of necessity, and from a sense of the inconveniences which would result from a contrary doctrine, by which the state and condition of a man, his capacity or incapacity, would change with every change of abode, for however short a time or transitory purpose. It is upon these considerations, that the jurists of the continent of Europe, where these questions have most frequently arisen, have admitted the extension of personal statutes.' pp. 26-28.

We entirely agree with Mr. Livermore in these positions. The notion that a judge of one of our courts should, out of civility to the king of Portugal or Sweden, compel a man to pay a sum of money, execute a contract, or go to prison, is absurd on the face of it. We give effect to a foreign law because our own laws adopt and ratify it in the particular case. We might as well pretend to have adopted a part of the civil law, out of respect to the memory of Justinian, as to say that we are influenced by a comity to the French government, in applying the laws of France to the interpretation of a contract made there. The word comity ought to be expunged from the legal phraseology on this subject, and the language used should be accommodated to the truth, or what ought to be the truth of the case, namely, that foreign laws are respected and adopted by our courts, because they do in effect, in certain cases, become, for the occasion, a part of our own laws. Whether they are to be applied in a particular case, or not, is a question of principle, and not to be decided by the arbitrary discretion of the court.

Our readers will perceive, from our cursory notice of this work of Mr. Livermore, that it embraces questions of great interest to the profession, admitting of much learned investigation and profound and elaborate discussion; and it is the more meritorious in Mr. Livermore to have devoted his labors to this subject, as it is in this country, as yet, in a great measure an unexplored, and at the same time a very extensive field. He has brought to the work a great deal of learning which will be new to most of his readers, and has discussed the questions with skill, acuteness, fairness, and sufficient independence. It seems to us, however, that his work is defective in arrangement, and that the divisions are not so clear and complete, and the distinction of one topic from another, not so definitely marked, as they should have been. In some instances the reader is hurried into the midst of a new subject before he is apprized of the transition.

ART. VII.-TESTIMONY OF QUAKERS.

No branch of law presents a wider field for moral and philosophical disquisition than the title of evidence. It involves fewer subtleties and technical peculiarities than other parts of the legal system, and may be considered a fit study for the general student, who has no intention of engaging in the practice of law. It may be strictly considered as coming within the department of moral and intellectual philosophy. Glassford's treatise on evidence, is as properly a philosophical work, as Stuart on the philosophy of the mind. This and every other treatise on the same subject, has for its object to explore the grounds of belief. A question or proposition being stated, as, for example, whether such a man is guilty of treason, murder, or larceny, whether such another committed an assault, or incurred a debt-the inquiry and logical process is the same, as in an experiment in chemistry, or magnetism, or any other chain of inductive reasoning, the object of which is to determine the truth of a given proposition.

In order to answer this question-to determine whether the given proposition, to wit, the guilt, the tort, or the debt, is established,—we must make a philosophical analysis of all the circumstances and facts, discriminating those tending to prove the affirmative, from those having an opposite bearing, and having selected those which are relevant to the question, we next consider their weight and force, as well those opposed to, as those corroborating each other; and if, in this process, we arrive at a moderate preponderance merely,-a faint probability, it does not constitute a legal demonstration; the result is not the satisfactory conviction of the mind which is recognised by the law as a reasonable and sufficient ground of a judgment. To frame all the rules for the admission of testimony, and settle the principles by which its relevancy is to be determined, and its force estimated, is, then, a work of profound intellectual science, requiring not only a knowledge of human nature in the abstract; of the mind, the passions, prejudices, habits, and foibles of man as a thinking, believing, and acting being; but also of all the social relations, and conventional rules and institutions, modes of acting, thinking, and speaking, prevalent among the parties and in the society to

which the transaction, making the subject of investigation, has reference. The science of evidence is, in short, the science of human nature as it is constituted by the Deity, and modified by education, the laws, social habitudes, and all those moral and external influences to which the individual, in any particular society, is subjected.

It is not at all surprising that so comprehensive and abstruse a science should not be every where well understood, though it must, of necessity, be every where acted upon and practically applied, and what is more, the safety and wellbeing of every member of every community in the world, depends upon the knowledge and skill with which the principles of this science are applied to his particular case. To illustrate how improbable it is that the principles of this science should be philosophically established and skilfully applied in every community, and we may say, indeed, in any community, let us suppose that the principles of any other science, even less difficult, as that of mechanics, were to be prescribed and applied by the intervention of the same machinery, and the cooperation of the same agents, namely, the legislature, the judges, and the jury, would not, think you, the state of this science be very rude, and the arts depending upon it, but very imperfectly practised? The science of human testimonyof the grounds of conviction and belief-and the application of its principles to the determination of the questions affecting the lives, liberty, and property of men, is certainly not less difficult, and yet it is a science which can be cultivated and improved, in respect to the legal administration, and its practical application determined, only by the combined knowledge, skill, and assent of a legislative body, a court, and a jury. It is a science of which the progress must necessarily be slow, and its practical application always imperfect. We say always imperfect, for changes are always taking place in the opinions, habits, and social relations of men, and require corresponding changes in the rules of testimony, since the species of testimony which could not be safely admitted or would not be a satisfactory ground of conviction and belief, in one condition of a community, become justly entitled to admission and credit at another period, and these changes will always be followed magno intervallo, if at all, by corresponding modifications in the rules of evidence.

The slow progress of improvement, and the tardy applica

tion of a remedy, even where the defect is palpable, well known, and generally acknowledged, is illustrated by the subject matter of a recent act of the British parliament, a notice of which is our principal object in the present article. By the statute in question, called Lord Lansdowne's act, being 22 Geo. IV. c. 32, the affirmation of a Quaker is made admissible in all cases, as well criminal as civil.

The sect of Quakers, as is well known, took its rise in England, about 1650, when George Fox, an apprentice to a shoemaker and dealer in cattle, of Nottingham, began to promulgate his new doctrines, to which William Penn became a convert some fourteen or fifteen years afterwards. Until the revolution in 1688, Quakers, who refused to take a legal oath in the usual form, were treated as obstinate offenders, and subject to penalties.

The first statute on this subject, 13 & 14 Car. II. c. 1. s. 1, was enacted in 1661, and runs thus:- Whereas of late times certain persons under the name of Quakers have taken up and maintained sundry dangerous opinions and tenets, and among others, that the taking of an oath in any case whatsoever is unlawful, and contrary to the word of God: and the said persons do daily refuse to take an oath, although lawfully tendered, whereby it often happens that the truth is wholly suppressed, and the administration of justice much obstructed,' &c. Therefore, for the redressing,' &c. be it enacted, 'that if any person or persons who maintain that the taking of an oath is unlawful and contrary to the word of God, from and after the 24th day of March, in the present year, 1661, shall, where by the laws of the realm, he or she shall be bound to take the same, wilfully and obstinately refuse and forbear taking the same, or go about to maintain and defend that taking an oath is unlawful, the party so offending shall lose and forfeit, for the first offence, such sum as shall be imposed, not exceeding five pounds; for the second, not exceeding ten pounds; and for want of payment, such parties shall, for the first offence, be committed to the common jail, or house of correction, for three months; and for the second, during six months, and there be kept to hard labor.'

The Quakers suffered much vexation and persecution under this law. Some of the judges,' says Clarkson, in his Portraiture of Quakerism, 'indulged a rancor against them unworthy of their high office, which prescribed justice impartially to all.

For when they could not convict them of the offences laid to their charge,' such, for instance, as attending unlawful meetings, they tendered to them the oath of allegiance, knowing that they would not take it, and that a confiscation of their property and imprisonment would ensue.'

The whimsical Quaker custom of wearing the hat at all times, gave them some trouble, and caused them some persecution, at first, in the courts of justice. Clarkson says, that when George Fox visited Cromwell, he never pulled off his hat, and the Protector was not angry with him. We have somewhere read an account of Penn's being jocosely reproved for this peculiarity by Charles II. who, observing that Penn sturdily wore his hat in his presence, took off his own. 'Why dost thou uncover thy head, Charles?' said Penn. 'It is not customary here for more than one person to remain covered,' the king replied. The late king George is said to have been very indulgent to this singularity of the Quakers. But the judges seem, at first, to have been a little intolerant of this point of conscience, of which the following instance is related. George Fox and other Quakers being brought out of Lamerston jail to be tried by Chief Justice Glynn, came into court with their hats on. The judge asked them the reason of this, but they remained silent. He then told them that the court ordered them to pull off their hats, to which Fox replied by asking him, 'Where did ever any magistrate, king, or judge, from Moses to Daniel, command any to pull off their hats, when they came before them, either amongst the Jews, who were God's people, or amongst the heathen? And if the law of God doth command any such thing, show me that law, either written or printed.' The Chief Justice upon this grew angry, and replied that he did not carry his law books upon his back. But George still persisted, and said, 'show me where it is written in any statute-book, that I may read it.' To this the judge only made a practical reply by ordering him back to prison, and to be shut up with thieves. He, however, in a short time ordered him up again, and put to him the following question: Come,' said he, 'when had they hats from Moses to Daniel? come, answer me!' George replied that he might read, in the third chapter of Daniel, that the children were sent into the fiery furnace by Nebuchadnezzar's order, with their coats, their hose, and their hats. This, says Clarkson, stopped the judge from any further comment.