contending parties in France, and eagerly circulated by those which fought under somewhat similar designations in this country. Great pains have been taken by our conservative party to trace the calamity of the late revolution to the establishment of representative government in France; and to show the incompatibility of freedom there, as elsewhere, with quiet submission to laws. They palliate the Ordinances of Charles X. as an imprudence into which the Court was driven by the continued aggressions of conspiring Liberals, or defend them as a paternal exertion of legitimate and well-intentioned despotism, frustrated unhappily by an absence of proper precaution on the part of the ministers, and by the outrageous turbulence of a capricious populace, incapable of appreciating the beneficence which lurked beneath the assumption of arbitrary power. The fanatical friends of Liberty have equally distorted the matter by their exaggerations. They represent the government of the Bourbons as from the very first unpopular, on account of the hereditary hatred borne by the people to the family of their ancient rulers, as established by the bayonets of the Allies, despite the longings of the nation for the popular sway of their chosen Napoleon, or the imagined blessings of a Republic, and as imposing a yoke of the most grinding tyranny on its conquered subjects. Far different views of the real situation of the French nation under the late dynasty, and of the causes of the revolution which overturned its dominion, will result from a careful investigation of events. Happily the publicity of representative government has prevented facts from being entirely obscured by the cotemporary frauds and passions which pervert the judgments of the careless: and it is quite in the power of any honest inquirer to obtain for himself by a little pains a simple and satisfactory explanation of events which are apt at first to appear obscure or anomalous. The restoration of the Bourbons, though not brought about by any unanimous expression of national desire, was accepted with very general satisfaction, and enjoyed a great popularity: their government secured a degree of tranquillity and practical freedom which the French had never before enjoyed; and it promoted, or, what is the same thing, allowed, an unparalleled improvement in the moral and material condition of the country. Its fall, nevertheless, is not to be attributed to unjustifiable popular caprice. The discontent against the Bourbons was just and general: it is to be attributed solely to the folly and oppression of their misrule, and the practical misery which it inflicted on the people at large.

It is easy to reconcile the merits of the fallen dynasty with the faults which occasioned its overthrow, to show that it was the best government which France ever had, and at the same time that its

further existence was incompatible with the welfare of the people. The Bourbon family reascended the throne of France with two conditions of peculiar fitness-its legitimacy, and its compatibility with constitutional government. Its descent from the ancient line of kings gave it an apparent title to royalty, which, weak as it was, was the only one that could be set against that of the deposed Emperor: and it conciliated the confidence of the European monarchs, in whose hands the fate of France was in some measure placed. The people were relieved from the pressure of foreign wars, and the conflict of the partisans of various forms of internal government. The Charter at the same time guaranteed to the people a certain share in the government, and the maintenance of the institutions which owed their origin to the Revolution. As long, and in as much as the Bourbons respected the Charter and the Revolution, their government was good and popular, and secured to the people the blessings of peace, tranquillity, and freedom. By their misconduct they marred both the happiness of their subjects and the advantages of their own position. They excited national discontent by their hostility to the constitutional restrictions on their authority, and their attempts to restore the institutions and manners which the Revolution had effaced, and the people hated; and this discontent dated from the very period of their restoration, because their misrule was simultaneous with their possession of power. The constitution was not sufficient to protect the people from various kinds of misgovernment, which inflicted excessive and general vexation: and to that extent the government of the Bourbons was oppressive and justly odious. To many of the designs of the Court the Charter enabled the people to oppose a successful legal resistance, and the government in consequence turned its hostility against the Constitution, and sought by various devices to narrow the protection which it afforded against encroachments. The last act of Charles X. was calculated to deprive the people of every guarantee for the continuance of such a degree of good government as had previously been enjoyed. There was no mystery either in the restoration or the expulsion of the Bourbons. The people recalled them because it trusted to their governing well. They had the folly to deceive these hopes. The people murmured at their misgovernment; bore it long in hopes of a change for the better; and finally shook off their authority when it had ceased to be in any degree compatible with a continuance of the benefits it had previously assured.

M. Lacretelle is well known by his writings on various periods of the history of his country. Gifted with a style, which, in spite of frequent pomposity and sentimentalism, is in general clear and

elegant, he has given an interesting and connected narrative of the events of the Restoration. A royalist by feeling, he is known to have advocated a strict fidelity to the Charter, as the most prudent and dignified course for the legitimate race; and to have drawn on himself the vengeance of its more bigoted partizans by his opposition to their unconstitutional tenets and acts. As a mere narrative, or as an exposition of the feelings of the class of royalists to which he belongs, his work is valuable: the reader who desires to arrive at the causes and connection of the various acts which it details, will find in it only information of the shallowest kind. A profound and accurate view M. Lacretelle is too careless, and far too little of a philosopher, to be enabled to impart.

The work of the anonymous 'Homme d'Etat' is much more interesting, and contains a more elaborate and a sounder view of events. The name of History is one, indeed, to which it has few pretensions: the narrative is too diffuse, too imperfect, to entitle it to any character save that of a species of contemporary memoirs, of which the reflections and anecdotes will afford useful materials to a future historian. A very general rumour has ascribed it to M. Decazes: the internal evidence, though not decisive against this supposition, on the whole appears somewhat incompatible with it. The writer is, however, no doubt what he professes himself to be a man of high station, and one who has played a leading part in the politics of the first years of the Restoration. Of the ministers who managed the affairs of the country at that period he professes himself a warm admirer: the work, indeed, seems undertaken chiefly for the purpose of obtaining from the public a just appreciation of their merits, which he sets in invidious contrast with the faults committed by their old opponents, the Liberals, during their occupation of the government since the Revolution of July. To the order of things established at the Restoration he professes himself attached. He entertained, in common with the best friends of liberty, the hope of seeing the throne of the Bourbons united to the freedom and civilization of France. Nevertheless, no man can show less sympathy with their errors. For their feudal and fanatical follies he throughout marks the greatest contempt and aversion; and if he exhibits an indulgence for the character of Louis XVIII., which, indeed, we cannot think wholly undeserved, he is unsparing in his exposure of the follies of his race, and the creatures by which it was surrounded. On the whole, his work presents a very laboured, clear and dispassionate view of the character of the restored dynasty, and of the causes which brought about its expulsion. In spite of the general carelessness of the style, the slipslop affectation of particular passages, and the profusion of that cant jargon which ren

ders the present language of French politics a singularly efficient instrument for disguising the want of thought, we should recommend this work as both interesting and instructive, were it not for its extreme length. Of the four volumes already published, one is nearly filled with introductory matter: the other three contain the history of two years and a half, closing with the ordonnance of September, 1816. The promised remainder is to bring down the work to the Revolution of July, 1830, a period which, at the same rate of dilation, would require fifteen more volumes. We doubt whether a conscientious reviewer can recommend the enterprize of such a study to men whose life is limited to threescore and ten years.

It is, however, exceedingly instructive to follow the author in his minute and extensive inquiries into the circumstances that gave to the Restoration its peculiar character. He commences these from a very early date-from the state of things preceding the great Revolution-and describes the character of the nobles who composed and the princes who led the emigration. The character of the Bourbons is the same throughout: the same unmeasured and inflexible pretensions, the same utter ignorance of their age, the same obstinate resistance to the counsels of prudence, the same deficiency in energy and skill in the execution of their plans, drove them from the throne, prolonged their exile, and has ultimately frustrated their restoration. It were enough, indeed, to observe their conduct in exile to convince us of their unfitness to govern France. The first step of the two princes who subsequently composed the restored dynasty was that insane emigration which rendered the continuance of their unhappy brother's reign impossible. They then sounded the tocsin over feudal and bigoted Europe for a war of extermination against their country. They appeared in arms among the invaders, and echoed, or rather prompted, the Duke of Brunswick's threats of totally undoing the work of the Revolution, partitioning France, and punishing as a rebel every Frenchman who dared to defend himself. When the support of foreign bayonets failed them, they speculated on operating a counter-revolution, "pure et simple," by the agency of civil war; attempted to lead the Gironde insurrection with the Drapeau Blanc; availed themselves of the support of Toulon to betray its arsenals to the English; fomented the resistance of the priest-led peasantry of La Vendee, and leagued with the Chouans of Brittany. All these attempts failed; the Revolution, in spite of its crimes and terrors, was dear to France; and the Bourbons sacrificed every chance of success by proclaiming their intention of re-establishing the ancient order of things, and of graciously pardoning the Revolution as a crime.

A hope of effecting their return by more peaceful means was inspired by the reaction which followed the fall of Robespierre. A strong feeling prevailed during that time in favour of a recall of the royal family-a feeling no longer confined to a few remote portions of the country, or lurking in the recesses of the old chateaux and the hiding-places of the proscribed priests. Royalist opinions were openly avowed in the representative body, and derived additional strength from every election. Prostrated by military force on the 18th Vendemiaire, the royalist party reared its head again, and professing more moderate and prudent designs, greatly augmented its numbers by uniting with the constitutional party. An attempt to effect the defection of the army under Pichegru was defeated by the folly of the Prince de Condé. Nevertheless, the opinion in favour of a constitutional monarchy acquired a rapid and solid growth, Louis XVIII., the only one of his race who ever profited by experience, saw the necessity of submitting to "transiger avec la Revolution," and signified his consent to a constitutional restoration. The party of the Clichistes counted in its ranks the most popular leaders of the sections, the majority of the legislative councils, a portion of the ministry, and even two of the directors. It was supported by an active periodical press, and if not warmly aided by the enthusiasm of the nation, was backed by the universal discontent against the misgovernment of the Directory. The ambition of Bonaparte detected the strength and designs of the royalists, and the republican army completely destroyed their party by the movement of the 18th Fructidor. It is, perhaps, to be regretted that the Restoration was not operated at this period. It might have been stable-it presented many chances of good government. At that period any attempt to renew the old régime would hardly have been dared, and would most assuredly have been defeated; and even the Bourbons might have been reconciled to exercise their authority on the only terms on which they would have been allowed to possess it.

The blow of the 18th Fructidor was complete: in the subsequent struggles of the Republicans and the Directory, the royalist party never ventured to show its head. The attempts of Louis were confined to vain efforts to obtain the crown from the indolence of Barras and the magnanimity of Bonaparte. But the ambition of Napoleon was proportioned to his power: he had destroyed the liberties of his country for his own benefit, not for that of a family whom his whole education led him to despise. It became obvious that during the existence of his power the return of the Bourbons was not to be expected: the republicans beheld the same insuperable obstacles opposed to the fulfilment