AN accurate estimate and forecast of Russian tendencies are matters of the greatest possible importance for German policy. We must, therefore, endeavor to have a glance behind the iron curtain which separates us from the future. To attempt this is to assume a weighty responsibility. It is especially difficult on account of the prevailing chaotic conditions. A man should attempt it only with the greatest caution.

The Bolshevik Government seems incapable of surviving, and it is approaching its overthrow at a rapid pace. The food situation is becoming increasingly unendurable and less promising. The whole commercial life of the country is coming to a full stop. All classes of the people are suffering more and more intensely in the midst of universal misery. When the Bolsheviki assert that they do not represent theories but interests, they reveal plainly enough the fact that they are no longer serving the interests of the working people as a whole, but only those of a new labor aristocracy. Under such conditions there is good reason why the masses should fall away from the movement. They will not remain loyal to it, and thus the so-called 'social' basis of the Socialist Government is growing constantly narrower and more insecure. While the number of defenders of the Soviet Government diminishes, the bitterness of its opponents and the dissatisfaction of the people at large increase.

One should not leave out of sight the fact that though the Red army continues to grow larger, at the same time

it is becoming less reliable. The reintroduction of compulsory service renders impossible the careful selection formerly practised, and the rule of picking out only workingmen for the Red army is no longer satisfactory, since the sentiment of the working people has swung in the other direction. This tendency is reinforced by the fact that the fighting itself results in the surviving of the men who are least loyal to the Soviet Government. No one wants to fight, and for that reason it is necessary to employ the troops that are most devoted to the Soviet Government. They must always be an inspiring example to the others, and always suffer the heaviest losses. Consequently, even in the Red army itself the ground is being prepared for a revolution, and the increasing difficulties experienced in supplying the army cooperate to strengthen this tendency.

One might suppose, therefore, that the days of the Soviet Government were numbered, and that it could not hope to survive more than a few months at the utmost.

But it is hazardous to make such a prognosis so long as we do not know from what source the overturn is to come. No solid centre is yet visible round which the masses can rally to overthrow the Bolshevik rule. We do not yet catch the battle-cry which they would inscribe on their banner. The natural passivity of the Russian people creates a difficulty. They are still confused as to the meaning of the revolution. In talking with leading Russian statesmen of the bourgeois camp I have

often told them plainly that the Russian bourgeoisie had been beaten by the Bolsheviki, not only physically but also morally. For the Bolsheviki are the only people in Russia who have maintained a high degree of energy and decision throughout the revolution. This is the source of their strength; and to-day the weak and docile masses of the Russian nation still show subservience, even against their will.

The Bolsheviki have encountered the most determined opposition from the Russian peasants, and there is no red terror that can break the tough resistance of the peasant masses. Every Russian Government in the future will have to reckon first of all with the interests and needs of the peasantry in order to maintain its existence. That spells the doom of the Bolsheviki. As the party of the city proletariat, they are naturally opposed to the peasantry, and this opposition has been accentuated beyond remedy by a number of short-sighted measures. However, the peasants themselves cannot lead a campaign against the Soviet Government. Only the educated bourgeoisie can do that.

I have already explained fully how the old bourgeois parties have disintegrated and declined and that there is no organization existing at present which can take up the battle with the Soviet Government. Irreparable confusion and disintegration is still evident in public opinion, and any new unity is the more difficult to obtain because all the newspapers and agencies permitting an interchange of public views, except those endorsing the Bolsheviki, have been suppressed. The bourgeoisie is still intimidated, despairing, and resigned. It makes no difference whether one questions the public men of Russia or the leaders in other fields of interest, one hears but the same reply unless we have help from abroad, we

shall not be able to shake off the Bolsheviki yoke. After hoping in turn for the aid of the Germans, the CzechoSlovaks, and the Entente, Russian opinion is now to the effect that not until peace has been concluded, and a general force has intervened, is there a possibility of overthrowing the Soviet Government. One of the leaders of the Russian business world, who has since had to flee to escape the Bolsheviki and to save his life, was in such a despairing state of mind a few weeks ago that he told me that under present conditions it would be a misfortune for the Bolsheviki to be overturned or to resign voluntarily. He thought that even worse things might happen, because it was not beyond the range of possibility that the Bolsheviki would control one district, the cadets another, the social revolutionists a third, the monarchists a fourth and that the country would dissolve in an anarchy of local feuds.

Unless there is outside intervention, or unless the Russian bourgeoisie gathers itself together, complete anarchy. will indeed result, and tragic, hopeless ruin will be the inevitable lot of Russia. However, I am convinced of one thing, Bolshevism cannot survive even if it has no enemies. It will destroy itself shortly by its own policies and disappear from the face of the earth.

Although the Russians themselves must appreciate the situation better than I do, I cannot share their view that the Soviet Government can only be thrown out by intervention from outside the country. During the war and during the revolution it has been only too plain that all of us are deluded by the appearances of the moment, and hypnotized by the transient conditions that surround us, and think them certain to continue forever. The Russian revolution is only eighteen months old, and it has already produced radical, rapidly succeeding, transformations in

popular sentiment. At first everybody suddenly became enthusiastic over the social revolution. They were ardent supporters of Kerensky and the continuance of the war. A few months later all these social revolutionists had become Bolsheviki and no one would listen to any further talk of war. Kerensky has for a long time been a subject for universal contempt, and the supporters of the Bolsheviki are so few that they are able to maintain themselves only by the most frightful terroristic and dictatorial measures. Even before the first outbreak of the revolution, there were actually no organized powers in existence which were capable and resolute enough to overthrow the Tsar, but he was overthrown because the situation and desperation of the people, partly due to most contradictory reasons unexpectedly forced itself on public attention.

A prominent Russian public man told me that shortly before the February revolution he was going down the Nevsky Prospekt with a friend, and had referred to the hunger demonstration then occurring as harmless and insignificant. He noticed with what apparent zeal the Cossacks scattered the demonstrators who had assembled. But only a few days later the same Cossacks made common cause with the people they had been dispersing, and the Tsar's Government was a thing of the past. Nothing could show more plainly the uncertainty of popular sentiment. It does n't mean anything that the Red army captured Samara.

The October revolution which gave the Bolsheviki power was accomplished, like the February revolution, with very small forces. In this case, also, it succeeded merely because the masses of the people had become desperate on account of the inactivity and helplessness of the Kerensky Government.

The Russian revolution has hitherto

proceeded by great waves. Just now we are in the trough between the waves, and many think we always will remain there; but certain indications prove that a new wave is flowing toward us. The attitude of the masses still seems apathetic and resigned, but the sign may change with surprising suddenness.

The Soviet Government cannot continue, but as yet we cannot perceive the forces which will overthrow it. Those forces may be very weak, as they were in October, until the desperation of the masses stands behind them. Universal misery is narrowing the social basis of the Bolsheviki until they are hanging in the air, and it requires only a breath of wind to plunge them over.

Can we not make out the new government and its programme? The frightful misery that will spread over Russia this winter will, one would fancy, bring to the front a series of practical political and economic demands, around which a majority of the people will rally. The new government may not be organized from the old parties, but from a small group of resolute men who speak out at the proper time what all realize is necessary to be said.

The policy which Russia must follow in the future I will discuss at a later opportunity. I would merely say that when the Bolsheviki fall, not only their particular brand of Socialism, but Socialism in any form will have lost its power in Russia. In my letter of September 3 I discussed at length the reasons why the social revolutionary party is politically bankrupt. It still retains only a few remnants of its former splendor. On the 27th of August I explained the weakness and passivity of the Menscheviki. It is but superstition to suppose that a mere social revolutionary era is going to succeed the Bolshevik era in Russia. The fu

ture control of Russia will not belong to Socialists of any stamp, but to a Russian bourgeoisie, disciplined and instructed by the revolution.

One other prophecy. Will the future government of Russia be hostile to Germany? That depends just now very largely on Germany itself. After having abundant opportunity to become thoroughly informed as to the

The Berliner Tageblatt

views and sentiments of controlling influences in Russia, I can say that Germany is still in a position to wipe out the memory of its past faults by a wise and friendly policy, and that it can win new sympathy in Russia. In any case, a new government in Russia whatever it may be, will have more important business on hand than attacking Germany.

THERE is a well-known firm in Bombay which is said at one time to have had in its private telegraphic code a word which meant 'I did not ask you whether you could, but how you would.' The spirit, though not perhaps the temper, that led to the codification of this businesslike retort must be read into the request for criticism that concludes Lord Chelmsford and Mr. Montagu's Report on Indian Constitutional Reforms. We may criticize details, but the main principle on which the report is founded is not to be impeached.

That principle is of course contained in Mr. Montagu's so-called 'Pronouncement' of the 20th of August, 1917, the keynote of which is that the policy of His Majesty's Government is the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realization of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire.' This statement is immune from criticism because it constitutes a promise by the nation to

the peoples of India that is as binding as any promise can be. True, it was in form only an answer to a question: it referred to a subject which had not been discussed in Parliament, still less in the country; it was made towards the end of a long session when all the attention of the country was closely devoted to matters of even greater importance than the welfare of the Indian Empire. And yet, though it was the 'most momentous utterance ever made in India's checkered history,' and initiates 'the plan of one of the greatest political experiments ever undertaken in the world's history,' Mr. Montagu's word has settled the whole matter irrevocably. The authors of the report have explained very clearly how resolutions of Parliament cannot bind a government. Yet Mr. Montagu's single word has bound the country. Mr. Curtis, who may fairly be associated with Mr. Montagu in this matter, tells us that 'it was tacitly accepted by the House of Commons and the House of Lords. Its announce

ment to Parliament without provoking a vote of censure is equivalent to its acceptance by the Imperial Parliament and electorate.' The British Constitution is very elastic, especially in war-time; but is it elastic enough to enable us to deal a blow at Parliamentary government in England while preparing the way for responsible government in India? According to all precedent Mr. Montagu's 'Pronouncement' bound no one outside the Government, and was at least as far from being a national promise as are the contents of a King's speech. I do not suggest that it is practically possible to act up to the letter of this rule; for by representing his own words as a national promise throughout India, Mr. Montagu has in fact given them a weight to which they were not entitled, and has created expectations, some of which will certainly not be realized. I hope that politicians may find means of showing that Mr. Montagu did not speak for the nation, without laying us open to an accusation of a breach of that faith which he has tried so hard to pledge. But what I am more immediately concerned with is that I do not consider the principle of the 'Pronouncement' free from criticism, and that I believe the more the report is studied the more will it appear that it is wholly mistaken. The scheme propounded is of course a transitional one, and it cannot be expected to be logical or complete. But if it breaks down, as I suggest it does, at its most critical points, that is surely a sign that the principle on which it is framed is defective.

Before noticing those details, however, and their bearing on the principles on which they are based, I must, though very shortly, say something of the material out of which the authors of the report hope to construct the foundations of the kind of government

that we are familiar with in Canada and Australia. The great mass of the people, most optimistically reckoned at only 95 per cent of the whole, are poor, ignorant, and helpless, far beyond the standard of Europe; they do not ask for responsible government and are not fitted for it. They are slow to complain and prefer to suffer rather than have the trouble of resisting; they are poorly equipped for politics and do not at present wish to take part in them. Till the ryot, who practically constitutes the great masses, has learned how to use a vote for his own benefit-it sounds like teaching a Suffolk laborer the right use of a family idol he will be exposed to the risk of oppression by people who are stronger and richer than he is; but meanwhile he will have the help of officials, candidates, those of the educated classes who resent the charge that they have looked after their own interests rather than his, and lastly of means that 'we' must retain in our own hands for helping him. Above him are the 'landed aristocracy,' the larger zamindars as they may be less inaptly called, who, mainly under the 'pressure of events,' will learn that political life

that is, the hustings and the ballot box-need not impair their dignity and self-respect. This will show them how to organize, argue, and make speeches, or get others to do so. Then come the 'smaller gentry,' the lesser zamindars, who are to be the chief agents for the spread of responsible government, with the help of 'the politically-minded' and intelligenzia, the lawyers, money lenders, and so forth. I think it is these two classes that will supply the oppressors of the ryots.

Such nearly in the words of the report is the condition of the people we have to train to responsible government, and I suggest it presents a pic