them of their danger in tones of corresponding earnest ness. These things being so, it is become a matter of supreme importance carefully and calmly to investigate whether these doctrines are the teachings of the New Testament respecting that future state of retribution which it affirms to await man beyond the grave; or whether they are unauthorised human inventions. In conducting this inquiry it will be necessary to appeal to both reason and revelation; for, as Bishop Butler justly observes, however imperfect our reason may be, it forms our only guide to enable us to judge of the truth of a revelation. A candle may be an imperfect light, but if we have no other it would be the height of folly to refuse to use it. On moral questions also, affirmations of the enlightened conscience and moral sense are authoritative, for they constitute our only guide to enable us to discriminate between right and wrong, between what is morally good and what is morally evil. The subject must be approached with reverence; but no consideration must hinder us from ascribing holiness, justice, mercy, and love to our Creator; for if He is not holy, just, merciful, and loving, the New Testament affirms of Him that which is not true, and consequently it is impossible that it can contain the record of a Divine revelation. CHAPTER II. HUMAN RESPONSIBILITY VIEWED IN RELATION TO THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES OF JUSTICE, HOLINESS, AND BENEVOLENCE, AS THEY ARE AFFIRMED BY REASON AND ENUNCIATED BY REVELATION. It will be necessary to commence the consideration of this subject by inquiring what is meant when it is affirmed that God is just; that He will judge the world in righteousness; that the judge of all the earth will certainly do right; and other similar expressions. In a word, when we ascribe justice to God, do we mean that the Divine justice may be something very different from the human conception of it? This is a question all important to our present inquiry. The investigation of this subject is rendered necessary because a class of Christian writers, under the idea that they were defending Revelation, have affirmed that when we ascribe such attributes as justice, holiness, mercy, and benevolence to God, such conceptions are only relatively and not absolutely true. This position is founded on the assumption that the affirmation that God is both infinite, absolute, and the first cause of all things, involves us in a number of logical contradictions. From this the inference has been drawn that because God is infinite and man finite, and inasmuch as the finite cannot comprehend the infinite, all our 'supposed knowledge of God's character and perfections is not a knowledge of God as he actually exists, but one which is only relative; or in other words, that justice, holiness, mercy, and benevolence, as they exist in God, may differ widely from our human conceptions of those qualities. To put the matter plainly, according to this theory, our human conception of justice may differ widely from that of justice as it exists in God; and when St. Paul declares that He will judge the world in righteousness, God's standard of what constitutes a righteous judgment may differ widely from our human conception of what constitutes justice. These positions have been endeavoured to be proved by a mass of metaphysical reasonings of a highly abstract character. With them I will not trouble the reader, my intention being simply to appeal to the principles of common sense. I shall only draw his attention to the fact that on these principles as a foundation, that system of philosophy designated Agnosticism is erected, which for all the practical purposes of life is neither more nor less than moral Atheism. Christian Agnostics, however, have taken a different course, and have argued that inasmuch as it is impossible to know anything of God as he actually is by the aid of man's rational faculties, the only way in which a knowledge of Him can be attained is by a revelation. This being so, the inference is drawn that a revelation is not only possible but necessary. It is simply marvellous that the obvious objection to this last position should have escaped the notice of the eminent metaphysical theologian who first propounded this theory to the English public in a systematic form. According to that theory the human understanding, because it is finite, is incapable of attaining any real knowledge of the infinite, that is, of God. But if this is owing to its limitations, it is impossible that a true knowledge of God can be introduced into a finite mind even by a revelation. A very homely illustration will make this plain. A vessel which is so conditioned that, owing to its size, it is only capable of holding a pint, can by no possibility, no, not even by infinite power, as long as the con ditions remain the same, be made to hold a gallon; for the contrary supposition involves a contradiction. If, then, man, owing to his finiteness, is so conditioned as to be incapable of embracing a true conception of God as he actually is, he must be equally incapable of doing so if his supposed knowledge is derived from a revelation. This being so, the fatal consequence follows that even the revelation of God which the Christian Scriptures affirm to have been made in the person of Him who declared, "He that hath seen me hath seen the Father," only conveys a knowledge of God which is relative and not a knowledge of Him as He actually is. In accordance with this principle, the author above referred to speaks of the attributes which the Scriptures ascribe to God as regulative only, by which is meant that although we should act on the assumption that they are true representations of the divine attributes, yet that the realities as they exist in God may differ widely from our human conceptions of them. If this be so, it may be justly asked, What becomes of the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation? Jesus Christ the Image of the invisible God, or is He one which is only relative and regulative, and not a veritable revelation of the Father? If the latter, the incarnation is unreal. Is It is hardly possible to conceive of a position more fatal to Christianity than the one in question. God demands love, adoration, and reverence. "The first of all the commandments is, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, with all thy mind, with all thy soul, and with all thy strength." How, I ask, is it possible to love a being our knowledge of whom is only relative? If we love God it must be because something really exists in Him which we can recognise as lovely. We are incapable of loving an idea, a conception, a tendency, or anything which is merely relative; we can only love a being who possesses attributes which excite our love. We can love God as He shines out in the person of Jesus Christ, because we believe that the character of our Lord is a manifestation of a reality as it exists in God; but it is impossible to arouse in the human heart either adoration, reverence, or love for a conception which has no corresponding reality. The affirmation, therefore, that "God is love," is either an affirmation of a reality as it exists in God or it is misleading and untrue; and when the Apostle adds that "He that dwelleth in love, dwelleth in God, and God in him," it is evident that he must have regarded the affection of love in man as the same as the affection of love which exists in God, or else his utterance is devoid of meaning. One of the things which imparted to this system of Christian Agnosticism a degree of plausibility was that it not only seemed to break in pieces some of the advanced teaching of unbelieving philosophy, but that it afforded an apparent escape from the difficulties involved in the affirmations both of systematic and popular theology respecting the condition of man after death. Many of these positionsmay I not say an overwhelming majority of them—are felt to be inconsistent with the ideas of justice, holiness, and mercy, as they are affirmed by man's enlightened conscience and moral sense. But if these attributes as they exist in God differ from our human conceptions of those qualities, not a few were induced to think that this position opened a way of escape from the difficulties in question. The result, however, of these theories has been to put into the hands of unbelief a more dangerous weapon than it has ever yet wielded against Theism and Christianity, as is abundantly proved by the state of modern unbelieving thought, for they are accepted by Mr. Herbert Spencer as the foundation of his Agnostic philosophy, which affirms that God is unknown and unknowable, and that, therefore, human conduct should be |