Vide ib. quæ contraria est

understood, and this matter of measure, although it seem local, yet it is indeed but opinion and observation of men.

The distinction being made, the rule is to be examined by it.

Therefore if I grant my close called Dale in the parish of Hurst, in the county of Southampton, and the parish likewise extendeth into the county of Berkshire, and the whole close of Dale lieth in the county of Berkshire; yet because the parcel is especially named, the falsity of the addition hurteth not, and yet this addition is found in name, but, as it was said, it was less worthy than a proper name.

So if I grant tenementum meum, or omnia tenementa mea, for the universal and indefinite to this purpose are all one, in parochia Sancti Butolphi extra Aldgate, where the verity is extra Bishopsgate, in tenura Guilielmi, which is true, yet this grant is void, because that which sounds in denomination is false, which is the more worthy; and that which sounds in addition is true, which is the less;* and though in tenura Guilielmi, which is true, had been first placed, yet it had been all one.

But if I grant tenementum meum quod perquisivi de R. C. in Dale, where the truth was T. C. and I lex, car icy have no other tenements in D. but one, this grant is auxile prigood, because that which soundeth in name, namely, in Dale, is true, and that which soundeth in addition, namely, quod perquisivi, etc. is only false.

mer cer

tainty est faux.

So if I grant prata mea in Dale continentia 10 acras, and they contain indeed twenty acres, the whole twenty pass.

So if I grant all my lands, being parcels manerii de D. in prædictis literis patentibus specificat', and there be no letters patent, yet the grant is good enough.

The like reason holds in demonstrations of persons, that have been declared in demonstration of lands and

Semble icy le grant ust este assets bon, come fuit resolu per cur', Co. lib. 3, fol. 10. a. vid. 33 H. 8. Dy. 50. b. 12 El, ib. 292. b. et Co. lib. 2. fo. 33. a.

places, the proper name of every one is in certainty worthiest next are such appellations as are fixed to his person, or at least of continuance, as, son of such a man, wife of such a husband; or addition of office, as, clerk of such a court, etc. and the third are actions or accidents, which sound no way in appellation or name, but only in circumstance, which are less worthy, although they may have a proper particular reference to the intention of the grant.

And therefore if an obligation be made to I. S. filio et hæredi G. S. where indeed he is a bastard, yet this obligation is good.

So if I grant land Episcopo nunc Londinensi, qui me erudivit in pueritia this is a good grant, although

he never instructed me.

But e converso, if I grant land to I. S. filio et hæredi G. S. and it be true that he is son and heir unto G. S. but his name is Thomas, this is a void grant.

Or if in the former grant it was the Bishop of Canterbury who taught me in my childhood, yet shall it be good, as was said, to the Bishop of London, and not to the Bishop of Canterbury.

The same rule holdeth of denomination of times, which are such a day of the month, such a day of the week, such a Saint's day or eve, to-day, to-morrow; these are names of times.

But the day that I was born, the day that I was married; these are but circumstances and addition of times.

And therefore if I bind myself to do some personal attendance upon you upon Innocents day, being the day of your birth, and you were not born that day, yet shall I attend.

There rest two questions of difficulty yet upon this rule, first, Of such things whereof men take not so much note as that they shall fail of this distinction of name and addition.

As," my box of ivory lying in my study sealed up "with my seal of arms; my suit of arras with the story of the nativity and passion:" of such things there can be no name, but all is of description, and of

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circumstance, and of these I hold the law to be, that precise truth of all recited circumstances is not required.

But in such things ex multitudine signorum colligitur identitas vera, therefore though my box were not sealed, and although the arras had the story of the nativity, and not of the passion, if I had no other box, nor no other suit, the gifts are good; and there is certainty sufficient, for the law doth not expect a precise description of such things as have no certain denomination.

Secondly, Of such things as do admit the distinction of name and addition, but the notes fall out to be of equal dignity all of name or addition.

As, prata mea juxta communem fossam in D. whereof the one is true, the other false; or tenementum meum in tenura Guilielmi, quod perquisivi de R. C. in prædict' indent specificat', whereof one is true, and two are false; or two are true, and one false, So ad curiam quam tenebat die Mercurii tertio die Martii, whereof the one is true, the other false.

In these cases the former rule, ex multitudine signorum, etc. holdeth not; neither is the placing of the falsity or verity first or last material, but all must be Vide livers true, or else the grant is void; always understood, that if you can reconcile all the words, and make no falsity, that is quite out of this rule, which hath place only where there is a direct contrariety or falsity not to be reconciled to this rule.

avant dit pur cest auxi.

As if I grant all my land in D. in tenura I. S. which I purchased of I. N. specified in a demise to I. D. and I have land in D. whereof in part of them all these circumstances are true, but I have other lands in D. wherein some of them fail, this grant will not pass all my land in D. for there these are references, and no words of falsity or error, but of limitation and restraint.

REGULA XXV.

Ambiguitas verborum latens verificatione suppletur; nam quod ex facto oritur ambiguum verificatione facti tollitur.

THERE be two sorts of ambiguities of words, the one is ambiguitas patens, and the other latens. Patens is that which appears to be ambiguous upon the deed or instrument: latens is that which seemeth certain and without ambiguity, for any thing that peareth upon the deed or instrument; but there is some collateral matter out of the deed that breedeth the ambiguity.

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Ambiguitas patens is never holpen by averment, and the reason is, because the law will not couple and mingle matter of specialty, which is of the higher account, with matter of averment, which is of inferior account in law; for that were to make all deeds hollow, and subject to averments, and so in effect, that to pass without deed, which the law appointeth shall not pass but by deed.

Therefore if a man give land to I. D. et I. S. et hæredibus, and do not limit to whether of their heirs, it shall not be supplied by averment to whether of them the intention was the inheritance should be limited.

So if a man give land in tail, though it be by will, the remainder in tail, and add a proviso in this manner: Provided that if he, or they, or any of them do any, etc. according to the usual clauses of perpetuities, it cannot be averred upon the ambiguities of the reference of this clause, that the intent of the devisor was, that the restraint should go only to him in the remainder, and the heirs of his body; and that the tenant in tail in possession was meant to be at large.

Of these infinite cases might be put, for it holdeth generally that all ambiguity of words by matter within the deed, and not out of the deed, shall be holpen by construction, or in some case by election, but never by averment, but rather shall make the deed void for uncertainty.

But if it be ambiguitas latens, then otherwise it is: as if I grant my manor of S. to I. F. and his heirs, here appeareth no ambiguity at all; but if the truth be, that I have the manors both of South S. and North S. this ambiguity is matter in fact; and therefore it shall be holpen by averment, whether of them was that the party intended should pass.

So if I set forth my land by quantity, then it shall be supplied by election, and not averment.

As if I grant ten acres of wood in sale, where I have an hundred acres, whether I say it in my deed or no, that I grant out of my hundred acres, yet here shall be an election in the grantee, which ten he will take.

And the reason is plain, for the presumption of the law is, where the thing is only nominated by quantity, that the parties had indifferent intentions which should be taken, and there being no cause to help the uncertainty by intention, it shall be holpen by election.

But in the former case the difference holdeth, where it is expressed, and where not; for if I recite, Whereas I am seised of the manor of North S. and South S. I lease unto you unum manerium de S. there it is clearly an election. So if I recite, Whereas I have two tenements in St. Dunstan's I lease unto you unum tenementum, there it is an election, not averment of intention, except the intent were of an election, which may be specially averred.

Another sort of ambiguitas latens is correlative unto these for this ambiguity spoken of before, is when one name and appellation doth denominate divers things, and the second, when the same thing is called by divers names.

As if I give lands to Christ-Church in Oxford, and the name of the corporation is Ecclesia Christi in universitate Oxford, this shall be holpen by averment, because there appears no ambiguity in the words for this variance is matter in fact, but the averment shall not be of intention, because it doth stand with the words.

For in the case of equivocation the general intent includes both the special, and therefore stands with