pointed by the King, if a Gentleman happens to have any difpute with him who is then the judge, he may wave bringing it to an illue till that judge be removed, and a new one appointed; nay, he has a chance of being himfelf the next that is chofen or appointed. In any country, therefore, a particular hereditary jurifdiction would be a grievance upon all those who live, or have any property within its bounds; but in Scotland this is a greater grievance than it would be in any other I have read of, because of what they call family-feuds, which are tranfmitted from father to fon through many generations, and feldom end, but in the deftruction of one or other of the contending families.

From these inconveniences, Sir, we may judge, that every man who lives, or has any property within an hereditary jurifdiction, muft be under a very great dependence upon his hereditary judge. In those districts where there lies an appeal to the fuperior courts, this dependence, I fhall grant, cannot be exceffive with refpect to thofe who can apply for redrefs; but with refpect to thofe who, by reafon of their poverty, cannot feek for redrefs, this dependence must be flavifh: and where a family is invested with a high criminal as well as civil jurifdiction, the dependence must be flavish with refpect to all ranks of men; because a sentence of death, demembration, or other corporal punishment, can admit of no appcal, nor indeed of any fufficient redrefs. The judge may indeed be profecuted and punifhed for paffing and executing an unjuft fentence; but this is no atonement to the man that is put to death, and but very little to a man that has been dif membered, or unmercifully whipt. Even the power of impofing fines, which every one of thefe hereditary judges is poffeffed of, may be, and, I am told, is often made ufe of for creating and preferving a flavish dependence. Few men have the good luck to pafs their whole lifetime without being guilty of fome little trefpafs. When a man within any of thefe hereditary jurifdictions commits a trefpafs, he is profecuted, and a fine impofed: the fine being exorbitant, he can

obtain no redrefs in any fuperior court and as the fine belongs to the lord of th jurifdiction, he may expect payment no, if he pleafes. If the trefpaffer ha always been a good boy, the fine is n ver exacted, but is kept hanging over head to fecure his future obedience, whic it effectually does as long as he lives; his immunity is an example for bindin all the people of that district to their goo behaviour, that they may meet with fame favour, in cafe they fhould have th misfortune to be guilty of any trefpafs.

Thus, Sir, it must appear, that all th people within these hereditary jurifdiction muft have a very extraordinary depen dence upon the lords of their respectiv jurifdictions; and this leads me natura ly to confider the bad confequences thefe jurifdictions with refpect to the pu blick tranquillity. I fhall not fay, the either of the two late rebellions proceed ed entirely from these hereditary jurisdi ctions; but I will fay, that they pro ceeded from them, and from fomethin very like them, which in Scotland the call clanship; for the chief of a clan i the Highlands and North of Scotland has by cuftom and education, as much, o rather more power over thofe of his clan than the lord of an hereditary jurifdicti on has over the people within his juri diction. The chief then has what I ma call a natural power over thofe of hi clan, the lord has a legal power ove those within his jurifdiction; and whe the chief or lord takes care to have hi people brought up in the fame princi ples with himself, and to cultivate a m litary fpirit among them, I am afrai they will always be too ready to follo him even into a rebellion. On the con trary, if the people be bred up in diffe rent principles, and no military spirit military difcipline propagated amon them, I fhall grant, they will not be re dy to take arms at the defire of the chief or lord, either for or against th government; which is the true reafo why thofe lords of hereditary jurifdiét ons in the South and Weft of Scotland that joined in either of the two late r bellions, could prevail upon fo few their people to join them.

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But this, I believe, Sir, I may with confidence allert, that it is very much in the power of the lord of an hereditary jurifdiction, who has fo many favours to beltow, and fo many terrors to difpenfe; I fay, it is very much in the power of fach a lord, to have the people within his jurifdiction bred up in what principles he pleafes, and to propagate both a military pirit and military difcipline among them: therefore, if his people are not ready to follow him into a rebellion, it is his own fault, and not the fault of the law, as it now ftands, which has provided him with fufficient means for that purpofe. And in my opinion, the tranquil lity of a country can never be fafe, while is in the power of two or three great lords, upon any private difguft of their own, to raife an army equal to any the government can fuddenly bring against them; becaufe, even under the belt go vernment, there will always be many difcontented; and thefe lords having fet up the ftandard of difcontent, and by means of their dependents furnished the difcontinted with a fafe rendezvous, a fhort march or a fuccessful skirmish may give them a chance for overturning the goverment, or at leaft for rendering a civil war of fome continuance.

I know it may be faid, That if there o lord, nor any two or three lords the nation, capable of raifing any troops againft an oppreffive government, heberties of the people must be un Ae; because there is no one man, nor amber or body of men, during the of parliament, that have power eBugh for undertaking their defence. But, Ar, if there be any thing in this argut, it is an argument for reftoring the power of the barons of England, as well for continuing the power of the lords f hereditary jurifdictions in Scotland; that is to fay, for reftoring a government which always did, and always will rendr thofe great lords licentious, and the whole body of the people flaves. For this reafon, I fhall always be against veft g any legal power in the family of any ¿Labject, or any power but what depends n the affections of the people. If the prefentative of an ancient and great fa

mily be a man famed for wisdom, valour, juftice, and hofpitality, he will always have great power among the people, tho' vested with no legal power over them; and by means of that power, which I shall call natural power, two or three fuch men will always be able to raise an army againft an oppreffive and tyrannical government. But the difference is, that this power never will, nor indeed can be made use of against a juft and mild government; whereas a great legal power may be, and has often been made use of against the beft of governments.

I fhall indeed grant, Sir, that, in order to make this natural power effectual for preferving the liberties of the people, care fhould be taken to propagate and preferve a martial fpirit and military difcipline among the people in general: for without this, it fignifies nothing to talk of the liberties of the people; they must become flaves either to a standing army of their own, or to fome foreign power. But, furely, a martial spirit and military difcipline may, by proper laws and regu→ lations, be propagated among the people in general, without establishing a number of arbitrary petty fovereigns, under a fovereign in chief, who can govern only by allowing them to plunder and opprefs the people under their refpective jurifdictions.

Such a government, Sir, is, I think, of all others the leaft calculated for the good of the people, or the happiness of fociety; and therefore I am against restoring it in England, or preferving any umbrage of it in Scotland. When I fee any proper regulation offered for propagating military difcipline and a martial fpirit among the people in general, I shall most readily give it my approbation; but, in the mean time, I think we ought to take this opportunity for abolishing the legal power of thofe lords of hereditary jurifdictions in Scotland. And as to that power which proceeds from the clannish fpirit, ftill remaining among the people in the highlands of Scotland, proper measures may be taken for putting a fpeedy end to it; nay, it will of itfelf foon come to its period, if we diveft their chiefs of all legal power, and prevent their oppreffing or injuring any man of

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their clan, who fhall appear to have fhaken off this fpirit of clannish fubjection: for which purpose nothing can be more proper than what is propofed by this bill, of having the courfe of circuitcourts regularly cftablished in the highlands of Scotland.

I hope, Sir, I have now fully proved, that thefe hereditary jurifdictions mult neceffarily be grievous to all thofe fubjected to them, and that they are of the moft dangerous confequence to the peace of fociety. If I have proved this to the fatisfaction of most Gentlemen that hear me, I am fure, no one of them can deny, that the abolishing of thefe jurifdictions is neceffary for the publick good; and if this be admitted, most of the arguments made ufe of against the bill now before us will evanish; particularly that of its being an incroachment upon the articles of union. I fhall grant, that thefe hereditary jurifdictions are, by the articles of union, fecured to the families poffeffed of them, as rights of property. How they came to call them fo, or how they could think of fecuring them as fuch, I do not know; for the property of hanging a man, or the property of cutting off his ears, feem to me to be a very odd fort of property. I therefore mult fuppofe, that they looked upon all the people living within their jurifdiction, as our planters in the Weft-Indies do upon their negroes: they looked up on them as their property, tho' perhaps they allowed them, as the Romans did their flaves, to have a little peculium which they might call their own. But let them look upon thefe jurifdictions, and the people fubject to them, in whatever light they will, their right is not, by the articles of union, rendered more facred than any other right of property they poffefs; and confequently they may, for the publick good, be obliged to fell them, at a reafonable price to the publick.

This bill is therefore no incroachment upon the 20th article of union; and as little is it an incroachment upon the laft claufe of the 19th; for, furely, by.the words of that claufe, the parliament of Scotland never intended to mean, that every little court-baron fhould for ever re

main. I am convinced they meant 1 more, than that they should have an i ferior court for each county or stewart in the fame manner as they had at th time: and there is no design by this b to abolish such courts, but to render the jurifdiction more extenfive, and mo useful to the fubject.

Another argument made ufe of agair this bill is, Sir, That by paffing it into law, we shall render the property of ev ry man in the kingdom precarious. B as this argument is founded upon the fu position, that the neceffity of abolishi thefe hereditary jurifdictions for the fal of the publick good, proceeds alone fro the fancy of our minifters; and as I hav I hope, demonstrated, that this necelli does not proceed from the fancy of ar minifter, but from the nature of things I have removed the foundation, and co fequently the argument itself must fall the ground: for the maxim, That a ful ject may be compelled to fell his proper to the publick, when it becomes neceffar for the publick good, is a maxim that h been allowed and established ever fince w had a conftitution; yet it was nev thought, that by this maxim the propert of any man in the kingdom was rendere precarious. This is fo far from being th effect of fuch a maxim, that a good fub ject will never render it neceffary for pu ting the maxim in execution, becaufe will voluntarily give up his property for reasonable price, when he fees that his do ing fo is become neceffary for the public good: and I have fo good an opinion the difcernment and publick fpirit of th lords of hereditary jurifdictions in Sco land, as to think, that most of them woul voluntarily furrender their jurifdictions the crown for a very moderate compenf tion; and, confequently, that we thou have no occafion for an act of parliamen if it were not that it may serve them as a excufe with thofe of the prefent, or of f ture ages, that may not be bleffed with much difcernment, or poffeffed of fuch generous publick spirit.

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For my own part, I proteft, Sir, that were poffeffed of any fuch heritable ju rifdiction, I fhould defire to get rid of at any rate. I should never think myfc

or my family fafe, as long as I held fuch a poffeffion; because I should most reafonably fuppofe, that the crown would always look upon my family with an envious and a jealous eye, and would be continually fifhing for a pretence to fubject it to a forfeiture. We know that one of the greatest families in Scotland was, fince the restoration, fubjected to a forfeiture, folely, I may say, upon this account; and would never, perhaps, have been reftored, if the bigotry of James II. had not brought on the revolution; which restored that tamily to its ancient poffeffions, and this kingdom to its ancient conftitution, by which means we have now the pleasure of fering the reprefentative of that family, moft worthily poffefs a seat in this auguft affembly.

As to the danger which our conftituti on may be expofed to, by our paffing this bill into a law, I look upon it as a mere phantom; because this bill gives the crown no greater power in Scotland, than it has for ages been poffeffed of in England, unless it be that of appointing an UnderSheriff, with this limitation, that he fhall be an Advocate of fo many years standing. And I wish we had the fame regulation in England. I should be glad to fee it enafted, that his Majesty should have the appointment of the Under-Sheriff in every county in England, with this limitation, that he fhould be a Gentleman of fo many years ftanding at the bar: our Under-Sheriffs would then be all Gentlemen of rank and character, and confequently not fo tally tempted to play tricks either at elections, or in their judicial capacity, as thofe little attorneys that are now ufually appointed; for, with regard to any poft or office whatever, the belt method we can take for having it justly and duly executed, is to have it filled with a Gentleman of rank and character, and of fome fortane in his country.

Ifhall not enter into the difpute, Sir, whether the jurifdictive power was originally by our conftitution lodged in the King folcly, or jointly in King and parBament? but whatever it was originally, we have, by the experience of many ages, found, that it is the best way to leave to the crown the nomination of most of our

judges, both fuperior and inferior, with the refervation of an appeal from the inferior to the fuperior, and from the fuperior to this houfe; and with the refervation likewife, that the parliament may inquire into, and cenfure or defeat the nomination of any judge, or fet of judges. Let this, which we have learned from fuch a long experience, be right or wrong, I am fure the nomination ought not to be lodged hereditarily in the families of any fubjects; because, as I have before obferved, it creates fo many petty and arbitrary fovereigns; and if it were to be lodged in the choice of the people, I am afraid that choice would much oftener fall on a merry fellow, or a drunken companion, than upon a man of real merit or capacity. I must therefore ftill think it the belt method to leave the nomination to the crown; and whatever is faid to belong to the crown, muft, by our conftitution, be fuppofed to belong to King and parliament, because the King is fuppofed to do every thing by the advice and with the confent of parliament, which must always be prefumed, till the parliament itself declares its difapprobation.

That the paffing of this bill, Sir, or his Majefty's giving it his affent, fhould alienate from him the affections of many of his fubjects, is a phantom ftill more imaginary than the former. To redeem multitudes of people in Scotland from the flavery they are kept under by these lords of hereditary jurifdictions; to render them free fubjects of G. Britain, inftead of being the property of their respective lords, as thefe lords themfelves were pleased to call them at the time of the union, cannot furely be fuppofed to alienate the affections of those who are thus redeemed. And with refpect to their now lords and mafters, if they have any love for mankind, or their country, they will rejoice to fee fo many of their fellow-creatures fet at liberty; they will think themfelves highly obliged to his Majefty, for adding fo many good fubjects to their country. If, on the other hand, they are fuch as love oppreffion, and fuch as would rather fee their country ruined, than find themselves deprived of the power to opprefs, fuch, indeed, may have a refentment at this bill's

being paffed into a law; but the affection of fuch men his Majelty never courted, I am fure he never will; and the lefs any King does, the more he may despise their refentment.

How the paffing of this bill can affect any of the noble or great families in England, is, Sir, what I cannot comprehend. Some of them may be poffeffed hereditarily of offices, privileges, or jurifdictions; but then, they are fuch as cannot enable them to opprefs their neighbours, nor can they ever be of dangerous confequence to the publick peace. If there were any fuch in England, they ought to be abolished; and therefore this bill, instead of being a dangerous, would be an useful precedent, because it would ferve as a precedent for establishing the liberty of the subject and the peace of fociety in England as well as Scotland; and if there be a man in England, who would take it amifs to find himself divested of the power to opprefs his neighbours, or disturb the publick tranquillity, I will fay the fame thing of him as I have faid of fuch men in Scotland: his good-will ought never to be courted; his refentment will, I hope, be always defpifed.

Now, Sir, with regard to what has been faid by way of anfwer to the arguments made use of in favour of this bill, I have fhewn, that what is propofed by this bill cannot in any fenfe be looked on as a breach of any of the articles of the union; that it will relieve multitudes of people in Scotland from many inconveniences and grievances they now labour under; and that it cannot be taken amifs even by the lords of hereditary jurifdictions themfelves, if they have any regard for the good of their country to which I must add, that I hope care will be taken to appoint fuch Sheriffs and Under-Sheriffs, in purfuance of this new regulation, as will make the people of Scotland fenfible of the benefits intended them; therefore this is not only a good beginning towards rendering the laws the fame in both parts of the kingdom, but fuch a beginning as will make the people of Scotland fee, that the profecution of this defign will be for their utility, and confequently no incroachment upon any one article of the union. But

fuppofe our ministers should not take ca to have proper Sheriffs and Under-Sh riffs appointed, could this be any object on to paffing the bill? We intend the fhould: this intention is right, therefo ought to be agreed to; and if they negle we may punish them for their negligene As to what has been faid, Sir, relati to the balance of power, no one ever pofed that the military power of the g vernment in Scotland is not now great than it was before the privy council w abolished; but will any one fay, the ci power of the government in Scotland now as great as it was while they had a pr vy council there? The power of that cou was fuperior to all hereditary jurisdiction they could call before them and punish ven the lord himself of the highest hered tary jurifdiction, as well as any man the pleafed within his jurifdiction. Have t courts now fubfifting in Scotland any fuc power? No, Sir; on the contrary, t people within fome of thefe jurifdiction are in moft cafes exempted from the juri diction both of the court of feffion an court of jufticiary. Again, whilft the pr vy council fubfifted in Scotland, it had power to call upon the poffe comitatus any neighbouring county or counties, fee their fentence or process executed but no civil court in Scotland has now ny fuch power: and if the sentence procefs of the court of feffion or court jufticiary is to be executed against an b ritable Sheriff in his own county, how c it be carried into execution, if he be folved to ftand upon his defence? No wa Sir, but by the military power; that is fay, by the afliftance of our regular troop and I am, every man ought to be form as often as he hears of their being emplo ed to affift the civil power, because it i ftep towards military government. The fore, to prevent its being neceffary for to make too many steps of this kind, us abolifh thofe jurifdictions in Scotlan which, if they remain, must often bri us under that neceffity.

Laftly, Sir, as to the freedom and h piness of the people in Scotland, it is i poffible to fuppofe, that fuch of them are fubjected to hereditary jurifdiction can enjoy the fame freedom and happin

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