fide with any of thefe contrary Opinions. We fhail not meddle with the fate of things unknown to us, but arguing only from what we know, fhail ret contented to conclude, that as the fimple Existence of matter was not fufficient to produce the Wonders of Nature, but 'twas neceffary fome External Principle should produce and direct its morion to that end; fo likewife that the motion of matter thus regulated and directed, was not fufficient to reflect upon its own Conceptions and manner of conceiving things, but there was an abfolute necelity of fome caufe of a higher nature than matter, or its motion, to put us into a condition of Thinking.

CHAP. VI.

Containing a further Confideration of the Arguments for the Existence of God; together with the Spirituality and Immortality of the Soul, taken from the Principles of Philosophy.

J

the foregoing Chapters, we have but just opened this Matter; in this we shall search a little deeper into it, by going over the fame Principles again, which are too abftracted to be well underflood at firft view, unlefs by Pervery well exercifed in fuch Speculations. are Two ways of confidering the Unione common to all Men who make f their Reafon, and that is to obferve al parts of it, the Connexion, Order and peculine

peculiar Ufes of those Parts, and endeavour to discover in them fome Characters of the Wisdom of their Maker; the other, which is peculiar to Philofophers, is to examin the Principles, the Springs and Caufes of things, and to dive into the very compofition of them: Both these ways equally lead us to the knowledge of God, but 'tis the last we must at present infist upon.

We find in the World fome matter, which exists and which moves after fuch a manner; and in fome portion of this matter, we find a Principle which thinks, which reflects on it felf, which judges of common Attributes, and that abstracts; which applies the most perfect of its Idea, to a Being Infinitely Perfect, and whofe Desires have no bounds. If matter does not derive all these Perfections from it felf, they must come to it from without, and confequently there must be a God who imparted them to it. Thus the Existence of matter, motion, the differences of this motion, Thought, and the differences of Thought, the Idea we have of God, together with that fort of Infinity we find in our Defires, do all prove the Exiitence of God.

J. Matter does not exist Effentially and of it felf. To apprehend which Truth, we need only fuppofe this undeniable Principle, viz. That every Being is determined to exist, either meerly because it is a Being; fo that 'tis effential to whatever exifts, to exift neceffarily; or elfe that it is determined to exift, by the help of fome external Principle, which is the caufe of its being what it is; or laftly, that it is determined to exist by the fublime excellency of its own Nature; because having all manner of Perfections, it must needs have that of necessary existence,

mined the

1: cannot be armed, that matter is deternearly because it does exist, that ds, becant: I exisʼn this moment, it does not fotor for at it has exifted in that which & Text needs exift in that which 4. to come. Je it does not appear to us, tha thot moments of existence have any naturecta Jesion one with another.

Jotected perhaps, that every Beised to be, meerly because it is a ming is determined not to exift, bems : § areng, which Principle is certainly De wether I song in be a fubftance or an ISI eat a Being in oppofition to g, and not an absolute no

MRSA do not believe that it has PR t always continue to be. Tron, that the Principle of it, sega is matter or motion, has akas suis, they will not allow, that That doubt adds fomething to Nina 252 278 Møter, has always existed; museeren, r "tas falle that a Being is as abcopes to exiit hereafter, and to 28 co this time, meerly because do weg is determined not to

ever to have exifted, because it

The difference confifts in this, that nogameer negation, has no need of any a enter to its non-exiltence; whereas a which is some thing positive, cannot exist Larter than the principle of its existence es, which is not the general quality of

ace we have already feen that there are waich do not always exift; but it must be, can cause from whence it has received

all

all it has, or else the eminence of its own Perfections, which puts it in a condition above receiving any thing.

'Tis not by the eminence of its own Perfections that matter neceffarily exifts, fince it is so far from having all perfections, that it has scarcely any at all; which gave occasion to some to say, 'tis Tabula rafa, potentia fimpliciffima; which is capable of receiving any thing, but has nothing of its own. It may become bright, glittering, &c. but thefe are qualities 'tis in a capacity of acquiring, and which it had not before. Besides, according to the most rational part of Philofophers, they are mixt qualities, which are much lefs the motion of matter, than the Sensations of the Mind.

A Being that is infinite, and has all manner of perfections, cannot but have that alfo of necessary exiftence; and a Being which neceffarily exists, has all manner of perfections, those things are reciprocal. For did not an infinite Being neceffarily exift, 'twould be false to say, it had all manner of perfections; for the principal perfection would be wanting, which is to exist effentially of it self, without the help or affiftance of any other Beings. Should a Being of a neceffary existence want any perfections, it would be limited; and if 'twere limited, fome principle or other must limit it; and if it had any Principle, it would not exift of it felf, which overthrows the Suppofition. Indeed, if it has not received its perfections, but derives them from itself, there's as much reason it should have all kind of perfections as any one of them, and have them all in an infinite, rather than a limited degree. For fince it has no principle of its existence, neither has it any principle to limit

its excellency and perfections to Ten or any other certain number of Degrees: Whence then could a Being that is of it felf, whatever it is, be limited in its excellence? Since therefore matter does not exist of it felf, we must acknowledge a Supream Cause that gave it its existence.

II. If the existence of matter does not seem to be neceffary, much lefs will its motion appear to be fo. For if we know enough of the nature of matter, to know that it cannot be made incapable of receiving motion, unless it ceases to be what it is, we do alfo understand it well enough, to know, that it would not ceafe to be what it is, though it were not in actual Motion. This needs not be proved in Cartefius's Syftem of Philofophy, who pretends that Motion and Reft are Two Modes which matter does indifferently receive; neither will Ariftotle's Party have any thing to except against the truth of this principle.

As for Epicurus and his Followers, 'twould be eafie to convince them, by distinguishing Three forts of Bodies; viz. Senfible Bodies, Atoms which compose these Bodies, and the Parts which we must conceive to compose those parts.

Senfible Bodies do feem fometimes to be at rest, and fometimes in motion; this is certain: But the difficulty is to know, whence this reft of fenfible Bodies does proceed, and whether it is not contrary to Nature. It is pretended by fome, that the parts of fenfible Bodies are at reft, because their Atoms being lock'd one into another, do as it were by a mutual conflict refift each other's wotion; and fo by that Opposition, sheir courfe is ftop'd,

But