covenant which is sealed in the Saviour's blood. And here we are forcibly reminded of the language of Moses when sprinkling the people with blood: "Behold the blood of the covenant which the Lord hath made with you concerning all these words." Ex. xxiv, 8. This use of blood as a sign of a covenant between God and man originated in the institution of the Passover. Under the present dispensation the sprinkling of blood has been abolished, but the "cup," with the wine, which symbolizes the shed blood, that is, the sacrificial death of Christ, comes instead thereof as the sign of the new covenant. This cup none can properly use who have not entered into a covenant relation with God through Jesus Christ.

Returning to the narrative we read: "For as often as ye eat this bread and drink this cup, show ye the Lord's death till he come.” The Passover was statedly celebrated as a sign to "show" forth the deliverance of Israel from the hand of the destroying angel. (Ex. xiii, 8, 9.) So is the eucharist to show forth our deliverance through Christ's death. The above words are signally repugnant to any theory of Christ's actual presence in the sacrament. We can conceive of but two ways in which Christ may be present. First, spiritually, as he is always present with his people: "Lo! I am with you always." Second, in his human or bodily form, in which he is to appear but once more, and at the end of the world. If he is spiritually present in the supper, it is no more than he is in any other means of grace properly used. If he is actually present, in bodily form, it is in contradiction to those passages which confine his coming to the last day. But Paul here says, the eucharist is to show forth his death until his coming again, hence he cannot be actually and bodily present therein.

Neander puts the institution of the supper between the 32d and 33d verses of the 13th chapter of John. This is very appropriate to our view; for in the 33d verse Christ notifies his disciples of his intended departure in such form as precluded the supposition that he would be in any manner present with them. In this connection, therefore, the Supper is a rite very full of comfort to all who love his appearing.

1 Cor. x, 16 is claimed for the support of the actual presence theory. The particular point rested on is the word communion, κοινωνια.* The use of this word in the Scriptures does not warrant such a conclusion. The apostle here affirms that we are partakers of the body and blood of Christ; that is, of the crucified, not of the living Christ. The separation of the body and blood, in this passage, • But to sustain this view, this kowvwvia must be ex opere operato, and not by faith, but that is an absurdity.

refers to the sacrificial death of Christ; it would be grossly absurd to say κοινωνία του αἵματος, του σωματος in reference to the glorified humanity of Jesus. Communion with his glorified corporeality could not be expressed by such terms. Had this been the meaning of the apostle he would have said, κοινωνία του χριστου, or used terms still more direct.

The eucharist is a symbolical rite. The bread and wine are used separately to symbolize Christ's sacrificial death. But the symbolism does not stop here, as is too commonly supposed. The partaking of these elements by the communicant is also a symbolical act. By his reception of the elements he symbolizes an actual, personal participation in the vicarious merits of Christ's death. In this sense, and in this sense only, are we partakers of the body and blood of Christ. This fact sufficiently answers the objection that the mass of Protestants make the eucharist a cold memorial rite, and invests it with sublime moral significance. (1 Cor. xi, 27-29.) The apostle here enjoins upon communicants the duty of self-examination. The Church has always recognized this duty, and in some instances formally enjoined its observance as an essential prerequisite to communion. Its utility is beyond dispute. He further warns against eating and drinking unworthily; for he that does so "eateth and drinketh damnation (judgment) to himself." He that commemorates the death of Christ, and yet lives in sin, gives judgment against himself; he stands self-condemned. He professes by this act a participation in the atonement, and yet in his daily life denies the blood which bought him.

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He discerns not the Lord's body," the broken body; that is, the sacrificial death of Christ symbolized by the supper.

The weakness and sickness mentioned in verse 30 was the result of the excesses and abuses attending the celebration of the agape and the supper among the Corinthians, which Paul has already so warmly condemned.

Such is our view of the eucharist. It is a sign to "show forth Christ's death" in its vicarious, sacrificial character; a memorial of Christ as a sin-offering and sufficient propitiation, in which is founded the new covenant; in the participation of which sign we show forth also our actual participation in the merits of his death. It is a seal of the covenant. On the part of the communicant, it is a pledge of faithfulness to the conditions of the new covenant. On the part of the Founder, it is a constantly renewed pledge to every one who receives it by faith, that he is an object of divine regard, and to him the covenant shall be well-ordered and sure.

ART. IX.-WESLEY ANISM AND TAYLORISM-REPLY TO THE NEW ENGLANDER.

THE Synopsis of our January Quarterly contains a running comment of our own on a review of Dr. Taylor's theology contained in the New Englander for November 1859. In our comment we commend the article and commend Dr. Taylor; but we charge the reviewer with imagining an unreal originality in Dr. Taylor, and with misstating and misrepresenting Mr. Wesley's opinions in order to exalt Dr. Taylor at his expense. To this the reviewer furnishes, in the New Englander for May 1860, a "Reply," in which reply he repeats the misrepresentation, reinforces it with additions, and aggravates it with a pretended proof of its truth. We now, in reply, reaffirm and extend our original allegation. The reviewer did misstate and misrepresent Mr. Wesley; he has repeated and aggravated the offense; and the object was to exalt Dr. Taylor at his expense; and of all these allegations we are now ready to furnish the proof.

We shall in our reply consider, first, our allegation that Mr. Wesley is misrepresented; and second, the truthfulness of our statement, that certain points claimed as original with Dr. Taylor are contained in Wesleyan Theology.

I. Said we truly that Mr. Wesley is misrepresented?

The point in regard to which the misrepresentation is alleged is the necessity of sin to the divine system. Mr. Wesley's doctrine as we aver is, in substance, that the sin of Adam has, through the divine interposition, been made the occasion of a greater good to men than could have otherwise existed in the system inaugurated on earth. The doctrine which the reviewer attributes to him is this: Sin is the necessary means of the highest good of the universe. If these two propositions are identical in meaning, and intentionally identical, then Mr. Wesley's doctrine has been truly represented; if they essentially vary, our first charge of misrepresentation is just and true. And now for our proof both of the object and the nature of the misrepresentation.

The object of the reviewer's entire article is to make a favorable presentation of Dr. Taylor and his theology. On the mooted point, the object was to show that Dr. Edwards, Dr. Hopkins, and Dr. West were all inferior to Dr. Taylor in the clearness and truth of their views. They held substantially that sin is for the best good of the system of divine government. And not only they but Wesley, and Mr. Bledsoe, who "is in sympathy with Wesley," were quoted as holding the same inferior view. Touching the object by

us alleged, then, we think, there can be no dispute. The reviewer's purpose was to exalt Dr. Taylor at the expense of Mr. Wesley. And now for the "misrepresentation" itself.

Let our reader now take the sermon of Mr. Wesley on Romans v, 15, and they will find his statements; every syllable of which, so far as this discussion is concerned, we indorse and adopt, and which they will find, we think, truly represented in the following summary. Wesley first states his purpose, which is to vindicate God in permitting Adam's sin, not to prove its necessity. By Adam's fall, he argues, good is attained for our race, contingent or positive, far above what the course of mere nature without divine interposition could have afforded. We have gained a capacity for higher holiness and happiness both in earth and heaven. For if Adam had not sinned Christ had not died; and all the blessings of the atonement system, of Christian faith, hope, and love, would have been wanting. The sufferings and trials which his sin has introduced would never have existed to develop our graces and enable us to attain a higher probationary reward. Moreover, had not Adam sinned every man would, perhaps, have been put upon his individual probation, and would have undergone a greater risk, with no provided remedy, of being finally lost. And in his sermon on Gen. iii, 19, Wesley maintains that the atonement through Christ, consequent upon the sin of Adam, is "the noblest theme of all the children of God on earth;" "yea, even of angels and archangels and all the company of heaven." We think we have now said it all; we adopt it all; and yet in full consistency with it all we promptly reject the maxim that sin is the necessary means of the highest good of the universe. If this is so very mysterious to the innocence of our reviewer, let him weigh the following suggestions:

1. Our earth is not the whole "universe." Throughout his article the reviewer writes precisely as if the universe and our earth were commensurate or identical. But our race is not the entire amount of God's kingdom. The angels, at least, fell before the fall of man; and hell is more ancient than our human world. Man was not the first sinner even in Eden, nor the eating the fruit the first sin; for these were preceded by the tempter and the temptation. The predicate true of this speck of earth is not necessarily true of the universe. There may have been countless million times more sin before Adam than since Adam. And it does not follow because his individual sin, so late in the multifarious history of the universe, has been overruled by God to place men on a higher plane of advantage than the level of mere nature, that, therefore, the first introduction of sin into the universe, or its existence on the whole in the universe,

is for the best good, and necessary to the best good, of the great whole. Nay, for aught we can say, the very fact that the existence of sin is a disadvantage to the universe may be the ground of God's turning it into an unthanked occasion of good to our little sphere. At any rate, there is a wide difference between saying that Adam's particular sin was overruled to the best good of a particular sphere, and saying that all sin or the first introduction of sin is necessary to the best good of the universe. The reviewer's assertion that Mr. Wesley maintained the latter because he maintained the former is, therefore, a misrepresentation.

2. Mr. Wesley does not assert that sin in general is for the good even of our human race, but that, specifically, Adam's sin, as being less than the sins that would otherwise have existed, was best for the race. Had not Adam sinned, every man, placed on his individual probation without a Saviour, would have perhaps sinned and been damned. Adam's sin and its results are, therefore, better, because the amount of sin and damnation is less. The course of things which his sin initiated, by divine interposition, is better than the natural course of things under the relentless law of works. It is simply saying the less the sin the better. But for this reviewer to quote such statements as affirming the proposition that sin is primordially the necessary means of the best good of the universe, is a "misrepresentation."

3. To affirm that a particular sin is the necessary means in a given state of things of a particular highest good, is not the same as to affirm that sin is primordially necessary to the best good of the universe. Take an illustration. A profligate orphan child is taken up in the streets for theft, and the judge who sentences him to imprisonment, being struck with his abilities, takes him, after his release, and gives him an education. Thereby he is converted, becomes a minister, and is the means of "the highest good" to thousands by their salvation. Now, in the given state of things his theft was a necessary antecedent to this particular highest good. But to declare that such a proposition is equivalent to saying that primordially sin is necessary to the highest good of the universe is, we say, a misrepresentation. Equally a misrepresentation it is to charge such a proposition upon Mr. Wesley, because he affirmed that the particular sin of Adam was conditional to the particular highest good placed by God as sequent to it.

4. This view is confirmed by the fact that Wesley does not affirm that the final result is best for our entire race, or for a large majority. The good to the finally impenitent, being conditional, results in evil; being an aggravation, through their abuse of their "capacity," of