These hardships were not removed until after the revolution of 1688, when by 1 W. & M. c. 18, s. 13, called the Toleration Act, the Quakers were allowed to make a declaration of their fidelity to the state, instead of taking the oath of allegiance in the usual form; and also exempted from all pains and penalties, on their making certain other declarations there prescribed. This was one step taken in adapting the law to a change which had occurred in the religious faith and prejudices of a part of the community. But this step was prompted rather by the exigencies of the monarch and the government, than by any broad and general view of the subject. The new monarchs and their adherents were naturally disposed to attract and fix the support and allegiance of their people. Had they been acting, like the judges of a court, between third parties, with-out any stake of their own, or had thus felt themselves to be sufficiently easy and well established in power to prescribe the forms and terms of allegiance, according to their own prejudices, they might have rigidly adhered to the opinion that a declaration of loyalty ought to be fortified by the strongest asseverations and the most solemn invocations of the vengeance of God in case of its being insincere and false. And they might have continued to inflict upon those refusing the oath in the usual form, all the pains and penalties so liberally accumulated upon non-jurors. There is no saying what strong irrefragable arguments might be urged in support of such a position. But as they were desirous of obtaining the declarations of allegiance, they were naturally solicitous to remove, rather than to aggravate, the obstacles in the way of making them. Accordingly the disability to take the oath, under which the Quakers labored in consequence of their religious prejudices, was immediately removed by accommodating the form of the declaration to their conscientious scruples. It seems singular, however, that the consciences of any sect should make so subtile a distinction as to make the declaration prescribed by the toleration act without scruple, and yet be horror-struck by the usual form of swearing, since the declaration, abjuration, &c. required by 1 W. & M. c. 18, s. 13, is substantially an oath, though the word swear is not used; the form being, 'I A. B. do sincerely promise and solemnly declare before God and the world,' &c., which corresponds to the definition of an oath given by Heineccius and commonly adopted, viz. Religiosa adseveratio per invocationem Dei tan

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quam vindicis, si juratus sciens fefellerit, an invocation of the vengeance of Deity upon the witness, if he does not declare the truth according to his own knowledge. This invocation is not made literally and in direct terms in the usual form of swearing, but is understood to be implied in the expression, so help me,' &c. The transition from this measure to a corresponding modification of the form of solemnizing and sanctioning a statement or declaration in all other cases where an oath is usually required, seems to be so natural, and its expediency so obvious, that it might be expected to take place of course on the very first occasion of public attention being called to the subject; and yet it has required the long period of one hundred and forty years completely to make this transition. The next step, in making it, was taken eight years after the toleration act, in 1696, by 7 & 8 W. III. c. 34, which runs as follows:

Whereas divers dissenters, commonly called Quakers, refusing to take an oath in courts of justice and other places, are frequently imprisoned and their estates sequestered, by process of contempt issuing out of such courts, to the ruin of themselves and families: For remedy thereof, be it enacted, that every Quaker who shall be required upon any lawful occasion to take an oath, shall, instead of the usual form, be permitted to make solemn affirmation in the words following: "I A. B. do declare, in presence of Almighty God, the witness of the truth of what I say:" Provided, that no Quaker shall, by virtue of this act, be qualified or permitted to give evidence in any criminal case, or serve on any juries, or bear any office or place of profit in the government.'

The form of affirmation prescribed by this statute varies a little from that of the declaration permitted by the toleration act; but still it retains, like that, the essential characteristics of an oath; it is calling God to witness. It is worthy of remark that this law, which breathes a spirit of toleration, and expresses a concern and compassion for the Quakers, should leave them exposed, in criminal cases, to all the penalties and hardships under which they had previously labored in all cases where they were called upon to give testimony in courts of justice.

The next statute on the subject is that of 8 Geo. I. c. 6 (1721), which runs thus: Whereas the inconveniences to the said people called Quakers and their families, and to others

requiring their testimony, in many cases are not sufficiently avoided, by reason of the difficulty among said Quakers relating to the forms of declaration, affirmation, and abjuration before mentioned, as the same are now prescribed; and whereas it is evident that the said people called Quakers have not abused the liberty and indulgence allowed to them by law, and they have given testimony of their fidelity and affection to his majesty and the settlement of the crown in the protestant line, and it is reasonable to give them further relief, &c.' and then proceeds to prescribe the following form of affirmation, which is, we presume, the same now in use, viz. 'I, A. B. do solemnly, sincerely, and truly declare and affirm.'

Thus stood the law in England until the recent act of parliament, whereby Quakers are permitted to give testimony by affirmation, in criminal prosecutions. These provisions are limited to the sect of Quakers, and not extended to the cases of all persons conscientiously scrupulous of taking an oath in the usual form.

The testimony of Quakers is universally admitted in the United States on solemn affirmation, without any invocation of the Deity, as well in criminal as civil suits, and the constitutions and laws generally provide for a similar form in declarations of allegiance and of fidelity in discharging the duties of any office. This sect seems no where in the country to have been greater objects of antipathy than in Massachusetts. As early as 1656, and accordingly very soon after the origin of the sect, a colony law recites, that whereas there is a cursed sect of heretics, lately risen up in the world, commonly called Quakers, who take upon themselves to be immediately sent of God, and infallibly assisted by the spirit, to speak and write blasphemous opinions, despising government and the order of God in church and commonwealth, speaking evil of dignities, reproaching and reviling magistrates and ministers, seeking to turn the people from the faith, and gain proselytes to their pernicious ways; the court, considering the premises, order,' that any master of a vessel bringing any one of the sect into the colony, shall forfeit a hundred pounds, besides giving bonds to carry him out of the jurisdiction.

No provision was as yet thought necessary in relation to their giving testimony, for they were banished the colony, and in the act of 1661, the General Court says, "This court being desirous to try all means, with as much lenity as may con

sist with our safety, to prevent the intrusion of Quakers, who, besides their blasphemous doctrines, do, like rogues and vagabonds, come in upon us, have ordered that every such vagabond Quaker shall be apprehended, and conveyed before the next magistrate, and not giving civil respect by the usual gestures thereof, or by any other way or means manifesting himself to be a Quaker, shall be stripped naked from the middle upwards, tied to a cart's tail and whipped through the town,' and so from town to town to the limits of the jurisdiction. Divers laws of similar spirit were enacted from 1656 to 1663.

The first law that we notice in favor, or at all tolerant of the Quakers, was not passed until about a hundred years afterwards, viz. in 1757, by which they were exempted from ministerial taxes.

The next year a law was passed providing 'that every Quaker who should be required upon any lawful occasion to take an oath, should, instead of the usual form, be permitted to make affirmation.' Similar provisions are to be found among the early laws of all the states, the statutes of which we have had an opportunity to examine. We do not find any where among them the distinction between civil and criminal suits, so long kept up in England; the provisions of these laws generally extend to all lawful occasions of taking an oath. There is, however, another distinction among these laws, of some importance; those, for instance, of New Hampshire, Vermont, New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and South Carolina, provide that any person having conscientious scruples on the subject of taking an oath, or, as the Pennsylvania law has it, who for conscience sake cannot take an oath,' are permitted to affirm, either in a form prescribed by these statutes rèspectively, or as in Virginia, according to the formula observed by the religious society of which he professes to be a member,' but until recently the law of Massachusetts on this subject was limited in its provisions to Quakers, and that of Maryland, being at first limited to this sect, was afterwards extended to Nicolites or New Quakers, Tunkers, and Menonites. The laws of the respective states govern the Circuit Courts of the United States in relation to the sanction of testimony, and, accordingly, in the case of a witness produced in the Circuit Court in the district of Massachusetts, some twelve years ago, who refused to be sworn on the ground of his conscientious scruples, the court, understanding that he was not of the Quaker

sect, ordered him to be committed for contempt. It is not improbable, however, that the court paid less respect to the alleged scruples of the witness, from the known circumstance that he was not restrained for conscience sake' from adopting the usual form of swearing on occasions which would not be considered, under the statutes, as any lawful occasions of taking an oath.' The laws of that state are, however, now altered so as to conform to those of most, at least, of the others, and extend the permission to affirm, to all persons having scruples of conscience in this respect.

ART. VIII.-MEMOIR OF JUDGE TRIMBLE.

For the following outline of the life and character of the late Judge Trimble, we are indebted to the kindness of an eminent judicial character of Kentucky, who was his schoolfellow and afterwards his neighbor, and has been his intimate friend for a long course of years.

Robert Trimble was the son of William Trimble; and he was born in Augusta County, Virginia, about the year 1777. His father was honest, respectable, and pious; but never wealthy. He was one of those hardy and enterprising adventurers, who first settled in Kentucky. His object, like that of others, was to improve his fortune by obtaining a grant of land. Before 1779 no titles to land could be acquired in Kentucky, except there were military surveys made under the royal government; and the issuing of patents was suspended by the revolution, under an entire uncertainty as to what the new government might do with these claims, excepting also what was called Savage's grant, which had been surveyed by General Washington, and protected by the crown. grant extends over the Big Sandy River, into the then district, now state of Kentucky. Previous to 1779 there were no settlements of farmers in Kentucky, but only a few garrisons, or rather little villages, which were called stations. They were composed of a number of cabins or cottages, in which several families resided and associated for greater security and more ready defence against the savages. In that year the legislature of Virginia not only confirmed the royal military surveys, and directed grants to issue, but provided that every

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