regulated without any reference to Him.

This form of unbelief is now become widespread among cultured unbelievers, being the most plausible yet most dangerous form of unbelief which has ever been propounded.

What, then, are the points in these theories which bear on the subject we are now considering? I answer, that while pure Agnosticism affirms that we can know nothing of the first cause of the universe, i.e. God, except that He exists; Christian Agnosticism affirms that our finite conceptions are inadequate as representations of the various attributes as they exist in God, and, therefore, that the Divine attributes may be very different from our human conceptions of them. Consequently the attributes which are ascribed to God in the Scriptures, such as justice, holiness, mercy, benevolence, and even personality itself, are no adequate representations of the Divine realities, which may differ widely from our human conceptions of such qualities; or, to put the position nakedly, the attribute of justice as it exists in God, and in conformity with which He will judge the world, may be something different from that which our conscience and moral sense pronounce to be just and righteous.

Not to enter into a number of interminable discussions respecting the nature of the infinite, I observe that the proper term to describe God's moral attributes is not infinite, but perfect. The reason of this is, that the idea which underlies the word "infinite" is quantitative, whereas some of the attributes which we ascribe to God are incapable of being so viewed. Of these, justice and holiness are examples. Both of these attributes admit only of the idea of perfection, and are entirely free from that of quantity, which is inseparable from that of infinitude. Thus imperfect justice is not justice, but injustice, as far as it is imperfect. I fully admit that when we affirm that justice is an attribute of God, our conception of justice is a human one, but if man is made in

the image of God, as Christianity affirms, and God not fashioned after the image of man, the fact that it is a human conception does not prevent it from being an attribute which really exists in God; and when we affirm that God's justice is perfect we mean that God's omniscience gives him a perfect knowledge of the minutest circumstances connected with each individual, and that this enables him to estimate correctly the precise degree of his responsibility. This knowledge man has not, and, therefore, as far as this ignorance prevails, his estimate of the character of an act is imperfect, and, consequently, the judgment formed of it partakes of the same degree of imperfection.

But this defect of our knowledge does not prevent our conception of justice from being a true representation of that attribute as it exists in God. The only difference between justice as administered by God, and justice as administered by man, is that the omniscience of God enables him to take into account the circumstances of a man's birth, of his surroundings, and of those tendencies which have been transmitted from ancestors, with the formation of which as an individual he has had nothing to do, and for which he is therefore irresponsible. This a human judge is incapable of doing, and therefore justice, as administered by him, is necessarily imperfect. Thus, in the case of murder, human judge is incapable of taking into account the various antecedents which have helped to form the murderer's character, and which, as far as they have not been created by himself, modify the guilt of the deed. Human law defines as murder every act of killing which is not done in self-defence, or as the result of an overwhelming provocation, or of unsound mind, and sentences every variety of action that comes within this definition to the penalty of death; but the omniscience of God enables Him to see in these actions, which according to human law constitute murder, a

great variety of moral guilt. I have selected this particular crime merely as an illustration, but the principle is applicable to every act of which law takes cognisance. Further, there are many crimes, involving the deepest moral delinquency, of which human law is unable to take any cognisance whatever, but which God as a righteous judge will certainly bring into judgment.

The same remarks are true, mutatis mutandis, of the Divine holiness, i.e. the human conception of holiness is a true representation of holiness as it exists in God, or, in other words, God's holiness cannot be one thing and man's holiness another. If this were possible, the command, “Be ye holy, for I the Lord your God am holy," would be utterly unmeaning. I admit that the attributes of benevolence and mercy may be conceived of as admitting of degrees, and that a man may be spoken of as benevolent and merciful without being perfectly benevolent and merciful; but yet the human conception of benevolence and mercy does not differ from the Divine reality, except that these attributes exist in man in an imperfect, whereas they exist in God in a perfect form, summed up in the declaration, "God is love," to which the Apostle adds, "he that dwelleth in love dwelleth in God, and God in him."

From the above reasonings the following deductions are necessary consequences :—

1. The conception of justice, as it is affirmed by the enlightened conscience and moral sense, is a true representation of justice as it exists in God.

2. The human conception of holiness, as it is affirmed by the enlightened conscience and moral sense, is a true representation of holiness as it exists in God.

3. The conceptions of mercy and benevolence, as they exist in God and man, do not differ in kind but in degree, the one being perfect, the other imperfect; the negative side

of God's benevolence being well expressed in one of the collects of the Church of England, "God hates nothing that He has made;" its positive side by a passage in the Psalms, His mercies are over all His works'

It will perhaps be urged as an objection to the first of these positions, that whereas it is contrary to the human conception of justice for one man to kill another, yet God has a right to take life at his pleasure. The answer to this is obvious. Justice takes into consideration the relations which exist between the parties, and those which exist between man and man and between God and man differ widely. Man has not given to his brother man the gift of life, and therefore he has no right to take it from him. God has conferred on him this gift, and therefore he has a right to withdraw it at his good pleasure. The only exception to this is, when its withdrawal is attended with suffering which is not inflicted as a punishment for past sin, or with suffering which is not intended to be corrective, i.e. to raise the sufferer to a higher degree of moral elevation. In the latter case suffering is not only consistent with the Divine justice, but with the Divine benevolence.

It has been urged in vindication of certain theological positions that the possession of almighty power gives the Creator a right to do what he will with those beings whom he has created. But by no possibility can might be translated into right. The two conceptions differ from one another utterly and entirely; and all the efforts of an unbelieving philosophy have failed to translate the one into the other. God is almighty in power, but its exercise by Him is limited by His attributes of justice, holiness, mercy, and benevolence, from which it is true to say that He cannot swerve, in the same sense as it is true to say, "God that cannot lie;" i.e. to do so would contradict His moral nature, which is the essence of His being. He is glorious in power, but he is still

more glorious in that power in Him can only be exerted in conformity with His moral perfections, for He cannot deny Himself.

Assuming the above principles to be incontestably true, it follows that the righteous judge of all the earth will only hold man accountable for what he is responsible, and that therefore He cannot punish him, consistently with His justice, for anything in him which is independent of the control of his will. To act otherwise would not be justice, but injustice. The things therefore for which we are irresponsible are—

1. That tendency to moral evil which has been transmitted to us by our ancestors, in the creation of which we, as individuals, have had no part. That such a tendency, though greatly varying in degree, exists in man is not a theory but an unquestionable fact.

ment.

2. The variations in intellectual powers which exist in different men. Thus some are endowed with the highest mental powers, while others are born idiots. Between these two extremes lie the utmost variety of mental endowBut with the production of our mental powers we have had nothing to do, for the distinction between one man and another has been determined by a higher power than man. But our intellectual and our moral nature are intimately united and correlated to one another, so that defects in the one cause defects in the other. For those of our actions, therefore, which are due to defects in our mental constitution we are irresponsible.

To these must be added all those actions which are performed in childhood. It is evident that an infant possesses no responsibility. Both its intellectual and its moral nature are undeveloped, and its conscience is unformed. While this continues so it can possess no more responsibility for its actions than an animal. It is true that at an early age it is capable of displaying passions and affections, but these