PROPOSITION,

The affirming or denying of one thing, concerning another.-Every complete sentence is a proposition, directly or obliquely declaring some truth; and every such sentence contains-1st, A subject; or that concerning which an affirmation is advanced: 2d, A predicate, or truth affirmed; and 3d, A form of connexion between the two, called a copula as thus.—(The sun) (is) (risen). Or, The people of India (the subject) are (the copula) divided into castes (the predicate). An argument, or chain of reasoning, consists of a series of propositions, each of which, after the first, is true, because, the one which precedes it is true. Every preceding proposition in an argument, contains, or is alleged to contain, its suc

cessor.

REASON

Has already been distinguished from INSTINCT. It is distinguished from the other faculties of the mind by its relating always to knowledge, and consisting in the action of the mind upon its knowledge; either separating its ideas, or notions, one

from another; or comparing or combining them. If the mind constantly obeyed external impulses, or invariably yielded itself to the current of its ideas, it would not deserve to be called-an intelligence, or a rational nature. Its power over itself, a power directed by knowledge, and employed for the accomplishment of some purpose foreseen, is what constitutes Reason.

REASONING,

In the acquired sense of the word, is not any employment of Reason; but that particular employment which has for its object the discovery of truth, by tracing the connexion of one admitted fact with another, through a longer or a shorter series of propositions. In a sound argument, that is to say, in conclusive reasoning, the predicate of each proposition must be true of its subject; and the connexion between the successive propositions must be truly stated. If this be the case, then the last proposition, for the sake of establishing which the process has been passed through, may be assented to as certain. Such processes of reasoning become necessary only on account of the limitation of the human mind, which does not admit more than a very few facts to be contemplated at

once. The more vigorous and comprehensive any mind is, the less need it has of reasoning, to reach a distant conclusion. On the contrary, a feeble and contracted mind must, as it were, creep from point to point, of an argument; and when it has reached the termination, it has perhaps lost its hold of the connexion of facts, and is rather so much the more perplexed, than convinced, by its own effort to attain the desired conclusion. But much facility may be acquired in reasoning, by exercise; and this sort of exercise ought to form a capital part of every good education.

The real nature of the operation which is passed through, in a process of reasoning, may be exhibited by dissecting, if we may so speak, the working of an easy arithmetical problem.—I affirm, for instance, that if you take 432, nine times over, you will have 3888.-This is my ultimate proposition, which I assume as true, and profess to be able to establish. I do so, by presenting to you a number of lesser propositions, the truth of which you have either already ascertained, or which you can perceive to be true, as soon as presented to you: and then, when all these propositions are taken together, or summed up in succession ;—that is to say, when the connexion between all of them is exhibited, you cannot refuse your assent to my conclusion. As thus.-The figures 432 represent,

We

in a condensed form, three distinct quantities; namely, four hundred, and thirty, and two. will therefore separately take each of these quantities nine times, and then join the several products:-2, nine times taken, is 18: and 30, nine times, is 270:-but 270, and 18, are 288. Again; 400, nine times taken, is 3600; and 3600, added to 288, is 3888; which was at first affirmed. Now, if any one were not convinced of the truth of this affirmation, as thus proved, it would be necessary, in the first place, to dissect each of the abovenamed propositions further; that is, to reduce each one to several smaller propositions, the truth of which might be more readily perceived:-as for instance, we should show how 2, nine times, makes 18, &c. And after this more minute dissection had been gone through, we should explain the general principle of the argument; by proving that all the parts of a thing, taken together, must be reckoned equal to the whole of it; and that therefore the summing up of all the propositions, must give a true result. It is often necessary, after a particular argument has been brought to a conclusion, to go back, in this manner, to a more general argument; for the purpose of justifying the mode of conducting it.

But whatever may be the subject of reasoning, or whatever the form it is made to assume, it is

always, in substance, the same, namely-a shewing, in succession, all the parts of a complex proposition, and all the connexions of those parts. It is obvious to remark, that an immeasurable advantage rests on the side of vigorous and practised minds, over the feeble and untaught:-for the very necessity of examining, one by one, all the minute parts of a proposition, adds so much to the labour of the mind, and so much increases the apparent confusion, that the weaker understanding is almost, or quite, as much embarrassed as aided by the endeavour to attain satisfaction. Meanwhile, the strong and well-taught mind, which has discerned the truth of the proposition in two or three large masses, if we might so speak, and has not descended to the lesser particulars, suffers no fatigue, is conscious of no confusion; but contemplates, at leisure, what has exhausted all the powers of the other to reach. Hence we may infer the serious responsibility which rests upon superior minds, in dealing with the simple and uninformed.-How careful should such be not to abuse the advantage they possess ;-an advantage which there are always so many temptations to abuse! It would be thought a poor triumph for an adult to exhibit his strength in crushing an infant. And is it not a paltry triumph which men of intellectual acuteness obtain, when they employ