can be nothing more in an effect, than was contained in its cause. It is an axiom in morals, that the will of God is the rule of right and wrong.

BEING:

The most comprehensive of all simple abstract terms. It expresses the notion which results from our own consciousness, thought of as a whole :-we feel that we are, or that we exist. God is emphatically called the Supreme BEING; both because He, and He alone, is self-existent; and because He is the author or cause of all other existences.

BELIEF,

Is that state of the mind which is produced by arguments that appear to be good, or sufficient. Belief rests upon evidence of the kind that is not absolutely demonstrative, or irresistible; hence it is susceptible of various degrees of strength, proportioned either to the intrinsic force of the evidence, or to the power of the understanding to perceive its force. There is much difference in different minds in this respect. Some instantly and clearly discern the soundness of an argument, or the consistency

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of testimony, and retain ever after an unshaken conviction of the truth of the fact or principle as so established. Other minds can but confusedly catch the connexion of reasons or evidences, and almost immediately lose whatever rational conviction they may, for a moment, have acquired; or if they adhere to their opinion, do so blindly, and often with many secret misgivings. Some, on the other hand, incapable of comprehending evidence, or impatient of the effort necessary for the purpose, embrace opinions, just as they choose their friends, by favour and prejudice, and adhere to them with a passionate resolution, and defend them with vehemence and dogmatism.

It is a general, though not universal principle, that the calmness or the violence with which matters of belief are entertained, bears proportion to the soundness or the unsoundness of the mental process by which conviction has been attained. Those who by patient attention to argument have convinced themselves of the truth of certain opinions, are, for the most part, ready to exercise patience and forbearance towards an opponent; while he who is conscious of being unable to give a good reason for his belief, betakes himself either to flippancy and banter, or to contumely, when his opinion is impugned.

It is important to remark that, in almost all the

affairs of life, even when the most momentous interests, or life itself, are at stake, we are ordinarily required to act upon the strength of rational belief, and must not wait for demonstration, or certainty. Nay, on some of the most signal occasions, we proceed on the ground only of some probable opinion, which falls very far short of full persuasion. But it is found (if a large number of instances are taken into the account) to be more advantageous, and less really hazardous, to act, and to venture upon some degree of probability, than to adhere habitually to the impulse of a suspicious and timid caution. It is on the whole safer to be bold and believing, than sceptical. In by far the larger number of instances, we are called to rely upon testimony, rather than to act upon our personal knowledge of facts; and it is found that human testimony (if certain cases are excepted where there is a peculiar temptation to falsify) is a very sufficient ground of confidence. It is so especially when testimony is supported by incidental proofs (see TESTIMONY). To withhold belief in such cases, evinces either an infirm judgment or a petulant and captious temper.

It is by no means always the case that we have the power of understanding the whole of what we are required, by good evidence, to believe. The contrary most often happens; that is to say, a certain fact is fully established, and yet nothing

more is known than the general fact, or than its external significance. In the mathematical sciences there are not a few propositions which, though demonstrably certain, are at the same time apparently incredible or impossible; so that though they cannot but be assented to, they can never be followed home by the human mind. Nevertheless, such facts or principles are taken confidently as the foundation of other principles. There are other truths which, though not seemingly incredible, yet so surpass the powers of the human mind to grasp them, that, while they are necessarily admitted as certain, we can advance no further, or little further, than to a blind assent. Of this sort is the notion of eternity-or of duration, without beginning, as well as without end: and of this kind, too, are other great principles of natural religion, and much that relates to the omniscience, the power, the providence, and the moral government of God. These are subjects concerning which certain comprehensive propositions may be affirmed, with the most perfect confidence, even while the mind feels its utter inability to comprehend what it assents to, or to reconcile one such principle with another.

Those hidden powers that are developed in the movements and changes of the material world, such as gravitation, chemical and magnetic attraction,

electricity, vegetable and animal life, and so forth, demand assent, while nothing concerning them can be understood, beyond the external facts which make themselves known to the senses. Nothing then can be more absurd, or unphilosophical, than the determination expressed by some persons that they will believe nothing which they do not understand. Το carry such a purpose into effect on all subjects, would be to reduce a man to universal ignorance and idiotcy. Rational belief stands midway between credulity and scepticism; both of which are faults, as well of the understanding as of the temper. Credulity is the error of sanguine, imaginative, and weak minds, which, in their eagerness to receive and hold whatever dazzles the fancy, or moves the sensibilities, or awakens pleasing emotions of wonder and admiration, believe whatever, of this sort, may be presented to them, without inquiring upon what evidence it rests, or perhaps rejecting contrary testimony. It may be noted as a frequent fact, that those who believe the most readily, and in opposition to reason, are the most slow to believe, or hard to be convinced, where evidence is good and abundant. The cause of this is easily assigned.--Good evidence appeals to the understanding; but the credulous have, by the long indulgence of their credulity, enfeebled 'their understandings, and have become actually