I do not meddle with the Differences betwixt Copernicus and Ptolomy, nor do I pretend to any vain-glorious Difcourfe about the System of the World. But let the Universe be framed how it will, and follow the Opinion of what Philofophers you have a mind to, you must undoubtedly agree with me in this particular, that it is neceffary for the preservation of the World in its present state, that there fhould be matter and motion, motion limited to a certain measure, and motion determined after a certain manner; fince if you take away all these Causes, you reduce the World to a mere nothing, or a Chaos. I demand therefore, firft of all, whence comes this matter whereof the World is compofed He that mentions matter, means not a thing that neceffarily exists; and no one hitherto, as I know of, ever believed, that matter having all other kinds of Perfections, muft needs have that of neceffary existence too, which is what we affirm of God.

Secondly, I would fain know what is the Original of it's motion? For one of these Two things must neceffarily be granted, either that 'tis effential to matter to move it felf, or else there is a God who has impreffed Motion upon it; this motion must either proceed from the nature of Matter, or come from without; there is no Medium,

If it be effential to matter to move it felf, all its Parts must needs be in a continual agitation, like thofe of Flame, and confequently rest must destroy matter, which is perfectly contrary both to Experience and Reafon. For who knows not, that matter with refpect to what is proper and effential to it, is fomething that is extended, measurable,

measurable, divisible, which is indeed neceffarily capable of motion, but which of it felf is not more determined to actual Motion than to Reft? It is certain also, that whilst it remains in its natural state, it will reft, 'till some extrinfecal impulfe gives it motion. Epicurus himself, who holds that Atoms naturally move themselves, must be obliged to acknowledge, that the Parts at least which compose those Atoms, are at reft among themselves, fince if Motion was essential to the parts which compofe the Atoms, and to the Particles of those parts, an Atom would be no less divisible and corruptible than the other parts of the Universe, because they would have in them a principle of Corruption, which is motion. Besides, were the parts of Atoms, and the particles of those parts agitated by a necessary motion, I do not fee how they could frame that folid and indivisible whole which Philofophers call an Atom and confequently I fhould conceive that motion instead of preferving Nature, would rather destroy it.

But fuppofe that motion did proceed from the very Principles of matter, why fhould matter needs move it felf according to fuch a degree and determination as was precifely neceffary to produce a World rather than a Chaos? For if there be infinite degrees poffible in Motion I fee no Reason to doubt but there are,) this motion might be determined a great n different ways; why did matter more part larly move it felf in that degree, and with th determination which was nee

almost an infinite number of fo wonderful a regularity, wonderful Mafs of fo many

Bodies, where nothing is needlefs, and where every thing is admirable and furprising?

Thus matter of it felf does not feem more determined to exist, than not to exift: Who then gave it its exiftence? But fuppofing it does exist, 'tis no more determined to move than not to move: Who then gave it its motion? And fuppose it moves, 'tis no more determined to move in this degree, than in another; who then has reduced its motion to that just measure which was neceflary to form the World, or to preferve and maintain it during fo many Ages? In fine, though it precisely moves in this degree, 'tis no more determined to move on this fide than another; who then gave its parts those particular determinations, by which every thing is made to tend to its center, and thereby to fupport the World in Being?

Were all these Effects produced by a natural and essential Neceffity? No: For it was not necellary for matter to exift. It is not necessary for matter that does exift to move; it was not necessary for that motion to be in fuch a degree or in fuch a measure; neither was it neceffary for that degree of motion to have all thofe particu lar determinations, without which the World could not be.

Since therefore it is no neceffity of Nature 3. Effence, which caufes things to be after this manner, it must be either Chance or God.

But 'tis fo abfurd to acknowledge Chance for the Author of the World, that 'tis an aftonishing thing how this thought could ever com Mind of Man: Though we fhould Chance had fome fhare in the order a of the parts of the Univerfe, yet w

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we imagin it had in their Production; or if you will, in the production of their motion? Moreover, wherein does confift the nature of Chance fo much talk'd of? Is it fomething, or is it nothing? If it be something, it must be a created Being; and then it must be acknowledged, that there is a Creator as we pretend: Or elfe it is an Uncreated Being, and then Chance must be conceived as a thing diftinct from matter, Eternal, Incorruptible and which exifts neceffarily of it felf, and confequently Chance will be that very thing which we call God.

But if Chance be nothing, if it be a defect and privation of canfe, rather than a true and efficient cafe, it follows, that we are deceived, when we are told that Chance produced the World; and one had as good fay, that nothing produced it, or rather that the principle of its production is perfectly unknown to us.

'Tis certain that Chance properly speaking, is nothing else but our own Ignorance, which makes a thing which has in it felf neceffary and determinate Causes of its existence, to feem to us not to have any, and renders us unable to give any reafon why it fhould exift after this manner, ra than any other. A Man who holds Dice or Cards in his Hand, fees in very thing

equal between him and and with respect to th

ftrange Spectre in his image He imagines there is fome

which without any Reafon, is

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nd yet

the thing in it f.

ted from

tion of this Man, bad Play, depends c.

in that

ar detering

of his Hand, who throws the Dice, or deals the Cards, which being fuppofed, it is abfolutely necessary that the Play should prove after this man

ner.

Chance is therefore nothing but a Name without any fenfe, a big Word that fignifies nothing at all, and ought not to hinder us from concluding, that fince there is no natural and effential neceflity for the World to continue in the state in which it is, there must neceffarily be a God that made it.

But though we should find in matter, Self-motion, and the Requifite degree and determination of that Motion without being obliged to have recourse to any external Principle, there are other Effects to be obferved in the World, which would neceffarily perfwade us of the Existence of a Supream Cause.

We find there certain Beings which fome time fince had neither Life, Senfe, nor Reafon, but yet as foon as they acquire certain Organs and Dif pofitions of their Parts, begin to think, doubt, argue and reflect. Befides, 'tis true in Fact and Experience, that matter acts only by motion, and is deprived of Action, fo long as its Parts are at rest. Whence 'tis eafie to conclude, that Thought, or at least that which thinks, is either produced in matter by fome External Principle, or if mat ter produces Thought it felf, it oduces it by motion, which is the only way by which it a that if this be once clearly demonftrated Thought cannot proceed from the motion o ter, we fhall be obliged from me to ack ledge the Existence of fomel Pri which is that which