difference between demonstration and argument. B. affirms that in going from London to Norwich, it is better to pass through Dunmow, Clare, and Bury, than to take the road through Chelmsford, Colchester, and Ipswich. C. denies this assertion. B. then says he can demonstrate the truth of his proposition; and forthwith proceeds to compute the distances from place to place; that is, he affirms, in due succession, a number of admitted truths; such as that Romford is twelve miles from London, Brentwood six miles from Romford, and so on, throughout the route; and he connects and computes these several distances on admitted principles, and truly sums up the entire series. So far this is a demonstration, and is unanswerable when compared with a similar computation of the other route. But C. replies, "You have indeed demonstrated that the road through Dunmow is shorter than that through Chelmsford; but yet have not convinced me that one had better go that way than the other; on the contrary, I can bring an argument to prove that the longer road is actually preferable to the shorter; and that in fact time will be gained by going eight or ten miles about.' For this purpose he affirms a number of facts, none of which perhaps his opponent will deny; but which are of too indefinite a kind to form part of a mathematical demonstration,

although very proper to be considered in the general argument. These indefinite facts are such as-the narrowness and ruggedness of the roads— the probable delay arising from the want of horses, and so forth. Now these assertions, though founded in truth, may have been mistated or exaggerated; and hence it may become necessary to examine each separate proposition, of which the general argument consists; and the disputants must agree upon all the particulars, before they can agree upon the conclusion.-That is to say, the necessary conditions of every sound argument must be complied with on both sides; each proposition must be assented to, and its connexion with the one which precedes, and the one which follows, must also be admitted by both disputants.

It is evident then that an argument is strictly conclusive only when all the facts contained in it are truly known by the disputants, and are understood also in their relation one to another. An argument is of no avail for discovering things unknown; but can serve only to set forth the connexion of a certain fact with another, which, hitherto, we have not perceived to be related to it.

A very large proportion of all controversies are fruitless and inconclusive, simply because the disputants, on both sides, in their eagerness to carry their opinion, or to confound their opponent,

assume many things to be known and unquestionable, which are not so; or because they neglect to ascertain the sense in which they themselves use the terms they employ; at the same time they refuse to give due attention to the explanations of their opponent's meaning. Thus argument is converted into wrangling; and often terminates in a personal contest. Thus it is too that differences of opinion are perpetuated, and that men learn to love truth only when it favours the faction to which they attach themselves, and to hate and fear it when it favours an adversary. Beside that accuracy and strength of understanding which is the first requisite in the discovery of truth, it is not less necessary to possess a conscientious preference of truth to interest, favour, or prejudice, and especially so when religious principles are in question. In this instance there is need that the mind should be freed from those evil inclinations, and those universal corrupt prejudices which belong, in greater or less degrees, to every human mind, and which render every mind inimical to the great principles of Christianity.

ARRANGEMENT,

Differs from Classification, which is a sorting of things according to their real differences; whereas

this is a sorting them for some particular purpose, in the manner that may be prescribed by special reasons of convenience. The books of a library may be classified according to the subjects of which they treat; or they may be arranged in that order which will bring those most often wanted within reach. It is often of more practical importance to arrange our thoughts in an artificial manner, such as shall give the mind a ready command over its stores, than to think precisely in the mode that is rigidly philosophical.

Skill and address in the arrangement of our thoughts is peculiarly advantageous to those whose business it is to teach or to persuade others; while habits of analysis, classification, and abstraction, are proper and indispensable to those who addict themselves to the discovery of truth.

ᎪᎡᎢ,

Is distinguished from science, rather by an accidental, than a real difference. Art is the knowledge of general facts, and science is so too. But it is only that part of such knowledge which is immediately convertible to practical purposes that is called art; while that which is either not at all applicable to common purposes, or only so in a remote manner,

is called science. A knowledge of the chemical laws of fermentation is applicable to the preparation of an ordinary beverage, and when so applied is called the art of brewing. If no such fermented liquor were in use, then the knowledge of the same facts would stand undistinguished, as part of the science of chemistry.

The art of navigation (in a principal branch of it) is an application of the knowledge of the places and movements of the heavenly bodies, to the purpose of ascertaining a ship's latitude and longitude. If men never adventured themselves upon the wide bosom of the sea, they might still know the same facts; but would call their knowledge science. In the natural order of discovery, art, in a rude form, precedes science; and then science instructs art; and again, these amended arts give man so much command over the operations of nature, that wealth is accumulated; and many individuals, in every community, are, by that means, set free from the necessity of labouring for subsistence, of whom some addict themselves to the cultivation of philosophy, from the influence of mere taste. In this manner new discoveries are made; and these, more or less directly, improve the arts of life; and so a perpetual advancement goes on by the mutual influence of mechanical skill and philosophical principles.