Wittgenstein's Metaphysics

Cover
Cambridge University Press, 28.01.1994 - 350 Seiten
Wittgenstein's Metaphysics offers a radical new interpretation of the fundamental ideas of Ludwig Wittgenstein. It takes issue with the conventional view that after 1930 Wittgenstein rejected the philosophy of the Tractatus and developed a wholly new conception of philosophy. By tracing the evolution of Wittgenstein's ideas, Cook shows that they are neither as original nor as difficult as is often supposed. Wittgenstein was essentially an empiricist, and the difference between his early views (as set forth in the Tractatus) and the later views (as expounded in the Philosophical Investigations) lies chiefly in the fact that after 1930 he replaced his early version of reductionism with a subtler version. So he ended where he began, as an empiricist armed with a theory of meaning. This iconoclastic interpretation is sure to influence all future study of Wittgenstein and will provoke a reassessment of the nature of his contribution to philosophy.
 

Ausgewählte Seiten

Inhalt

Wittgensteins Phenomenalism
85
A New Philosophical Method
101
Wittgensteins Behaviorism
119
Wittgenstein and Kohler
135
Hume on Causation
155
Wittgensteins Humean View of Causation
174
The Problem of Induction
195
Logical Possibilities and Philosophical Method
207
The Search for a Phenomenalists Theory of Knowledge
221
Wittgensteins Analysis of Mental States and Powers
269
Following A Rule
286
The Private Language Argument
316
Names of Sensations and the Use Theory of Meaning
335
Name Index
343
Urheberrecht

Andere Ausgaben - Alle anzeigen

Häufige Begriffe und Wortgruppen

Bibliografische Informationen