PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY.

The first Session of the third Parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland.-47. GEO. III.

CHAP. I.

Discussion on the late Negociation with ,France, in both Houses.

THE proceedings of Parliament are so essential to a knowledge of the political history of this country, that, to be ignorant of them, is to be unacquainted with the strength and resources of the state, with the conduct and intentions of government, and with our relations of peace or war with foreign powers. There is no individual so humble, so inconsequential, in his life and pursuits, as to be uninterested in these proceedings. From the general importance, therefore, which attaches to this species of information, it is our wish, as far as our limits admit, to present a sort of parliamentary coup d'œil. Omitting the details of debate, &c..it will be our object to present an historical sketch, in which, without descending to particulars, we shall endeavour to preserve the essence of all that is requisite to be known by the general reader.

The opening of the present Parliament, with the royal speech by commission, we have given, Panorama, p. 111. The papers relative to the late negociation with France, (vide p. 873,) which were laid before Parliament Dec. 22, 1806, were taken into consideration, in the House of Lords, Jan. 2, 1807; and, in the House of Commons, on the 5th.- -In the upper House, Lord Grenville, after zealously vindicating the conduct of the British government, moved: an hunble address to his Majesty, "to assure him that this House has taken into serious consideration, those papers relative to the late negociation, and see with gratitude, that he has employed every means to restore the blessing of peace, in a manner consistent with the interests and glory of his people, and, with an observance of that good faith with our allies, which this country is bound to retain inviolate. That while we lament that by the ambition and the avarice of our enemy, these laudable endeavours to restore tranquillity to his kingdom, have been frustrated, we beg leave to assure his Majesty, that no exertion shall be wanting on our part to support and assist him, in the adoption of such measures as may yet be found necessary, either for the restoration of peace, or to meet the various exigencies of the war in this most important crisis."

Lord Grenville observed, that there were yery few instances, in which the papers presented to Parliament entered into such lengthened detail on particular points, as the present. All that had passed upon the business

had not indeed been stated; but it was evident, that it might have been inconsistent, not only with regard to the interests of our allies, but to our own, to give farther particulars. In the last war, it was found to have been the means of creating great difficulties in effecting an amiable accommodation. He thought, however, that the papers now presented furnished ample grounds for voting the address proposed.His Lordship observed, that, it was unnecessary for him to argue as a general principle, the propriety of pursuing the attainment of peace. No apology therefore was necessary, for a desire to obtain such a blessing, or to ascertain whether it were practicable. There were conditions, in which nations might be placed, which might render peace worthy of being purchased with considerable sacrifices; and such sacrifices were to be esteemed, not by the value of the national commerce, finances, or revenue, but by the real value of peace to the existence of the subjects, and by looking forward to the means which might yet be necessary for the farther continuance of the war. From the experience of the last fourteen years, he must acknowledge, that the permanency of any peace now likely to be concluded, would be decreased, in proportion as the times were more perilous. When, therefore, we lament the failure of the late negociation, this small degree of probability, of obtaining a permanent peace, must be taken into consideration.We were in possession of objects of considerable advantage, both as to our safety in time of peace, and in time of war, so as to weaken the force of the enemy. The state of actual possession was considered as the only basis on which alone we could enter into the negociations with our present enemy, because we could not afford to pay any considerable price for an unstable and an uncertain peace. Our object was, not so much profit or commerce, as security. At the same time, this basis of actual posses sion was never intended to exclude such exchanges, as might be judged expedient, Above all, we could never be conceived to be entering on such a negociation, under the supposition that we were in a state of inferiority to France. This was the general sentiment of those who had conducted the late negociation.With respect to our allies, we were bound to support them. It was impossible to conceal the distress which must result to this country, from the total subjugation of the Continent. When the present ministers came into power, they found a subsisting treaty between this country and Russia, by which Great Britain was bound not to niake peace without the consent of the Emperor Alexander. That engagement, had he had the honour of being consulted, he should have advised; and

being made, he was sure that no noble lord in that House, or in his Majesty's councils, could think that it should have been broken through. We had other allies beside Russia, to whom we were bound, though not to the same extent. Such were Sweden and Portugal, for whom we asked nothing, except their original state of possession. Beside these, were allies of another description : the King of Naples, and the Elector of Hanover, as a distinct and separate power. As to the King of Naples, we were not bound by any distinct engagement, to procure the restoration of his whole dominions; yet, if they could be recovered, even with considerable sacrifices, we ought to meet the difficulty. The kingdom of Sicily stands in a different point of view: with the consent of its sovereign, we had occupied Sicily, and we could not think of delivering it over to the enemy. As to the Elector of Hanover, if his possessions had been attacked, not on account of any quarrel in which they had been engaged, but solely because war had been declared against Great Britain, and our enemy finding us invulnerable on any point, thought proper to take possession of the Electorate, were we not bound in honour to effect, by a treaty, its restoration? The irresistibility of this claim was admitted at Paris. In concluding, Lord Grenville observed, that he should have been much happier in addressing their lordships on the conclusion of a peace. In France, throughout the negociations, there was evidently a uniform and invariable desire evinced, to disunite this country from all her continental allies. Large proposals were made, and every means were used to sever us from our allies, particularly from Russia. Finding us not likely to be prevailed on, they next applied to the Russian minister; and, by dint of threats, menaces, and promises, compelled him to break faith with this country, and to sign a treaty beyond the powers which he had received. On the very day of the signing of the treaty by d'Oubril, the demands of France were increased; but, at the moment when suspicion began to prevail at Paris, that his treaty would not be ratified, a different language was held to us; clearly exhibiting, that it was equally the same to France, which of the two amicable powers they could prevail upon to break with the other.

The only remaining point to be considered was, whether the demands of Russia were so extravagant, as to warrant us in making a separate peace. They were not: and they merely added a demand, that France should desist from the occupation of Dalmatia, which could not be holden but for the purpose of general offence against Europe, being neither a commercial nor a maritime acquisition should France continue to hold

Dalmatia, it would give her the controul of the Austrian capital, and the power of dictating to the Porte.

Lord Hawkesbury concurred in the general object of the proposed address, but did not perceive any expressions that bore out the assertion contained in His Majesty's Declaration, that the first proposals for negociation were made by the French government; nor could he discover any grounds for supposing, that the uti possidetis had ever been acknowledged as the basis of the treaty. Such a fact should have been established by some written document.

Lord Sidmouth contended, that, although there was no specific admission of the uti possidetis, on the part of the French government, the whole of the negociation had been conducted on that basis. His Lordship supported this position, by quoting the words of M. Talleyrand, in his letter to Mr. Fox, in the early stage of the correspondence between the two governments:-"France desires nothing of Great-Britain that she already possesses." This also was the uniform impression on the mind of Lord Yarmouth, to whom Talleyrand had used the expressionnous ne vous la demandons pas.—Alluding to the finances of this country, his Lordship observed, that, at the present moment, we had resources very different from those of 1801. Since that time, £97,000,000 had been funded; and taxation, to the amount of £4,900,000, had been imposed in addis tion to war taxes, amounting to nearly £20,000,000.

Earl Grosvenor expressed himself as doubting the propriety of continuing the negociation to so protracted a period; conceiving that it tended to relax the vigour of our operations. He rejoiced, however, at the flourishing state of our finances, at the approaching abolition of the Slave Trade, and the preservation of the established Church. Yet he lamented the violation of the Lord's day, and the great increase of sectaries.

Lord Eldon declared himself feelingly alive to that part of the address, which proposed the most unceasing vigour and undaunted resolution in continuing the contest; yet he could not but lament the protraction of the negociation; because the chicanery and de ception of the French government had beent so peculiarly marked, throughout its every stage. From his conviction of the unceasing ambition by which the chief of the French government was actuated, he could by no means bring himself to join in that part of the address, where the ineffectual endeavours of His Majesty to form a pacific treaty were considered as a cause of regret. He had. never considered the treaty of Amiens, as honourable or glorious; and, since that treaty, the characteristic duplicity of the French ca

binet had been more obvious than ever. He was much deceived, if the changes in Germany, and the Rhenish Confederation, were not only meditated, but actually completed, before the signing of D'Oubril's treaty ;most certainly before the arrival of that ambassador, with the treaty, at St. Petersburgh.

-With respect to the uti possidetis, he could not recognize that principle, as forming the basis of a treaty, compared with either of the two bases agreed upon. His Majesty's government had proved that it sought for peace, in the spirit of peace; but the conduct of the French had been a tissue of perfidy and evasion. As to the last letter, said to have been sent from M. Talleyrand to the noble Lord who latterly conducted the negociation at Paris, he should hope that no such letter had ever been received; and that no minister of a hostile power would dare to send to the plenipotentiary of Great Britain, a communication replete with such base and injurious calum

nies.

Lord Grenville, in his closing speech, strongly insisted, that the uti possidetis had not only been admitted, and acted upon, but had actually been selected by the French government, in preference to any other; in support of which his Lordship adverted to the statement made by Lord Yarmouth, in the House of Commons.

The Earl of Lauderdale, feeling himself called upon for some explanation, entered into a review of his own conduct, during the negociation; and contended that the papers themselves, as well as the verbal communications of Lord Yarmouth, would all shew, that, throughout the negociation, he had had the uti possidetis solely in view.-The original motion for the address was then put, and carried nem. dis.

In the House of Commons, Dec. 30, some days previously to the discussion of the Negociation Papers, Lord Yarmouth stated that he had been desired, by the French ministers, to inform Mr. Fox that France would agree to treat on the basis of actual possession; but that there might be stipulations for such exchanges as should be mutually satisfactory.

On the night of discussion, in the lower house, Lord Howick moved an address to His Majesty, similar in substance to that of Lord Grenville in the House of Lords.-He observed, that in rising to perform this duty, it was impossible that he should not experience many painful feelings; among which were, his deep regret for the failure of an effort, sincerely directed for the restoration of peace to this country and to Europe; and his loss of a friend and instructor, without whose support he had no confidence in his own strength. His Lordship went over nearly the same grounds as Lord Grenville had done';

contending chiefly, that the first overture came from the enemy, that the negociation was instituted on the basis of actual possession, and that we had been treating fairly in conjunction with our allies. In adverting to the note of M. Talleyrand to Lord Lauderdale, of Sept. 4, as it appeared in the French publication of the correspondence, it ought to be made known, that that insulting note had never been delivered; if it had, blame would have been justly imputable to his Lordship, for remaining a day longer in Paris. Nothing was more false than the insinuation in that note, that, after the death of Mr. Fox, the war party had prevailed in the English cabinet, and had indulged a disposition to break off the negociation. No difference of opinion whatever subsisted among His Majesty's ministers during the whole period of the negociation. In the last conversation which he had with Mr. Fox, Sept. 7, that great man expressly stated, that, anxious as he was for peace, he had insisted on such a peace only as should be found, first, consistent with the honour and interests of this country; secondly, with our connections with Russia; and, thirdly, with the preservation of Sicily to its legitimate sovereign, or such an equivalent as he would be willing to accept of.

Lord Yarmouth rose to vindicate himself from the degree of blame thrown upon him in some of the papers before the House. From considering the original grounds of the present war, and the then present situation of affairs, every thing seemed favorable for the commencement of the late negociation. The war originally broke out on the subject of Malta: he thought, therefore, that if, in a treaty for peace, Malta should be secured to England, a great object would be obtained. Another inducement for commencing the war, had been the growing spirit which manifested itself throughout Europe, for resisting the encroachments of France. Through the crooked policy of Prussia, the coalition which had been formed on that principle had been dissolved, and Austria laid prostrate at the feet of France. Under these circumstances the negociation commenced. at the very outset, great difficulties arose: France knew that we should insist on Hanover; but, at the same time, she had partly guaranteed that Electorate to Prussia. With a view of getting over that difficulty, a verbal communication had been made to him (Lord Yarmouth) by M. Talleyrand, intended to facilitate the restoration of peace. It was begun in secresy, that, should the issue be un successful, the subsisting connection between France and Prussia might not be dissolved, By the particular desire of M. Talleyrand, he had not committed this communication. to writing, at least so as to submit any paper

But,

being made, he was sure that no noble lord in that House, or in his Majesty's councils, could think that it should have been broken through. We had other allies beside Russia, to whom we were bound, though not to the same extent. Such were Sweden and Portugal, for whom we asked nothing, except their original state of possession. Beside these, were allies of another description: the King of Naples, and the Elector of Hanover, as a distinct and separate power. As to the King of Naples, we were not bound by any distinct engagement, to procure the restoration of his whole dominions; yet, if they could be recovered, even with considerable sacrifices, we ought to meet the difficulty. The kingdom of Sicily stands in a different point of view: with the consent of its sovereign, we had occupied Sicily, and we could not think of delivering it over to the enemy. As to the Elector of Hanover, if his possessions had been attacked, not on account of any quarrel in which they had been engaged, but solely because war had been declared against Great Britain, and our enemy finding us invulnerable on any point, thought proper to take possession of the Electorate, were we not bound in honour to effect, by a treaty, its restoration? The irresistibility of this claim was admitted at Paris. In concluding, Lord Grenville observed, that he should have been much happier in addressing their lordships on the conclusion of a peace. In France, throughout the negociations, there was evidently a uniform and invariable desire evinced, to disunite this country from all her continental allies. Large proposals were made, and every means were used to sever us from our allies, particularly from Russia. Finding us not likely to be prevailed on, they next applied to the Russian minister; and, by dint of threats, menaces, and promises, compelled him to break faith with this country, and to sign a treaty beyond the powers which he had received. On the very day of the signing of the treaty by d'Oubril, the demands of France were increased; but, at the moment when suspicion began to prevail at Paris, that his treaty would not be ratified, a different language was held to us; clearly exhibiting, that it was equally the same to France, which of the two amicable powers they could prevail upon to break with the other. The only remaining point to be considered was, whether the demands of Russia were so extravagant, as to warrant us in making a separate peace. They were not: and they merely added a demand, that France should desist from the occupation of Dalmatia, which could not be holden but for the purpose of general offence against Europe, being neither a commercial nor a maritime acquisition should France continue to hold

Dalmatia, it would give her the controul of the Austrian capital, and the power of dictating to the Porte.

Lord Hawkesbury concurred in the general object of the proposed address, but did not perceive any expressions that bore out the assertion contained in His Majesty's Declaration, that the first proposals for negociation were made by the French government; nor could he discover any grounds for supposing, that the uti possidetis had ever been acknowledged as the basis of the treaty. Such a fact should have been established by some written document.

Lord Sidmouth contended, that, although there was no specific admission of the uti possidetis, on the part of the French government, the whole of the negociation had been conducted on that basis. His Lordship supported this position, by quoting the words of M. Talleyrand, in his letter to Mr. Fox, in the early stage of the correspondence between the two governments:- France desires nothing of Great-Britain that she already possesses." This also was the uniform impression on the mind of Lord Yarmouth, to whom Talleyrand had used the expressionnous ne vous la demandons pas.-Alluding to the finances of this country, his Lordship observed, that, at the present moment, we had resources very different from those of 1801. Since that time, £97,000,000 had been funded; and taxation, to the amount of £4,900,000, had been imposed in addition to war taxes, amounting to nearly £20,000,000.

Earl Grosvenor expressed himself as doubting the propriety of continuing the negocia tion to so protracted a period; conceiving that it tended to relax the vigour of our operations. He rejoiced, however, at the flourishing state of our finances, at the approaching abolition of the Slave Trade, and the preservation of the established Church. Yet he lamented the violation of the Lord's day, and the great increase of sectaries.

Lord Eldon declared himself feelingly alive to that part of the address, which proposed the most unceasing vigour and undaunted resolution in continuing the contest; yet hø could not but lament the protraction of the negociation; because the chicanery and deception of the French government had been so peculiarly marked, throughout its every stage. From his conviction of the unceasing ambition by which the chief of the French government was actuated, he could by no means bring himself to join in that part of the address, where the ineffectual endeavours of His Majesty to form a pacific treaty were considered as a cause of regret. He had. never considered the treaty of Amiens, as honourable or glorious; and, since that treaty, the characteristic duplicity of the French ca

binet had been more obvious than ever. He was much deceived, if the changes in Germany, and the Rhenish Confederation, were not only meditated, but actually completed, before the signing of D'Oubril's treaty ;most certainly before the arrival of that ambassador, with the treaty, at St. Petersburgh. -With respect to the uti possidetis, he could not recognize that principle, as forming the basis of a treaty, compared with either of the two bases agreed upon. His Majesty's government had proved that it sought for peace, in the spirit of peace; but the conduct of the French had been a tissue of perfidy and evasion. As to the last letter, said to have been sent from M. Talleyrand to the noble Lord who latterly conducted the negociation at Paris, he should hope that no such letter had ever been received; and that no minister of a hostile power would dare to send to the plenipotentiary of Great Britain, a communication replete with such base and injurious calumnies.

Lord Grenville, in his closing speech, strongly insisted, that the uti possidetis had not only been admitted, and acted upon, but had actually been selected by the French government, in preference to any other; in support of which his Lordship adverted to the statement made by Lord Yarmouth, in the House of Commons.

The Earl of Lauderdale, feeling himself called upon for some explanation, entered into a review of his own conduct, during the negociation; and contended that the papers themselves, as well as the verbal communications of Lord Yarmouth, would all shew, that, throughout the negociation, he had had the uti possidetis solely in view.-The original motion for the address was then put, and carLied nem. dis.

In the House of Commons, Dec. 30, some days previously to the discussion of the Negociation Papers, Lord Yarmouth stated that he had been desired, by the French ministers, to inform Mr. Fox that France would agree to treat on the basis of actual possession; but that there might be stipulations for such exchanges as should be mutually satisfactory.

On the night of discussion, in the lower house, Lord Howick moved an address to His Majesty, similar in substance to that of Lord Grenville in the House of Lords.-He observed, that in rising to perform this duty, it was impossible that he should not experience many painful feelings; among which were, his deep regret for the failure of an effort, sincerely directed for the restoration of peace to this country and to Europe; and his foss of a friend and instructor, without whose support he had no confidence in his own strength. His Lordship went over nearly the same grounds as Lord Grenville had done';

contending chiefly, that the first overture came from the enemy, that the negociation was instituted on the basis of actual possession, and that we had been treating fairly in conjunction with our allies. In adverting to the note of M. Talleyrand to Lord Lauderdale, of Sept. 4, as it appeared in the French publication of the correspondence, it ought to be made known, that that insulting note had never been delivered; if it had, blame would have been justly imputable to his Lordship, for remaining a day longer in Paris. Nothing was more false than the insinuation in that note, that, after the death of Mr. Fox, the war party had prevailed in the English cabinet, and had indulged a disposition to break off the negociation. No difference of opinion whatever subsisted among His Majesty's ministers during the whole period of the negociation. In the last conversation which he had with Mr. Fox, Sept. 7, that great man expressly stated, that, anxious as he was for peace, he had insisted on such a peace only as should be found, first, consistent with the honour and interests of this country; secondly, with our connections with Russia; and, thirdly, with the preservation of Sicily to its legitimate sovereign, or such an equivalent as he would be willing to accept of.

Lord Yarmouth rose to vindicate himself from the degree of blame thrown upon him in some of the papers before the House. From considering the original grounds of the present war, and the then present situation of affairs, every thing seemed favorable for the commencement of the late negociation. The war originally broke out on the subject of Malta: he thought, therefore, that if, in a treaty for peace, Malta should be secured to England, a great object would be obtained. Another inducement for commencing the war, had been the growing spirit which manifested itself throughout Europe, for resisting the encroachments of France. Through the crooked policy of Prussia, the coalition which had been formed on that principle had been dissolved, and Austria laid prostrate at the feet of France. Under these circumstances the negociation commenced. But, at the very outset, great difficulties arose : France knew that we should insist on Hanover; but, at the same time, she had partly guaranteed that Electorate to Prussia. With a view of getting over that difficulty, a verbal communication had been made to him (Lord Yarmouth) by M. Talleyrand, intended to facilitate the restoration of peace. It was begun in secresy, that, should the issue be un successful, the subsisting connection between France and Prussia might not be dissolved, By the particular desire of M. Talleyrand, he had not committed this communication. to writing, at least so as to submit any paper