of Holland (through | which it entered the ocean), under the provisions of the treaty of Westphalia (1648), which established the international relations of modern Europe. En gland, as the protector of Holland, justly complained of this, chiefly, however, as Mr. Pitt remarks, on account of the general principle avowed by the French of setting aside the provisions of the treaty of Westphalia. 5 If, The reader will see (in note 9) M. Chauvelin's disclaimer in respect to this decree, of any intention on the part of the French to "favor insurrections or excite disturbance in any neutral or friendly country whatever"-" particularly Holland, so long as that power adheres to the principles of her neutrality." Mr. Pitt, of course, had no confidence in the sincerity of these declarations. 7 Within ten days after the decree of November 19th was passed, an English "Society for Constitutional Information" sent delegates to Paris, who presented at the bar of the National Couvention an address congratulating that body on "the glorious triumph of liberty on the 10th of August," when the King was deposed. These delegates take upon them to predict "that, after the example given by France, revolutions will become easy. Reason is about to make a rapid progress; and it would not be extraordinary if, in a much less time than can be Savoy had been invaded by the French in Sep- imagined, the French should send addresses of contember, 1792, on the ground that the King of Sar-gratulation to a National Convention in England." dinia had united at Mantua with Austria and Spain M. Gregoire, the President of the Convention, rein agreeing to march one hundred thousand troops plied in a high flown style, praising the English as to the borders of France. See page 531. The peo-having afforded illustrious examples to the universe. ple united to a considerable extent with the French, and sent deputations from their clubs to Paris. On the 27th of November, 1792, the National Convention erected Savoy into an eighty-fourth department of France, in direct defiance of the existing Constitution, which interdicted any permanent extension of the territory. This celebrated decree was passed by the National Convention in the tumult of joy which followed the victory at Jemappe. They resolved to adopt in other countries the course taken in Savoy, and hence framed this document in the following words: "The National Convention declare, in the name of the French nation, they will grant fraternity and assistance to all those people who wish to procure liberty. And they charge the executive power to send orders to the generals to give assistance to The shades of Hampden and Sydney," said he, "hover over your heads; and the moment without doubt approaches when the French will bring congratulations to the National Convention of Great Britain. Generous Republicans! your appearance among us prepares a subject for history!" The French were egregiously deceived, no doubt, by these demonstrations of a comparatively small number of individuals in England, and really expected great results. The English government had certainly grounds of serious complaint against the Convention for receiving the deputation in this manner. • Austria had endeavored, in 1784, to force the nav. igation of the Scheldt, but France had interfered and guaranteed to Holland her exclusive right to the lower part of that river. This guarantee England was bound to maintain by a subsequent alliance which she formed with Holland. |