I

PRINCE MAX'S STATEMENT

[EDITORIAL NOTE: The late Imperial Chancellor, Prince Max of Baden, intended to render an account of his conduct of the Imperial administration in the Upper Chamber of the Parliament of Baden. He cannot carry out this plan, because the Parliament will not be summoned again. Under these circumstances the Prince has permitted the publication of his proposed address in the Preussische Jährbucher.]

I FEEL that I ought to render an account of what occurred during the historical weeks that lie immediately behind us, while I was responsible for the direction of the Imperial Government. Such an accounting must be made to the whole German nation, but above all, to the people of Baden, for I know how many of my fellow countryfellow countrymen are burdened with the painful question: Did a son of our own homeland possibly have it in his power to save the German nation from the indescribable suffering that it is now enduring? You can well imagine that I have asked myself this question day and night. I wish to answer it here as I have answered it to my own conscience.

When I was summoned to Berlin I already knew the seriousness of the

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situation. Our offensive had failed. The enemy was advancing victoriously. The war was lost. The only thing to be attained was to rescue our people from worse consequences. I saw one small way to escape, which must be tried. To be sure, chauvinist passion controlled public sentiment in all the hostile countries. The men who hated Germany most held the reins of government in England and France. The war had become a war of vengeance. But there were strong influences working in another direction, and those seem to have found a powerful leader in President Wilson. The working people of both England and France endorsed Wilson's programme. In England, above all, influential circles existed, who believed that the honor of their nation demanded that it should be just to its enemy. To these people a League of Nations seemed the great immediate object of the war and the only hope for the restoration of human weal. That was likewise my faith a faith to which I had endeavored to give testimony by word and act throughout the war. My name was associated with conciliation. I undertook to form a ministry constituted, so far as possible, of men whose humane sentiments were equally well known and trusted.

President Wilson himself demanded increasing constitutional guarantees for the permanence and the genuineness of the Democratic system. After his first two notes we received reliable information that he would consider it a real guarantee, corresponding to the demands of the German Reichstag majority, if the power of the Kaiser were reduced to that of the King of England. But, on account of the threatening growth of Republican chauvinist sentiment shortly before the election, he injected the question of the Kaiser's abdication into public discussion. He was no longer satisfied with being convinced personally of our sincerity. But he wished to show a sensational victory for his diplomacy in order to control the chauvinism in his own country.

The effect of the armistice tender upon the Central Powers was, if possible, still more ruinous. It precipitated separate action by our Allies. All the considerations that conscience and loyalty demanded were cast aside as soon as their friend was found to be powerless. Our own people were seized with despair and impatience.

We experienced a complete moral collapse. To be sure, we were forced to admit to ourselves after Austria's defection that further resistance gave no promise of success; but we should at least have impressed upon the enemy the possibility that there were demands against which we would fight even though our cause was hopeless. This was the advice that friendly neutrals repeatedly gave us: Do not deprive the friends of peace in the countries hostile to you of their last effective argument in other words, that there are limits to German concessions.

German national pride was undermined. It were a miracle had it been otherwise after the nameless sufferings and disappointments of four years of warfare and the misuse that had been

made of our patriotism for improper ends. Indeed, this miracle did occur among our soldiers in the field. To be sure, disorganization and despair appeared even among them, but in the crisis there were always heroes among our soldiers and officers, who led forlorn hopes as bravely as in the days of our victory, because they knew that everything depended upon keeping the enemy out of our own territory until the armistice was signed. Many of these heroes did not live to see the armistice. Although we may be able to explain so satisfactorily what happened back home, our gratitude to these dead heroes will always contain an element of painful humiliation.

I will now try to point out the rocks upon which our domestic policy was shipwrecked just as we thought we had entered the harbor safely.

We succeeded in erecting a civil government with complete authority. The legislative reforms which were carried out were not in themselves the most important factors in this transformation. We deprived irresponsible and oppressive masters of their authority. We were making rapid progress in abolishing the illegal dictation that competed with the government itself. Those that did not yield voluntarily were thrust aside. At the first direct conflict of authority General Ludendorff yielded. At the second he resigned. Much remained to be done, but the time was very short.

Thereupon the abdication question was broached by President Wilson. I considered it my duty to keep the Kaiser continually informed of the national and international significance of his abdication. In my opinion, only his voluntary retirement would save the Empire from serious disaster. We must not misinterpret the Kaiser's hesitation. There were powerful influences at work trying to convince him

that his abdication would be the signal for the dispersion of the army in the field.

As I saw the danger of civil war approaching after the events in Kiel, I sought an interview with Representative Ebert on Thursday, and informed him that I proposed to visit headquarters that same evening. He promised to do all in his power to have his party and the people at large await the results of my visit. However, the same evening Messrs. Scheidemann and Ebert brought me an ultimatum of the Social Democrats, which forced me to hand in my resignation. For that ultimatum implied the defeat of my policy, which was not to force but to persuade. You will spare me the task of detailing all the steps which I took after requesting to be relieved of office. They all had but a single purpose to insure that the revolution, which had become inevitable, should not be accompanied by civil war.

I do not wish to pass judgment upon those who brought about the revolution and supported it. I believe to-day that the popular will might have been realized without violence through a constitutional convention. The latter had become inevitable after the collapse of Austria. I cannot free myself from the thought that perhaps our workers and soldiers would have been patient for twenty-four hours more, if their own leaders had made the necessity of maintaining intact the front at home as clear to them as it was to the soldiers in the field that they must maintain intact the front opposed to the hostile armies. If that had happened, we should not have had the collapse of the government a day before the armistice was signed.

The revolution is now irrevocable. A tremendous responsibility rests in the hands of the new administration. It can rescue us, or it can destroy us as a nation.

I have learned to know Imperial Chancellor Ebert as a man of the purest intention, who is conscientiously convinced that Germany can meet its international obligations only as a united people. The government may preserve us from civil war if it is true to Democratic principles, and its first and immediate duty is to provide a legal foundation for its authority by calling a constitutional convention. The German nation will not tolerate usurped authority. The people freed themselves from the dictatorship of Ludendorff when they created a popular government on October 3. They will not tolerate another dictatorship by a minority group. But it would be a disgrace for Germany if the enemy, which will deal only with a legally constituted German government, should be obliged to compel us to call a constitutional convention.

The government should not let the initiative in this matter be taken from its hands. If it follows Democratic precepts, it may rest assured that support will flow to it from every camp to aid it in its superhuman task.

External discipline has broken down. But there remain universal loyalty to our own people and that voluntary selfdiscipline which springs from such loyalty. This loyalty is the only thing that has saved us from hostile invasion in the West. It is the only thing that can save us again from civil war, anarchy, and the temptation to become brutes.

There is still another demand that we must make of the government at this hour. We can no longer think of armed resistance to the conditions imposed by the enemy. But there is such a thing as moral resistance to injustice, and those who in the past have opposed Germany's injustice to its enemies, should be the first to oppose such injustice to Germany itself. Our foes should