the instincts of its nature; and a necessity of nature denies to man the liberty of soaring through the air. These forms of speaking add nothing to the clearness or precision of our notions; and have arisen out of absurd disputations. Necessity, certainty, possibility, impossibility, &c. are words (as they are familiarly used) which indicate only a higher or lower degree of knowledge of the hidden causes of things. One man regards a future event as contingent-probable-possible, which another pronounces to be necessary, certain, or impossible. As thus:-A bowing wall, or a tottering house, is looked at by two persons; one, if asked whether it will stand a year longer, replies, "That it may stand so long, but its doing so is contingent, or probable, or improbable." But the other, who is a builder, and who has examined the foundations and the fissures, and has held his plumb-line to the uprights, affirms, that the whole will fall to the ground in a few days;-he says it will necessarily fall that is to say-he who so speaks knows the causes on which the event depends; the other was ignorant of them, and thought the event in question a chance. (See CONTINGENCY and Li

BERTY.)

NEGATIVE and POSITIVE,

Are correlative terms, when causes or qualities are spoken of. Beneficence Beneficence is a positive virtue. Justice may, in a sense, be called a negative virtue; for it may be defined as consisting in not invading the rights of others. Negative and affirmative are the correlative terms, if applied to propositions. As-"Piety, with contentment, is great gain:" this is a positive proposition. "Riches will not ensure happiness," is negative.

NOMINAL and REAL,

Are terms occurring in the history of intellectual philosophy, and refer to an absurd dispute, long carried on with great violence and rancour, on the question, whether general ideas, or essential forms, have any real existence- -no one can say where-as Plato imagined; or whether they are nothing more than the notions formed in the human mind, after contemplating things, as genus and species. The adherents of the former opinion were called Realists, those of the latter Nominalists.

NOTION.

The word idea is most properly applied to images of things in the mind, retained or recalled; while the word notion signifies complex abstractions of some kind, such as those of justice, truth, equality, disproportion, &c.

ORDER,

Is a fixed succession of many things-which succession has reference to some intention, and is the consequence of arrangement. Or the word order is used more abstractedly, in relation to number, spoken of, not in the aggregate, but as consisting of successive integers, the relative place of each being noted-as the 7th, 8th, 9th.

OPINION.

Facts or principles which rest upon demonstration, are known. Facts established by good and sufficient evidence, are believed. Abstract or speculative principles, confirmed by arguments, which

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we deem conclusive or satisfactory, though they may not seem so to others, are matters of opinion. We know, or may know, that a square, raised upon a hypotheneuse, is equal to the two squares together, that are raised upon the upright and base line of a right-angled triangle. We believe, that Brutus killed Cæsar. It is our opinion, that a limited monarchy is preferable to a democracy. The word opinion is most frequently applied to abstract propositions, which are matters of dispute, and which excite a lively interest, such, for example, as political or religious principles.

The circumstances of education, habit, and interest, or association; or even the tastes and inclinations that belong to the imagination, have, with most men, more influence in the determination of their opinions, than the mere arguments that support such principles. It is to be remembered, that in questions which do not admit of demonstrative reasoning, or on which the evidence is not of the most obvious and irresistible kind, there is always room for the establishment of a contrary supposition; so that even the most improbable opinion, if viewed exclusively in the light of those few evidences which give it an appearance of truth, may seem reasonable. And if the mind has acquired the habit of timidly, or resentfully, or perversely turning away from all evidence but that

which favours its prejudices, or interests, its pride, or its indolence, it may hold and defend an error of opinion, without direct insincerity, or conscious dishonesty. And after a while, the inconclusive evidence, which at first perhaps by no means satisfied the understanding, has made itself so familiar, so intelligible, and has assumed so fair an aspect, and has insensibly drawn to itself so many little corroborations, that all doubt and suspicion is for ever dismissed; and the mind becomes absolutely enslaved by its own delusions.

Though the majority of mankind adhere, through life, to the opinions they may have adopted from education, or interest; instances of a change of opinion are not uncommon. Such changes take place from various causes. Some men are very often veering from point to point, in consequence of instability of disposition. There is a feeble activity-an irresolute force, in the mind, which at once prevents its attaining complete conviction on any disputed matter, and tempts it to wander, hither and thither, in search of what it can never find-undoubted certainty. A melancholic timidity also, breeds, in some minds, a distrust of all evidence: persons of this temper change their opinions, again and again, from the mere fear of having been deceived in those they last held. There is also an affectation of independence and